People v. Williams CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 8/28/26 P. v. Williams CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B349696

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 24VWCF00015)

SELWYN DWIGHT WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Reversed with directions. Travis Daily, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney Generals, Stephanie C. Brenan and Nancy Lii Ladner for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________ While facing 21 residential burglary charges and a lengthy sentence under the Three Strikes Law, Selwyn Dwight Williams sought pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.1 The trial court found that Williams is eligible and suitable for diversion but denied his motion because he poses a risk of committing more burglaries. After diversion was denied, Williams pleaded no contest and was sentenced to prison. A court may deny diversion if a defendant poses “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” which exists if a defendant is likely to commit “super strike” offenses such as murder or sex crimes. (§§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4), 1170.18, subd. (c).) The court abused its discretion by denying diversion after finding that Williams is not likely to commit a super strike offense.2 We reverse the judgment and direct the court to vacate its order denying mental health diversion and enter a new order granting the motion unless there is evidence of changed circumstances that provide a basis for denying the motion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 2023, Williams forced his way into homes while the owners were gone and stole jewelry, watches, luxury handbags, computers, credit cards, passports, a firearm, and cash. Victims’ losses exceeded $374,000. Williams was arrested while meeting with his parole officer for a prior burglary conviction.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Assembly Bill No. 46, signed into law on June 29, 2026, amends section 1001.36 to eliminate the super strike requirement and broaden discretion. Beginning January 1, 2027, a court may deny diversion if a defendant will pose a “substantial and undue risk to the physical safety of another person.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 18, § 1(c)(1)(D).)

2 Williams was charged with 19 counts of residential burglary and two counts of attempted burglary. (§§ 459, 664.) He was alleged to have three strike convictions for residential burglary and five felony convictions; he served prior prison terms; he was on parole when he committed the current crimes and performed unsatisfactorily while on parole. He pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations. The court held him to answer on all counts. Before trial, Williams requested mental health diversion. Psychological Report A psychologist’s report described Williams’s “exposure to, and indoctrination into substance use by adult role models at an early age.” His parents and stepfather used drugs, abused alcohol, affiliated with gangs, committed crimes, and assaulted him. No one guided Williams in a positive direction. He said, “Jail is a part of my life [because] it was part of my mom’s, part of my dad’s. We all go there. . . . It’s the norm. I don’t know many people who don’t go to jail.” He lacked “ ‘opportunities to get on the right road,’ ” because his criminal record disqualified him for work. The psychologist opined that the “pervasive presence” of criminals in Williams’s youth “formed the foundation of his worldview and his behaviors.” His history does not show crimes of violence. He acknowledged substance use. He “quickly relapsed on substances” after his release from a prior treatment program “due to the antisocial influences of the environment he re-entered.” The report concluded that Williams is eligible for diversion. He has alcohol use disorder, cannabis use disorder, stimulant related disorder, opioid use disorder, major depressive disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. He uses substances to mask 3 depression. The disorders played a significant role in Williams’s crimes, and were motivating, causal, or contributing factors. The psychologist felt Williams would respond to treatment and did not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety because he was not violent. Williams was armed during the burglaries, saying, “ ‘A gun was to protect myself and burglary was my means to survive. I only wanted to sneak in and get out; get money to eat. I carry protection to make sure I’m not hurt.’ ” The Court’s Ruling The court found Williams has a mental disorder that substantially contributed to his crimes and is amenable to treatment. It deemed him eligible and suitable for diversion, saying, “I don’t think he would pose a risk of killing anybody or committing a violent sex crime. In other words, I don’t think he [would] commit a superstrike offense.” It did not credit Williams’s claim of stealing “just to get by,” because “you don’t need $375,000 to eat.” The court denied diversion. It believed that two years of mental health treatment would not protect public safety because “the sheer number of offenses committed within an eight-month period, resulting in huge losses, indicates that Mr. Williams poses an unreasonable risk of committing further residential burglaries, especially in light of his prior ‘strike’ conviction and his parole status at the time of the offenses.” The court observed that residential burglary causes “a deep sense of violation in its victims [and] has a high potential for somebody getting really hurt.” No Contest Plea After the court denied diversion, Williams pleaded no contest to all counts; he admitted three prior strike convictions, 4 five prior felony convictions; prior prison terms; aggravating factors; and failure to perform satisfactorily on parole. He faced 21 sentences of 25 years to life in prison. Instead, the court struck two prior strikes and sentenced him to 24 years in prison. Williams obtained a certificate of probable cause and appealed the denial of his motion for mental health diversion. DISCUSSION Appeal lies from the judgment. (§ 1237.5 [appeal may be taken after a no contest plea if the court issues a certificate of probable cause]; People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147 (Whitmill).) We review the order for abuse of discretion, meaning the decision is arbitrary or capricious, applied the wrong legal standard, or is unsupported by substantial evidence. (Whitmill, at p. 1147; People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795.) The diversion law promotes “[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).) The “potentially ameliorative benefit” for criminal defendants who suffer from a qualifying mental disorder is balanced against “ ‘protecting public safety.’ ” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 631 (Frahs).) The law is intended to apply “ ‘as broadly as possible.’ ” (Id. at pp. 630, 632; Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149.) A defendant charged with a felony “may be referred to a program of mental health treatment utilizing existing inpatient or outpatient mental health resources” for up to two years. (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(ii) & (C)(i).) If the defendant “performed satisfactorily in diversion, at the end of the period of diversion, the court shall dismiss the defendant’s criminal 5 charges that were the subject of the criminal proceedings at the time of the initial diversion.” (Id., subd. (h).) In other words, “the ‘arrest upon which the diversion was based shall be deemed never to have occurred.’ ” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 631.) If the defendant performs unsatisfactorily in a treatment program or engages in criminal conduct, the court may reinstate criminal proceedings. (§ 1001.36, subd. (g).) “[T]he court “may, in its discretion . . . grant pretrial diversion to a defendant pursuant to this section if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A defendant is “eligible” for diversion if a mental health expert diagnoses the defendant with a qualifying mental disorder that was a significant factor in commission of the charged offense. A defendant is “suitable” for diversion if (1) the expert opines that the defendant would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to diversion and waives the right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1001.36, subds. (b) & (c); People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 452 (Tourville).)3 The only disputed issue in this appeal is public safety. The Legislature defined “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”

