People v. Broadey CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/28/26 P. v. Broadey CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086339

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FVI24001879)

v.

DEQUAN ONEAL BROADEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Enrique Guerrero, Judge. Affirmed. William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Rogers and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION A jury convicted Dequan Oneal Broadey in 2024 of making a criminal threat and the trial court found true he had previously been convicted of an offense qualifying as a strike prior and a serious felony. He was sentenced to seven years and eight months in prison. He now challenges the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm. BACKGROUND In 2015, Broadey was convicted of assault with a firearm, with gang and gun sentence enhancements, and received a 14-year prison sentence. He was released on parole in January 2024. About two months after being released from prison, Broadey went to his father’s home and threatened to fight his father and his stepson. The father contacted law enforcement and they escorted Broadey off the property. A few months later, in June 2024, Broadey sent two text messages to his father. The first read, “U about to get smoked.” The second read, “U got 72 hrs.” The father reported the text messages to law enforcement and expressed he was in fear for his life. The People charged Broadey with one count of making a criminal threat in violation of Penal Code1 section 422, subdivision (a), with allegations that he suffered a prior conviction qualifying as both a strike pursuant to sections 667 and 1170.12 and a serious felony pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The People further alleged 12 aggravating sentencing factors. In November 2024, a jury convicted Broadey of making a criminal threat. At a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the strike prior and prior serious felony conviction allegations. It further found true seven of the 12 alleged aggravating sentencing factors, including that “there was a 1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 threat of great bodily harm that is disclosing a high degree of cruelty”; Broadey “has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society”; he “served a prior term in prison”; and he was on parole when he committed the current offense. Before sentencing, Broadey filed a motion under section 1385, subdivision (c), to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancement.2 As relevant here, he argued that two mitigating factors weighed in favor of dismissal, namely his current conviction was not for a violent felony and his prior conviction was more than five years old.3 Broadey further argued that 2 Broadey also moved the trial court to dismiss the strike prior, but he does not challenge on appeal that portion of the trial court’s ruling.

3 In addition, Broadey argued in the trial court that he established the mitigating circumstance that the prosecution was trying to impose more than one enhancement (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)) based on the strike prior and prior serious felony conviction allegations. He does not rely on this mitigating circumstance here, as he recognizes it is foreclosed by precedent. (See People v. Grandberry (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 14, 19 [“[C]ourts have uniformly rejected the contention that the mitigating factors identified in subdivision (c) of section 1385 apply to a request to dismiss a prior strike because the Three Strikes is an alternate sentencing scheme, not an ‘enhancement.’ ”].) He continues to argue in this appeal, however, that he established a third mitigating circumstance, namely that, “[t]hough a firearm was used in the current offense, it was inoperable or unloaded.” (§ 1385 subd. (c)(2)(I).) He reasons this factor is established because he did not use a firearm at all during the commission of the current offense. The People argue Broadey forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court and, regardless, it is inapplicable here where Broadey did not use a gun to commit the crime. We agree Broadey forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below (People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92), and that, under the plain language of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(I), this factor is inapplicable under the facts presented here. But even if we considered this mitigating circumstance, for the reasons we shall explain, Broadey has not established error.

3 dismissal of the enhancement would not endanger public safety because the current offense “is of a much less serious nature,” he committed it “via text message,” police did not find him in possession of any weapons, and his father testified he did not fear Broadey. In addition, he highlighted that he committed the prior offense when he “was a very young man” and had not been convicted of any crimes between his prior and current convictions. In support of the motion, Broadey offered his father’s statement that he wanted Broadey to be granted probation because the crime “is not really that serious,” as it only involved a text message and the father was not concerned for his safety or that of his family. The court denied Broadey’s motion to dismiss the enhancement, reasoning that Broadey’s prior conviction involved a gun, he committed the current offense less than a year after being released on parole, and the current offense involved a threat to use a gun. In imposing sentence, the court stated it had considered the mitigating and aggravating factors. It then sentenced Broadey to a total prison term of seven years and eight months, consisting of the low term of 16 months, doubled to two years eight months pursuant to the strike prior allegation, plus five years pursuant to the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. DISCUSSION I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 1385 gives a sentencing court discretion to dismiss or strike a sentence enhancement, or strike the additional punishment for the enhancement, in furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subds. (a), (b)(1), (c)(1).) Effective January 2022, the Legislature amended section 1385 to add subdivision (c). (Sen. Bill No. 81 (Stats 2021, ch. 721, § 1).) Section 1385, 4 subdivision (c)(1) now provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) Section, 1385, subdivision (c)(2) requires the sentencing court to give “great weight to evidence” offered to prove any of the “mitigating circumstances” enumerated in the statute, including that the current offense is not a violent felony under section 667.5, subdivision (c) and “[t]he enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(F), (H).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Id., subd. (c)(2); People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032, 1036, 1038 (Walker), italics in original.) “Section 1385[, subdivision] (c) does not mean that, whenever a listed mitigating circumstance is present, the trial court must dismiss all enhancements unless it finds dismissal would endanger public safety.” (People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157 (Bravo).) Rather, “[c]onstrued as a whole, [section 1385] makes clear that all the mitigating circumstances listed in subdivision (c)(2) merely guide the court’s discretion in determining whether a dismissal is in furtherance of justice. Subdivision (c)(1) first sets forth the controlling ‘furtherance of justice’ standard for dismissal. Subdivision (c)(2) then states the court must give great weight to the presence of any one or more of the nine listed mitigating circumstances ‘[i]n exercising its discretion’ whether to dismiss. Subdivision (c)(3) confirms the discretionary nature of this decision by stating that the court ‘may exercise its discretion at sentencing’ but is not prevented 5 ‘from exercising its discretion’ earlier in the proceedings.” (People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 445 (Mazur).) “[I]f the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.) The trial court must conduct “ ‘a holistic balancing’ ” that gives these mitigating factors “ ‘increased significance and importance.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036.) But “ ‘the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement.’ ” (Id. at p. 1033.) We review a trial court’s determination not to dismiss a sentence enhancement for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) “The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential.” (Ibid.) “A trial court may abuse its discretion where its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it, where the trial court was not aware of its discretion to dismiss a sentencing allegation under section 1385, or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss.” (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490 (Nazir) [cleaned up].) The trial court “is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Myers).) And “ ‘[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it.’ ” (Bravo, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.)

