In re E.G. CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 8/27/26 In re E.G. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B348806 In re E.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00914A–C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.R., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed. Tracy M. De Soto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ Appellant D.R. (mother) appeals from juvenile court jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders sustaining a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and asserting dependency jurisdiction over mother’s three children.1 We affirm the orders. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 12, 2025, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that mother had generally neglected the children. The reporting party stated that roaches and rodents were “jumping on the couches” in the family home, which smelled “horrible.” A DCFS social worker visited mother’s apartment on February 19, 2025, but nobody answered the door. The social worker left a business card on the door. The social worker then interviewed the apartment’s property manager, who reported that mother’s apartment had been “in poor condition and filthy” for over a year, and was in the worst condition of the 11 units in the complex. The landlord had warned mother three times about 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 the condition of the apartment. The property manager reported that mother violated her lease agreement by allowing the apartment to become so filthy, and that she had been served with an eviction notice. A DCFS social worker visited mother’s apartment again on February 24 and 26, 2025, but nobody answered the door. On February 27, 2025, the social worker contacted mother by mail and email to notify her of the general neglect report and to schedule a home assessment. On March 3, 2025, the social worker interviewed the children at school. All three children reported seeing roaches and rats in the home. Two of the children said that they saw rat feces on the floor, and one reported seeing roaches in the fridge. The social worker spoke to mother by phone on March 6, 2025, and informed her of the general neglect referral. Mother stated that she planned to move soon and was actively looking for housing. Mother agreed to schedule a home visit for March 12, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. The morning of the scheduled visit, the social worker called and texted mother to reschedule the visit to 10:30 a.m. Mother did not respond. When the social worker arrived, mother did not answer the door and did not respond to several phone calls or text messages. The social worker detected a “strong foul odor” coming from the front door, consistent with “filth and rotten food.” The social worker returned to the home on March 14, 2025, but nobody answered the door. On or about March 17, 2025, mother agreed to send the children to live with their father.2 The next day, a DCFS social worker visited father’s home and found it had sufficient 2 Father was nonoffending and is not a party to this appeal.

3 furniture, food, and clothing for the children. The children were happy to be with father and did not appear distressed. Meanwhile, mother’s landlord completed the eviction process on or about March 14, 2025. Mother told a DCFS social worker that she planned to move in with maternal grandmother the following week. Before mother moved, the social worker conducted a home assessment. The social worker observed that the apartment was “crammed” with furniture, boxes, and plastic bags, with just one “walkable area” near the front door. The home smelled “very foul” through the social worker’s N95 mask. The refrigerator was unplugged and contained rotting food. The social worker observed rat feces on the floor. According to mother, the property management company scheduled a pest control appointment, but mother was not home at the time, and the pest control company could not treat the home because it was too cluttered. Mother admitted that the home had a roach and rat problem and that it was not safe for the children. The juvenile court ordered the children removed from mother on March 24, 2025. On March 28, 2025, DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging that the children were at substantial risk of harm because mother allowed the home to become filthy and unsanitary. At the April 14, 2025 initial hearing, the court released the children to mother’s home on the condition that the family live with maternal grandmother and that the home remain safe for the children. DCFS later determined that maternal grandmother’s home adequately accommodated the children. A DCFS social worker interviewed mother about the petition on May 14, 2025. Mother asserted that the allegations 4 were only partially true. She admitted that the apartment had been infested with rats, but she said that she cleaned every day and that the infestation was something the property management company failed to remediate. Mother claimed that the children had moved in with maternal grandmother, and that mother was already in the process of moving out, by the time that DCFS became involved. Mother explained that there was rotten food in the refrigerator because she had unplugged it in anticipation of the move. At the July 10, 2025 adjudication and disposition hearing, the court sustained the petition. The court declared the children dependents of the court and released them to the home of the parents. Mother timely appealed. DISCUSSION Mother argues that the juvenile court erroneously sustained jurisdictional allegations that the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm. I. Applicable law and standard of review The juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child when that child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness” resulting from his or her parent’s failure to protect the child or failure to provide the child with adequate shelter. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) We review jurisdictional findings “ ‘ “in the light of the whole record” ’ ‘to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . .’ ” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892 (I.C.).)

5 “ ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.) II. Substantial evidence supports a finding that the children were at substantial risk of harm Mother asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. We do not agree. For more than a year, mother allowed the children to live in a home that was infested with roaches and rodents. The rodents defecated on the floor. (Cf. Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 686, fn. 2 [plaintiffs’ daughter died after contracting hantavirus, which spreads through contact with mouse feces].) The refrigerator sometimes contained roaches and rotting food, and a social worker could smell a strong odor consistent with rotten food from outside the front door of the unit. (Cf. Sue E. v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 399, 402 [petitioners’ child “died of salmonella poisoning probably contracted from eating rotten food”].) When the social worker finally managed to assess the interior of the home—some four weeks after first attempting to contact mother—the apartment was extremely cluttered, and the social worker detected a “very foul smell” despite wearing an N95 mask. This evidence supports a finding that the children faced substantial risk of serious harm or illness. (In re M.D.

6 (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 853 (M.D.) [affirming finding of substantial risk of harm where father left child unsupervised in “a foul-smelling apartment strewn with ‘hordes of trash’ ” and dog feces].) Mother argues that M.D. is distinguishable because the father in that case denied neglecting his child. (M.D., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 852; see In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].) In contrast, after DCFS became involved in this case, mother acknowledged that the home was unsafe for her children. Yet, mother also allowed the hazards in the family home to persist for more than a year. Mother’s landlord urged her to remediate the hazardous conditions of the home at least three times, but mother was unable or unwilling to do so, and ultimately the landlord evicted her. Additionally, a full month passed between DCFS’s first attempt to contact mother and the home assessment, despite numerous attempts by DCFS to contact mother and visit the apartment. Mother’s lack of diligence in ameliorating the home’s condition and responding to DCFS inquiries casts doubt on her assertion that she truly understood the severity of the situation. In short, while mother’s acknowledgement is commendable, the record as a whole supports the juvenile court’s findings. (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 892.) Mother also contends that the jurisdictional findings should be reversed because there was no evidence that the children were actually harmed by the conditions in the home. “ ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citations.] The focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the 7 child.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 (T.V.).) Consistent with this focus, the statute expressly permits the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction after finding that there is a substantial risk of harm. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) As we have discussed, the evidence supports a finding that such a risk existed here. Next, mother asserts that any risk had been ameliorated prior to the jurisdictional hearing, because by that time mother had moved in with maternal grandmother. But the juvenile court may consider a parent’s past conduct. (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332; T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.”].) As we have discussed, mother allowed the children to live in hazardous conditions for more than a year. Based on the whole record, including mother’s past conduct, the evidence is “ ‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value,’ ” and is sufficient to support a finding that mother’s children were at substantial risk of suffering serious harm or illness. (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 892.) Finally, mother also appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders, but this challenge is premised on the success of her arguments as to the jurisdictional findings. Because we affirm the jurisdictional findings, we also affirm the dispositional orders.

8 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

OCHOA, J. * * Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.