Schmid v. County of Sonoma CA1/2

Opinion

Filed 8/28/26 Schmid v. County of Sonoma CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

FREAR STEPHEN SCHMID et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, A172601 v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. 24CV00337) Defendant and Respondent.

By separate opinion, we have affirmed an order declaring appellant Frear Stephen Schmid a vexatious litigant. (Schmid v. County of Sonoma (Aug. 27, 2026, No. A172089).) Here, he and his wife Astrid Schmid timely appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the County of Sonoma (the County) on December 4, 2024, following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend in separate but related litigation. The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the complaint in this case is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We affirm. BACKGROUND The Schmids initiated this case on January 24, 2024, against the County and two other defendants, Two Rock Fire Department (the Fire Department) and the Fire Department’s insurance carrier, Glatfelter Group.

1 They allege that in 2018, the County issued an illegal, invalid use permit allowing the Fire Department to construct a garage on a parcel neighboring their own property, and that after completing construction of the building in 2020, the Fire Department, “aided and abetted by the County,” began using the building and neighboring parcel “for numerous unauthorized activities.” They allege that they filed suit against the County, the Fire Department “and other entities” to challenge both the issuance of the permit and the unauthorized uses in other litigation, and that “there are several [such] lawsuits.” Their complaint identifies nine such lawsuits in which they “are” plaintiffs, although it does not clearly specify whether all are still pending.1 They allege that, after more than two and a half years of litigation, they entered into an oral, global settlement agreement on the record with the County and the Fire Department at a mandatory settlement conference held on November 10, 2022, with the Fire Department’s insurance carrier on phone stand-by, to settle all pending lawsuits between them. They allege the settlement agreement required the Schmids to dismiss with prejudice all pending litigation in exchange for payment to them of $100,000 as well as the County and the Fire Department making various changes to the configuration of the garage and parking lot on the neighboring parcel and 1 They are: Sonoma County Superior Court cases SCV-266225 (including consolidated cases SCV-266731 and SCV-270339) and related California First District Court of Appeal case A164620; Sonoma County Superior Court cases SCV-270332; SCV270568; and SCV-270771; United States Northern District of California case 3:21-CV 01920-TLT and related Ninth Circuit Appeal 23-15314; Schmid v. Thompson Gas Sonoma County Superior Court case SCV-270322; and Schmid v. Air Exchange, Sonoma County Superior Court case SCV-270568 and Schmid v. Sonoma County Sonoma County Superior Court case SCV-270771.

