Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT EMERT, Case No.: 25-CV-0820 TWR (BLM)

12 Petitioner, ORDER (1) OVERRULING 13 v. PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS, (2) ADOPTING REPORT & 14 SAN DIEGO PROBATION RECOMMENDATION, DEPARTMENT, 15 (3) DENYING AMENDED Respondent. PETITION, AND (4) DENYING 16 CERTIFICATE OF 17 APPEALABILITY 18 (ECF Nos. 13, 36, 38) 19 20 Presently before the Court is the Petitioner Robert Emert’s Amended Petition for 21 Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Am. Pet.,” ECF No. 13). Magistrate 22 Judge Barbara L. Major has issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R,” ECF No. 36) 23 recommending that the Court deny the Amended Petition, to which Petitioner has filed 24 timely Objections (“Objs.,” ECF No. 38). Having carefully reviewed the Parties’ 25 arguments, Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R, and the relevant law, the Court OVERRULES 26 Petitioner’s Objections, ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, DENIES Petitioner’s Amended 27 Petition, and DENIES Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of the 3 factual and procedural history underlying the instant Amended Petition. (See R&R at 4 1–4.) This Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein. 5 LEGAL STANDARD 6 When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation on a motion pending 7 before a district court judge, the district court must “make a de novo determination of those 8 portion of the report . . . to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, 9 in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 10 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980); United 11 States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). But “[w]hen no timely objection is 12 filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record 13 in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee’s note 14 to 1983 amendment (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir.), cert. 15 denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974)); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 16 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and 17 recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” (emphasis in original)). 18 ANALYSIS 19 Magistrate Judge Major recommends denying each of the six grounds for relief 20 alleged in Petitioner’s Amended Petition. (See generally R&R.) Based on its review of 21 Petitioner’s Objections and concurrently filed Notice of Errata, Supplemental Authority, 22 and Invocation of Pro Se Liberal Construction (ECF No. 39), the Court identifies ten 23 objections raised by Petitioner, which the Court addresses in turn below. 24 I. First Objection: “Ghost Docket”/“Manufactured Record” 25 Petitioner first contends that the R&R was issued on a “manufactured record” 26 because the Clerk’s Office failed to docket thirteen of his filings between January 16, 2026, 27 and March 16, 2026. (See Objs. at 8.) This objection lacks merit. 28 / / / 1 Specifically, Petitioner claims that he “submitted 13 filings to the court’s official 2 email address at efile_robinson@casd.uscourts.gov” but that “[n]one were docketed[, 3 n]one generated a confirmation[, and n]one appeared on the public docket.” (See id.) In 4 this District, “[u]nless otherwise authorized by the court, all documents submitted for filing 5 to the Clerk’s Office by parties appearing without an attorney must be in legible, paper 6 form,” see Office of the Clerk, United States District Court for the Southern District of 7 California, Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual, § 2(b) 8 (Jan. 16, 2026), and, “[u]nless otherwise authorized by the court, E-mailing a document to 9 the Clerk’s Office or to the assigned judge does not constitute ‘filing’ of the document.” 10 See id. § 2(a). Accordingly, Petitioner failed to file these documents with the Court, as he 11 had successfully demonstrated he could do both before, (see ECF Nos. 1–3, 5, 6, 10, 13, 12 20, 23, 24, 26, 29), and after, (see ECF Nos. 30–32, 34, 38, 39), January 16, 2026. 13 Petitioner also asserts that his traverse was hand-delivered to the Clerk’s office on 14 January 16, 2026, and stamped “RECEIVED” but was never docketed. (See Objs. at 9.) 15 Although the Court hopes they are rare, mistakes happen, particularly in a busy border 16 district with an unprecedented influx of habeas petitions filed by immigration detainees. 17 See, e.g., Tracking Habeas Cases, ProPublica (Feb. 10, 2026), https://projects.propublica. 18 org/habeas-tracker/ (showing 3,304 habeas petitions filed since January 1, 2025, under 28 19 U.S.C. § 2241 in this District as of August 25, 2026). On February 11, 2026, the Court 20 provided Petitioner “one final extension of time to file his traverse,” (see ECF No. 33 at 2), 21 making clear that Petitioner’s traverse was not part of the Court’s record at that time. On 22 February 13, 2026, the Court again notified Petitioner that “[t]he docket does not show any 23 such filing” and requested that, “[n]o later than February 20, 2026, Petitioner must either 24 file a notice identifying by ECF Number which document is his Traverse or refile the 25 Traverse that allegedly was filed on January 16, 2026.” (See ECF No. 35 (the “Feb. 13, 26 2026 Minute Order”).) After Petitioner failed to comply with her February 13, 2026 27 Minute Order, (see generally Docket), Magistrate Judge Major issued her R&R on 28 March 16, 2026. (See ECF No. 36.) 