Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ANGEL ISREAL CUEVAS Case No.: 26-cv-04121-AJB-VET 11 MIRANDA, 12 CDCR #BJ-1072, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 13 Plaintiff, AND SCREENING PRO SE § 1983 14 v. COMPLAINT 15 (Doc. Nos. 2; 3) 16 J. AMAYA, C/O Officer for the State; M. RAMIREZ, RJD Donovan, Warden, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Angel Isreal Cuevas Miranda, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil 20 rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in forma 21 pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 1–2.) 22 In his Complaint, Miranda alleges that Defendant J. Amaya violated the Eighth 23 Amendment when Amaya assaulted Miranda, breaking Miranda’s nose while he was 24 incarcerated at Richard J. Donavan State Prison (“RJD”). (Doc. No. 1 at 3–4.) Miranda 25 further alleges that Defendant M. Ramirez also violated the Eighth Amendment by failing 26 to adequately train Amaya. (Id. at 5.) As explained below, the Court GRANTS Miranda’s 27 IFP motion and SCREENS his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). 28 The Court finds that Miranda adequately alleges an Eighth Amendment claim against 1 Defendant Amaya in Count One. But the Court finds that he fails to state any plausible 2 claim for relief against Warden Ramirez in Count Two. The Court therefore ORDERS 3 Miranda to file either an amended complaint that addresses the pleading deficiencies 4 discussed below or a Notice of Intent to Proceed with the excessive-force claims alleged 5 in Count One of his current Complaint against Defendant Amaya only. 6 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 7 Generally, anyone initiating a civil action in a U.S. district court must pay a $405 8 filing fee, which includes a $350 statutory fee and a $55 administrative fee (although 9 anyone granted IFP status is excused from paying the administrative fee). See 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 11 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). If a plaintiff fails to prepay the entire fee, the lawsuit will not go 12 forward unless the plaintiff’s IFP motion is granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 13 Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 14 A prisoner filing an IFP motion must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund 15 account statement (or institutional equivalent),” which must cover “the 6-month period 16 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 17 King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 18 Even if the court grants IFP status, the prisoner must pay the statutory filing fee. 19 Payments, however, are determined based on the prisoner’s available resources. The 20 determination is as follows. First, courts calculate an initial filing fee payment. This initial 21 fee is twenty percent of the larger of two amounts: either the average monthly deposits in 22 the trust fund account over the past six months, or the average monthly balance in the 23 account for the past six months. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (4); Bruce v. Samuels, 577 24 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). Nevertheless, if a prisoner plaintiff has insufficient assets, no initial 25 filing fee is required. Second, once the IFP motion is granted and the initial fee is charged, 26 the remaining balance must be paid in installments. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2); Bruce, 27 577 U.S. at 84. 28 /// 1 Miranda’s IFP motion includes a copy of his California Department of Corrections 2 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Inmate Statement Report and a declaration from Miranda 3 under penalty of perjury. (Doc. No. 2 at 1–8.) For the months provided, his monthly balance 4 fluctuated between $0.00 and $161.89, his average monthly deposits were $160.00, and his 5 available balance was $0.19 at the time his statement was printed. (Id.) 6 The Court therefore GRANTS Miranda’s IFP motion. No initial partial fee will be 7 charged since it appears Miranda presently has no means to pay. See 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action” 9 simply because “the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial 10 filing fee.”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 12 solely on “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 13 ordered”). Miranda is nevertheless required to pay the full $350 filing fee in installments 14 as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) calls for. 15 II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 16 A. Standard of Review 17 Because Miranda is a prisoner proceeding IFP, federal law requires pre-screening of 18 Miranda’s claims before any defendants are required to file an answer. 28 U.S.C. 19 §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b). Pre-screening means that the Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP 20 complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks 21 damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th 22 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 23 (9th Cir. 2010) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 24 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 25 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 26 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 27 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Likewise, § 1915A screening “incorporates 28 the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 1 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) 2 (citations omitted). 