People v. Sapien CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/1/26 P. v. Sapien CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B342052 (Super. Ct. No. 2020013576) Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

JESUS ANDREW SAPIEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Jesus Andrew Sapien appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of 13 counts of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a)). The jury also found true enhancements for multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)), victims under age 14 (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2)), substantial sexual conduct with a victim under age 14 (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)), and allegations that he took advantage of a position of trust or confidence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)), and the victims were particularly vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)). The 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. trial court sentenced Sapien to prison for 325 years to life. Sapien contends the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS), and that the jury instruction regarding CSAAS was erroneous. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Sapien lived with his girlfriend, Kristen B.2 Kristen B.’s family had a very close relationship. Her sisters Melissa B. and Kathleen B., her cousin Stacey G., and all their children were frequently at Sapien and Kristen B.’s home. Sapien committed lewd acts on two of Kristen B.’s nieces (A.G. and I.B.) and on Stacey G.’s daughter (D.G.). A.G. (counts 1–9) A.G. and her mother Melissa B. lived in Kristen B. and Sapien’s home around 2018 to 2019. A.G. and Melissa B. then moved nearby but visited Kristen B. and Sapien’s home daily. A.G. saw Sapien as a father figure and referred to him as “Uncle Jesse.” Sapien was sometimes the only adult in the house with A.G. In May 2020, when A.G. was six years old, her mother noticed what appeared to be dried blood on A.G.’s underwear. She asked A.G. if anyone had touched her “private parts.” A.G. began crying and said Sapien had touched her “private areas,” pointing to her vagina. She said he had done it “many times.” The first time occurred in 2018 or 2019. The most recent incident was a week before Melissa B. found the blood on her underwear. She told her mother that in one incident, Sapien took 2 We refer to the victims and family members by their initials or first name and last initial to protect their privacy. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10), & (11).)

2 her to a bedroom, blocked the door with a chair, and licked her “private area” (count 3). A.G. said Sapien “told her not to tell anybody. It was their secret,” and “she could get into trouble.” Melissa B. called the police. A.G. told a detective she was scared to disclose the abuse because she “thought [she] was going to go to jail and get in trouble.” She described acts of sexual abuse Sapien committed against her in bedrooms (counts 1, 2, 4). She described his additional acts of sexual abuse against her in a closet (counts 5–8). She told the detective she tried to defend herself but Sapien was too strong for her. She then “had to just do it and get it over with.” A.G. testified about acts of sexual abuse committed in bedrooms (counts 1–4, 9). She was “pretty sure” he licked her “privates” in the closet (count 7), and did not remember if he licked her “bottom” in the closet (count 8). But she confirmed that what she told the detective was true. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if A.G. would lie to the detective. He asked if she would “make up stories about somebody else” or would “tell him about something that happened to someone else.” On cross-examination of Melissa B., defense counsel solicited testimony that A.G. never complained about having to stay at Kristen B.’s house, and never said she did not want to be around Sapien. D.G. (counts 10–11) After A.G.’s disclosures, Kristen B. called her cousin, Stacey G., and told her to check with her daughters to see if Sapien had done anything to them. Her daughter, D.G., age 16, began crying and said Sapien had touched her inappropriately when she was younger. When D.G. was eight or nine years old, she slept at Kristen 3 B. and Sapien’s home once or twice a month. She loved being with her cousins there. When Kristen B. would go to work, D.G. and one of her young cousins would be left alone with Sapien to watch them. Sapien began sexually abusing D.G. when she was eight or nine years old. D.G. eventually told her mother that she refused to stay over at the residence anymore, but at that time she did not tell her about the abuse. D.G. testified that in one incident, she tried to move her hand from Sapien’s penis but he moved it back. In another incident, she told him she didn’t like it and to stop. He told her, “to not cry, it’s going to be okay,” and continued touching her. He told her, “to not tell anyone.” She did not tell her parents about the abuse because she was scared and didn’t understand what had happened. I.B. (counts 12–13) I.B. and her mother, Kathleen B., lived with Kristen B. and Sapien in 2017. I.B. loved and “looked up to” Sapien because he would take them to the park and “do fun things” with her and the other children. I.B. enjoyed sleepovers at Kristen B. and Sapien’s home with the other children. After Kathleen B. and I.B. moved out, when I.B. was four years old, Kathleen B. would drop I.B. off at Kristen B. and Sapien’s house to take care of her. Sapien was sometimes the only adult in the house with I.B. In 2019, when I.B. was six, she cried when her mother dropped her off at Kristen B.’s and said she didn’t want to go. She said Sapien made her uncomfortable because “she felt like he was going to bite her face off.” Two or three days later, she told her mother that Sapien had sexually abused her. After that, Kathleen B. did not allow I.B. to be alone with Sapien. But she did not report the abuse to the police at that time.

