People v. Fuentesveloz CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/31/26 P. v. Fuentesveloz CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B351459

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 25CJCF02877)

MARIO FUENTESVELOZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed. Omer Ali Khan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________ Appellant Mario Fuentesveloz requested diversion to a mental health program for alcohol use disorder. (Pen. Code, §1001.36.)1 The trial court denied his request because he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Id., subd. (c)(4).) We review his appeal of the diversion ruling pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Appellant attacked his partner of 28 years, M.S., on May 19, 2025. He grabbed her without provocation and began to strangle her. As she lost consciousness, appellant said he was going to kill her and tried to throw her from an upstairs window. The couple’s adult daughter D.F. walked in and saw appellant strangling her mother. She yelled at him to stop or she would call police. Appellant released M.S. and chased D.F., grabbing her hair and trying to take her phone. The victims escaped and called police. Appellant’s brief states that police “observed red marks on [M.S.’s] neck consistent with strangulation” and she urinated on herself during the attack. M.S. disclosed eight instances of domestic violence by appellant, who previously threatened to shoot and kill her. M.S. fears for her life. Appellant was charged with inflicting corporal injury on M.S. and committing battery on D.F. (§§ 242, 273.5, subd. (a).) He pleaded not guilty and was held to answer at the preliminary hearing. He petitioned for diversion after a psychologist diagnosed him with alcohol use disorder and anxiety disorder. He argued that he meets eligibility requirements for diversion, is likely to respond to treatment, and does not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The People opposed diversion. They conceded appellant was diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder but argued it was not a significant factor in the commission of his crimes; his symptoms would not respond to the outpatient treatment recommended by the psychologist; and he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community. At the hearing, the People argued that the victims fear appellant will come to their home and kill them if he is released. M.S. would have died if D.F. had not intervened. The court found appellant has a qualifying mental disorder. However, “based on the level of violence that’s alleged against the victim in this case, the victim’s fear as well as her daughter’s fear of [appellant], as well as the allegations of domestic violence incidents, including threats to kill the victim, unfortunately, I do find that he poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike if treated in the community.” It denied diversion. After diversion was denied, appellant pleaded no contest to inflicting injury on a cohabitant; was placed on formal probation for three years; ordered to serve 364 days in county jail; and forbidden from approaching the victims. The court issued a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5.) We appointed counsel to represent appellant. After reviewing the record, counsel filed a brief raising no issues. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441–442; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 125–126 (Kelly).) We advised appellant that he had 30 days to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished to raise on appeal. (See Kelly, at p. 124.) He did not file a supplemental brief. A court may deny diversion if a defendant poses “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” An unreasonable risk to public safety means a defendant is likely to commit a 3 “super strike” offense. (§§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4), 1170.18, subd. (c); People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 452–453.)2 An order denying diversion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147; People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795.) Citing appellant’s violence, the court found he is likely to commit a super strike offense. The record supports this finding. Appellant has a history of domestic violence. He strangled M.S. until she could not breathe and was losing consciousness, and said he was going to kill her. The murder was thwarted by the fortuitous arrival of D.F. Appellant attacked D.F. to prevent her from calling police. He tried to throw M.S. from an upstairs window and previously threatened to kill her by shooting her. The victims fear he will kill them if released into the community. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying diversion. We have independently examined the entire record and are satisfied that counsel fully complied with all responsibilities and no arguable issues exist. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441– 443.) By virtue of counsel’s compliance with Wende procedures and our independent review of the record, appellant has received adequate and effective review of the judgment. (See Smith v. 2 Super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, sexually violent offenses, or sexual offenses committed against minors under the age of 14. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1150–1151.)

4 Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278–280, 283 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 109–110.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J. We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GOORVITCH, J.