3 Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 4 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 5 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “De- 6 termining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task 7 that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 8 at 679 (citation omitted). 9 “Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 10 color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 11 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The statute, though “not 12 itself a source of substantive rights, . . . provides a method for vindicating federal rights 13 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (citation and in- 14 ternal quotation marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both 15 (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 16 (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 17 Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011). 18 Complaints filed pro se must be “liberally construed, particularly where civil rights 19 claims are involved.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) 20 (citations omitted). 21 B. Allegations in the Complaint 22 Miranda names two defendants: RJD Correctional Officer J. Amaya and RJD 23 Warden M. Ramirez. He raises two causes of action, i.e., counts. Count One alleges that 24 Officer Amaya violated Miranda’s Eighth Amendment right when he used excessive force 25 against Miranda on January 29, 2025. (Doc. No. 1 at 3–4.) According to Miranda’s 26 narrative, when Miranda attempted to walk away from Amaya on RJD’s C-yard, Amaya 27 followed and assaulted Miranda, striking Miranda several times in his face using both his 28 fist and his open palm as Miranda attempted to protect his head and face from Amaya’s 1 blows. (Id. at 3.) Miranda claims Amaya caused him great bodily injury and mental anguish 2 by breaking his nose, which required surgery. (Id. at 3–4.) 3 Count Two alleges that Warden Ramirez also violated the Eighth Amendment by 4 failing to adequately train RJD officers “who should always be trained to act in a 5 professional manner.” (Id. at 5.) 6 C. Discussion 7 1. Excessive Force (Count One) – Defendant Amaya 8 Unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 9 Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). 10 For claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the Court considers “whether 11 force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 12 sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (citing 13 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted). Factors relevant to this inquiry 14 include: “the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the 15 amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and 16 ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 17 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321(1986)). “There is no legitimate need to use 18 any force against an inmate who is neither violating prison rules nor reasonably believed 19 to pose a security threat.” Stewart v. Ayala, No. 21-cv-9638-RGK-AS, 2023 WL 2993042, 20 at *2 (C.D. Cal. March 8, 2023) (citing Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 21 1991)). 22 Miranda alleges Amaya violated his Eighth Amendment rights on January 29, 2025, 23 by striking him numerous times in the face. (Doc. No. 1 at 3–4.) The Complaint does not 24 suggest any need justifying the use of such force, any threat posed by Miranda, or any 25 effort on Amaya’s part to temper the severity of his response. Rather, Miranda maintains 26 he was trying to protect his face as Amaya delivered blows that allegedly caused such a 27 severe injury to Miranda’s nose that he required surgery. (Doc. No. 1 at 3–4.) 28 /// 1 As currently pleaded against Amaya, Miranda’s Complaint is sufficient to survive 2 the threshold set for sua sponte screening as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 3 1915A(b). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; see also Hughes v. Rodriguez, 4 31 F.4th 1211, 1222 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming denial of summary judgment for officers 5 alleged to have beaten and permitted a canine to bite prisoner “after he was fully subdued”); 6 Duclos v. Smith, No. 1:24-cv-00515-HBK-PC, 2024 WL 5508219, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 7 24, 2024) (finding prisoner adequately pleaded an excessive force claim where he claimed 8 officers struck him so forcefully in the face that he “dropped to the ground immediately” 9 even though he posed no credible threat to officers by simply “raising [his] hands” and 10 asking what they were doing); Quinones v. Parr, No. 3:20-cv-00390-MMD-CLB, 2021 11 WL 8321869, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2021) (finding prisoner’s allegations of having been 12 tased and beaten by officers “after they found him sitting against a wall with his legs 13 crossed, hands in the air, and compliant” sufficient to survive screening pursuant to 28 14 U.S.C. § 1915A). 15 2. Excessive Force – Defendant Ramirez 16 Miranda, however, fails to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against 17 Warden Ramirez. Miranda’s claim against Ramirez states only that Ramirez had “not 18 properly train[ed] the [correctional officers] who should always be trained to act in a 19 professional manner.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) Miranda then lists multiple terms of art: “GBI[,] 20 cruel & unusual punishment[,] excessive use of force[,] failure to protect.” (Id.) 21 “A prison official in a supervisory position may be held liable under § 1983” only 22 “if he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal 23 connection exists between his unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Lemire 24 v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Lolli v. 25 Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003)). “This causal connection can include: 26 1) [the supervisor’s] own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control 27 of subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation of which a 28 complaint is made; or 3) [their] conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to 1 the rights of others.