People v. Martin CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 9/1/26 P. v. Martin CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B346799

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA089862-01) v.

JOEL MARTIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:

Defendant and appellant Joel Martin (defendant) appeals from the denial of his petition for vacatur of his murder conviction and resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6.

1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. Defendant’s appointed counsel identified no arguable issues and filed a brief requesting we exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record as set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Defendant contends his hearing counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims under the Racial Justice Act (Pen. Code, § 745) (RJA) and to request “full resentencing” under various sentencing reform statutes. He also asserts his innocence. Finally, he claims his trial counsel was ineffective. We have considered defendant’s supplemental brief and reviewed the record. Finding none of defendant’s contentions are cognizable in this appeal, and having conducted an independent review of the record, we affirm the court’s order.

BACKGROUND Procedural Background In 2010, a jury convicted defendant of second degree murder of Carlos Espinoza but was unable to reach a verdict on the alleged firearm enhancements. Upon retrial, in 2011, a jury found true the personal firearm use allegations. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 40 years to life in prison, comprised of 15 years to life for the murder, plus 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). As to the remaining two firearm enhancements, the trial court imposed terms of 20 years and 10 years respectively and stayed them pursuant to section 654. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. (People v. Martin (Feb. 6, 2013, B232642) [nonpub. opn.] (Martin I).)

2 On March 20, 2020, defendant filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction and for resentencing under section 1172.6,2 which provides a procedure for persons convicted of murder, manslaughter or attempted murder to obtain retroactive relief if they could not be convicted under sections 188 and 189 as amended effective January 1, 2019. A petition for such relief may be filed by those who were not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or were not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See Senate Bill No. 1437; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 223, fn. 3.) The court summarily denied defendant’s petition on the grounds the jury found defendant personally discharged a firearm and, as such, determined he was the actual killer. Defendant timely appealed.3 (People v. Martin (May 31, 2023, B306008) [nonpub. opn.] (Martin II).) On appeal, in light of People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) and People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598, this court reversed the trial court’s denial and remanded for the trial court to proceed to a prima facie hearing. (Martin II, supra, B306008.)

2 At the time of filing, the section for such relief was found in section 1170.95. The section was renumbered in June 2022, with no substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to these proceedings using the current numbering.

3 On April 11, 2022, defendant filed a second petition. On June 30, 2022, the court issued an order noting defendant’s previous petition was denied and “an appeal is pending,” as such, the court denied the petition.

3 In September 2023, the People filed an opposition to the petition arguing defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. In February 2024, defendant filed his reply asserting the record of conviction “does not eliminate the possibility that the jury reached its verdict based upon an imputation of malice.” On March 13, 2024, the court decided, based on this court’s opinion in Martin II, that it would set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. On May 27, 2025, defendant filed an evidentiary hearing brief arguing because he was convicted of second degree murder, he could not be found to have intended to kill Espinoza. On May 29 and 30, 2025, an evidentiary hearing was held. The court noted receipt of defendant’s petition, the briefs of the parties, and the Court of Appeal opinion in Martin II. The court explained its understanding of the People’s burden of proof. The People did not offer any new evidence. Defendant testified on his own behalf. On May 30, 2025, following argument, the court denied the petition. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of denial. Factual background4 First trial On February 4, 2009, Hazar Escamilla Parra visited her friend Espinoza. Parra testified Espinoza introduced her to a friend of his they met near the restaurant where they ate lunch, but she did not see Espinoza argue with him or anyone else that day. After their visit Espinoza accompanied Parra to the bus stop near his home and waited with her for the bus. Parra was seated on Espinoza’s lap on the bench when an older-model gray 4 The factual background is taken from our opinion affirming defendant’s underlying conviction in Martin I, supra, B232642.

4 Astro van pulled up to the curb very close to them. Parra testified there were two people in the van, both in the front. The passenger pulled out a gun, said with a thick accent, “You Carlos?” When Espinoza acknowledged he was, the passenger fired his weapon. Espinoza pushed Parra out of the way, stood up and the shooter continued to fire, more than five times in all. Parra was not able to identify either the driver or the shooter. The police arrived quickly, and Espinoza was able to answer their questions as they waited for medical assistance. Pomona Police Officers James Gibson and Dennis Cooper both testified that Espinoza said the shooter fired from the passenger seat of the van after saying, “Fuck you, Carlos.” Espinoza also said he knew the shooter from the neighborhood as “Huero” and that one of Huero’s brothers, Miguel, had been shot and killed a month or two earlier at the nearby Guadalajara Market. Officer Cooper asked Espinoza about his quarrel with Huero. Espinoza denied there had been a quarrel, but he had been a friend of the man who killed Huero’s brother. Espinoza later died at the hospital from multiple gunshot wounds. Crime scene investigator Sheri Orellana recovered a bullet and some bullet fragments at the scene. A firearms expert, Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff Edmund Anderson, testified that the bullet was consistent with a nine-millimeter bullet, which was almost always fired from a semiautomatic pistol, and only rarely from a .38-caliber revolver. Anderson explained that among the differences between a semiautomatic pistol and a revolver, a semiautomatic could hold seven or more rounds of ammunition depending on the size of the magazine, and ejected shell casings when fired, whereas a revolver held six bullets and did not eject casings.