2 agreeing to prohibit some activities that could take place there (i.e., meetings and some training activities). They allege that the County was to prepare some further documentation to memorialize the settlement, i.e., a “more formal version” of a plot map the parties had used in their settlement negotiations to indicate the agreed-upon terms (referred to in the complaint as Exhibit 1)—and that the settlement was to be consummated at the next court hearing, at which the settlement funds were to be paid and requests for dismissals were to be filed. At the next court hearing, however, the County allegedly breached the settlement agreement by tendering written documentation (a parcel map) that, in numerous ways, did not comply with the terms to which the parties had previously agreed. They allege they rejected the document. Although what happened next is not entirely clear from the complaint’s allegations, they allege the Fire Department thereafter created another “schematic” that did not comport with the settlement terms either, the County never submitted a “formal version” of the map that complied with the settlement terms and made an additional demand that the map prepared by the Fire Department would have to be reviewed and approved by its Permit Department. The Schmids allegedly submitted an engineering drawing to the court (at an unspecified point) that accurately reflected what had been agreed to, and ultimately they did not dismiss the litigation but instead, on December 14, 2022, timely submitted a government tort claim to the County for breach of contract and related claims. They now allege six causes of action against the County: breach of contract (first cause of action), alleging the County breached the settlement agreement and praying for specific performance of the agreement and $900,000 in damages; a cause of action for equitable estoppel (second cause of 3 action), alleging they relied on the defendants’ promises to settle the ligation on the promised terms, that defendants should be “estopped from depriving plaintiffs of the benefits of the promised settlement” and praying for “specific performance of the promises” and $900,000 in damages; a cause of action for promissory estoppel (third cause of action) praying for the same relief and alleging the Schmids had no knowledge the County and other defendants had no intention of fulfilling their promises under the settlement agreement; a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations (fifth cause of action), alleging a settlement agreement existed between them, the Fire Department and Glatfelter that the County disrupted and praying for $900,000 in damages and an injunction “directing [the] County to cease [its] interference” with the settlement agreement; and causes of action for negligent interference with economic advantage (sixth cause of action) and intentional interference with economic advantage (seventh cause of action), both praying for similar relief and both alleging the County “engaged in wrongful conduct through its breach of its contract with [the Fire Department] and by misrepresentation to [the Schmids] and the Court as to the promises it would undertake to fulfill the settlement.” What the complaint does not disclose is that courts had previously rejected these contentions or identical causes of action, twice. The first time was on April 18, 2023, when the superior court in three of the pending cases that had been consolidated (case numbers SCV-266225, SCV-266731 and SCV-270339 (consolidated cases)) denied a motion brought by the County to enforce and enter judgment on the settlement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 after efforts to consummate the settlement had 4 unraveled.2 The County’s motion is not in the record, but the Schmids’ written response is. Contrary to the Schmids’ characterization of the record, stating “[n]o parties to the settlement opposed the [County’s] motion,” the Schmids did oppose the motion, at least partly if not entirely. In their written response to the motion, the Schmids stated they “agree that a settlement was reached” at the November 10, 2022 mandatory settlement conference but then devoted the rest of their discussion to detailing disagreements with the County’s positions. They explained in detail their view of what the parties had agreed to and the ways in which documents the County and Fire Department had prepared and submitted were inconsistent with the terms of the settlement agreement—a description they later incorporated nearly verbatim into their complaint in this case, asserting breaches of the settlement agreement. They also attacked the evidence the County submitted with the motion3 and submitted their own form of proposed 2 One of the three cases (case number SCV-266731) was a writ proceeding brought against the County challenging the County’s issuance of the use permit; the other two cases appear to have been brought solely against the Fire Department. 3 For example, they characterized some statements in a declaration about parking spots as “irrelevant and hearsay statements” about subjects “never raised at the settlement conference.” They characterized an exhibit submitted with the motion as “violat[ing] the agreement reached” in numerous ways and another schematic submitted with the motion as “a complete concoction almost completely divorce[d] from the settlement agreement.” And although they said another map submitted with the motion (Exhibit 4) “substantially” complied with the settlement terms, they went on to explain that “[t]his may be accomplished on Keefer’s Ex. 4 by simply moving the fence back to the front of each parking lot, and having the fence follow the outer lines of parking spots 6 and 7 and extending it to the property line, and correspondingly moving the fence enclosing the water tank an equal distance easterly, adding the BASMAA, and repositioning the exhaust vent, as agreed and set forth above,” and all as depicted on a 5 judgment that they requested the court sign. In denying the motion, the court ruled there was “a dispute as to the substance, scope, and intent of disputed material terms” of the settlement and concluded “the Parties did not reach a ‘meeting of the minds’ on material terms and consequently a settlement agreement was not reached that would now allow for judicial enforcement, even on equitable principles.” It repeated, “there is no agreement between the parties sufficient to enforce settlement.”4 It also rejected plaintiffs’ request to enter judgment in their favor because, as it had already discussed, “there is no agreement between the parties sufficient to enforce settlement.” The second time occurred less than a month after denial of the motion to enforce settlement in the consolidated cases, when the Schmids filed an amended complaint in another pending case (Schmid v. Thompson Gas, No. SCV-270322 (Thompson Gas)). The amended complaint in Thompson Gas added new claims against the County alleging the same facts concerning the settlement they had alleged in response to the motion to enforce the settlement in the consolidated cases and the exact same six causes of action against the County they now allege here. Six months later, the superior court in Thompson Gas granted a motion to strike those causes of action without leave to amend because they exceeded the scope of leave the court different engineering drawing the Schmids had submitted “reflecting these changes to Keefer[’s] exhibit 4” with the additional caveat that the Schmids’ drawing “ha[s] made more pronounced the distance at the intersection of spots 6 and 7 by means of a straight diagonal line instead of a curved line.” 4 Neither party has summarized or analyzed the evidence on this question in a complete or coherent way (much less their areas of disagreement).