1 Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the R&R was based on an 2 incomplete or “manufactured” record. 3 II. Second Objection: “Mail Trap” 4 Petitioner next argues that it was impossible for him to respond to the February 13, 5 2026 Minute Order because it was not delivered to him until February 20, 2026—the same 6 day his response was due. (See Objs. at 11.) Accepting as true Petitioner’s assertion 7 regarding the date of his receipt of the February 13, 2026 Minute Order, the appropriate 8 course of action would have been to seek an extension of the applicable deadline. Because 9 Petitioner failed to file anything alerting the Court to this issue, Magistrate Judge Major 10 properly concluded that Petitioner “did not respond to the Court’s order and did not file a 11 traverse by the deadline[.]” (See R&R at 4.) Accordingly, this objection is without merit. 12 III. Third Objection: “Pinholster/Dickens” 13 Petitioner objects that Magistrate Judge Major improperly relied on Cullen v. 14 Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), to limit the Court’s review to the state court record. (See 15 Objs. at 12–14.) Petitioner contends that Pinholster applies only to claims adjudicated on 16 the merits and argues that the R&R failed to conduct the threshold inquiry required under 17 Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014), to determine whether his claims were 18 adjudicated on the merits. (See Objs. at 12–13.) 19 As an initial matter, for the reasons discussed below, see infra Section IV, Magistrate 20 Judge Major did not err in determining that Petitioner had failed to identify any evidence 21 of Brady violations. Even if he had, as Magistrate Judge Major explained in the R&R, (see 22 R&R at 24), Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) for 23 consideration of evidence outside the state record. An evidentiary hearing was therefore 24 not authorized, and Petitioner has not proven otherwise. 25 IV. Fourth Objection: Brady 26 Petitioner next objects to Magistrate Judge Major’s analysis of his Brady claim, 27 claiming that “the fact that Petitioner participated in a phone call does not cure the State’s 28 deliberate suppression of the recording of that call from defense counsel.” (Objs. at 16.) 1 Petitioner further contends that Brady requires disclosure by the prosecution to defense 2 counsel and is “not satisfied by arguing the accused could have reconstructed the evidence 3 from memory.” (Id.) 4 This objection misunderstands the R&R’s reasoning: Magistrate Judge Major was 5 not suggesting that Petitioner “reconstruct the evidence from memory[;]” rather, she was 6 explaining that, “[w]hen the defendant is aware of ‘the essential facts enabling him to take 7 advantage of any exculpatory evidence, the [prosecution] does not commit a Brady 8 violation by not bringing the evidence to the attention of the defense.’” (See R&R at 13 9 (citing Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006).) The Court has conducted a de 10 novo review and agrees with Magistrate Judge Major’s analysis. Because Petitioner was 11 aware of the existence of the communications, his counsel could have sought the 12 corresponding documents through discovery. See Ylst, 470 F.3d at 804 (citing United 13 States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983).) 14 Further, Magistrate Judge Major specifically addressed each category of allegedly 15 suppressed evidence identified by Petitioner and correctly concluded that none constituted 16 a Brady violation. With respect to Categories 1 (DIA Pena’s admissions), 3 (FBI call 17 transcript), and 4 (defense documentation and malice negation), Petitioner’s claims fail 18 because he was a party to the communications and therefore aware of the essential facts 19 underlying the purportedly suppressed evidence. (See R&R at 13–15 & n.13.) As to 20 Category 2 (DDA Balerio’s interview with B.E., Petitioner’s minor son), Magistrate Judge 21 Major correctly concluded that this evidence was not material because B.E.’s feelings and 22 desires were irrelevant to the offense of child abduction under California law. (See R&R 23 at 15 (citing Cal. Pen. Code § 278.5(a).) Finally, to the extent Categories 5 and 6 (breached 24 plea promises and Brady compliance documentation) were before Magistrate Judge Major, 25 they simply are not material subject to Brady. The Court therefore overrules Petitioner’s 26 fourth objection. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 V. Fifth Objection: “Franks Claim” 2 Petitioner next contends that on March 13, 2026—thirteen days before the R&R was 3 issued—the San Diego District Attorney certified that the arrest warrant application, 4 supporting affidavits, and related attachments could not be located. (See Objs. at 20.) 5 According to Petitioner, the missing warrant materials demonstrate that probable cause for 6 the warrant did not exist and that the warrant affidavit was “an orchestrated formality – not 7 a truthful presentation of facts to a neutral magistrate.” (Objs. at 21.) Petitioner alleges 8 that because the warrant was written with “reckless disregard for the truth,” he is entitled 9 to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). (Objs. at 21.) 