3 Certain crimes, such as murder and sex offenses, disqualify a defendant for diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (d).) That exception is not at issue here.

6 by incorporating section 1170.18.4 Section 1170.18, subdivision (c) reads, “As used throughout this code, ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony” listed in section 667. The relevant violent felonies in section 667 are super strikes.5 Burglary is not a super strike. The parties disagree whether the court had discretion to deny diversion if there is no likelihood of a super strike. Williams argues that the court could not deny diversion on public safety grounds after finding that he poses no risk of committing a super strike because he met all the eligibility and suitability factors. He is correct. Courts limit discretion to deny diversion on “public safety” grounds to instances where a defendant is likely to commit a super strike. Cases that so hold include People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449–450; People v. Williams (2021) 63 4 The court must find “[t]he defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community. The court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4), italics added.) 5 Super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, sexually violent offenses, or sexual offenses committed against minors under the age of 14. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1150–1151.)

7 Cal.App.5th 990, 1001; Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151; Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 896; People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 121; People v. Graham, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 798–799; Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 690–691; Siam v. Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 83, 87–88; and Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 454–455.) The Legislature is presumed to know about existing case law when it amends a statute. (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1062; People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 743; Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Our colleagues in Division Seven of this district noted that the Legislature amended section 1001.36 seven times between 2022 and 2026 without eliminating the reference to section 1170.18, despite the decisions cited above, which require a finding that the defendant poses a risk of committing super strikes. (Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 458–459.) Until recently, the Legislature did not see a need to amend the diversion law to address judicial interpretations about the scope of trial court discretion. It has now made that change: Beginning in 2027, courts applying section 1001.36 will no longer use the old definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” from section 1170.18; instead, they will apply a new standard: “substantial and undue risk to the physical safety of another person.” (See fn. 2, ante.) Regardless of the forthcoming changes to section 1001.36, the version of the law applying to Williams required a super strike finding. The trial court found he did not pose a risk of committing super strikes, only that he “poses an unreasonable risk of committing further residential burglaries.” The court 8 could not deny diversion based on a risk Williams will commit burglaries, thereby discounting the need to find public safety is imperiled by likely super strike offenses. The Attorney General argues that courts may view danger to public safety more broadly than section 1170.18. Respondent’s position would require us to rewrite section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4) to redefine a term to which the Legislature has given a very specific definition. We cannot do so. “[T]he Legislature has specifically defined what constitutes ‘an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ under the statue, limiting it to the danger the defendant will commit a super strike.” (Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 455.) Courts recognize “residual discretion” to deny diversion.6 However, “while it is clear a trial court retains ‘residual’ discretion to deny diversion even if all the threshold requirements are met, that does not mean, as the court suggested here, that it could reject a request for diversion based on an alternative meaning of ‘public safety’ inconsistent with the specific statutory definition in section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4). In the guise of exercising its ‘residual’ discretion, a court is not permitted to redefine public safety in a manner inconsistent with the Legislature’s expressed intent.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.)

6 Reasons the court might exercise discretion to deny diversion include lack of a treatment program; a defendant’s history of failed treatment or misconduct in prior programs; or the availability of a better program for the defendant’s needs. (Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 457; People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 889–890.)

9 DISPOSITION We reverse the judgment and direct the court to vacate its order denying mental health diversion and enter a new order granting the motion unless there is evidence of changed circumstances that provide a basis for denying the motion. If the court finds changed circumstances, it shall hold a further hearing to address mental health diversion consistent with this opinion NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J. We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.