Marriage of Cervantes and Rodriguez CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 9/1/26 Marriage of Cervantes and Rodriguez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of JOSEFINA RODRIGUEZ CERVANTES and JOSE RODRIGUEZ. D087798 JOSEFINA RODRIGUEZ CERVANTES, (Riverside Super. Ct. Appellant, No. IND101232)

v.

JOSE RODRIGUEZ,

Respondent.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Kristi Kirk, Judge. Affirmed. La Quinta Law Group and Timothy L. Ewanyshyn, for Appellant. Law Offices of Lisa R. McCall, Lisa R. McCall and Erica M. Barbero, for Respondent. Josefina Rodriguez Cervantes (Josefina) and Jose Rodriguez (Jose) divorced in 2011. They reached a marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution and included a handwritten order concerning the marital home. More than a decade later, the trial court determined the language of the order and the parties’ postjudgment conduct indicated the parties intended for Jose to keep the home after the divorce. We see no basis to disturb the court’s ruling and therefore affirm its order denying Josefina a share in the net proceeds from the sale of the property.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Fifteen years into their marriage, in December 2001, Josefina and Jose purchased a home on Verona Road in Cathedral City. They separated several years later, in April 2010, and judgment on the dissolution of their marriage was entered in June 2011. According to their settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment, Josefina would receive an SUV and a Chase account as her share of the community property, while Jose would receive a truck, a Bank of America account, a Chase account, and retirement accounts from the Roman Catholic Archdiocese (his employer) and Country Villas (her employer). The marital home was not listed in either the community property or community debts sections of the agreement. Instead, the agreement included the following handwritten entry under “Miscellaneous Orders”:

“Reserved: Residence located [on] Verona Rd, Cathedral City, CA. Respondent to have exclusive use and possession and to pay all mortgage debt and insurance. Petitioner agrees to cooperate as necessary when Respondent is ready to refinance.”

2 Not long after the divorce, in June 2013, Josefina quitclaimed the property to Jose. More than a decade after that, in July 2024, she became aware that Jose was selling the property. Josefina requested an emergency order mandating that any sale proceeds be placed in a separate account while the court divided the property. She asserted that although Jose had “full control of the house,” “informed [her] on multiple occasions that he plan[ned] to keep all the profits,” and “claimed that [she had] no right to any profit or equity in the house,” the house was in fact community property. In a responsive declaration, Jose explained that at the time of their divorce, the parties mutually understood that he would keep the house, which meant he would assume a significant debt because the house had no equity at the time. Two years later, the parties “renegotiated” the terms of their property division out of court. Jose agreed to let Josefina keep her Country Villas retirement account that he was awarded in the divorce. In return, she agreed to deed the house to him. He also noted that, since the divorce, he had been solely responsible for paying the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs, and had made significant improvements that increased the value of the property. The trial court heard the matter on August 6, 2024. At the hearing, Josefina stated that she did not know whether the house was “upside down” at the time of the divorce and she was unaware of the Country Villas retirement account. She conceded that she had not paid any bills for the property since the divorce and that she quitclaimed the property to Jose in 2013. She seemed to believe, however, that signing the deed would modify the mortgage payment without affecting her ownership. As the court interpreted the judgment, the parties bargained for Jose to take over the house, pay for it, and eventually refinance in his name.