5 Pomona Police Detective Mark McCann was one of the lead investigators in the December 2008 murder case of defendant’s brother at the Guadalajara Market. He was also assigned to investigate this case. After a two-year search, Detective McCann found defendant living in New Mexico. Detectives McCann and Aguirre had defendant detained and interviewed him there in jail. A recording of the interview was played for the jury. Defendant admitted his nickname was “Huero.”5 After many denials, defendant eventually admitted to having shot Espinoza. Defendant previously heard that Espinoza had spoken badly of his brother, Miguel. Defendant claimed he was alone in the van driving to the carwash, when he happened to see Espinoza at the bus stop.6 Defendant did not recall seeing Parra. He said, “I just—I change—I took off my seat belt and I changed seats. And I (inaudible).” Defendant did not know how many rounds he fired, only that it was more than three. He told detectives he bought the gun a few hours earlier from someone on the street. He did not remember the kind of gun it was, but later said it was a “3–8” that held 10 rounds in a clip, and that the casings were ejected 5 We note at trial defendant’s nickname was spelled as “Huero.” During the evidentiary hearing testimony of defendant it was spelled “Guero” and during the People’s argument at the hearing, it was spelled “Wedo.” 6 Defendant said, “I saw him ‘cause he was (inaudible) saying that my brother was—my brother was a piece of shit and it was good. It was good to him to they killed [sic]. And I was—I was so pissed off, sir.... I was really, really ... I wasn’t—where he living, I wasn’t know where he used to live [sic].” “But things happened when I seen him.... I couldn’t hold (inaudible).”

6 into the van when he fired. Defendant later threw away the gun and abandoned the van. He told detectives he “wasn’t wanting to kill him”; he was “just ... feeling something here.” Defendant presented no witnesses and did not testify at the first trial. Second trial Prosecution evidence The prosecution presented the same evidence of defendant’s guilt as was presented in the first trial. Parra testified that before the shooting she and Espinoza went to lunch at a restaurant and nothing unusual occurred during their visit until the old gray Astro van pulled up to the bus stop. Parra and Officers Gibson and Cooper gave essentially the same testimony regarding Espinoza’s statements that the shooter was Huero, who lived a few blocks away, and whose brother Miguel had been shot at the Guadalajara Market by a friend of Espinoza’s. The prosecution again presented testimony regarding the nine- millimeter bullet found at the scene, and the medical examiner again testified that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. Defendant’s recorded interview was played for the jury. Defense evidence After the defense rested without presenting evidence, the parties stipulated that a drug screen conducted by the coroner showed that Espinoza had 0.09 micrograms per milliliter of methamphetamine in his system, but it could not be determined the time the victim consumed the drug or whether it had any intoxicating effect on him. After the jury began deliberating, the defense was permitted to reopen its case to present the testimony 7 of two witnesses, Andrea Torres7 and defendant’s sister Lorena Vacquz. Torres testified she lived near the scene of the shooting, and although she did not know Espinoza, she knew his family and his sister. Torres was outside her trailer park at the time of the shooting, about 35 feet from the bus stop. She heard what she thought were firecrackers and then screams, looked in the direction of the noise, and saw the shooter and a van. There were seven or more shots in the space of five seconds, and before the gunfire stopped, she turned away to go inside to be with her baby. Torres saw two men in the van, dressed alike. The driver was the shooter. Torres described him as bald, hatless, wearing a white tank top, with many tattoos, one of which was a shark. Torres testified that five or 10 minutes earlier, she had seen defendant near a neighborhood fast food restaurant, arguing with a light-skinned Hispanic man in a black or gray van. Vacquz testified that defendant had no tattoos on his face or neck, that as far as she knew he had not removed any tattoos, and had no scars from tattoo removal. Defendant pulled down his collar to show his neck to the jury. Rebuttal Detective McCann testified that in his 2009 interview with defendant, defendant was thinner and wore his hair much shorter than during trial. Within a week after the shooting, Espinoza’s sister telephoned Detective McCann, told him she knew Torres, and that Torres had contacted her and said she witnessed the shooting. Detective McCann called the number Espinoza’s sister gave him, left a message, and located Torres at 7 Torres had received a subpoena but claimed that she had forgotten to come in earlier.

