Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 ESTATE OF MONICA LILIANA Case No.: 25-cv-1447-WQH-MSB CAMERONI DE ADAMS, by 7 and through its Administrator ORDER 8 Eliot Cobb Adams; ELIOT COBB ADAMS, an individual; and 9 NATALIE DANIELLE 10 CAMERONI-ADAMS, an individual, 11 Plaintiffs, 12 v. 13 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a public 14 entity; CITY OF SAN DIEGO 15 POLICE DEPARTMENT, a public entity; OFFICER 16 MATTHEW BRACE, an 17 individual; OFFICER MALLORY MARASCHIELLO, 18 an individual; CHIEF DAVID 19 NISLEIT, an individual; KHATI BROTHERS INVESTMENTS, 20 INC., dba ROADWAY TOWING 21 & RECOVERY, a California corporation; TOW & 22 TRANSPORT, INC., dba 23 ROADWAY TOWING & 24 RECOVERY, a California corporation; JORDAN 25 MAXIMILIAN LOPEZ, an 26 individual; and DOES 1–25, inclusive, 27 Defendants. 28 1 HAYES, Judge: 2 The matter before the Court is the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by 3 Defendants City of San Diego, Officer Matthew Brace, Officer Mallory Maraschiello, and 4 Chief David Nisleit. (ECF No. 21.) 5 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 6 On April 2, 2025, Plaintiff Estate of Monica Liliana Cameroni de Adams, by and 7 through its Administrator Eliot Cobb Adams; Plaintiff Eliot Cobb Adams; and Plaintiff 8 Natalie Danielle Cameroni-Adams (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint in the 9 Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, Case No. 25CU017593C. 10 (Compl., ECF No. 1-2.) 11 On June 5, 2025, Defendants City of San Diego, Officer Matthew Brace, Officer 12 Mallory Maraschiello, and Chief David Nisleit (collectively, “San Diego Defendants”) 13 removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) 14 On June 12, 2025, San Diego Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 15 Complaint. (ECF No. 2.) 16 On March 26, 2026, the Court issued an Order (the “Dismissal Order”) granting in 17 part and denying in part the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (ECF No. 20.) 18 On April 23, 2026, San Diego Defendants filed the pending Motion for Partial 19 Reconsideration. (ECF No. 21.) 20 II. CONTENTIONS 21 San Diego Defendants move for reconsideration of the Dismissal Order regarding 22 “two distinct issues.” (ECF No. 21-1 at 1.) 23 San Diego Defendants contend that the San Diego Police Department should be 24 entirely dismissed from this action because it is not a proper defendant under either state 25 or federal law. Id. at 2–3. San Diego Defendants contend that the Court correctly identified 26 in its Dismissal Order that the San Diego Police Department is “not a distinct legal entity” 27 from the City of San Diego, and that this holding requires its dismissal from this action. Id. 28 at 3. 1 San Diego Defendants also contend that the Court applied an erroneous negligence 2 standard when analyzing vicarious liability against Defendant City of San Diego. Id. at 3– 3 5. San Diego Defendants contend that California Government Code § 815.2, which permits 4 a municipality to be held vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of its employees, is 5 limited only to cases involving “gross negligence or bad faith.” Id. at 4–5 (citation omitted). 6 San Diego Defendants contend that the Court improperly considered Plaintiffs’ negligence 7 claim under an ordinary care, rather than a gross negligence, standard and request that the 8 Court reconsider its analysis of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against Defendant City of San 9 Diego. Id. 10 III. LEGAL STANDARD 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides: 12 On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 13 reasons: 14 (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 15 (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have 16 been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 17 (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, 18 or misconduct by an opposing party; 19 (4) the judgment is void; 20 (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an 21 earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it 22 prospectively is no longer equitable; or 23 (6) any other reason that justifies relief. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also S.D. Cal. L.R. 7(i). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the 25 district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or 26 the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in 27 controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 28 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 In its Dismissal Order, the Court granted in part and denied in part San Diego 3 Defendants’ motion to dismiss “all claims in the Complaint against [City of San Diego], 4 [San Diego Police Department], Officers Brace and Maraschiello, and Chief David 5 Nisleit.” (ECF No. 19 at 6 (quoting ECF No. 2-1 at 8–9).) 6 The relevant claims asserted in the Complaint are: (1) a claim for due process 7 violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted against Defendant Officers Matthew Brace and 8 Mallory Maraschiello (together, the “Defendant Officers”); (2) a claim for municipal 9 liability for a failure to train under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City of San Diego 10 and San Diego Police Department; (3) a negligence claim against San Diego Defendants; 11 and (4) a claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against San Diego 12 Defendants. Id. at 7. 