3 The court “reserved jurisdiction” to the extent of ensuring that Josefina cooperated with the refinancing process, not to give her money for the property. Based on the language of the judgment and the parties’ postjudgment conduct—specifically, that Jose had paid the mortgage and taxes for more than a decade and made improvements on the property, whereas Josefina had paid nothing and deeded the property to him—the court found the parties intended the residence to be awarded to Jose and deemed it his separate property. In August 2024, Jose sold the house for $450,000 and received $223,027.84 in profits. Soon thereafter, Josefina, now represented by counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration. She requested Watts charges to reimburse the community for all the years Jose exclusively used and possessed the property at its fair rental value. (See In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 372–374.) At the same time, she recognized that Jose would be entitled to Epstein credits for his payments on the property from the time of the divorce until the sale of the property. (See In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 80, 82–84.) The court granted the request for reconsideration and held an evidentiary hearing on May 7, 2025. Josefina testified that at the time of the divorce she did not believe she was giving the house to Jose. She acknowledged, however, that she agreed Jose would keep the property because she could not afford it on her own. Josefina also conceded that she had not made any financial contributions toward the property since the divorce and that she never asked Jose to pay her rent or sought reimbursement through the court. On the latter point, she explained that she did not attempt to seek reimbursement for her share of the property until now because she “didn’t know [her] rights” or “that there was something 4 for [her].” She also did not want to disturb Jose, who had a history of violence toward her. Josefina maintained that she signed the quitclaim deed believing it would help Jose modify the mortgage but not remove her from title. She noted that he was “harassing” and “bothering” her to sign it. As to the Watts claim, the parties stipulated that the fair rental value of the property between June 2011 and August 2024 totaled $278,900. According to Jose, when they divorced, Josefina told him to keep the house. She did not want anything to do with it. When he signed the judgment in 2011, he believed he owned the house. The parties stipulated that at the time of their divorce, the property was subject to an interest-only fixed rate note with a principal amount of $214,000.00. In the years that followed, Jose paid $247,585.66 for the mortgage and taxes alone. In addition, he testified that he spent about $26,500 on upgrades and repairs— $15,000 to replace the air conditioner, $4,000 to install new cabinets, $6,000 to repair leaky pipes, and $1,500 to fix the garage door. He did not seek contributions from Josefina for these amounts because “it was [his] house.” The court ultimately decided that Josefina was not entitled to share in the sale proceeds. Upon reexamining the language of the judgment— giving Jose exclusive use and possession of the property, requiring him to pay the mortgage debt and insurance, and directing Josefina to cooperate when Jose was ready to refinance—the court surmised that the property was a debt assigned to Jose. Even assuming the judgment was ambiguous, the parties’ intent became clear when Josefina executed the quitclaim deed, relinquishing all her rights to the property. In any event, the court would not award Watts charges to Josefina. It noted there was no indication in the judgment that the parties wished to reserve jurisdiction on Watts or Epstein issues, Josefina’s testimony made 5 clear she never intended to collect rent from Jose (until now), and any Watts charges would be offset by the Epstein credits owed to Jose—both parties would be entitled to roughly the same amounts.

DISCUSSION

Josefina maintains she is entitled to share in the sale proceeds of the property. She argues the judgment of dissolution did not award the property to either party, and therefore characterizes it as an unadjudicated asset. As we understand its ruling, the trial court determined that the parties intended for Jose to receive the property at the time of their divorce. In other words, the property was accounted for in the martial settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. Accordingly, we observe that such agreements “are construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally.” (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) “ ‘The basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting.’ ” (In re Marriage of Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518.) “When the language of the judgment incorporating the marital settlement agreement is clear, explicit, and unequivocal, and there is no ambiguity, the court will enforce the express language.” (Iberti, at p. 1440.) When a term of the agreement is ambiguous, however, the court may accept extrinsic evidence to prove the parties’ intent, provided the evidence supports a meaning to which the language is reasonably susceptible. (Id. at p. 1439.) We review the language of a written agreement independently (Simundza, at p. 1518), and the trial court’s findings based on extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence (see In re Marriage of Trearse (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1189, 1195). In our view, the judgment of dissolution is ambiguous as to what the parties intended with respect to the property. The handwritten entry under 6 the “Miscellaneous Orders” section of the judgment could be construed as reserving jurisdiction over the eventual adjudication of the parties’ respective interests in the property. Or, as the trial court read the entry, it could be interpreted as giving the property to Jose but reserving jurisdiction to ensure that Josefina formally transferred title at a later date. The last sentence of the handwritten entry—requiring Josefina to cooperate as necessary when Jose alone was ready to refinance—reasonably supports an inference that the parties intended Jose to be the sole owner. Indeed, other than the vague reservation of jurisdiction, there is no language in the judgment suggesting the parties were contemplating selling the house and sharing in the proceeds. To the extent the judgment was ambiguous, the trial court found the extrinsic evidence confirmed the parties’ intent that the property to be given to Jose, and substantial evidence supports that finding. The evidence showed that at the time of their divorce, the parties had zero equity in the property and were making interest-only payments. It makes sense, then, why Josefina would be willing to let it go. Two years later, consistent with the handwritten entry, Josefina deeded the property to Jose, allowing him to refinance in his name. In the decade that followed, Josefina did not take any action consistent with believing she retained an interest in the property—she did not attempt to collect rent from Jose directly or through the court, nor did she contribute to the property in any manner. It was not until the house was selling at a profit that she asserted an interest. Although Josefina claimed at the evidentiary hearing that she did not take action sooner because she did not know her rights or “that there was something for [her]” in the house, the court could reasonably conclude she would have known she retained an interest in the property if that was the parties’ understanding at the time of the divorce.