4 A detective interviewed I.B. after Melissa B. went to the police. I.B. said she went to Sapien’s house 20 times, and he sexually abused her every time. She said she had told her parents about the abuse but had “cut some of it off.” I.B. testified she considered Sapien her uncle and “used to love” him. She “tr[ied] not to think about” the abuse. On cross- examination, counsel asked if she told the detective the truth and didn’t “make up stories.” On redirect, I.B. admitted that she did not tell the detective everything. For example, she told the detective Sapien licked her belly button, but did not disclose that Sapien also licked her “private area.” Motions in limine The prosecution made a motion in limine to admit expert testimony regarding CSAAS. The motion summarized the victims’ statements to police. The defense did not object to the motion in general, but made a motion in limine to exclude testimony that it is rare that children lie about being molested. The court granted the prosecution’s motion to admit CSAAS evidence. The court also granted the defense motion to exclude evidence that child molest victims seldom lie. CSAAS testimony Jody Ward, Ph.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified about CSAAS as an expert witness for the prosecution. Sapien did not object to her qualifications or to her testifying. She testified that she did not know the facts of the case, and was not testifying whether the victims were telling the truth or whether Sapien committed the alleged crimes. She testified that CSAAS does not diagnose whether sexual abuse occurred, but helps understand a child’s reaction to abuse by someone with 5 whom they have an ongoing relationship. Dr. Ward testified that CSAAS has five components: secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed unconvincing disclosure, and recantation or retraction. Secrecy means the abuse occurs outside others’ presence. It also means the victims keep the abuse secret for long periods based on embarrassment and “gentle reminders” to not tell, like saying they or the abuser will get in trouble. Helplessness refers to the power imbalance between adults and children, and the dependency of children on adults. Adults are also bigger and stronger than children. Younger children without knowledge of sex may not realize the conduct is wrong. Entrapment and accommodation allow the abuser to repeat the abuse. The victims may acquiesce to the abuse because they want to maintain the status quo of keeping the family together, to keep other children from being abused, and to continue receiving the positive aspects of the relationship such as care and the provision of material or emotional needs. Victims may try to not think about the abuse and try to forget about it, which may interfere with their memory of the abuse. Delayed, unconvincing disclosure is based on helplessness. Victims may disclose a little at a time to “[t]est the waters” of the other person’s reaction. Retraction or recantation occurs in “a substantial minority of cases” as a reaction to the effects of the disclosure. Sapien’s statement The prosecution introduced portions of Sapien’s interview by police. He initially denied ever touching the victims inappropriately. He suggested that if he had done so, his older daughter would have “stood up and said something a long time 6 ago.” He said if he had touched D.G., he “would have been in trouble a long time ago.” He then admitted much of the sexual abuse but minimized some of it, e.g., by stating he touched them accidentally or claiming they initiated the conduct. He stated that in the closet A.G. licked his elbow and kissed his neck and chest. He also said it was “[p]ossible” he inserted his tongue into her “butt and vagina” in the closet (counts 7 and 8). He denied any sexual contact in the closet other than licking. DISCUSSION Admissibility of CSAAS evidence Sapien contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted CSAAS evidence. We disagree. Sapien did not object to the admission of CSAAS evidence. He moved only that the court exclude testimony that sexual abuse victims seldom lie, and the court granted his motion. Sapien thus forfeited an objection to CSAAS evidence by failing to object to it in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333.) Forfeiture aside, admission of the evidence was not error. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1302 (McAlpin).) In McAlpin, our Supreme Court held that “expert testimony on the common reactions of child molestation victims . . . is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident— e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1300–1301.)

