Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 HAMDI ABDEL MUNIM ABU Case No.: 25-cv-02246-H-JLB 14 KHALAF, et al., 15 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT 16 v. AMGUARD INSURANCE 17 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY COMPANY’S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER 18 ASSURANCE CORPORATION, et al., PROHIBITING DEPOSITIONS 19 Defendants. 20 [ECF No. 38] 21 22 Before the Court is Defendant AmGuard Insurance Company’s 23 (“Defendant AmGUARD”) Motion for a Protective Order Prohibiting Depositions 24 (“Motion”). (ECF No. 38.) Plaintiffs Hamdi Abdel Munim Abu Khalaf and Aladdin 25 Clairemont & MKT, Inc., doing business as Aladdin’s Cafe (“Plaintiff Aladdin’s Cafe”) 26 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), oppose the Motion. (ECF No. 39.) For the reasons set forth 27 below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion. 28 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 Plaintiff Aladdin’s Cafe was insured under a commercial insurance policy issued by 4 Defendant AmGUARD that provided coverage for property damage and lost business 5 income, with a policy period from October 1, 2022, to October 1, 2023. (ECF No. 1-4 at 6 5, ¶ 19.) In February 2023, Plaintiff Aladdin’s Cafe sustained water damage during a 7 period of heavy rainfall. (Id. at 5, ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs filed a claim (the “February Claim” or 8 “February Loss”) with Defendants AmGUARD, Berkshire Hathaway Assurance 9 Corporation, Berkshire Hathaway Guard Insurance Companies, and Berkshire Hathaway 10 Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), and the necessary repairs were completed in March 2023. 11 (Id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 28–32.) 12 In August 2023, Plaintiff Aladdin’s Cafe sustained water damage during Tropical 13 Storm Hilary. (Id. at 6, ¶¶ 35–36.) Plaintiffs submitted a claim for damage and loss of 14 income due to the tropical storm (the “August Claim” or “August Loss”), which was denied 15 in January 2024. (Id. at 7–8, ¶¶ 38, 49.) According to Plaintiffs, Defendant AmGUARD 16 initially “provided no explanation” for the denial of the August Claim. (Id. at 8, ¶ 51.) 17 Presently, Defendant AmGUARD contends that the “interior damage limitation” 18 contained in Plaintiffs’ insurance policy precluded coverage of the August Claim. 19 (ECF No. 38 at 3–4.) Pursuant to this limitation, Defendant AmGUARD only covers loss 20 or damage to the interior of a building or structure caused by or resulting from rain if the 21 building or structure first sustains damage by a covered cause of loss to its roof or walls 22 through which the rain enters. (Id. at 4.) Defendant AmGUARD asserts that an inspection 23 of Plaintiff Aladdin’s Cafe revealed that the claimed water damage resulted from 24 deteriorated sealants in or about the roof, deteriorated underlayment, and water that had 25 accumulated on the roof and overflowed a roof vent, and that “there was no damage to the 26 roof or exterior of the restaurant that allowed rainwater to enter the building and damage 27 its interior elements.” (Id. at 4–5.) 28 /// 1 B. Procedural Background 2 In July 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in the San Diego County 3 Superior Court for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 4 dealing, alleging that the August Claim was wrongfully denied. (Id. at 4, 6, ¶¶ 18, 35–36.) 5 The following month, Defendants secured removal to federal court. (ECF No. 2.) 6 Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to remand the matter to state court, which was denied. 7 (ECF No. 10.) 8 In December 2025, the Court issued a scheduling order regulating discovery. 9 (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiffs began deposing Defendant AmGUARD’s employees in mid-May. 10 (ECF No. 38 at 5.) On May 15, 2026, Plaintiffs deposed Scotty Shaver, the primary 11 adjuster assigned to the August Claim. (Id. at 3.) Between May 2026 and June 2026, 12 Plaintiffs deposed Darren Heiser, Mr. Shaver’s supervisor and author of the August Claim 13 denial letter; Sean Timmons, an independent adjuster who assisted Defendant AmGUARD 14 in the coverage investigation for the August Claim and inspected Plaintiffs’ restaurant; and 15 Dwayne Hyre, who investigated the February Claim on Defendant AmGUARD’s behalf. 16 (Id. at 5–6.) 