10 Petitioner’s Franks claim was not presented in either his original Petition, (see 11 generally ECF No. 1), or his operative Amended Petition, (see generally ECF No. 13), and 12 therefore was not before Magistrate Judge Major. Although Petitioner claims that he 13 emailed the relevant materials to the Court on March 7, 2026, and that they therefore were 14 “in the Court’s email inbox 13 days before the R&R was signed on March 16, 2026,” (Objs. 15 at 6), as discussed above, see supra Section I, Petitioner failed to file these materials so that 16 they were part of the Court’s record. (See generally Docket.) If Petitioner wished for this 17 claim to be before the Court, he should have filed a motion to amend his Amended Petition 18 so that the issue could be decided by Magistrate Judge Major. 19 Ultimately, because Petitioner’s Franks claim was never properly before the Court, 20 Magistrate Judge Major did not err by declining to address it. In any event, Magistrate 21 Judge Major did not err in concluding based on the record before her that “there was 22 ‘probable cause’ for the criminal charges and [Petitioner]’s arrest, meaning that his arrest, 23 detention, and subsequent prosecution were not unlawful.” (See R&R at 17.) The Court 24 therefore overrules Petitioner’s fifth objection. 25 VI. Sixth Objection: “Off-Record Plea Promises” 26 Petitioner next objects that Magistrate Judge Major erred in rejecting his claim that 27 the plea agreement included custody-related promises regarding Petitioner’s son, B.E., that 28 induced his guilty plea and rendered the plea unenforceable. (See Objs. at 22.) Petitioner 1 contends that Magistrate Judge Major failed adequately to consider Brown v. Poole, 337 2 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003), and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), which he 3 asserts establish that such promises may render a guilty plea invalid. (See Objs. at 23.) 4 This objection is without merit for several reasons. First, as Magistrate Judge Major 5 explained, (see R&R at 16–20), both the trial court and the California Supreme Court 6 rejected Petitioner’s contention that his plea was induced by an off-the-record promise. On 7 November 20, 2023, Superior Court Judge Aaron Katz denied Petitioner’s motion to 8 withdraw his guilty plea, finding that his plea was “free and voluntary” and that counsel 9 had advised him of “all the primary and direct consequences of the plea” without any 10 misrepresentations. (Id. at 16.) The California Supreme Court also rejected Petitioner’s 11 claim. (Id.) Further, although Petitioner testified before the trial court that “other people 12 were present during the conversations, and that there was a recording,” (see ECF No. 17- 13 15 at 50–57), as Magistrate Judge Major noted, (id. at 18 n.14), Petitioner did not introduce 14 any corroborating evidence. 15 Petitioner’s reliance on Brown and Santobello is also misplaced because those cases 16 are materially distinguishable from the case at hand. In Brown, the plea promise was made 17 by an attorney on the record during the plea colloquy in open court. See Brown, 337 F.3d 18 1155 at 1157–58. Here, by contrast, the alleged promise was made off the record, and there 19 is no evidence of its existence. This case also differs dramatically from Santobello, where 20 there was no question that the prosecution had made a promise and that the promise had 21 induced a guilty plea. See Santobello, 404 U.S. 257 at 258. Here, the existence of any 22 promise is itself disputed. Indeed, Petitioner’s attorney, Mr. Badillo, testified before the 23 trial court that the plea deal had not included the alleged promise, (see ECF No. 17-15 at 24 35, 39, 45), and that, to the contrary, he had explained to Petitioner that the family court 25 had already awarded custody of B.E. to his ex-wife. (See id. at 39, 45.) As Magistrate 26 Judge Major noted, in denying Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Judge Katz 27 concluded that the alleged promise had “never [been] stated” and had “never [been] agreed 28 upon.” (R&R at 19 (citing ECF No. 17-15 at 99).) Because Brown and Santobello are 1 factually distinguishable, Magistrate Judge Major did not err in failing to consider them in 2 her R&R. 3 For all these reasons, the Court overrules Petitioner’s sixth objection. 4 VII. Seventh Objection: Actual Innocence 5 Petitioner objects that Magistrate Judge Major improperly recommends dismissal of 6 his claims as procedurally barred without conducting the actual innocence gateway analysis 7 required by Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), and McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 8 (2013). (See Obj at 23.) To invoke the Schlup gateway, a petitioner must present new, 9 reliable evidence of actual innocence sufficient to demonstrate that, in light of that new 10 evidence, no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Because Petitioner has not satisfied this standard, his 12 objection is without merit. 