Romero v. Jones CA4/3
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Orange County · No. 30-2024-01408424
- Trial judge
- Sheila Recio
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- James B. Scott (author), Joanne Motoike, Thomas A. Delaney
Analysis
No analysis yet. When one exists it is a model's reading of this opinion — the rulings it reviewed, whether it agrees with the court, and the authorities it checked — shown beside the court's own disposition, never in place of it. How analyses are made.
Opinion
Filed 8/31/26 Romero v. Jones CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MARSHELL ROMERO,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065501 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024- 01408424) GERALDINE JONES, OPINION Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Sheila Recio, Judge. Affirmed. Marshell Romero, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Poliquin & DeGrave, Douglas M. DeGrave and Donald B. Wallace for Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiff Marshell Romero appeals from an order granting defendant Geraldine Jones’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm. Romero did not establish through admissible evidence that Jones has sufficient minimum contacts with California to create personal jurisdiction. FACTS According to her complaint, Romero dated Jones’s son, Jamal Abdul Brown, for several months in 2022. One morning in September 2022, Brown allegedly attacked Romero while they were driving. Bleeding profusely, Romero pleaded with Brown to take her to the hospital. Instead, Brown allegedly called Jones, who begged Romero not to call the police or report her son. Brown was arrested and criminally charged with felony corporal injury and related crimes. Meanwhile, Romero filed a civil complaint against both Brown and Jones, asserting various intentional tort claims. Jones filed a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting she was born in Alabama, has lived in Georgia since 1996, and has almost no contacts with California. In her supporting declaration, Jones explained she has visited California only twice—once in the early 1970’s to visit a friend, and again for three or four days in May 2022 to attend Brown’s college graduation. She further attested that she has never lived, worked, banked, or owned any real property or a business in California; she was in Georgia during the September 2022 incident; and it was Brown, not Jones, who initiated the telephone call during that incident. Romero opposed the motion, asserting Jones has sufficient contacts with California because she paid for Brown’s bail bond following his 2 2022 arrest and because she operates a moving company in California. In support, Romero submitted documents she had subpoenaed from a bail bond company, although she did not include a declaration authenticating those records. Her opposition offered no evidence to support her argument about the moving company. Before the hearing, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting Jones’s motion on the grounds that Romero had presented no admissible evidence to establish Jones’s alleged ties to California. The tentative also noted the court intended to strike the bail bond records, as they contained confidential information such as social security numbers and driver’s license numbers. At the hearing the next day, Romero (representing herself) appeared in person, and defense counsel appeared remotely. According to Romero, the trial court permitted her to speak briefly but did not let her present any documentary evidence.1 Because the proceeding was not reported by a court reporter, however, the record does not confirm one way or the other whether Romero asked for the opportunity to present any such evidence. According to the court’s corrected settled statement submitted in this appeal, the court has no recollection whether Romero brought any documents to the hearing, and no documentary or live testimony was authorized or received at the hearing.2 1 According to Romero, she was prepared to present (1) redacted copies of the bail bond records showing Jones posted bail for Brown in California, and (2) business records from the Georgia Secretary of State identifying Jones as the registered agent for the moving company. 2 The trial court explained that the matter was calendared as a nonevidentiary law and motion hearing, new documents are generally not accepted after a tentative has been posted, the court will generally not review 3 After oral argument, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling and granted Jones’s motion to quash. It also struck the bail bond records. The next day, Romero filed a supplemental declaration, in which she attempted to authenticate the bail bond records with her own personal knowledge and an e-mail from the bail bond company’s representative. She also attached as an exhibit a document that appears to be a printout from the Georgia Secretary of State identifying Jones as the registered agent for Super Moving Heroes, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, as well as what appears to be a Yelp printout regarding a moving company called Super Moving Heroes that apparently services the Lake Forest area. However, Romero’s supplemental declaration did not mention or authenticate either exhibit. There is no indication the trial court considered the uninvited supplemental declaration. Romero filed a notice of appeal. In lieu of a reporter’s transcript, she submitted a proposed settled statement describing the proceedings below, and she attached, among other documents, another Georgia Secretary of State printout concerning Super Moving Heroes, LLC. The trial court determined that modifications to Romero’s proposed settled statement were required and issued a corrected settled statement concerning what transpired at the hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(f)(3)(B)(i).)
documents that were not first presented to the other side, and sharing any documents brought to the hearing would have been “extremely difficult” since defense counsel appeared remotely.
4 DISCUSSION For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction3 over a nonresident defendant, the defendant must have purposefully availed herself of forum benefits, the controversy must be related to or arise out of her forum contacts, and the assertion of personal jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice. (ParaFi Digital Opportunities LP v. Egorov (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 124, 134 (ParaFi).) The purposeful availment “requirement ensures defendants will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely because [of] fortuitous or attenuated contacts or because of the unilateral activity of another party.” (Farina v. SAVWCL III, LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 286, 294−295.) “When a defendant moves to quash service of process, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. [Citation.] To carry this burden, the plaintiff must do more than merely allege facts.” (ParaFi, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.) Instead, she “must support [her] allegations with ‘competent evidence of jurisdictional facts.’” (Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 393 (Rivelli).) That means providing “‘specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate.’” (Swenberg v. dmarcian, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 280, 291 (Swenberg); see ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 218 [plaintiff must “produce admissible evidence that support[s] its jurisdictional facts” to defeat motion to quash].) A 3 Romero contends Jones is subject to California’s specific jurisdiction. She does not assert Jones is subject to general jurisdiction.
5 plaintiff “‘cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts.’” (Swenberg, at p. 291.) If the plaintiff shows “by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the defendant has purposefully availed [her]self of the forum and the plaintiff’s claims relate to or arise out of the defendant’s forum-related contacts . . . , the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.) When the facts are undisputed, we independently determine whether the exercise of special jurisdiction is fair and reasonable under all of the circumstances. (ParaFi, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.) We review the trial court’s evidentiary determinations for abuse of discretion. (Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 975.) Romero asserts the trial court erred by not allowing her to present additional evidence at the hearing. But because the proceeding below was not reported, there is nothing in the record confirming Romero in fact offered to present any evidence at the hearing. The court, for its part, has no recollection of her trying to do so. Even assuming Romero did ask to present additional evidence at the hearing, “the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing [any] last-minute request” to fix evidentiary issues. (Lowery v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 119, 126.) We therefore have no basis to conclude the court abused its discretion or otherwise denied Romero a fair hearing. Romero alternatively argues that if the trial court had considered the proffered evidence, it would have found she made a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction. But even if the court had permitted Romero to submit 6 her evidence, those documents would not have warranted a different outcome. The bail bond documents, for example, were not authenticated. And even if they had been, they would at most show Jones had contact with California after the underlying incident, which is insufficient to create specific jurisdiction. (Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Fiscus (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1239 [relevant period for measuring nonresident defendant’s contacts with forum is when plaintiff’s cause of action arose].) Similarly, the Georgia Secretary of State printouts and the Yelp printout likewise were not authenticated and thus inadmissible. And the record is devoid of any evidence that the Super Moving Heroes company listed in the Yelp printout is the same Super Moving Heroes company registered in Georgia. Because Romero did not support her allegations of specific jurisdiction with “‘affidavits and other authenticated documents’” (Swenberg, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 291) constituting “‘competent evidence of jurisdictional facts’” (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 393), Jones’s motion to quash was properly granted.
7 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Jones shall recover her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
DELANEY, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff H041521 · 2016-07-06
- Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Fiscus G039037 · 2008-06-12