17 In May 2026, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order 18 (Ex Parte Motion”), seeking to extend the fact discovery deadline by 60 days to enable 19 Plaintiffs to depose Defendant AmGUARD employees Melinda Champluvier, Nona 20 Loftus, and Christana Coury, and two of Defendant AmGUARD’s former employees— 21 Alex Wolfe and Read Walden. (ECF No. 29 at 7.) The Court granted the Ex Parte Motion 22 and extended the deadline for the completion of fact discovery to August 7, 2026, “for the 23 limited purpose of deposing only the witnesses identified in Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion, 24 pending the Court’s disposition of the parties’ dispute regarding those depositions.” (ECF 25 No. 34.) 26 Also in May 2026, Defendant AmGUARD filed an Ex Parte Application for 27 Protective Order Prohibiting the Depositions of Upper Management or, Alternatively, for 28 Leave to File a Motion for Protective Order (“Ex Parte Application”), which Plaintiffs 1 opposed. (ECF Nos. 32, 33.) The Court granted, in limited part, and otherwise denied 2 without prejudice the Ex Parte Application and granted Defendant AmGUARD leave to 3 file a noticed motion for a protective order. (ECF No. 35.) On June 9, 2026, Defendant 4 AmGUARD filed the instant Motion, which Plaintiffs opposed. (ECF Nos. 38, 39.) 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) provides that 7 [a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is 8 pending--or as an alternative on matters relating to a deposition, 9 in the court for the district where the deposition will be taken. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in 10 good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected 11 parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party 12 or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 13 burden or expense, including one or more of the following:

14 (A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; 15 . . . (D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the 16 scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters[.] 17 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 19 On motion or sua sponte, courts “must limit the frequency or extent” of otherwise 20 permissible discovery if it determines that 21 (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source 22 that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 23 expensive;

24 (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to 25 obtain the information by discovery in the action; or 26 27 28 1 (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).1 2 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 4 The party seeking a protective order bears the burden of showing good cause. In re 5 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). This 6 burden may be satisfied by “showing “that specific prejudice or harm will result if the 7 protective order is not granted.” (Id.) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “Broad 8 allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not 9 satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th 10 Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). If the Court determines that such harm will result, the Court 11 must “balance the interests in allowing the discovery against the relative burdens to the 12 parties and nonparties.” Lectrolarm Cust. Sys., Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 567, 13 573 (E.D. Cal. 2002). The burden to obtain a protective order may also be satisfied by 14 demonstrating that the requested discovery is irrelevant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 16 17 18 1 Rule 26(b)(1) provides that 19 [u]nless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery 20 is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 21 nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the 22 importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 23 controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in 24 resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the 25 proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence 26 to be discoverable. 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 28 1 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); Carrera v. First American Home Buyers Protection Co., No. 13cv1585- 2 BAS (JLB), 2014 WL 3695403, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2014). 3 “The court has wide discretion to determine what constitutes a showing of good 4 cause and to fashion a protective order that provides the appropriate degree of protection.” 