13 Petitioner argues that recordings of telephone conversations between himself and his 14 former wife negate the malice element of his conviction and constitute new evidence 15 because the prosecution suppressed them. (See Objs. at 24–26.) As explained above, 16 however, Petitioner was a participant in those conversations and therefore was aware of 17 the essential facts underlying that evidence before entering his guilty plea. See supra 18 Section IV. Accordingly, the recordings do not constitute the type of new, reliable 19 evidence needed to warrant a Schlup analysis. See, e.g., Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 20 (explaining that a petitioner is required to “support his allegations of constitutional error 21 with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 22 eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial”). 23 Moreover, even assuming the recordings qualified as new evidence, Petitioner has not 24 demonstrated that, in light of those recordings, no reasonable juror would have convicted 25 him. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (explaining that the Schlup standard is 26 “demanding and permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. 27 at 327)). Thus, Magistrate Judge Major did not err because Petitioner failed to adduce new, 28 reliable evidence of his actual innocence. 1 Petitioner also objects to Magistrate Judge Major’s finding that his retaliatory 2 prosecution claim was conclusory, unsupported, and barred by the guilty plea. (See Objs. 3 at 27.) As an initial matter, Petitioner’s objection is improper because it merely reiterates 4 his prior arguments and presents no new evidence or argument for the claim. See, e.g., 5 Gonzales v. Borla, No. 2:22-CV-09221-SB-AJR, 2024 WL 187687, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 6 Jan. 17, 2024) (adopting magistrate judge’s R&R and overruling the petitioner’s objections 7 where they “largely repeat[ed] arguments that [had been] adequately addressed” in the 8 R&R). On de novo review, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Major that Petitioner’s 9 allegations of retaliatory prosecution are conclusory and barred by Tollet v. Henderson, 10 411 U.S. 258 (1973). (See R&R at 21–22.) 11 For the above reasons, the Court overrules Petitioner’s seventh objection. 12 VIII. Eighth Objection: “The Section 2254(e)(2) Catch-22” 13 Next, Petitioner argues that Magistrate Judge Major improperly applied 28 U.S.C. 14 § 2254(e)(2) because his Brady, plea-inducement, and warrant claims depend upon 15 allegedly suppressed evidence and missing records. (See Objs. at 27.) Petitioner contends 16 that he “did not fail to develop the factual record” and that, instead, “[t]he factual record 17 was not developed because the prosecution concealed it.” (Id. at 28.) 18 This objection is not persuasive because, as explained above, Petitioner has not 19 established that the prosecution suppressed any evidence in violation of Brady, see supra 20 Section IV; (see also R&R at 12–15), and his Franks claim was not properly before the 21 Court. See supra Section V. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that the alleged missing 22 records entitle him to further factual development because Magistrate Judge Major 23 correctly concluded that the existing state-court record provided a sufficient factual basis 24 to resolve Petitioner’s claims. See supra Section III; (see also R&R at 24). The Court 25 therefore overrules Petitioner’s eighth objection. 26 IX. Ninth Objection: Santobello and Judicial Bias 27 Petitioner next objects to Magistrate Judge Major’s failure to address “the welched 28 plea as a standalone constitutional ground,” separate from the coercion claim addressed in 1 Section IV.D of Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R. (Objs. at 30.) Again, Petitioner cites 2 Santobello to assert that, “[w]hen a plea rests on a prosecutorial promise, that promise must 3 be kept” and that the breach of such a promise “renders the plea involuntary as a matter of 4 constitutional law.” (Objs. at 30 (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262).) 5 Although Petitioner treats this objection as independent of the one addressed in 6 Section VI above, the Court’s analysis remains the same because Petitioner has failed to 7 establish the existence of an alleged “welched promise.” See supra Section VI. As the 8 Court has already explained, Magistrate Judge Major did not err in concluding that both 9 the state trial court and the California Supreme Court properly rejected Petitioner’s 10 contention that his guilty plea had been coerced by a false promise, and Petitioner has 11 identified no evidence undermining those determinations. Further, Santobello is factually 12 distinguishable. Petitioner’s reliance on Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), is 13 likewise unavailing because Blackledge predates the enactment of the Antiterrorism and 14 Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which substantially limited the scope of 15 federal habeas corpus review of state court criminal convictions. 16 Petitioner also objects to Magistrate Judge Major’s conclusion that Ground Six of 17 the Amended Petition—which alleges judicial bias—is unexhausted, conclusory, and 18 unrelated to his criminal judgment. (See Objs. at 32; see also R&R at 22–24.) But none 19 of the evidence Petitioner cites, i.e., the Clerk’s Office’s failure to docket thirteen of his 20 submissions, the Court’s failure to rule on his requests for accommodation under the 21 Americans with Disabilities Act, and the allegedly “missing warrant,” were before 22 Magistrate Judge Major when she issued her R&R. See supra Sections I, V. Because 23 Petitioner has not identified any factual or legal bias for concluding that Magistrate Judge 24 Major erred in rejecting his judicial bias claim, the Court overrules this objection. 