13 The Court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to both claims under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983 and the claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Id. at 35. The Court 15 denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the negligence claim. Id. 16 A. Defendant San Diego Police Department 17 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 18 Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department for a failure to train. (ECF 19 No. 1-2 ¶¶ 73–83.) In the Dismissal Order, the Court held that Defendant San Diego Police 20 Department was not a properly named defendant with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim 21 because the police department is a “municipal department within the City of San Diego” 22 that does not qualify as a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at 18–19 (citing 23 Paschelke v. Doe, No. CIV 09-2191 IEG(CAB), 2010 WL 2640501, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 24 30, 2010) (quotations omitted); Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995–96 25 (N.D. Cal. 1996)). 26 In the pending Motion for Partial Reconsideration, San Diego Defendants move the 27 Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law negligence claim against Defendant San Diego Police 28 Department because the “principle” that the police department cannot be properly named 1 as a defendant for a Monell claim is “equally applicable to state law causes of action.” 2 (ECF No. 21-1 at 3.) 3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Plaintiffs’ ability to name San Diego 4 Police Department as a defendant “is to be determined by the law of California.” Shaw v. 5 State of California Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1986); 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (stating that the “[c]apacity to sue or be sued” is determined based on 7 the “law of the state where the court is located” for parties that are neither individuals nor 8 corporations). Under California law, a “public entity may sue and be sued.” Cal. Gov’t 9 Code § 945. California law also provides that the term “public entity” includes, among 10 other things, “a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political 11 subdivision or public corporation in the State.” Id. § 811.2. Although California law does 12 not expressly state that a “department,” like the San Diego Police Department, qualifies as 13 a “public entity” within the meaning of the California Government Code, the statute’s 14 inclusion of “other political subdivision[s]” in its definition supports the inference that a 15 department within the City of San Diego is capable of being named as a defendant. 16 The Ninth Circuit conducted an analysis under Rule 17(b) regarding a municipal 17 police department and determined that “the courts of California would hold that the [San 18 Jose Police Department] is a public entity under section 811.2” of the California 19 Government Code and, “[t]hus, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) the [San Jose] Police 20 Department may be sued in Federal court.” Shaw, 788 F.2d at 605; see also Streit v. Cnty. 21 of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 566 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Los Angeles County 22 Sheriff’s Department is “a separately suable entity”). More recently, a district court in the 23 Eastern District of California also concluded that the plaintiffs asserting claims under both 24 42 U.S.C § 1983 and California law against a police department and individual defendants 25 “may name the Ceres Police Department as a defendant under California law, even if the 26 27 28 1 City [of Ceres] is ultimately liable.” Est. of Mendez v. City of Ceres, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 2 1197, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 2019).1 3 Moreover, in Duarte v. City of Stockton, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s 4 determination that “the City of Stockton and Stockton Police Department are not persons 5 within the meaning of § 1983.” 60 F.4th 566, 574 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added). 6 Although Plaintiffs’ Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remains dismissed without 7 prejudice on the independent basis that Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead an underlying 8 constitutional violation, the Court notes that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Duarte v. City 9 of Stockton compels the conclusion that the City of San Diego may be properly named as 10 a defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 notwithstanding the cited district court cases reaching 11 the opposite conclusion. (ECF No. 19 at 19–20.) The Court held otherwise in its earlier 12 Order and, upon review, concludes that the San Diego Police Department may be properly 13 named as a defendant for a § 1983 claim. 14 The Motion for Partial Reconsideration is denied with respect to the dismissal of 15 Defendant San Diego Police Department. 