7 Resisting this conclusion, Josefina argues it does not make sense that Jose would give her the Country Villas retirement account in exchange for her signing the deed if he was already entitled to the deed under the judgment. Based on evidence that Jose was “bothering” and “harassing” her to sign the deed, however, the trial court could have fairly inferred that she was reluctant to sign the deed, and Jose let her keep the retirement account to persuade her to sign instead of forcing him to return to court to enforce the judgment. Insofar as the judgment assigned the property—a debt—to Jose, there was no occasion to award Watts charges. (See In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 978 [“ ‘Where one spouse has the exclusive use of a community asset during the period between separation and trial, that spouse may be required to compensate the community for the reasonable value of that use’ ” (italics added)].) Moreover, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the claimed Watts charges ($278,900 fair rental value) were almost exactly offset by the estimated Epstein credits ($247,585.66 for the mortgage and taxes plus $26,500 for repairs totals $274,085.66). Even if we were to accept the premise that the property was unadjudicated in the judgment of dissolution, this would not necessarily entitle Josefina to an equal share in the sale proceeds. When a party seeks adjudication of a community estate asset or liability not adjudicated by the judgment, “the court shall equally divide the omitted or unadjudicated community estate asset or liability, unless the court finds upon good cause shown that the interests of justice require an unequal division of the asset or liability.” (Fam. Code, § 2556, italics added.) On the record in this case, it would not be a clear abuse of discretion for the trial court to award Jose all of the sale proceeds in the interests of justice. (See In re Marriage of De Prieto 8 (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 748, 759 [decisions made in the interests of justice are reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Jose took the risk of keeping the property when it was “upside down.” By holding onto the property for several years, making regular payments, and investing in necessary repairs, Jose managed to sell the property at a profit. It hardly seems fair to allow Josefina to collect half of those proceeds after deeding the property to Jose and otherwise remaining unconcerned with the property for more than a decade. Josefina also makes multiple arguments centered around the 2013 quitclaim deed. Specifically, she asserts that any agreement she made to deed the property to Jose in exchange for the Country Villas retirement account is invalid because the account does not exist, the agreement was not in writing, and Jose failed to establish the transaction was not the product of undue influence. We need not address these arguments in detail. The trial court (and this court) treat the deed as evidence that the parties intended Jose to keep the property, not as the sole reason Josefina is not entitled to share in the sale proceeds. We note, however, that that the judgment plainly identifies the Country Villas retirement account as a community asset originally awarded to Jose. And the authorities on which Josefina relies (Fam. Code, § 852; In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096; In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277) concern transactions between spouses, yet Josefina executed the deed years after their divorce.

9 DISPOSITION

The order denying the postjudgment motion to divide the property is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.

DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.