People v. Lara CA2/4

Opinion

Filed 8/28/26 P. v. Lara CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B345190

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA072069) v.

DANIEL JOSEPH LARA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from denial of a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170 by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Affirmed. Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithney, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION In this juvenile resentencing appeal, the defendant invokes People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard). Heard and its reasoning is likely to be addressed by our Supreme Court in People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828 (Munoz). In the meantime, we agree with the approach of courts that have declined to follow Heard. We therefore affirm the trial court. Daniel Joseph Lara was convicted for crimes he committed as a juvenile. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (1170(d)).1 That provision authorizes juvenile offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) to petition for the recall of their sentences and resentencing. Lara did not receive an LWOP sentence. And he will receive a parole hearing by the time he is 42 years old under section 3051, which requires “youth offender parole hearing[s]” for defendants like Lara. Nonetheless, citing Heard, he argues his sentence of 40 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP. He argues that the Legislature could not rationally have allowed defendants actually sentenced to LWOP to petition for relief under section 1170(d) while not permitting defendants sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP to do so. He argues that section 1170(d) violates the guarantee of equal protection of the laws provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution.2 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.

2 Lara’s brief asserts that his challenge is under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. But his only 2 Critically, he also argues—again, relying on Heard—that he is entitled to raise this equal protection argument as a person sentenced to the “functional equivalent” of LWOP even though he will in fact have a parole hearing. His argument is that section 1170(d) focuses on the original sentencing, not later developments. Since, he says, he was originally sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP, he is entitled to invoke section 1170(d) as a matter of equal protection, even though he has an upcoming parole hearing. Lara’s argument is derived from Heard. We respectfully disagree with Heard and therefore reject Lara’s argument. We follow those courts that have distinguished Heard on the following basis. Contra Heard, section 1170(d) is focused on a defendant’s sentence at the time the defendant files a section 1170(d) petition. It is not focused on the sentence as it was originally imposed. Since they have the possibility of parole, defendants entitled to a section 3051 parole hearing at the time they petition for relief under section 1170(d) are not serving either the actual or functional equivalent of LWOP (“life without the possibility of parole”). So, even if the Legislature irrationally failed to extend section 1170(d) relief to defendants serving the functional equivalent of LWOP while making such relief available to defendants sentenced to LWOP (an issue we do not decide), that distinction would not matter to defendants like Lara. Defendants like Lara are entitled to parole hearings. They are not in any meaningful sense argument for reversing the trial court’s denial of his petition is that the trial court’s failure to allow him to petition for relief under section 1170(d) violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, based upon the rationale of Heard and cases that have followed Heard. To the extent that Lara intended to assert a separate Eighth Amendment argument, we deem that argument to have been forfeited by Lara’s failure to adequately assert it. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218–1219.) 3 sentenced to LWOP, actually or functionally. Put differently, the equal protection problem Lara identifies does not exist as to him. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Lara’s petition.

BACKGROUND In 2012, a jury convicted Lara of three counts of attempted murder, crimes he committed at age 17. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a).) The jury also found true related firearm enhancement allegations. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) In December 2012, Lara received concurrent sentences on each count of attempted murder of 15 years to life plus 25 years for the firearm enhancements, for a total aggregate sentence of 40 years to life, with 2,066 days credit for time served.3 Lara appealed, arguing that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as it was effectively a sentence of LWOP. In 2015, we affirmed the sentence, holding that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment. We reasoned that Lara’s life expectancy exceeded his minimum parole period by at least 19 years. At that time, we declined to address whether the youth offender parole hearing provisions of section 30514 would also insulate the sentence from an Eighth 3 The jury also found true that he discharged a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (b)) and discharged a firearm in a grossly negligent manner at a dwelling (§ 246.3). The trial court stayed the sentences on these counts pursuant to section 654.

4 At the time we rendered this decision in Lara’s case, section 3051, subdivision (b)(3) provided: “A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the person had attained 23 years of age and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing, unless previously released or entitled to an 4 Amendment challenge. (See People v. Lara (Sept. 17, 2015, B258181) [nonpub. opn.] (Lara I).) The California Supreme Court granted review and stayed the matter pending its decision in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). Thereafter, in Franklin, the Supreme Court held that the availability of youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 mooted Eighth Amendment challenges similar to Lara’s. (Id. at p. 268.) The court vacated our prior decision and remanded the matter for us to reconsider in light of Franklin. On remand, we noted that, under section 3051, Lara is eligible for a youth offender parole hearing in the 25th year of his incarceration, when he will be 42 years old. (People v. Lara (Oct. 5, 2016, B258181) [nonpub. opn.] (Lara II).) Accordingly, we concluded that Lara’s sentence is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent, mooting his Eighth Amendment challenge. In 2024, Lara filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1170(d) and Heard. While the trial court assumed that it was bound by Heard, the trial court nonetheless denied the petition, finding that a sentence of 40 years to life was not functionally equivalent to LWOP because Lara would be eligible for parole at age 57, at least 19 years before his life expectancy of age 77. Lara appealed the denial of his petition.

