In re D.H. CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/31/26 In re D.H. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re D.H., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH D087410 AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. EJ5009A) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.S., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Micheal P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed. Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. J.S. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order denying him placement of S.S. S.S. is a dependent child who was removed from his mother’s custody and Father is S.S.’s noncustodial parent. Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361.2, subdivision (a), requires that when a dependent child is removed from one parent, the court must place the child in the care of the child’s noncustodial parent unless it finds that placement would be detrimental to the child’s well-being. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) The juvenile court found placement with Father would be detrimental to S.S. and Father argues the court’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm the court’s dispositional order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The San Diego County of Health and Human Services (Agency) received multiple referrals of alleged emotional abuse, physical abuse, and general neglect involving S.S., spanning from the time he was five months old until the age of seven. In July 2025, when S.S. was seven years old, the Agency investigated an allegation that S.S.’s mother (Mother) and stepfather (Stepfather) were involved in a verbal and physical altercation involving injury to Mother while S.S. was present. The Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging Mother and Stepfather exposed S.S. to multiple violent confrontations, Stepfather physically harmed S.S. during an altercation, and Mother and S.S. resumed living with Stepfather afterwards 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 while a temporary restraining order remained pending. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing that followed, the juvenile court sustained the petition and removed S.S. from Mother’s custody. The court explained removal was appropriate because Mother and Stepfather “exposed [S.S.] to direct acts of violence” that placed him at risk of emotional and physical harm. Father requested S.S. be placed with him. S.S. is non-verbal and Mother reported that he was diagnosed with autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and delayed speech. Family members explained S.S. requires “high attention” and more recently, his behavior became “a bit aggressive” and “unprovoked.” Father is diagnosed with bipolar disorder. He discontinued both medication and therapy and admitted he previously abused his prescription medication. Father also has a history of domestic violence. Mother first obtained a restraining order protecting her and S.S. from Father in 2018 when S.S. was five months old. When S.S. was a year old, Father put his left hand around Mother’s neck while he punched her with his right hand in her torso and face. In discussing that incident during the pendency of this case, Father stated he “ ‘took the hit’ ” and participated in domestic violence class. In 2022, Mother obtained a criminal protective order against Father and in 2023, she obtained a temporary restraining order. In 2023, Father was convicted of violating a restraining order. In 2024, Mother obtained a domestic violence restraining order against Father. The domestic violence restraining order required Father to have no contact with Mother and S.S. Less than a month after this order was imposed, Mother reported Father violated the order by knocking on Mother’s door, demanding custody of S.S, texting Mother, and damaging Mother’s vehicle outside her home. Father 3 took a tool, cracked Mother’s car’s mirror, broke off her mirror cover, and scratched her car. The Agency noted when it investigated this incident that Father had obtained a restraining order based on allegations that Stepfather was physically abusing S.S. The Agency opined then that Father “continues to violate restraining orders and protective orders seeking out the mother and acting out towards her; [t]he father does not show that he is concerned for the safety and/or well-being of the children and there are concerns that he will continue to act out towards the mother regardless of the safety or well- being of the children.” In 2025, the Superior Court issued a postconviction criminal protective order, protecting Mother from Father. While S.S. remained in Mother’s care, Father harbored concerns about S.S.’s safety. Father believed Stepfather beat Mother in front of S.S., kidnapped her at knifepoint, sexually assaulted S.S.’s half-sibling, and “beat[ ] and mistreat[ed]” S.S. Father explained Stepfather was “very violent,” manipulative, and that he sent “disturbing videos” of S.S. Father believed Mother knew about Stepfather’s mistreatment of S.S. and she did not stop it. Although Father obtained temporary restraining orders against Mother, he did not attend subsequent court proceedings, so the orders were dismissed or expired. As this dependency case progressed, Father stated to the social worker that he would “happily do time, after I kill [Stepfather’s] ass.” This caused the social worker to remind Father that he needed to leave his complications with Mother and Stepfather aside. Despite the social worker’s advice, Father taunted Stepfather by sending messages, including “you gonna go to jail scum bag” and “I can [s]mell [t]he fear in you.” In November 2025, the domestic violence restraining order that restricted Father from all contact with S.S. was modified to allow Father supervised visitation with S.S.