6 had granted the Schmids to amend their complaint in response to a prior demurrer. This lawsuit was filed about three months later. In January 2024, two days after the Schmids had filed the instant case asserting the same causes of action as in Thompson Gas, they sought dismissal without prejudice of those claims in Thompson Gas, which the clerk entered. Meanwhile, one of the three consolidated cases in which the court had previously denied the motion to enforce the settlement agreement—the writ proceeding the Schmids had filed against the County (SCV-266731)—had been bifurcated from the other two and proceeded to a bench trial. On April 18, 2024, the court issued a final statement of decision denying the Schmid’s petition. The court ruled against the Schmids on their requests for a writ of mandate and for declaratory relief on multiple grounds, and it concluded by stating, it “now renders a verdict in favor of County and against Plaintiffs on the issues outlined herein,” and “[i]t is so ordered.” On May 2, 2024, after that decision was entered in the writ case, the County demurred to the complaint in this case. As relevant here, it demurred on the ground that all causes of action are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or claim preclusion, because the court in its order denying the motion to enforce the settlement “already made a factual determination that no contract was formed constituting a settlement agreement.” Among other points, they argued that “[t]o the extent the Schmids claim that the prior decision of this court denying the formation of a settlement agreement, was not a ‘final’ decision, there is now a Final Statement of Decision in SCV- 266731 against the County” in the writ case.

7 The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend in a five- page written ruling and entered judgment in favor of the County. This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, assuming the truth of all properly pleaded facts but not conclusions of law and considering all properly judicially noticeable facts. (Baker v. Bay Area Toll Authority (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 1254, 1264 (Baker).) A. General Principles and Overview The Schmids’ appellate brief presents some challenges. It lacks a coherent summary of the relevant facts. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) [appellant must “provide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record”].) It includes many factual assertions that lack citations to the record, all of which we ignore. (See Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 385, 408, fn. 14 [“ ‘Statement of facts that are not supported by references to the record are disregarded by the reviewing court’ ”]; East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226, 1240, fn. 5; see also Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172 [“[A]n appellant waives or forfeits contentions that are not supported by citations to relevant portions of the record”].) And its arguments are somewhat disorganized. We will consider only those issues that are clearly identified in an argument heading of the Schmids’ brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellate brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point”].) Any other arguments, wherever they may be located, are forfeited. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC 8 (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153; Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of Sacramento (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 280, 309-310.) “ ‘The law of preclusion helps to ensure that a dispute resolved in one case is not relitigated in a later case.’ ” (Baker, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265.) In particular, the doctrine of collateral estoppel “ ‘prevents “relitigation of previously decided issues,” rather than causes of action as a whole.’ ” (Ibid.) Although its requirements have been stated under various formulations, it is generally understood to require five elements: “ ‘ “ ‘First, the issue . . . must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘[t]hird, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision . . . must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1266.) Here, the Schmids argue the court erred in sustaining the demurrer because the order declining to enforce the settlement was not final, and it was not on the merits. They also argue that the ruling was erroneous as to all but the first cause of action for breach of contract because “neither the County nor Court addressed how” the other five causes of action were barred by collateral estoppel at all. B. Analysis First, the Schmids have not persuaded us that the order declining to enforce the settlement was not sufficiently final to be preclusive. They discuss authority holding that an order denying a motion to enforce a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 is nonappealable. (Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292-1294.) But Doran addressed finality for purposes of appealability, not for issue preclusion.