earlier parole consideration hearing pursuant to other statutory provisions.” Later, the Legislature expanded the protections of section 3051 to youthful offenders who committed crimes before attaining the age of 25. 5 DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review We review Lara’s claims, which involve only questions of law, de novo. (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 518.) B. Equal Protection Challenges to Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) allows “a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to” LWOP and who “has been incarcerated for at least 15 years” to petition the sentencing court for recall and resentencing. There is no dispute that, as written, section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) does not apply to Lara. It applies only to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. Lara was not sentenced to LWOP. (People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583.) Heard, however, held that the federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal protection require that juvenile offenders sentenced to terms functionally equivalent to LWOP also have the right to petition for section 1170(d) relief. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 633–634.) Equally important, according to Heard, a defendant’s eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 is irrelevant to the equal protection analysis. (Ibid.) At least two other appellate courts have agreed with Heard. (People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 454; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1056.) Other appellate courts, however, have disagreed with Heard or substantially limited its holding. They have done so for varying reasons. First, a number of courts have held that defendants sentenced to 50 years to life or less are not serving the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence. These courts have therefore concluded the equal protection problem identified 6 in Heard does not apply to sentences of 50 years to life or less. (See, e.g., People v. Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 507 [observing that the “minimum parole eligibility of Munoz’s sentence (50 years) ... is less than half the defendant’s in Heard (103 years)”].) Second, some appellate courts have found that the Legislature did not act irrationally in granting resentencing relief in section 1170(d) to defendants with LWOP terms but denying it to those with terms of 50 years to life or less. (See People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1062, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540.) Third, a number of courts have disagreed with Heard’s conclusion that the availability of youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 is not relevant to the equal protection analysis. They have reasoned that when a defendant is eligible for a youth offender parole hearing that defendant is not, functionally or otherwise, subject to an LWOP sentence—thus mooting the equal protection problem identified in Heard. (People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1142, review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 (Isayev); People v. Lara (Isaac) (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, 488, review granted Dec. 30, 2025, S294095 (Isaac); People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1264, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070 (Ortega).) As noted, our Supreme Court is set to consider these issues soon in Munoz, supra, S290828. C. Lara is Not Serving the Functional Equivalent of LWOP We disagree with Lara that he is serving the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence for purposes of section 1170(d) or that the equal protection problem identified in Heard exists in this case. In so concluding, we agree with the reasoning of Isayev, Isaac, and Ortega.

7 As he acknowledges, Lara will receive a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 during his 25th year of incarceration. That will happen when Lara is 42 years old. Lara is therefore serving a sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for parole well within his expected lifetime. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279–280.) As our colleagues in Division Six have observed, when a defendant will have a parole hearing, “he is not presently serving the functional equivalent of LWOP.” (Isaac, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 488.) Lara’s argument relies on Heard. Heard reasoned that because section 1170(d) refers to the sentence to which the defendant “was sentenced,” section 1170(d) is concerned only with the original sentence at the time it was imposed. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 628–630.) Heard also found that, because section 1170(d) is focused on the defendant’s original sentence, the equal protection problem cannot be cured by subsequent changes to that sentence. (Ibid.) Thus, in the view of Heard, the relevant equal protection comparison is only between defendants who were explicitly sentenced to LWOP and defendants who were originally sentenced to terms functionally equivalent to LWOP. A defendant’s subsequent right to a parole hearing under section 3051 is irrelevant to that analysis. (Ibid.) We respectfully disagree with Heard on this point. We believe that its analysis is incorrect at its first step. Section 1170(d) is designed to provide relief based upon the sentence a defendant is actually serving at the time a petition for relief is considered. It is not focused only on relief based upon the sentence at the time it was first imposed, regardless of later developments. As our colleagues in the Third District have observed, section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)’s focus “is the sentence being served at the time the petition for recall and resentencing is filed, not whatever sentence may have been 8 imposed at the original sentencing hearing.” (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142.) “The Legislature enacted section [1170(d)] to provide (certain) juvenile offenders serving LWOP terms an avenue ‘to seek recall of their sentences and resentencing to a term that includes an opportunity for parole.’” (Ibid.) It would be inconsistent with that legislative intent “[t]o conclude ... that the Legislature created a procedure for recalling and resentencing juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP even if that sentence was modified or vacated on direct appeal or via postconviction collateral attack.” (Ibid.) Moreover, we also agree with our colleagues in the Fourth District, Division One, that the reasoning in Heard is inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s directives in Franklin. Under Franklin, persons who initially receive the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence, but then are later granted the opportunity to pursue a parole hearing under section 3051 are, by operation of law, retroactively deemed to be serving a sentence with the possibility of parole. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279–280 [concluding that possibility of parole mooted an Eighth Amendment challenge]; Ortega, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265 [discussing Franklin].) Since section 3051 relief is retroactive, persons (like Lara) who have the opportunity for meaningful parole relief through a parole hearing under section 3051 now have an original sentence that is neither LWOP nor the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Ortega, supra at p. 1265.) Thus, from either the angle of Isayev or Ortega, we conclude that trial courts should consider whether a defendant is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 in deciding whether that defendant is entitled to relief under section 1170(d). Here, since Lara was serving a sentence with the possibility of parole at the time he filed his section 1170(d) petition, he is not serving the functional 9 equivalent of LWOP for purposes of section 1170(d). Even if section 1170(d) irrationally fails to distinguish between actual and functional LWOP sentences (an issue we do not decide), that distinction does not matter in Lara’s case. That is enough to resolve Lara’s equal protection argument, and with it this appeal. Again, we note that these issues are currently pending before our Supreme Court. In the interim, we do not find Lara’s equal protection arguments persuasive. We therefore affirm the trial court.

DISPOSITION The trial court’s order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS DAUM, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.