5 Grano v. Sodexo Mgt., Inc., 335 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Seattle Times Co. 6 v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)); see also U.S. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 666 7 F.2d 364, 368–69 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining that “Rule 26(c) . . . was enacted as a 8 safeguard for the protection of parties and witnesses in view of the broad discovery rights 9 authorized in Rule 26(b).” 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Meet and Confer Requirement 12 Counsel for Plaintiffs attests that Defendant AmGUARD “made no good-faith effort 13 to confer with Plaintiff’s counsel before filing this Motion.” (ECF No. 39-1 at 2, ¶ 2.) 14 Plaintiffs therefore ask the Court to deny the Motion on the basis that Defendant 15 AmGUARD “failed to satisfy the mandatory meet-and-confer requirement under Federal 16 Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1).” (ECF No. 39 at 6.) 17 Rule 26(c)(1) states that a motion for a protective order must include “a certification 18 that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected 19 parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 20 “The Court, however, has the discretion to decide a [discovery] motion . . . on the merits 21 even if parties fail to meet and confer.” Reveal Chat Holdco, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 22 20-CV-00363-BLF, 2020 WL 2843369, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020) (granting 23 defendant’s motion to stay discovery notwithstanding the failure of the parties to first meet 24 and confer pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1)). The Court elects to do so here and will proceed to 25 consideration of the merits. See id. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Depositions of Current Employees 2 Defendant AmGUARD seeks a protective order shielding Ms. Champluvier, Ms. 3 Loftus, and Ms. Coury from providing deposition testimony on the basis that they are 4 “high-ranking officials subject to the apex doctrine.” (ECF No. 38 at 7.) 5 “[C]ourts have recognized that permitting depositions of high-level executives (so- 6 called ‘apex’ witnesses) with scant personal knowledge of the facts of a case ‘creates a 7 tremendous potential for abuse or harassment.’” In re Mosaic LLM Litig., No. 24-CV- 8 01451-CRB (LJC), 2025 WL 3080548, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (quoting In re 9 Mosaic LLM Litig., No. 24-CV-01451-CRB (LJC), 2025 WL 3080548, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 10 Nov. 4, 2025)). Thus, courts may exercise discretion under the federal rules to limit the 11 taking of “apex” depositions. Id. The party opposing the deposition bears the burden of 12 establishing that the witness is sufficiently high-ranking to merit “apex” doctrine 13 protections. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc. v. U.S., 670 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1070 14 (S.D. Cal. 2023); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs, Co., Ltd., 282 F.R.D. 259, 263 15 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (the moving party carries the “burden to demonstrate that each ‘apex’ 16 witness is so entitled to that designation”). “If this initial showing is met, courts then 17 consider: (1) whether the deponent has unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge of the 18 facts at issue in the case; and (2) whether the party seeking the deposition has exhausted 19 other less intrusive discovery methods.” Momtazee v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 2:25-CV-03899- 20 JLS-AJR, 2026 WL 1370123, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2026) (citation omitted). “[T]he 21 closer that a proposed witness is to the apex of some particular peak in the corporate 22 mountain range, and the less directly relevant that person is to the evidence proffered in 23 support of his deposition, the more appropriate the protections of the apex doctrine 24 become.” Apple Inc., 282 F.R.D. at 263. 