8 the trailer park after she did not return his call. Detective McCann estimated the distance from Torres’s trailer to the bus stop to be 50 or 60 yards. Evidentiary hearing Defendant’s testimony Defendant, also known as “Guero,” testified that on the day of the murder he was driving a dark blue Astro van, with gray stripes. Defendant’s brother, Israel Martin8, was in the front passenger seat and defendant was in the driver’s seat. Defendant was wearing a Cowboys jacket and Israel was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt with the hood up. Israel was three or four years younger than defendant; both men were of light complexion; Israel was taller than defendant and “heavier set.” Defendant came to the intersection of Buena Vista Avenue and Mission Boulevard where he planned to make a right turn from Buena Vista Avenue onto Mission Boulevard. He never stopped at the curb and was going approximately five miles per hour the entire time. After he made the right turn, he checked his rearview mirror in an effort to change lanes to the left lane. While checking his mirror, he heard the sound of approximately three to four gunshots and a scream. After he heard the gunshots, he “turned to see[9] what happened.” By the time he turned, the gunshots had stopped, and he saw Israel turned looking over his right shoulder with what appeared to be “half 8 Because both men have the same surname, we will refer to defendant’s brother as Israel. No disrespect is intended. 9 On cross-examination, defendant testified he did not look in the direction of the gunshots and “did not pay attention” to whether there were people in the area on the passenger side of the car.

9 the part of a pistol.” Defendant “took off” toward the freeway because he panicked. He believed Israel must have fired the gun he saw in Israel’s hand. Defendant did not know Israel was armed. Defendant was uncertain if anyone had been hit. When he asked Israel what he had done, Israel told him to let him out of the car. About 10 seconds down the road, defendant let Israel get out. Defendant got onto the freeway and headed to Bakersfield where he stayed with a friend. Defendant was scared to return home “because of what Israel had done.” Defendant moved to New Mexico after the murder “because [he] did not want to get involved in that shooting,” and he was afraid he would be implicated “because [he] was driving.” After he moved to New Mexico, defendant was arrested and interviewed by a Pomona police detective. Defendant learned from Detective McCann that Espinoza was the person killed at the bus stop. Defendant knew Detective McCann because he was also the detective in the case involving Miguel’s murder. During the interview with detectives, defendant initially denied being near the scene of the shooting. Eventually he admitted being present but told police he was in the van by himself. He lied to police and told them he committed the shooting on his own to protect Israel. Defendant claimed he was telling the truth now because Israel passed away in late 2022.10 Defendant did not really know Espinoza; rather he knew of him and thought “perhaps” Espinoza knew of defendant. Israel told defendant a few months after the Espinoza shooting that Israel believed Espinoza was connected to their brother Miguel’s 10 We note defendant filed his petition for resentencing in March 2020, more than two years before Israel died.

10 killing. Defendant was not aware of this prior to Espinoza’s shooting. Specifically, Israel told defendant that Espinoza “bad mouthed Miguel” after Miguel’s murder and that Espinoza “was involved with the friends of the [people] that murdered [Miguel].” Other evidence Along with defendant’s testimony, counsel introduced the photographic lineup shown to Parra during the investigation, as well as a video recording and transcript of a one-minute portion of an interview with Parra. Hearing argument The People argued the evidence supported a finding that defendant was the actual shooter and he acted with malice. Defense counsel argued, consistent with his briefing, that the People could not establish malice because the “first jury” rejected such a finding by failing to reach a verdict on the firearm use allegations. Counsel also pointed to Parra’s identification of defendant as “‘not the shooter.’” Accordingly, counsel argued the evidence did not establish defendant was the shooter, and there is no evidence he knew what his brother planned to do. The court’s ruling The court denied the petition, finding both brothers were in the van at the time of the shooting, and both had a motive to kill Espinoza. The court found the shooter harbored express malice at the time of the shooting based on Espinoza’s vulnerable position sitting at the bus stop with Parra on his lap. The court also found defendant’s testimony not credible. Specifically, defendant’s claim that he did not stop near the curb and was maneuvering his car to the left while his brother fired multiple times and struck Espinoza six times—and avoided hitting anyone else—from a moving vehicle was “remarkable.”