25 X. Tenth Objection: Misapplication of AEDPA 26 Finally, Petitioner objects that Magistrate Judge Major “misapplied three separate 27 AEDPA subsections in ways that, taken together, transformed the statute’s deferential 28 / / / 1 review standard into a complete bar to relief.” (Objs. at 33.) None of Petitioner’s 2 arguments, however, identify an error. 3 First, Petitioner reiterates his argument that Pinholster does not apply because the 4 state court did not adjudicate his claims on the merits. (Id.) As discussed above, see supra 5 Section III, the Court has already addressed and rejected this argument. 6 Second, Petitioner argues that AEDPA deference cannot apply because portions of 7 the state court record allegedly cannot be located. (Objs. at 33.) Again, this contention 8 fails for reasons discussed above. See supra Section V. 9 Third, Petitioner contends that Magistrate Judge Major failed to perform the “look- 10 through” analysis mandated by Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991), which requires 11 courts to “look through” to the last reasoned court decision to identify the basis for denial 12 when the highest court opinion does not provide reasoning for a decision. (See Objs. at 13 34.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that Magistrate Judge Major never identified the 14 relevant last reasoned state-court decision for his claims. (Id.) 15 Petitioner is incorrect. Magistrate Judge Major expressly addressed Ylst on page 5 16 of the R&R, where she explained that, where the dispositive state court decision does not 17 provide a reasoned basis for its ruling, a federal habeas court must independently review 18 the record to determine whether the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an 19 unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. (See R&R at 5 20 (citing Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000)).) Consistent with that 21 framework, Judge Major independently reviewed the claims for which no reasoned state- 22 court decision existed. For example, Judge Major conducted an independent review of 23 Petitioner’s Brady claims. (See R&R at 12–15.) Likewise, Judge Major independently 24 analyzed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (See R&R at 17–20.) 25 Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Major properly reviewed Petitioner’s claims for which the 26 opinion of the highest reviewing court had failed to provide a reasoned basis for its ruling 27 under Ylst. 28 / / / 1 Lastly and relatedly, Petitioner argues that Magistrate Judge Major improperly 2 treated the California Supreme Court’s summary denials as merit adjudications. (See Objs. 3 at 34.) The Court disagrees. As reflected throughout the R&R and noted directly above, 4 Magistrate Judge Major conducted a thorough and independent review of the record where 5 appropriate rather than deferring to unexplained state-court decisions. Accordingly, 6 Petitioner has not shown that Magistrate Judge Major misapplied AEDPA or the standard 7 of review. For these reasons, the Court overrules Petitioner’s final objection. 8 XI. Conclusion 9 Having reviewed Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R in its entirety, the Court finds that 10 it is thorough, well-reasoned, and contains no clear error. The Court therefore 11 OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objection (ECF No. 38), ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Major’s 12 R&R (ECF No. 36) in its entirety, and DENIES Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of 13 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 13). 14 CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 15 A petitioner may not appeal “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which 16 the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court” except where “a 17 circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). 18 “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial 19 showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme 20 Court has further explained: “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 21 procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 22 certificate of appealability should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of 23 reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 24 constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 25 court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 26 Because the Court finds that no reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether the 27 Court was correct in its determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus 28 / / / 1 relief, the questions presented by the Amended Petition do not warrant further proceedings. 2 || The Court therefore DENIES Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability. 3 CONCLUSION 4 In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objections (ECF No. 5 ||38), ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Major R&R (ECF No. 36) in its entirety, DENIES 6 || Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 13), and DENIES 7 || Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 ||Dated: August 31, 2026 —— 11 Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28