People v. Bennett CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/2/26 P. v. Bennett CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Yolo)

THE PEOPLE, C105208 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. CR2021- v. 2111, CR2023-0488, CR2024- 1951) DAVID HILL BENNETT, Defendant and Appellant.

The People charged defendant David Hill Bennett with carjacking, attempted carjacking, theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle, attempted theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle, resisting or obstructing a public officer, and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury. The trial court declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial, denied defendant’s motion to substitute appointed counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), found defendant incompetent to stand trial, and committed him to the Department of State Hospitals. (Pen. Code §§ 1368, 1370.) Defendant appealed from the order finding him incompetent to stand trial, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion. Finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of the Marsden motion, we will affirm the trial court’s order finding defendant incompetent to stand trial.

1 BACKGROUND In early 2023, while defendant was in custody on charges related to a carjacking (case No. CR2021-2111), his mental health decompensated and competency proceedings were initiated. During those proceedings, defendant attempted to escape, resulting in additional charges (case No. CR2023-0488). The trial court found defendant incompetent to stand trial, and nine months later declared him restored to competence. In mid-2024, as the criminal cases proceeded, defendant again decompensated and competency proceedings were initiated once more. During those competency proceedings, defendant assaulted correctional officers in jail (case No. CR2024-1951). The trial court again found defendant incompetent to stand trial. In mid-2025, the trial court declared defendant restored to competence and the second two cases were consolidated. After doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial was declared once again on July 16, 2025, and the trial court ordered reports evaluating his competency, defendant requested a Marsden hearing. During the Marsden hearing, the trial court gave defendant an opportunity to explain why he wanted substitute counsel, and then gave defense counsel an opportunity to respond. We organize defendant’s expressed concerns, and defense counsel’s responses, by topic for ease of reference. Defendant complained that his defense attorney and another person pressured him into doing a social history that he did not want to do; he said he did the social history because they threatened to report him to law enforcement and immigration if he did not. Defense counsel responded that they prepared the social history because defendant wanted the best outcome possible, and they used it to successfully argue for dismissal of a prior strike in case No. CR2021-2111. Defense counsel denied ever threatening to report defendant to law enforcement or immigration, noting that efforts had been made to connect defendant with an immigration attorney.

2 Defendant claimed the competency proceedings involved retaliation and also fraud when the state hospital gave him forms saying he was responsible to pay for his mental health treatment. Counsel denied retaliation and noted that the competency proceedings were initiated by the trial court, not defense counsel. Defense counsel said he had not previously heard about the hospital forms but he could work with defendant on that issue. Defendant alleged that defense counsel pressured him to take plea deals. Defense counsel replied that he had advised defendant to take a favorable plea deal but respected defendant’s choice not to take the deal. Defendant asserted that defense counsel failed to procure and share with defendant, and improperly excluded, audio and video evidence. Referring to the incident involving defendant’s assault on correctional officers in jail, defense counsel explained that there were jail videos of the incident, but he had confirmed there was no accompanying audio, and the lack of audio was consistent with his experience that the jail’s cameras recorded video but not audio. Defense counsel said he reviewed the video with defendant. Defendant further stated that he “spent money coming out of [defense counsel’s] pocket in order to access court,” that defense counsel tricked him into handing over property and owed him reimbursement, and that defense counsel and county counsel or others owed him reimbursement for fees he incurred in representing himself in civil proceedings. Defense counsel said he had added money to defendant’s commissary account because he knew defendant was away from family. Defense counsel also referenced a ledger of filing fees defendant had incurred while representing himself and that defendant had been reimbursed for some of those costs.