25 1. Ms. Champluvier 26 As noted above, the party opposing the deposition bears the burden of establishing 27 that the witness is sufficiently high ranking to warrant “apex” doctrine protections. See 28 BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc., 670 F. Supp. 3d at 1070. Defendant AmGUARD 1 offers the declaration of Ms. Champluvier, in which she attests that “as Property Claims 2 Manager, [she] supervise[s] multiple teams of claim representatives and their team 3 leaders/supervisors responsible for investigating various types of claims for insurance 4 policy benefits due to property damage submitted to AmGUARD . . . pursuant to insurance 5 policies issued by AmGUARD.” (ECF No. 38-2 at 2, ¶ 2.) However, Defendant 6 AmGUARD acknowledges that Ms. Champluvier is supervised by Ms. Loftus, who in turn 7 is supervised by Ms. Coury. (ECF No. 38 at 7.) This chain of supervision suggests that 8 Ms. Champluvier is not particularly close to the “apex of some particular peak in the 9 corporate mountain range.” See Apple Inc., 282 F.R.D. at 263. The Court therefore 10 concludes that Defendant AMGUARD fails to meet its burden of demonstrating that Ms. 11 Champluvier is an “apex” witness. Cf. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc., 670 F. Supp. 12 3d at 1070; cf. LA Terminals, Inc. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 2022 WL 1637206, at *6 (C.D. 13 Cal. Jan. 28, 2022) (holding that the senior vice president of claims for defendant’s parent 14 company, who functioned as the sole head of all insurance claims in the United States of 15 America for the parent company’s subsidiary insurance companies, qualified as an “apex” 16 employee entitled to the protections of the apex deposition doctrine); Ellena v. Standard 17 Ins. Co., 2013 WL 4520200, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013) (deeming an employee who 18 held the title of Vice President of the Insurance Services Group subject to “apex” witness 19 protection, where the employee reported directly to the CEO and was responsible for the 20 strategy and management of several aspects of overall business). 21 The Court now considers whether Defendant AmGUARD has otherwise established 22 good cause for the requested protective order. See In re Bank of Am. California 23 Unemployment Benefits Litig., No. 21MD2992-GPC(MSB), 2025 WL 1557598, at *4 24 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2025), reconsideration denied, No. 21MD2992-GPC(MSB), 2025 WL 25 2617075 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2025) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 26 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Even when a party seeks a protective order barring an apex deposition, it 27 retains the heavy burden to show good cause for a protective order.” (internal quotation 28 marks omitted)). Defendant AmGUARD contends that Ms. Champluvier “played no role 1 in the investigations of the February or August [Claims]” and that her decision to allow 2 Mr. Heiser to adjust the claimed loss in excess of his monetary authority “ha[d] no bearing 3 on the propriety of the coverage denial or reasonableness of Defendant’s coverage 4 investigation.” (ECF No. 38 at 9.) Though concededly “aware” of both the February Claim 5 and the August Claim, Ms. Champluvier insists that she “had no involvement” in the 6 coverage investigation or determination regarding the February Claim. (ECF No. 38-2 at 7 2, ¶¶ 2, 3.) Ms. Champluvier attests that she “conferred with [Mr. Heiser] and attorney 8 [Richard C.] Weston about the August [Claim] via e-mail on January 4, 2024 prior to the 9 denial letter,” and that she thereafter “participated in other email correspondence about the 10 August Loss from January 29, 2024 through March 19, 2024 with attorney Weston, [Mr. 11 Shaver], [Mr. Heiser,] and [Mr.] Walden (former Director of Claims for AmGUARD).” 12 (Id. at 3, ¶ 5.) Ms. Champluvier maintains that she “had no involvement in AmGUARD’s 13 investigation of coverage for the August [Claim] outside of these communications 14 involving counsel” and, further, that she does not “have unique, personal, firsthand 15 knowledge concerning the August [Claim] other than information exchanged during [her] 16 conferences involving attorney Weston.” (Id.) 17 As Ms. Champluvier communicated with Mr. Heiser concerning the August Claim 18 prior to issuance of the denial letter, she likely possesses information relevant to the 19 handling of that claim. (ECF No. 38-2 at 3, ¶ 5.) Indeed, counsel for Plaintiffs attests that 20 “[f]rom the depositions of Mr. Shaver and Mr. Heiser, it was discovered that Ms. 21 Champluvier . . . not only supervised both Mr. Shaver and Mr. Heiser, but she also made 22 the decision that Mr. Heiser could handle the August Claim even though it exceeded his 23 authority limit of $250,000.00.” (ECF No. 39-1 at 2, ¶ 6.) Further, Defendant 24 AmGUARD’s blanket statement that Ms. Champluvier’s decision to allow Mr. Heiser to 25 adjust the claimed loss in excess of his monetary authority “ha[d] no bearing on the 26 propriety of the coverage denial or reasonableness of Defendant’s coverage investigation” 27 does not establish that the sought-after information is irrelevant or that any particular 28 prejudice or harm would result if she were deposed. (ECF No. 38 at 9); see Beckman 1 Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that 2 “[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated 3 reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test”). 