11 Due to the accuracy of the shots, the court found Parra’s account of the shooting made more sense and found the driver would have needed to “line[] up the shooter in order to achieve … that style of accuracy” rather than from a moving vehicle. Thus, even if defendant was not the shooter, the driver “helped facilitate that shooting,” and both men had motive to shoot Espinoza. The court pointed to defendant’s actions following the shooting as demonstrative of his consciousness of guilt. Specifically, the court noted defendant fled town immediately following the shooting, and according to defendant, Israel (as the shooter) asked defendant to drop him off 10 seconds from the shooting scene with the murder weapon still on his person. Finally, the court credited Espinoza’s identification of defendant as the man who shot him. Ultimately, the court found “even if [defendant] was not the shooter, he certainly is a direct aider and abettor” based on “the way the vehicle was maneuvered.”

DISCUSSION Where, as here, appointed counsel finds no arguable issues in an appeal that is not from the first appeal after conviction, we are not required to conduct an independent review of the record. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) However, even if we do not independently review the record to identify unraised issues in a case, we give the defendant the opportunity to file his or her own supplemental brief or letter and we then evaluate any specific arguments raised. (See id. at pp. 231-232.) Counsel provided defendant with a copy of the record on appeal and informed him of his right to file his own supplemental brief. We notified defendant of counsel’s brief and gave defendant 30 days to file his own letter or brief stating any 12 grounds for an appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished to be considered and if he did not, the appeal would be dismissed. Defendant filed a supplemental brief within the time allowed. First, defendant asserts his actual innocence, claiming, “I did not ‘kill the victim,’” and avers he only admitted to doing so to “protect[]” Israel. He also points to other factual issues with his case, including Parra’s failure to identify him as the shooter. Second, defendant alleges his trial counsel was ineffective because he “did nothing.” Third, defendant asserts a violation of the RJA because, according to defendant, he was not provided an interpreter during his police interview. Fourth, defendant contends his hearing counsel was ineffective because he failed to (1) “add a[n] ‘RJA claim’” and (2) bring other postjudgment resentencing requests. Notably, defendant does not allege the trial court erred in denying his petition for relief pursuant to section 1172.6, and we note, most of defendant’s claims are not cognizable in this appeal. We take each of his assertions in turn. First, to the extent defendant raises challenges to his underlying trial unrelated to the changes brought about by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), including his claim of innocence, section 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial error.” (People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438, abrogated on other grounds by Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.) Instead, section 1172.6 is a mechanism to provide relief for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter convictions that may have been based on now- invalid theories. (Lewis, supra, at pp. 959–960.) Second, his allegation that trial counsel was ineffective is not properly before us because the “appropriate means of raising 13 a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is either by direct appeal or by petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1477.) This postjudgment appeal fits neither of those categories. Third, defendant’s claim regarding the RJA is not properly before this court on appeal from his postconviction section 1172.6 petition. (See § 745, subd. (b) [“For claims based on the trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence.” (Italics added.)].) Defendant’s claim regarding interpreter services during his police interview is neither based on the trial record, nor is it being raised on direct appeal from conviction or sentence. Therefore it is not properly raised in this appeal and is more appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Fourth, defendant’s claim that hearing counsel was ineffective is unavailing. Regarding counsel’s failure to raise an RJA claim, pursuant to section 745, subdivision (j), an incarcerated defendant “whose judgment is already final [is] permitted to bring a Racial Justice Act claim only in … a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 1473.” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 1000.) Moreover, the RJA did not become retroactive to cases that became final before 2015 until January 1, 2026. (See § 745, subd. (j)(4) & (5).) Defendant’s judgment became final in 2013 after his petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was denied. (See Martin v. California (2013) 571 U.S. 993.) Therefore, even if it were appropriate to file an RJA claim during a section 1172.6 proceeding, such a filing would have been premature at the time of defendant’s May 2025 hearing.

14 Defendant’s claim that hearing counsel was ineffective for failing to raise other postjudgment resentencing requests, including a “full resentencing” under later-enacted statutes, is also without merit. As noted, section 1172.6 is a mechanism to provide relief for murder … convictions that may have been based on now-invalid theories (Delgadillo, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 223; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960) and does not provide for “retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute” after the judgment is final. (People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 341-342.) Because defendant’s case became final in 2013, hearing counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring such requests.

DISPOSITION The May 30, 2025 order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. RICHARDSON, J. GOORVITCH, J.