7 We are bound by the Supreme Court precedent in McAlpin. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) As we concluded in People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468–472 (Munch), we do not deviate from McAlpin based on contrary decisions in other jurisdictions. (Accord, People v. Melgoza (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 632, 655–656.) Nor do we reject CSAAS based on a purported failure to establish scientific reliability. (Munch, at pp. 472–473.) And California cases continue to allow CSAAS evidence. (E.g., Melgoza, at pp. 655– 656; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 172–174.) The record does not support Sapien’s contention that the prosecutor argued that CSAAS established the abuse occurred. The prosecutor told the jury: “The law is clear, you can’t use [CSAAS] to say the defendant is guilty. But you can use that to see that the way the victims acted in this case is common for victims of child sexual abuse.” This is a correct statement of the law. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1300.) Relevance Sapien also contends the CSAAS evidence was improperly admitted because it was irrelevant. Again, Sapien’s failure to object in the trial court forfeits this issue. (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1002.) Forfeiture aside, we conclude the admission of expert testimony regarding CSAAS was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. (People v. Sedano (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 474, 479.) CSAAS helped explain the victims’ conduct to the jury. For example, A.G. did not disclose the ongoing abuse because she was scared. She was helpless, as shown by her unsuccessful attempt to defend herself against the more powerful Sapien. He told her not to tell anyone because it was a “secret” and she would “get in 8 trouble.” She accommodated the abuse by continuing to go to Sapien’s home without complaint. I.B. reported the abuse to her mother, but only after Sapien had abused her numerous times. She held back some information when she described the abuse to her mother and police. D.G. did not disclose the abuse until her mother asked her about it years later. D.G. did not understand what was happening to her at the time, she was scared, and Sapien told her not to tell anyone. She was powerless to stop Sapien, as evidenced by the incident in which she moved her hand away from his penis and he moved it back. She “tr[ied] not to think about” the abuse. This case is unlike People v. Clotfelter (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 30, upon which Sapien relies. The court there found CSAAS testimony was irrelevant where “there was no testimony that those victims delayed reporting or recanted, and Clotfelter did not question their credibility at trial.” (Id. at p. 64.) Here, all three victims delayed reporting and exhibited other behavior explained by CSAAS. They were close to Sapien and considered him their uncle. They were little girls powerless to prevent a grown man from abusing them. The CSAAS concept of accommodation explained why maintaining the status quo of family relationships, housing, and childcare would motivate the victims to continue to be around Sapien. Defense counsel raised the issue of the victims’ credibility, questioning whether A.G. and I.B. would “make up stories.” CSAAS evidence was thus relevant and properly admitted. Jury instruction Sapien contends the jury instruction regarding CSAAS was 9 erroneous because it allowed the jury to use the expert testimony as evidence of guilt. We again disagree. The trial court advised the jury pursuant to a modified version of CALCRIM No. 1193: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Jody Ward regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. “Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse. “Dr. Jody Ward’s testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him or any conduct or crimes with which he was not charged. “You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [A.G., D.G., and I.B.’s] conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.” Sapien forfeited his claim of instructional error because he did not object in the trial court. “ ‘A party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’ ” (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 483.) But in the absence of an objection, we may review a jury instruction “if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259.) We conclude Sapien’s substantial rights were not affected because CALCRIM No. 1193 is a correct statement of the law. (People v. Page (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1032–1033; People 10 v. Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176.) Permitting the jury to use CSAAS “ ‘in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim’ ” does not “impermissibly permit[] jurors to consider CSAAS testimony as evidence of guilt.” (Page, at pp. 1029, 1030.) We agree with Page that using CSAAS to evaluate witness credibility versus using it as evidence of the truth of the charges is not “ ‘a distinction without a difference.’ ” (Id. at p. 1029.) As we stated in Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at page 474: “ ‘A reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM No. 1193 to mean that the jury can use [the expert’s] testimony to conclude that [the child’s] behavior does not mean she lied when she said she was abused. The jury also would understand it cannot use [the expert’s] testimony to conclude [the child] was, in fact, molested. The CSAAS evidence simply neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (Italics omitted.) The jury instruction here was correct. Harmless error Sapien contends the purported errors in admitting and instructing about the CSAAS evidence were prejudicial. This contention is without merit. Sapien contends the admission of CSAAS evidence was particularly prejudicial regarding counts 5 through 7 because he did not admit “genital contact in the closet.” But in fact, Sapien admitted it was “[p]ossible” he inserted his tongue into A.G.’s vagina in the closet (count 7). The evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The victims described the sexual abuse Sapien inflicted on them. Their testimony was consistent with, and corroborated by, their statements to detectives, and three victims testified to similar 11 acts he committed. Sapien also admitted much of the conduct. The jury was properly instructed that if it found one or more counts proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it was a factor to conclude he committed the other charged offenses. (CALCRIM No. 1191B; Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a); People v. Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 67–68.) We conclude any error was harmless under the California and federal tests. If the CSAAS evidence had not been admitted or the jury instruction not given, it is not “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We also conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

12 David R. Worley, Judge Superior Court County of Ventura ______________________________ Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Susan S. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.