4 Moreover, Ms. Champluvier maintains that any knowledge she has derives from 5 privileged communications with counsel. (ECF No. 38-2 at 3, ¶ 5.) “The attorney-client 6 privilege protects confidential communications between attorneys and clients, which are 7 made for the purpose of giving legal advice.” In re Grand Jury, 23 F.4th 1088, 1091 (9th 8 Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Sanmina Corp., 968 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir. 2020)). 9 “Attorney-client privilege is ‘narrowly and strictly construed,’ and the party asserting it 10 has the burden of proving that the privilege applies.” In re Soc. Media Adolescent 11 Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 22-MD-03047-YGR (PHK), 2025 WL 12 325970, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2025) (quoting United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 13 1415 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted)). “While “communications about facts that relate 14 to potential legal liability may constitute legal advice,” the law recognizes that “the 15 underlying facts are not privileged.” Id. at *5 (quoting City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. 16 Apple Inc., No. 19-cv-02033-YGR (JCS), 2022 WL 3083000, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 17 2022) (emphasis in original)). That Ms. Champluvier communicated with counsel 18 concerning the August Claim does not prevent her from providing deposition testimony 19 regarding underlying facts pertaining to that claim. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 20 383, 396 (1981) (holding that a party “may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within 21 his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his 22 communication to his attorney”). 23 Thus, the Court finds that Defendant AmGUARD fails to establish cause for a 24 protective order shielding Ms. Champluvier from providing deposition testimony. See 25 First United Methodist Church of San Jose v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., No. C-95-2243 DLJ, 1995 26 WL 566026, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 1995) (“A strong showing is required before a party 27 will be denied entirely the right to take a deposition.” (quoting Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 28 429)); see also WebSideStory, Inc. v. NetRatings, Inc., No. 06CV408 WQH(AJB), 2007 1 WL 1120567, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2007) (“A party seeking to prevent a deposition 2 carries a heavy burden to show why discovery should be denied.”) The Court therefore 3 DENIES Defendant AmGUARD’s Motion as to Ms. Champluvier. 4 2. Ms. Loftus and Ms. Coury 5 Defendant AmGUARD notes Mr. Heiser’s testimony that Ms. Loftus supervised his 6 direct supervisor, Mr. Walden, and that Ms. Loftus was, in turn, supervised by Ms. Coury. 7 (ECF No. 38 at 7.) Ms. Champluvier attests on behalf of Defendant AmGUARD that Ms. 8 Loftus 9 is employed as Assistant Vice President of Claims by Berkshire Hathaway GUARD Insurance Companies. In that capacity, [Ms. 10 Loftus] supervises and oversees, along with other Vice 11 Presidents of Claims, the claim department responsible for investigating various types of claims for insurance policy 12 benefits submitted to AmGUARD pursuant to insurance policies 13 issued by AmGUARD.

14 (ECF No. 38-2 at 3, ¶ 6.) Regarding Ms. Coury, Ms. Champluvier attests that she 15 16 is employed as Vice President of Claims by Berkshire Hathaway GUARD Insurance Companies. In that capacity, [Ms. Coury] 17 supervises and oversees, along with other Vice Presidents of 18 Claims, the claim department responsible for investigating various types of claims for insurance policy benefits submitted 19 to AmGUARD pursuant to insurance policies issued by 20 AmGUARD.