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the 2 Complaint contains no factual allegations from which the Court could infer a causal 3 connection between any culpable act or omission on the part of Warden Ramirez and the 4 alleged constitutional violation by Officer Amaya. Cf. Est. of Gutierrez ex rel. Benitez v. 5 Castillo, No. 21-cv-01292-H-LL, 2021 WL 5989972, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2021) 6 (finding at the pleading stage that plaintiff adequately alleged a § 1983 claim against the 7 San Diego Chief of Police for failure to properly train officers in de-escalation techniques, 8 handling individuals with mental health issues, and firearm use, where the plaintiff cited 9 two prior incidents where San Diego police had similarly shot individuals in psychiatric 10 crises). The Court therefore concludes Miranda fails to allege facts sufficient to support a 11 plausible claim for relief against Defendant Ramirez. 12 D. Summary and Miranda’s Options 13 In sum, while Miranda’s Eighth Amendment claim against Amaya is sufficiently 14 pleaded, his Complaint requires dismissal with respect to Warden Ramirez. Since it is not 15 “absolutely clear” that Miranda cannot fix the pleading deficiencies in his claim against 16 Ramirez, see Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015), he has two options: 17 (1) Miranda may simply notify the Court of his intent to proceed only with the Eighth 18 Amendment excessive force claims he has adequately alleged against Defendant Amaya; 19 or (2) Miranda may file an amended complaint that includes his adequately pleaded claim 20 and corrects his deficiencies of pleading with respect to Warden Ramirez. Miranda must 21 choose one of those two options within 45 days of the date this Order is filed. 22 If Miranda notifies the Court that he wishes to proceed only with his excessive force 23 claim against Defendant Amaya, the Court will direct the Clerk to issue a summons upon 24 Defendant Amaya, and order the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon Amaya on his behalf 25 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). But his insufficiently pleaded 26 claim against Warden Ramirez will remain dismissed from this action. If Miranda chooses 27 to file an amended complaint, that pleading will be subject to another preliminary screening 28 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) before the Court determines whether 1 U.S. Marshal Service upon any Defendant is warranted. If Miranda does nothing, the Court 2 will dismiss the case based on his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order. 3 III. Conclusion 4 Thus, for the reasons explained, the Court: 5 1. GRANTS Miranda’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2). 6 2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect the $350 7 filing fee owed in this case and forward monthly payments from Miranda’s account to the 8 Clerk of the Court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 9 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order by U.S. Mail 10 on Jeff Macomber, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 11 P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001. 12 4. DISMISSES all claims against Defendant Ramirez based on Miranda’s 13 failure to state a plausible claim for relief against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 14 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). 15 5. GRANTS Miranda forty-five (45) days’ leave from the date of this Order in 16 which to file either: (A) a Notice of Intent to Proceed with his excessive-force claims 17 against Amaya; or (B) an amended complaint that corrects the deficiencies of pleading 18 identified in this Order. If Plaintiff files a Notice of Intent to proceed against Amaya only, 19 he may include a request that the U.S. Marshal effect service of summons and his original 20 Complaint on Amaya pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 21 If Miranda instead chooses to amend, his new pleading must be clearly titled as his 22 amended complaint, contain S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 26-cv-4121-AJB-VET in its caption, 23 and be complete in itself without reference to his original Complaint. Defendants not 24 named and any claim not realleged in Miranda’s amended complaint, including the cur- 25 rently sufficient excessive force claim alleged against Amaya in his original Complaint, 26 will be considered waived. See CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & 27 Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 28 original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 1 ||dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 2 “considered waived if not repled’). 3 If Miranda fails to file an amended complaint within the time provided, the Court 4 || will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Miranda’s failure to state 5 |}a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 6 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 7 |}amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Ifa plaintiff does 8 || not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 9 || dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: August 26, 2026 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28