Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ELOV ULUGBEK, Case No.: 3:26-cv-04586-RBM-DDL 11 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING AMENDED 12 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 13 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden, et al., 14 Respondents. [Doc. 5] 15 16 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Elov Ulugbek’s (“Petitioner”) Amended 18 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 5.) 19 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner was born in Tajikistan and entered the United States in 2022 by applying 22 for asylum at a port of entry. (Id. at 2.) After being detained for several weeks, he was 23 paroled into the United States. (Id.) However, he “was ordered removed in absentia on 24 May 2, 2025, because his lawyer did not tell him that he had a court hearing.” (Id. (citing 25 Doc. 5-1 [Decl. of Elov Ulugbek] ¶¶ 1–5).) On June 10, 2026, United States Immigration 26 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers arrested Petitioner for sleeping in his work 27 vehicle. (Id.) When the officers determined that Petitioner had been ordered removed, 28 they brought him to Otay Mesa Detention Center, where he remains today. (Id. at 3.) 1 Petitioner, then proceeding pro se, filed his original petition on August 11, 2026. 2 (Doc. 1.) The Court referred the petition to Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., for an 3 evaluation of whether Petitioner was eligible for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 2.) 4 Petitioner, now represented by Federal Defenders, filed the operative Petition on August 5 17, 2026. (Doc. 5.) Respondents filed their return on August 24, 2026. (Doc. 6.) 6 Petitioner filed his reply on August 27, 2026. (Doc. 7.) 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 9 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 10 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 11 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 12 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 13 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 14 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 15 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 16 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Supreme Court’s decision in 19 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because his removal is not significantly likely in 20 the reasonably foreseeable future. (Doc. 5 at 3–5.) Respondents do not respond to the 21 Zadvydas claim, arguing only that the Petition is premature because “Petitioner’s post-final 22 order detention is within the 90-day” removal period mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 23 (Doc. 6 at 2–4.) 24 A. Zadvydas 25 The Supreme Court has recognized a six-month presumptively reasonable period of 26 detention after a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 27 “After this 6-month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there 28 is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the 1 Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. “Once 2 removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized 3 by statute.” Id. (citation modified). In that case, the noncitizen’s release “may and should 4 be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the 5 circumstances, and the [noncitizen] may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation 6 of those conditions.” Id. at 700. 7 1. Presumption of Reasonableness 8 The six-month presumptively reasonable period has passed for Petitioner. “The 9 removal period begins when [a noncitizen] is ordered removed, and the removal order 10 becomes administratively final.” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534 (2021) 11 (citation modified). Under § 1231: 12 The removal period begins on the latest of the following:

13 (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

14 (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the [noncitizen], the date of the court’s final order. 15 16 (iii) If the [noncitizen] is detained or confined (except under an immigration process, the date the [noncitizen] is released from detention or confinement. 17 18 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). 19 The Parties agree that only the first option is relevant here, and that Petitioner’s 20 removal order became final on May 2, 2025. (See Doc. 6 at 3 (Respondents acknowledging 21 that “Petitioner’s removal order became final on May 2, 2025, when he was ordered 22 removed in absentia”); Doc. 6-4 at 2.) Respondents argue, though, that the mandatory 90- 23 day detention period does not end 90 days after the removal order becomes administratively 24 final, but after the petitioner has been detained for 90 days. (See id. at 3.) But as multiple 25 courts in this District have concluded, “a plain reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)” 26 demonstrates that “the statute is unequivocal that the removal period begins on the . . . day 27 that Petitioner’s order of removal bec[omes] administratively final.” Nguyen v. Mullin, 28 2026 WL 1480803, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2026) (citing Baythavong v. Noem, 26-cv- 1 01138-DMS-MSB, ECF No. 7, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2026) (“Respondents failed to 2 cite any authority to support their position that the presumptively reasonable period of 3 detention only applies when the individual is actually in detention, i.e., that the nearly 4 seven-year period in which Petitioner was on supervision is not relevant to the Zadvydas 5 argument.”)); see also Nguyen v. Noem, Civil Action No. 5:25-CV-176, 2026 WL 237282, 6 at *7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2026) (“[T]here is nothing in the relevant statutory language to 7 suggest that the removal period restarts or resets automatically with another arrest or 8 subsequent redetention.”). 9 The Court agrees with the reasoning in the above cases and incorporates it here. 10 Therefore, under § 1231 and Zadvydas, Petitioner’s detention would have been 11 presumptively constitutional for six months after May 2, 2025, through November 2, 2025. 12 Because Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final over 15 months ago, 13 though, his current detention is not presumptively reasonable. 14 2. Good Reason to Believe 15 After the six-month period expires, Petitioner has the initial burden of showing 16 “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 17 foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “Good reason to believe does not place a 18 burden upon the detainee to demonstrate no reasonably foreseeable, significant likelihood 19 of removal or show that his detention is indefinite; it is something less than that.” Senor v. 20 Barr, 401 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up). Respondents do not dispute 21 Petitioner’s contention that they have made no progress in removing him despite his 22 removal order being finalized over 15 months ago. Accordingly, the Court finds that 23 Petitioner has met his initial burden. The burden thus shifts to Respondents to “respond 24 with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. As discussed 25 below, Respondents have not done so. 26 3. Significant Likelihood of Removal in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future 27 Respondents do not respond substantively to Petitioner’s Zadvydas argument. They 28 attach no declarations or documentary evidence regarding progress being made toward 1 Petitioner’s removal. They make no representations in their return that progress is being 2 made toward Petitioner’s removal. In fact, the sole piece of information in the record 3 regarding Petitioner’s removal prospects comes from Petitioner: “ICE officers have told 4 him that they will have to apply for a Tajikistan passport for him but have not said how 5 long this will take.” (Doc. 5 (citing Decl. of Elov Ulugbek ¶ 6).) Courts in this District, 6 including this Court, have found that the Government failed to meet its burden on facts far 7 more favorable to them than those present here. See, e.g., Phan v. Warden of Otay Mesa 8 Det. Facility, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1186–87 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (holding that the 9 Government failed to sufficiently rebut even though it had already submitted a travel 10 document request to ICE headquarters because it “conceded that the travel document 11 request had yet to be submitted to Vietnam, provided no estimate for when it would be 12 submitted, and provided no estimate for how long it would take for Vietnam to respond”) 13 (citation modified); Conchas-Valdez v. Casey, No. 25-cv-02469-DMS-JLB, 2025 WL 14 2884822, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2025) (“[T]he Government’s minimal work on this case— 15 one resettlement request and two follow up emails over the course of seven months—do 16 not instill confidence that it will be able to secure [the petitioner’s] removal in the 17 reasonably foreseeable future.”); Alkhafaji v. Mullin, Case No.: 3:26-cv-02262-RBM- 18 BJW, 2026 WL 1862613, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2026) (holding that the Government 19 failed to sufficiently rebut because it had “not identified a third country to which they plan 20 to remove Petitioner, much less a travel document or . . . an estimate for how long it would 21 take for the third country to respond”). 22 Petitioner has sufficiently established that his removal is not significantly likely in 23 the reasonably foreseeable future. Therefore, his detention is no longer reasonable or 24 authorized by statute. 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 5) is GRANTED. Respondents are 27 ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to “appropriate 28 conditions” of supervision to be determined by immigration authorities and in accordance 1 || with applicable statutory and regulatory procedures. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700; Vlasov 2 ||v. Bondi, Case No.: 25-cv-1342-AJB-MSB, 2025 WL 2258582, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 3 |{2025). 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 ||DATE: August 28, 2026 FR trormud, Moiige 7 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28