6 II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion In ruling on Broadey’s motion to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancement, the trial court did not discuss the applicable standards and did not state whether it denied the motion based on a finding that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety or that it otherwise was not in furtherance of justice. Nor did it explicitly consider the mitigating factors or afford them great weight when it denied Broadey’s motion, although it indicated it considered the mitigating factors for purposes of imposing the low term sentence. Nevertheless, Broadey filed his motion and the trial court denied it more than three years after the addition of subdivision (c) to section 1385 and months after the California Supreme Court decided Walker. In addition, Broadey’s motion quoted the pertinent language from section 1385, subdivision (c) and identified the mitigating factors he believed applied. Thus, we presume the court knew the law and followed it with due consideration to all the relevant factors. (Bravo, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157; Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.) Having done so, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Broadey’s motion because a “reasonable person could agree” that dismissing the prior serious felony conviction enhancement would endanger public safety and would not be in the furtherance of justice. (Nazir, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 490.) First, the record supports the finding that dismissal of the sentence enhancement would endanger public safety. As we have stated, shortly after his release from prison related to a conviction for a violent offense, Broadey physically threatened his father at his home and then threatened to kill him by text message. The trial court recognized this background in denying 7 Broadey’s motion to dismiss the enhancement, explaining he previously committed an assault with a gun and, less than a year after being released on parole, he committed the current offense in which he threatened violence. These facts also led the trial court to find true aggravating factors that the current offense involved violent conduct indicating Broadey’s danger to society, and he committed the offense after serving a prison sentence and while he was on parole. This history shows that, despite having served prison time, Broadey returned to his violent tendencies promptly after his release. Thus, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Broadey was a danger to public safety at the time the trial court denied his motion and that he would continue to be a danger at the time of his release from prison if his sentence were reduced via the dismissal of the enhancement. (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228 [determination regarding danger to public safety requires consideration of the defendant’s present dangerousness and dangerousness at the time of would-be release].) Second, for similar reasons, the result is the same even if we set aside the public safety issue and, instead, balance the great weight of the mitigating factors against countervailing factors. This is because a reasonable factfinder could find substantial, credible evidence that the mitigating factors here are neutralized and dismissal of the enhancement would not further justice. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1029, 1033, 1036.) Although the current offense is not a violent felony within the meaning of the applicable statutes (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(F)) and might be viewed as “less serious” in light of the facts, Broadey still twice threatened violence and instilled some degree of fear in his father and/or his family members. In addition, although Broadey sustained his prior conviction over five years before being convicted in this case (id., subd. (c)(2)(H)) and had no 8 intervening criminal convictions, his commission of this crime so soon after being paroled from his prior prison sentence indicates he has not dedicated himself to a law-abiding life. We also recognize that Broadey committed his prior offense at a much younger age and significant time has passed since the prior conviction. But his choice to continue engaging in violent behavior many years after his prior conviction suggests his youth was not the driving factor behind his commission of the prior offense and increased maturity will not dissuade him from committing future crimes. These circumstances support a conclusion that reducing Broadey’s sentence through the dismissal of the prior serious conviction enhancement is not in the interest of justice. (Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 446 [“[T]he controlling ‘furtherance of justice’ standard is broad[ ] and allows the court to consider factors beyond public safety in exercising its discretion whether to dismiss an enhancement, including the nature and circumstances of the crimes and the defendant’s background, character, and prospects.”].) Whether based on a finding that dismissal of the sentence enhancement would endanger public safety or on finding that dismissal would not further justice, the trial court’s denial of Broadey’s motion under section 1385, subdivision (c) was not arbitrary or irrational. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099 [find no abuse of discretion where trial court “determined that other factors were collectively weightier” than the applicable mitigating factors].)

9 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

DO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

RUBIN, J.