21 (Id. at 3–4, ¶ 7.) 22 Based upon this, the Court concludes that neither Ms. Loftus nor Ms. Coury 23 are at the very apex of the corporate mountain range, but they both are closer to a peak— 24 Ms. Coury more so than Ms. Loftus. Momtazee, 2026 WL 1370123, at *3 (citation 25 omitted). “[T]he closer that a proposed witness is to the apex of some particular peak in 26 the corporate mountain range, and the less directly relevant that person is to the evidence 27 proffered in support of his deposition, the more appropriate the protections of the apex 28 1 doctrine become.” Apple Inc., 282 F.R.D. at 263. The Court looks to balance the burden 2 to the corporation and the executives against the importance of their testimony to the 3 litigation. 4 Defendant AmGUARD asserts that Ms. Loftus’s absence from Defendant’s 5 privilege log and claim file for the August Claim confirms that she “had no role in the 6 investigation or coverage determination at issue.” (ECF No. 38 at 8.) Ms. Champluvier 7 attests on behalf of Defendant AmGUARD that Ms. Loftus and Ms. Coury 8 had no involvement in AmGUARD’s coverage investigation of the February Loss or August Loss. [They] did not consult with 9 claim personnel assigned to investigate coverage for the 10 February Loss or August Loss, direct said personnel to do or refrain from doing anything in relation to those losses or make 11 any recommendations to said personnel about the coverage 12 investigation of the February Loss or August Loss or AmGUARD’s determinations of coverage related to those 13 losses. 14 (ECF No. 38-2 at 3–4, ¶¶ 6–7.) Defendant AmGUARD’s representations indicate that 15 deposing Ms. Loftus and Ms. Coury would not uncover information relevant to the 16 handling of the August Claim. 17 Further, whereas Plaintiffs established the relevance of the deposition testimony 18 sought from Ms. Champluvier through her communications and decisions regarding the 19 August Claim, Plaintiffs offer no such representations with respect to Ms. Loftus and Ms. 20 Coury. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ argument acknowledges the lack of established relevance to the 21 testimony of Ms. Loftus and Ms. Coury. (See ECF No. 39 at 12 (Plaintiff’s assertion that 22 they “are entitled to explore [Ms. Loftus’s] involvement and what, if anything, was 23 escalated to them and why”) (emphasis added).) Thus, the Court finds that the burden of 24 these depositions would not be proportional to the needs of the case and Defendant 25 AmGUARD has established good cause to enter a protective order shielding Ms. Loftus 26 and Ms. Coury from providing deposition testimony. See Ginena v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 27 No. 2:04-CV-01304-RCJ, 2011 WL 4749104, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 6, 2011) (holding that 28 1 defendant established good cause for issuance of a protective order precluding the 2 deposition of an individual who did not possess information relevant to any pending claims, 3 explaining that “[i]f discovery sought is not relevant, the court should restrict discovery by 4 issuing a protective order”); see also Carrera v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Co., No. 5 13CV1585-BAS JLB, 2014 WL 3695403, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2014) (citing 6 Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)) (explaining that the burden of establishing good cause to 7 obtain a protective order “can be met by showing that the sought after discovery is 8 irrelevant”); Monte H. Greenawalt Revocable Trust v. Brown, No. 12cv1983, 2013 WL 9 6844760, *3 (D. Nev. Dec.19, 2013) (“Discovery requests seeking irrelevant information 10 are inherently undue and burdensome”). 11 Based upon the respective representations of the parties, the Court concludes that 12 the depositions of these two executive witnesses would be, at best, a fishing expedition 13 and, at worst, harassment. 14 The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion as to Ms. Loftus and Ms. Coury. 15 C. Depositions of Former Employees 16 Rule 26(c)(1) requires courts to find good cause to issue a protective order, even 17 when the subject of discovery is a nonparty. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “While discovery is 18 a valuable right and should not be unnecessarily restricted, the ‘necessary’ restriction may 19 be broader when a nonparty is the target of discovery.” Dart Indus. Co. v. Westwood Chem. 20 Co., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted). 