9 They also cite authority stating that collateral estoppel requires a “ ‘final judgment’ ” (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 484), which the order quite clearly was not, at least for purposes of appeal. But as the County points out, the trial court cited authority stating the principle that “ ‘for purposes of issue preclusion (as distinguished from merger and bar [i.e., claim preclusion]), “final judgment” includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.’ ” (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 688 (Meridian).) Meridian suggested that while appealability is a factor, it is not dispositive. It explained, “The Restatement cautions that in considering whether a particular judgment is ‘sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect,’ courts should ‘determine that the decision to be carried over was adequately deliberated and firm, even if not final in the sense of forming a basis for a judgment already entered. Thus preclusion should be refused if the decision was avowedly tentative. On the other hand, that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, that the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal, are factors supporting the conclusion that the decision is final for the purpose of preclusion.’ [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘Finality’ in the context here relevant may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 688-689.) In their opening brief the Schmids do not address this case, the legal standard it articulates or any of the examples it discusses of rulings involving “decisions that were never reduced to judgment or appealed” that were nonetheless held to be sufficiently final to support the application of collateral estoppel. (See Meridian, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 692.) In their 10 reply brief, they say only that the case is factually distinguishable. But an argument that fails to address the legal standard Meridian articulates and apply that standard to the facts of this case, is not an adequate demonstration of error. “ ‘It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that the judgment appealed from is presumed correct and “ ‘ “all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions. . . . “Issues do not have a life of their own: If they are not . . . supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . . waived.” [Citation.] It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’ ” (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799.) We apply that waiver rule here. Second, the Schmids’ finality argument focuses solely on the nonappealable order declining the motion to enforce the settlement but overlooks the fact that one of the cases in which that order was entered did ultimately result in an appealable decision: the writ case against the County. The court’s statement of decision fully disposed of the issues, denied a writ and was sufficiently final that an appeal could have been taken from it. (See, e.g., Tomra Pacific, Inc. v. Chiang (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 463, 481-482.) The Schmids make no attempt to show this does not satisfy the finality requirement of collateral estoppel. (See, e.g., Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1564-1565 [order sustaining demurrer without leave to amend held final for purposes of issue preclusion despite absence of final judgment].) By failing to address this point, which 11 was squarely raised by the demurrer, they have failed to demonstrate the court erred in deeming the finality element satisfied.5 Next, the Schmids’ argument that the writ ruling was not on the merits warrants little discussion. Our review of the court’s order declining to enforce the settlement persuades us the court determined that there was no meeting of the minds and therefore no settlement was reached. Had the court found instead that one of the statutory requirements for utilizing the summary mechanism of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 was not satisfied, the parties would be free to file an independent lawsuit to enforce the purported settlement they had reached, as suggested in the authority the Schmids cite. (See Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 5, superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, 1325.) But the court’s decision did not rest on such a procedural ground (nor was such an issue even litigated as far as we can tell). The court’s decision was clearly on the merits as to the existence of an enforceable agreement. The Schmids’ arguments as to the remaining causes of action also warrant little discussion (i.e., all but the breach of contract cause of action). Like the first cause of action for breach of contract, all of them were premised on the existence of valid, enforceable promises to which the parties mutually 5 Although the trial court’s ruling does not explicitly rest on this fact, applying de novo review, we “analyze the issues independent of the trial court’s reasoning,” and “ ‘[i]f the trial court’s decision is correct on any theory . . . , we affirm the order regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the lower court reached its conclusion.’ ” (Gaynor v. Bulen (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 864, 876; see Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 957, 972 [on review of demurrer ruling, “The trial court’s reasoning does not bind us, and we may affirm the judgment if it was correct under any theory”].)

12 agreed during settlement discussions. That issue was squarely decided on the merits against the Schmids (and the other parties) by the court’s ruling denying the motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Hence, for collateral estoppel purposes, nothing distinguishes those other causes of action from the breach of contract cause of action for any relevant legal reason. Finally, and more generally, the trial court cited authority that is practically on all fours with this case, but again the Schmids have not addressed it in their appellate briefing: Smith v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1371 (Smith). In that case the plaintiffs, who were spouses, filed a personal injury action after one of them was injured in a collision, and after settling with the driver they engaged in settlement discussions with the remaining defendants. (Id. at p. 1373.) Like the plaintiffs in this case, the Smiths moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce a settlement purportedly reached at a settlement conference, but the trial court denied the motion “finding that no settlement had been reached.” (Id. at pp. 1373-1374.) The Smiths then proceeded to trial, but after the defendants prevailed did not appeal the judgment. (Id. at p. 1374.) Instead, they initiated a new lawsuit against the defendants alleging two causes of action: one for breach of the settlement agreement, and the other for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both premised on allegations that an oral settlement agreement had been reached. (Ibid.) Affirming summary judgment for defendants, the Court of Appeal held the second action was barred in its entirety by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1374-1375.) It also held alternatively that by proceeding with the personal injury case to final judgment, the plaintiffs had waived their right to enforce the purported settlement agreement under the doctrine of election of remedies. (Id. at 13 pp. 1375-1376.) This separate and independent holding would likewise seem to fully dispose of the case before us, since the Schmids dismissed their claims for breach of the settlement agreement and proceeded to litigate the merits of their writ case to conclusion. In any event, given the Schmids’ failure to discuss the Smith case and explain why it does not dispose of this entire appeal, including as to the noncontract causes of action, the Schmids have failed to overcome the presumption that the trial court did not err. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs.

14 STEWART, P. J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

Schmid v. County of Sonoma (A172601)