3 In addition, defendant claimed defense counsel filed false Pitchess1 motions, failed to comply with defendant’s letters that presented a defense, and made arguments with which defendant did not agree. During defense counsel’s opportunity to respond, he did not specifically address those assertions. Defendant also referenced other topics, such as the judge who previously declared doubt as to defendant’s competency, defendant’s self-represented civil cases, the fact that charges were brought against him for the in- custody incidents, and the jail. The trial court asked defendant what else he wanted the court to know. Defendant claimed counsel had mixed up the cases; that with regard to the video, “the escape” was a different situation; that there was insufficient evidence to convict him; that counsel was not responding to his letters; and that defendant came up with defenses counsel agreed to present. Defendant added that he was a victim of human trafficking during his in-custody incidents “because our jail systems are blanketed with surveillance cameras,” the lack of missing audio and body camera footage was suspicious, and he was mistreated at the hospital. The trial court reminded defendant that the relevant issue pertained to his attorney. Defendant responded that defense counsel failed to provide him with video, audio, and cell phones. The trial court referenced defense counsel’s representation that there was no audio from the jail, then asked defense counsel to respond to defendant’s allegation about missing cell phone information. Defense counsel said defendant had claimed cell phone video was taken of him at the state hospital; defense counsel requested any such video and followed up on the request, but did not receive any video and thought there was a decent possibility it might not exist. When defense counsel added that he had, at various times, shown defendant the footage he had obtained relating to defendant’s escape and 1 Pitchess v . Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

4 assault charges, defendant interrupted, saying he had been talking about different cell phones. The trial court asked defendant to stop interrupting. When defense counsel finished his response, the trial court said it had heard enough. Defendant continued to talk, but the trial court noted that defendant had been given an opportunity to speak for nearly 30 minutes. The trial court denied the Marsden motion. The trial court subsequently found defendant incompetent to stand trial, suspended criminal proceedings as to all three cases, and ordered defendant committed to the Department of State Hospitals. DISCUSSION Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion. He claims he made a compelling showing of irreconcilable conflict, and the trial court did not sufficiently inquire into the instances of counsel’s alleged inadequacy. “Marsden motions are subject to the following well-established rules. ‘ “ ‘When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085.) “Depending on the nature of the grievances related by defendant, it may be necessary for the court also to question his attorney.” (People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 753.) “ ‘ “ ‘A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].’ [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.] Denials of Marsden motions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Denial ‘is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would “substantially impair” the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Barnett, at p. 1085.)

5 Defendant argues defense counsel’s attempt to convince him to take a plea deal, and failure to respond to defendant’s letters, show an irreconcilable conflict. However, guidance to take a plea deal is not a ground for change of counsel unless it falls outside “ ‘the range of reasonable competence under the circumstances.’ ” (U.S. v. Rogers (9th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 1418, 1424.) Moreover, a complaint of insufficient communication is not a ground for change of counsel unless it “ ‘ “prevent[s] an adequate defense.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 606.) Here, the record contains no indication that defense counsel’s recommendation to take the plea deal fell below the range of reasonable competence. As for communication, the record shows many examples of counsel’s responsive communication with defendant. Defense counsel explained why the audio footage defendant requested did not exist, presented plea deals to him, helped him with his self-represented civil cases, and agreed to present arguments that defendant originated. In addition, defense counsel pursued defendant’s requests for cell phone footage, made efforts to connect defendant with an immigration attorney, helped defendant obtain reimbursement for some of his self-represented civil filing fees, and reviewed with defendant the available video footage. The record does not establish an irreconcilable conflict. As for defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to sufficiently inquire into instances of counsel’s alleged inadequacy, it is true that defense counsel did not specifically address every concern mentioned by defendant. But in upholding the denial of a Marsden motion in People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 91-92, 95-96, the California Supreme Court explained that the record demonstrated that the trial court gave the defendant ample opportunity to detail his concerns and state the grounds for his motion, and the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that counsel’s representation was adequate and that there was no irreconcilable conflict. There was no basis to conclude that the trial court failed to conduct a proper Marsden inquiry or abused its discretion in declining to substitute counsel. (Id. at p. 96.)

6 Here, the record establishes that the trial court gave defendant almost 30 minutes to detail his concerns, asking him twice to articulate why counsel should be substituted. Defense counsel responded by describing his efforts to address defendant’s requests and concerns, and to provide guidance and advice. He denied retaliation or threats against defendant. The trial court was entitled to credit defense counsel’s explanations. (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.) The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that counsel’s representation was adequate and that there was no irreconcilable conflict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden motion. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order finding defendant incompetent to stand trial is affirmed.

/S/ MAURO, J.

We concur:

/S/ ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/S/ RENNER, J.