21 Here, Plaintiffs seek to depose Mr. Walden and Mr. Wolfe, two former employees 22 of Defendant AmGUARD.2 (ECF No. 38 at 10.) Mr. Walden was the direct supervisor of 23 Mr. Heiser, who drafted the denial letter for the August Claim. (ECF No. 39 at 16.) Mr. 24 Wolfe is a former adjuster who assisted Mr. Shaver with the August Claim. (ECF 25 No. 38 at 10.) Defendant AmGUARD moves for a protective order prohibiting the 26 27 2 An apparent typographical error, Plaintiffs repeatedly refer to Mr. Walden as “Mr. 28 Waldon.” (See ECF No. 39.) 1 depositions of both Mr. Walden and Mr. Wolfe. (Id.) The Court will evaluate each request 2 in turn. 3 1. Mr. Walden 4 Defendant AmGUARD argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to depose Mr. Walden, 5 because as the supervisor of Mr. Heiser, he did not play a “direct role in the investigation 6 or coverage determination for the August [Claim].” (ECF No. 38 at 11.) Additionally, 7 Defendant AmGUARD argues that “Plaintiffs have identified no evidence that Walden 8 possesses independent factual knowledge regarding the investigation, adjustment, or 9 coverage analysis beyond information already obtained.” (Id.) Finally, Defendant 10 AmGUARD argues that the late timing of Plaintiffs’ request to take Mr. Walden’s 11 deposition demonstrates its “cumulative and harassing nature,” where Plaintiffs already 12 pursued extensive discovery concerning the August Claim and Mr. Walden was identified 13 in Defendant’s privilege log served on December 23, 2025. (Id.) 14 Plaintiffs counter that Mr. Walden, as Mr. Heiser’s direct supervisor, “is a critical 15 link in the chain of supervision and decision making that led to the wrongful denial of 16 Plaintiffs’ August Claim.” (ECF No. 39 at 16.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendant 17 AmGUARD’s privilege log indicates that Mr. Walden “was copied on and involved in 18 communications during the very period surrounding the denial, communications that 19 Defendant [AmGUARD] has entirely redacted and refused to produce on privilege 20 grounds.” (Id. at 16.) Plaintiffs seek information regarding “how and why” a claim 21 exceeding Mr. Heiser’s authority limit “was sent back down to Mr. Heiser to handle and 22 issue a denial letter.” (Id. at 17.) Further, Plaintiffs seek to depose Mr. Walden regarding 23 “his supervisory decisions, his knowledge of the August Claim, what was communicated 24 to him about the escalation, and what directives, if any, he issued regarding how the August 25 Claim should be handled.” (Id.) Plaintiffs maintain that Mr. Walden’s testimony would 26 be neither cumulative nor duplicative, as Mr. Heiser testified that he had a limited 27 recollection of the substance of the escalation communications and did not know the 28 reasons for the claim denial. (Id. at 16–17.) Moreover, Plaintiffs accuse Defendant 1 AmGUARD of “procedural gamesmanship” for refusing to provide the last known address 2 and contact information for Mr. Walden on the basis that he is longer in Defendant 3 AmGUARD’s employ, thereby hindering Plaintiff’s ability to subpoena him directly. 4 (Id. at 18.) 5 Defendant AmGUARD’s assertion that good cause exists to shield Mr. Walden from 6 providing deposition testimony on the basis that he did not play a “direct role” the handling 7 of the August claim turns primarily on the question of relevance. (ECF No. 38 at 11.) 8 “‘The compulsion of production of irrelevant information is an inherently undue burden’ 9 for which a protective order may issue.” Carrera v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Co., No. 10 13CV1585-BAS JLB, 2014 WL 3695403, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2014) (quoting Jimenez 11 v. City of Chicago, 733 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1273 (W.D. Wash. 2010)) (further citations 12 omitted). 13 Ms. Van Ginneken attests in the supporting declaration accompanying Plaintiff’s 14 Opposition that “Mr. Heiser [] testified to ‘triaging’ the August Claim up to Ms. 15 Champluvier to handle it as it exceeded his authority” and to having “no idea how Ms. 16 Champluvier reached her determination to send the August Claim back to him.” 17 (ECF No. 39-1 at 3, ¶¶ 7, 10.) Although this testimony indicates that Ms. Champluvier, 18 rather than Mr. Walden, may possess information relevant to the August claim, Mr. Walden 19 is identified in Defendant AmGUARD’s privilege log as one of several recipients, 20 including Ms. Champluvier, of “[e]mails with coverage counsel concerning [P]laintiff’s 21 subject insurance claim.” (ECF No. 38-1 at 32 (emphasis added); see also id. at 33.) As 22 explained above, “[a] company cannot shield from discovery facts learned by an attorney 23 in the course of an investigation because the attorney-client privilege protects 24 communications, not facts.” In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. 