In re D.H. CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 8/27/26 In re D.H. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re D.H., a Person Coming B347722 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. AND FAMILY SERVICES, 24CCJP03970A–D)

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.H., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from findings of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed.

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ______________________________ K.H. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings regarding her four children, D.H. (born Feb. 2012), D.H.W. (born Sept. 2015), K.S. (born May 2019), and Z.S. (born Feb. 2021). Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND I. The Family All four children resided with mother. Mother entered into a relationship with Q.S. (father), the father of K.S. and Z.S., in 2017.1 In 2019, father went to prison, where he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, PTSD, hallucinations, and schizophrenia. Upon his release, he resumed “an on and off relationship” with mother. Mother reported that she “officially ended the relationship” with father in 2023, but father claimed that “he had been living with the family . . . from March 2024 to September 2024.” II. Inciting Incident On November 4, 2024, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) responded to a call at the family home. Mother reported that father physically assaulted her and threatened her life. Mother initially told the children to go into a separate bedroom, but when then 12-year-old D.H. heard the fighting, she exited the bedroom, brandished a broom or mop at father, and told him to leave. When father refused, mother told D.H. to grab a knife 1 Neither Q.S. nor the fathers of D.H. and D.H.W. are part of this appeal.

2 from the kitchen, telling D.H. that she (mother) “was going to gut [father] like a fish.” D.H. grabbed the knife and again told father to leave. Father “told [D.H.] to stab him.” Mother grabbed the knife from D.H., called the police, and told father to leave. Father finally complied. III. Investigation The following week, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigated the incident. Mother told a social worker that the November 4 incident represented “common behavior” by father, who had been subjecting mother to “ongoing harassment[.]” Mother said that father was “fixated on the idea that [she] has a new man in the home[,]” “spam[med] her phone using blocked numbers[,]” and had “show[n] up” at the family home and the homes of relatives “unannounced, aggressive, and armed . . . in hopes to see” mother. Mother also told the social worker that father refused to engage with mental health services and take prescribed medication, instead “repeatedly turn[ing] to crystal meth and other drugs.” However, even when mother suspected that father was “on drugs[,]” she “allow[ed] [him] to come over every day to hang [out] with his children.” Mother reported that she was often “the aggressor” in altercations between herself and father saying that she would “ ‘blank out’ ” and “ ‘see red’ ” when she “ ‘g[o]t mad[.]’ ” She told a dependency investigator about another incident wherein “she hit . . . father with her car because he swung on her[.]” The investigator noted that “[m]other was laughing when she was explaining . . . how she put her car in reverse[,] and hit . . . father with her car.”

3 Father agreed that mother “becomes escalated very quickly[,]” and said that mother often “taunt[ed][]” or “provok[ed] him.” Between March 2024 and November 2024, mother and father made multiple calls to the LAPD. In these calls, mother claimed that father “verbally threaten[ed]” her, “refus[ed] to leave her home” while on drugs, and made “threats to harm her and vandalize her vehicle[.]” On at least one occasion prior to November 4, mother armed herself with a knife in fear of father. Father also claimed that mother “maced [him] and threatened [him] with a bat.” The three oldest children confirmed that father and mother fought often, but they all felt safe with mother. D.H. and D.H.W. reported not feeling safe around father. IV. Petition In December 2024, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002 petition. The petition alleged that mother and father’s “history of engaging in violent altercations in the children’s presence,” including the November 4 incident in which D.H. “armed herself . . . and intervened in the altercation[,]” endangered the children. (§ 300, subds. (a) [nonaccidental harm inflicted by a parent] & (b)(1) [accidental harm]; counts a-1 & b- 1.) The petition also alleged that father’s “history of mental and emotional problems[,]” coupled with his “fail[ure] to take . . . psychotropic medications as prescribed” and “regularly attend mental health treatment[,]” endangered the children. Mother “allowed . . . father to have unlimited access to the children”

