Hanna v. Mogu Mogu CA2/8
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Los Angeles County
- Trial judge
- Bradley S. Phillips
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Scherb (author), John S. Wiley, Victor G. Viramontes
Analysis
No analysis yet. When one exists it is a model's reading of this opinion — the rulings it reviewed, whether it agrees with the court, and the authorities it checked — shown beside the court's own disposition, never in place of it. How analyses are made.
Opinion
Filed 9/1/26 Hanna v. Mogu Mogu CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
BISHOY HANNA, B353123 Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County v. Super. Ct. No. 22SMCV01647 MOGU MOGU, Defendant and Respondent.
NDM ENTERPRISE LLC, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23SMCV01176 Plaintiff, v. BISHOY HANNA et al., Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Bradley S. Phillips, Judge. Affirmed. Bishoy Hanna, in pro per. for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Offices of Stephen Abraham and Stephen E. Abraham for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ Bishoy Hanna, an individual business owner, sued Mogu Mogu, a corporation, for willfully interfering with Hanna’s rights to parking spaces under a commercial lease with landlord NDM Enterprise LLC. Mogu Mogu moved for judgment on the pleadings as to Hanna’s then-operative second amended complaint. Later, Hanna moved for reconsideration of an order granting in part and denying in part a motion to compel discovery. On February 3, 2026, the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to Mogu Mogu without affording Hanna further leave to amend and denied reconsideration of Hanna’s discovery motion. Hanna noticed an appeal from these orders. Issues in the consolidated action in which NDM Enterprise LLC is plaintiff are not before us. On appeal, Hanna argues the trial court improperly granted judgment on the pleadings while “restricting Appellant’s access to discovery, declining to consider judicially noticeable evidence central to the dispute, and denying leave to amend to include those same facts.” The problem we face, however, is that Hanna does not discuss how the court restricted discovery, what matters the court declined to consider, and how this impacted the causes of action in his second amended complaint, the trial court’s reasons for granting judgment on the pleadings, or his ability to successfully amend. Accordingly, while, in this instance, we treat the granting of judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend as appealable (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 527, fn. 1), we affirm the judgment because Hanna has not met his burden on appeal to show reversible error.
2 We presume an appealed judgment is correct and it is appellant’s burden to overcome this presumption. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.) The appellant may not rest on bare assertions of error but must present reasoned argument and legal authority on each point urged. (Ibid.) Failure to do so results in forfeiture. (Ibid.) “We may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ” (Ibid.) An appellate court, then, is not obliged to make arguments for an appellant or speculate about the issues an appellant means to raise. (Ibid.; accord, E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1288– 1289; Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1008; Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) These rules apply to self-represented litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) We recognize Hanna’s contention that leave to amend a complaint should be liberally granted. But a policy of liberal amendment does not absolve an appellant of his or her burden to show reversible error. When it comes to leave to amend, an appellant must show a reasonable possibility of successful amendment and cannot rest on “an abstract right to amend.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Instead, an appellant must proffer an amendment and explain how it will alter the legal effect of the complaint with reference to the applicable substantive law. (Ibid.) This Hanna has not done.
3 DISPOSITION We affirm the judgment and award appellate costs to Mogu Mogu.
SCHERB, J.
We Concur:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Melton v. Boustred H033148 · 2010-03-12
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles B189151, B191036 · 2007-03-15
- Nwosu v. Uba No. H026182 · 2004-10-01
- Rakestraw v. California Physicians' Service B115766 · 2000-05-31