16 B. Vicarious Liability for Defendant City of San Diego 17 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a negligence claim against San Diego 18 Defendants for their alleged failure to “secur[e] a scene following a collision” and “ensur[e] 19 persons were transported to receive medical care.” (ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 84–99.) Plaintiffs 20 allege that Ms. Cameroni de Adams was inside her parked vehicle at the time that it was 21 “struck and rear-ended” by another vehicle, and that San Diego Defendants failed to 22 reasonably inspect her vehicle before having it removed to a tow yard, where Ms. Cameroni 23 de Adams succumbed to her injuries. Id. ¶¶ 34–36, 45. In their Motion to Dismiss, San 24 25 1 San Diego Defendants’ lone citation to Hovd v. Hayward Unified School District does not persuade the 26 Court to hold otherwise. 74 Cal. App. 3d 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). In its one-page opinion, the state appellate court in that case held that the respondent Vocational Skills Center was “not a public agency” 27 and, as a result, was exempt from certain filing requirements under California law. Id. at 471. It is not clear—and San Diego Defendants do not explain—how the case supports their contention that Defendant 28 1 Diego Defendants contended that the negligence claim should be dismissed with respect to 2 the Defendant Officers because they did not “have a duty to protect or render care” to the 3 decedent, Ms. Cameroni de Adams, at the time that they encountered the site of the 4 automobile accident. (ECF No. 2-1 at 13–16, 20.) 5 In denying the motion to dismiss the negligence claim, the Court stated, in relevant 6 part: 7 California courts have recognized that a duty of care may arise when police officers encounter an incident, render assistance, and become aware of a 8 foreseeable danger. Mann v. State of California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 780 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Dutton v. City of Pacifica, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1171, 1175– 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a defendant officer did not owe the 10 plaintiff a duty of care when ordering her to disperse from a park because it 11 was not clearly “more likely that [the plaintiff] would be injured as a result of [the officer’s] order to disperse than that she would be injured if [the officer] 12 exercised [] other options”). . . . 13 Here, Plaintiffs adequately allege that the Defendant Officers owed a duty of 14 care to Ms. Cameroni de Adams. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant Officers 15 “responded to the scene” of a multiple-vehicle crash that occurred at approximately 1:08 a.m. in the morning. (Compl. ¶¶ 35–36.) Plaintiffs’ 16 allegation that the Defendant Officers arranged to have Ms. Cameroni de 17 Adams’s vehicle transported to a tow yard supports an inference that the Defendant Officers were exercising control over the crash site and attempting 18 to render assistance to persons and/or property in the area. In doing so, it is 19 plausible that the Defendant Officers were aware of the risk that the drivers and passengers involved in the incident could have been injured. Like the 20 traffic officer in Mann, the Defendant Officers chose to “investigate the plight 21 of specific persons” and became appraised [of] a “foreseeable danger” that persons at or near the crash site may have been injured and would require 22 medical assistance. 23 At this stage of the proceedings, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs adequately 24 allege that the Defendant Officers owed a duty of care to persons involved in the automobile accident, including Ms. Cameroni de Adams. 25 26 Id. at 28–29. The Court stated that “San Diego Defendants do not raise any contentions 27 regarding the other elements of this negligence claim against the Defendant Officers.” Id. 28 at 29. Having found that Plaintiffs adequately demonstrated that the officers owed a duty 1 of care to Ms. Cameroni de Adams, the Court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to 2 Defendant Officers. Id. at 29–30. 3 The Court then considered whether Defendant City of San Diego could be held 4 vicariously liable for the conduct of its officers. Id. at 30–31. The Court stated: 5 California Government Code § 815 states: “[E]xcept as otherwise provided by statute[,] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury 6 arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or 7 any other person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. California Government Code § 815.2, however, provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately 8 caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the 9 scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal 10 representative.” Id. § 815.2; see also Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 11 Cal. 4th 1175, 1180 (Cal. 2003) (“Government Code section 815.2 [] makes a public entity vicariously liable for its employee’s negligent acts or omissions 12 within the scope of employment . . . [with] the importation qualification that 13 a public entity is not liable for injuries committed by an employee who is immune from liability for such injuries.”). 