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

4 despite knowing about these issues. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1) [failure to protect]; count b-2.) V. Subsequent Developments In December 2024, father was incarcerated for probation violations. Mother reported that father “ha[d] been calling her and verbally harassing her from the jail phones.” In February 2025, DCFS confirmed that father had been arrested on new charges unrelated to this case. There was no information about when father would be released. VI. Findings; Appeal; Postjudgment Developments In May 2025, the juvenile court held an adjudication hearing on the petition. The court found that “repeated violent conduct . . . against . . . mother[] put[] the children’s physical health and safety at risk[,]” justifying jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a). The court also found that jurisdiction was warranted under subdivision (b)(1), explaining that while mother “did contact the police on numerous occasions[,] . . . she repeatedly allowed . . . father back into the home . . . . [and] allow[ed] [him] unlimited a[cc]ess to the children . . . despite [his] repeated and ongoing behaviors.” Accordingly, the court sustained counts a-1, b-1, and b-2 as to mother. The juvenile court released the children to mother’s home with family maintenance services. Mother timely appealed. In November 2025, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and released the children to mother’s sole legal and physical custody.3 3 On May 21, 2025, DCFS requested that we take judicial notice of orders terminating jurisdiction. We hereby grant the request. (In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86, 110 5 DISCUSSION I. Mootness As an initial matter, we address whether mother’s appeal is moot. As noted above, after mother filed the instant appeal, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and awarded her sole legal and physical custody of the children. DCFS claims the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction arguably rendered mother’s appeal moot. Mother counters that her appeal is not moot because the allegations underlying the jurisdictional findings must be reported for inclusion in California’s Child Abuse Central Index (CACI), pursuant to the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA) (Pen. Code, §§ 11164–11174.3). (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1052 (S.R.); Pen. Code, § 11169.) Mother notes that these findings, if erroneous, would directly affect her legal rights in future proceedings, including by foreclosing her ability to administratively contest inclusion in CACI. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 279 (D.P.).) It is not clear that the allegations in this case rise to the level of inclusion in CACI. (Compare S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1053 [appellant and DCFS agreed that sustained allegations of a parent’s “physical violence towards her . . . daughter” triggered mandatory CACI reporting] with In re Landon M. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 686, 697 [appellant did not show that she would be included in CACI where the sustained allegations established that “the parents’ conduct collectively ‘endanger[ed] the[ir] children’s physical health and safety and place[d] the[m] . . . at [“[P]ostjudgment evidence . . . is admissible for the limited purpose of determining whether [a] subsequent development has rendered an appeal . . . moot”].)

6 risk of serious harm . . .’ but . . . did not allege conduct by [the] [m]other constituting either ‘child abuse’ or ‘severe neglect[]’ ” as defined by CANRA].) Our Supreme Court has suggested that, where “the conduct at issue is likely but not indisputably reportable[,]” the reviewing court should consider exercising its inherent “discretion to conduct a merits review of the parent’s claim even if the case is moot.” (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1054.) Given the nature of the allegations against mother, we will exercise our discretion to hear her appeal. II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings A. Standard of review Jurisdictional findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) We review those findings for substantial evidence— “evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value. [Citations.] We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or determine the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if there is other evidence supporting a contrary finding.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) “Substantial evidence may include inferences, so long as any such inferences are based on logic and reason and rest on the evidence.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 318.) B. Analysis 7 Under section 300, subdivision (a), the juvenile court has jurisdiction over and may adjudge to be a dependent of the court a child who “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent . . . .” Exposing children to domestic violence between their parents is sufficient to trigger jurisdiction under this provision if (1) the violence places the child in harm’s way, and (2) “there is evidence that the violence is ongoing or is likely to continue.” (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598–599.) “For example, if . . . an older child intervenes during a fight to protect her mother from her father’s abuse, the risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as nonaccidental.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 603 (Cole L.).) “The somewhat more common potential for accidental injury during parents’ physically violent fights in the presence of bystander children, however, constitutes a failure or inability to protect the child, creating the potential for dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).” (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603; see also § 300, subd. (b)(1) [authorizing jurisdiction over a “child [who] has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of [his or her] parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child”].) Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146), there is ample evidence that the parents’ domestic violence warrants jurisdiction under subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). Mother and father had an ongoing history of domestic violence, which 8 occasionally devolved into serious physical altercations. On one occasion, mother intentionally hit father with a car. On another, D.H. intervened in a physical altercation between mother and father; mother deputized D.H. to get a knife so that mother could “gut [father] like a fish”; and when D.H. complied, father told her to “stab him.” This created a significant risk of nonaccidental harm. (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603.) Moreover, father’s history of arriving to the family home and relatives’ homes unannounced and armed—and mother’s history of “taunting[]” and “provoking” father, despite knowing about his mental instability and violent tendencies—constituted a failure to protect the children from domestic violence. (See In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453–1454 [“[O]ngoing domestic violence in the household where children are living, standing alone, ‘is a failure to protect [them] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.’ ”].) Mother argues that any future risk of domestic violence was minimal due to father’s incarceration. (In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719 [courts must look to whether “ ‘ “[the] circumstances at the time of the [jurisdictional] hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm” ’ ”].) But the record provides no indication of how long father would stay incarcerated. He was arrested and jailed pending adjudication of new criminal charges, but the record does not suggest that he was convicted or sentenced. There is ample basis to infer that father would resume his part in the cycle of domestic violence if he regained his liberty, especially since he had continued telephonically harassing mother from jail. Moreover, mother had previously resumed a relationship with father upon his release from prison.

9 Under these circumstances, the record supports the juvenile court’s determination that the children were, at the time of the adjudication hearing, endangered by the parents’ domestic violence. (In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 848 [“[T]he juvenile court may consider past events when determining whether a child presently needs its protection.”].) In light of our conclusion that evidence of the parents’ domestic violence supports jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), mother’s arguments challenging alternate bases for jurisdiction are moot. (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289 [a single basis for dependency jurisdiction is enough to support the exertion of jurisdiction over a child].) DISPOSITION The jurisdictional findings are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J. GOORVITCH We concur:

________________________, P. J. LUI ________________________, J. CHAVEZ