4 At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in January 2026, the juvenile court acknowledged that visitation between Father and S.S. had gone well. It also acknowledged Father had engaged in services, addressing his mental health and substance abuse. But the court explained Father needed parenting skills and it could not ignore the domestic violence findings made regarding Father. The court explained the 2025 criminal protective order was a postconviction order and the court issuing the 2024 domestic violence restraining order found “no contact at all with [S.S.] was appropriate.” The juvenile court continued that while the 2024 order had recently been modified, it still allowed only supervised visitation. The court deduced from this that “different judicial officers looking at the facts of this family have come to the determination that there is domestic violence . . . that requires protection.” The court noted, on “[t]he positive side,” that Father was no longer in a relationship with Mother and the court did not have evidence of any other domestic violence. But it reasoned, “I simply don’t have evidence – while I do believe more is needed for parenting and mental health stability and also domestic violence treatment, and all of the things that he’s working on in order for [S.S.] to be full time in his care.” The court concluded that placement with Father would be detrimental to S.S. but “cautiously and optimistically” granted Father unsupervised visitation. DISCUSSION Father asserts there was insufficient evidence that placement with him would be detrimental to S.S. We disagree. A. Guiding Principles When a court determines a dependent child would be at substantial risk of physical or emotional harm if left in parental custody and there is a noncustodial and nonoffending parent who is willing to assume custody, the 5 juvenile court must place the child with the noncustodial parent unless it finds that doing so would be “detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) In assessing whether placement would be detrimental, the court “may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances.” (In re A.T. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 722, 736 (A.T.), internal quotation marks omitted.) In doing so, the court may consider whether a history of domestic violence in the child’s household presents an ongoing risk to the child’s physical and emotional health. (See In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194, disapproved on another ground in In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628–629 [finding that failure to protect children from domestic violence exposes them to substantial risk of encountering violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.].) Before the juvenile court, “[t]he nonoffending parent does not have to prove lack of detriment. Rather, the party opposing placement with a nonoffending parent has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be harmed if the nonoffending parent is given custody.” (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402.) “Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.” (In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262.) On appeal, we review the court’s detriment finding for substantial evidence, asking “whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the 6 evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (A.T., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 736 [cleaned up].) If there is evidence of reasonable, credible and solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find as the juvenile court did, we must affirm. (In re K.B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 972, 979.) It is the noncustodial parent’s burden to show there is no such evidence. (In re Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1087.) B. Analysis The record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that placement with Father would be detrimental to S.S. At the time of the disposition hearing, S.S. was seven years old, required high attention, and his behavior had recently become difficult to handle at times. Because of S.S.’s limited speech abilities and needs, the court could find that he needed an understanding caregiver who could handle the stress involved in caring for him with patience and self-control. However, Father had a history of domestic violence spanning from the time S.S. was five months old and continuing throughout his childhood. Father’s actions led Mother to obtain several restraining orders including a domestic violence restraining order. The issuance of the domestic violence restraining order signified the imposing court found that Father had committed a past act or acts of domestic violence abuse, either physical or emotional in nature. (See Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, 592.) And the imposing court found it appropriate to protect not only Mother, but S.S. too. Despite the restraining orders against him, Father repeatedly contacted Mother. Father was convicted of violating a restraining order when S.S. was five years old. When S.S. was six years old, Father again violated a domestic violence restraining order one month after the order was imposed. In the latter instance, Father alleged Stepfather was physically 7 abusing S.S. and rather than seeking the assistance of law enforcement or social services to safeguard his son, he acted out violently outside S.S.’s home, damaging Mother’s vehicle. His behavior risked S.S.’s physical and emotional safety. Moreover, Father did not follow through with any restraining order hearing against Mother that could have safeguarded S.S. from harm. Father also allowed his frustrations to boil over during this case when he chose to ignore the social worker’s advice and sent taunting messages to Stepfather. Thus, the court had evidence of reasonable, credible and solid value that in addition to Father’s history of domestic violence, he demonstrated recent lack of self-control. Father avers, however, the court improperly found that placement with him would be detrimental to S.S. because there was not enough evidence to afford Father custody. We are not persuaded. Viewed in context, the court’s finding that Father needed more treatment and stability for S.S. to be placed in his full time care was based on information the court did have regarding Father’s issues, not a lack of information. (See In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1568 [a lack of information does not constitute substantial evidence].) Moreover, we review the juvenile court’s ruling, not its reasoning, and may affirm if it is correct on any ground. (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38.) We conclude that based on the totality of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the juvenile court could reasonably find by clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to S.S.’s well-being if he was placed with Father. Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not err by denying Father’s request for placement.

8 DISPOSITION We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.