14 15 Id. The Court “construe[d] the Complaint as asserting a theory of vicarious liability” 16 against Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department for the conduct 17 of their employees acting within the scope of their employment, and denied the motion to 18 dismiss the negligence claim against those Defendants. Id. at 31. 19 In the pending Motion for Partial Reconsideration, San Diego Defendants contend 20 that “the California Supreme Court in Eastburn limited the principle of vicarious liability 21 against municipalities under Government Code section 815.2 to ‘cases involving gross 22 negligence or bad faith.’” (ECF No. 21-1 at 4–5 (quoting Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. 23 Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1180 (Cal. 2003) (citing Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1799.107)).) 24 San Diego Defendants contend that “[t]his conclusion is also supported by Health and 25 Safety Code section 1799.107.” Id. at 5. San Diego Defendants contend that “the proper 26 standard for judging the SDPD’s officers’ actions is gross negligence, which is the only 27 theory under which the City [of San Diego] can be held vicariously liable.” Id. at 5. 28 1 In Eastburn, the California Supreme Court reviewed a judgment of dismissal in a 2 case concerning a three-year-old plaintiff who, after “suffer[ing] an electric shock while 3 bathing,” was allegedly “denied early and prompt medical attention” because the “911 4 emergency dispatcher” failed to properly dispatch personnel who could render aid. 5 Eastburn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1179. The California Supreme Court stated that it “must decide 6 whether public entities employing emergency dispatchers are subject to direct or vicarious 7 tort liability for injury attributable in part to a dispatcher’s failure or delay in responding 8 to a 911 call.” Id. at 1178 (emphasis added). “We conclude that, based on applicable 9 statutory provisions and the legislative policies underlying them, no statute imposes direct 10 liability on public entities in such situations, and vicarious liability is limited to cases 11 involving gross negligence or bad faith.” Id. (citations omitted). 12 Assuming that the Eastburn court’s holding can be properly applied to the conduct 13 of the Defendant Officers in this action, San Diego Defendants’ contentions fail to provide 14 good cause for the Court to reconsider its earlier holding. In their Motion to Dismiss, San 15 Diego Defendants contended that the Defendant Officers had “no duty . . . to assist” Ms. 16 Cameroni de Adams and that the facts did not support the existence of a “special 17 relationship.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 14, 20.) San Diego Defendants did not contend, as they do 18 now, that the allegations in Plaintiffs’ SAC fail to support a finding of gross negligence or 19 bad faith. Based on the parties’ briefing, the Court considered the issue of whether the 20 allegations regarding the Defendant Officers’ conduct at the scene of the automobile 21 accident plausibly supported the conclusion that they “owed a duty of care to persons 22 involved in the [] accident, including Ms. Cameroni de Adams.” (ECF No. 19 at 29–30 23 (“San Diego Defendants do not raise any contentions regarding the other elements of this 24 negligence claim against the Defendant Officers . . .”).) San Diego Defendants’ contentions 25 in the Motion for Reconsideration raise new arguments that were not adequately addressed 26 in the briefing on the Motion to Dismiss and to which Plaintiffs have not responded. 27 Without reaching the question of whether the Defendant Officers’ alleged failure to 28 investigate the scene of the automobile accident did rise to the level of gross negligence, 1 ||the Court declines to reconsider its earlier holding at this stage because San Diego 2 || Defendants did not move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence claim on those grounds in their 3 || Motion to Dismiss. The pending Motion for Reconsideration is not the appropriate vehicle 4 ||to raise additional contentions that were not raised in the original motion and to which 5 || Plaintiffs have not replied. Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 6 || 2000) (stating that a motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or 7 || present evidence for the first ttme when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in 8 || the litigation”). 9 Vv. CONCLUSION 10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Reconsideration (ECF No. 11 }}21) is denied. This ruling is without prejudice to San Diego Defendants raising these 12 || arguments in an appropriate substantive motion at a subsequent stage in this litigation. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs may file an Amended Complaint no 14 || later than twenty-one (21) days from the filing of this Order. If no Amended Complaint is 15 || filed, San Diego Defendants shall file an Answer to the Complaint no later than thirty (30) 16 || days from the filing of this Order. 17 18 Dated: August 31, 2026 Mie 19 bee (a 20 United States District Court 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28