25 Litig., No. 22-MD-03047-YGR (PHK), 2025 WL 325970, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2025) 26 (citation omitted). 27 As the supervisor to whom the August claim was escalated, Mr. Walden plausibly 28 possesses relevant, noncumulative information about the substance of the escalatory 1 communications and the decisions he made regarding the handling of the August Claim. 2 (ECF No. 39 at 17.) The Court is not persuaded by Defendant AmGUARD’s argument 3 that “the timing of Plaintiffs’ desire to take these depositions further demonstrates their 4 cumulative and harassing nature.” To the contrary, “there is no basis for denying a 5 discovery request simply because it is served toward the end of the designated period.” 6 Trump, 329 F.R.D. at 274. Moreover, Defendant AmGUARD has not identified any 7 specific “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” that would 8 befall Mr. Walden if a protective order were not granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 9 Defendant AmGUARD made a generalized argument that “locat[ing], prepar[ing], and 10 produc[ing]” Mr. Walden as a witness would be a burden. (ECF No. 38 at 12.) However, 11 Defendant AmGUARD fails to articulate why the deposition of Mr. Walden would be 12 uniquely burdensome or what “specific prejudice or harm” would ensue in the absence of 13 a protective order. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 14 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 The Court therefore DENIES Defendant AmGUARD’s Motion as to Mr. Walden. 16 2. Mr. Wolfe 17 Defendant AmGUARD argues that a protective order prohibiting the deposition of 18 Mr. Wolfe is necessary, because Plaintiffs “already deposed Mr. Shaver, who[m] Mr. 19 Wolfe assisted in adjusting the August Claim, and Mr. Heiser, who supervised both Mr. 20 Shaver and Mr. Wolfe.” (ECF No. 38 at 10.) Defendant AmGUARD contends that 21 Plaintiffs have “not identified any information uniquely possessed by Wolfe that is not 22 already available through those witnesses, the subject file claim, or the extensive discovery 23 produced by Defendant.” (Id. at 11.) Defendant AmGUARD also argues that the late 24 timing of Plaintiffs’ request to take Mr. Wolfe’s deposition demonstrates its “cumulative 25 and harassing nature.” (Id.) 26 Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Wolfe’s deposition is necessary to supplement the 27 information provided by Mr. Shaver in his deposition. (ECF No. 39 at 17.) Plaintiffs note 28 that Mr. Shaver demonstrated a “near-total inability to account for his handling of the 1 || August Claim” during his deposition, responding “I’m not sure” over 300 times during his 2 || deposition and “I don’t know” over 100 times. (/d. at 17-18.) Plaintiffs contend that Mr. 3 || Shaver’s lack of recollection “underscores the need for further depositions of the adjusters 4 ||that also handled the August Claim.” (/d. at 18.) As with Mr. Walden, Plaintiffs accuse 5 Defendant AmMGUARD of “procedural gamesmanship” for refusing to provide the last 6 ||known address and contact information for Mr. Wolfe on the basis that he is longer in 7 ||Defendant AmGUARD’s employ, thereby hindering Plaintiff's ability to subpoena him 8 || directly. Ud. at 18.) 9 The Court finds that Defendant AmGUARD fails to establish good cause for a 10 || protective order with respect to Mr. Wolfe. Mr. Wolfe was personally involved in adjusting 11 very claim at issue in this case. (ECF No. 38 at 10.) While Mr. Wolfe’s knowledge 12 || about the August Claim may overlap with that of Mr. Shaver, the inability of Mr. Shaver 13 recall his handling of the August Claim renders Mr. Wolfe’s testimony potentially 14 || significant. 15 The Court therefore DENIES Defendant AmGUARD’s Motion as to Mr. Wolfe. 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the 18 ||Motion. The deadline for the completion of fact discovery is extended to 19 || September 25, 2026 for the limited purpose of permitting Plaintiffs to take the depositions 20 Ms. Champluvier, Mr. Walden, and Mr. Wolfe. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: August 27, 2026 23 che a det n. Jill L. Burkhardt 24 ited States Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28 17