In re V.M. CA4/3
- Proceeding
- appeal from a postjudgment order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Orange County · No. 24DP0469
- Trial judge
- Michael T. Mooney
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- dependency
- Panel
- Joanne Motoike (author), James B. Scott, Thomas A. Delaney
Analysis
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Opinion
Filed 8/27/26 In re V.M. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re V.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G066526 v. (Super. Ct. No. 24DP0469)
C.M., OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael T. Mooney, Judge. Affirmed. Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R. Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance for Minor. C.M. (Mother) is the mother of V.M. (the child), who was taken into protective custody in April 2024 at the age of 15. Mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivisions (b) and (c).1 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the Orange County Social Services Agency (the Agency) did not adequately document its efforts to comply with the duty of further inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. (ICWA) and section 224.2, subdivision (e).2 We conclude an interim review report prepared by the Agency and admitted into evidence by stipulation, adequately documented the Agency’s ICWA compliance efforts and imparted information sufficient to support the juvenile court’s ICWA findings. The Agency was not required to also submit copies of its tribal and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) inquiries, the certified mail receipts, or the tribes’ and the BIA’s responses to the court. We therefore affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. OVERVIEW OF THE CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS3 In April 2024, the Agency removed the child from Mother and 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
2 “The language of both federal and state law uses the term ‘Indian.’ California courts have used alternative terms, such as ‘American Indian’ or ‘Native American’; we use the term ‘Indian’ throughout to reflect the statutory language . . . . No disrespect is intended.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).)
3 This overview is limited in scope as its purpose is only to provide context to the single issue presented by this appeal.
2 placed the child with the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt. The Agency subsequently filed a child welfare petition alleging failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)), serious emotional damage (§ 300, subd. (c)), and no provision for support (§ 300, subd. (g)). At the jurisdiction hearing in June 2024, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petition to be true by a preponderance of the evidence. A month later, at the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared the child to be a dependent child of the court and found by clear and convincing evidence that removal from Mother’s custody was necessary. The court granted Mother reunification services and supervised visitation. At the 12-month review hearing in July 2025, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. At the section 366.26 hearing, the court found the child to be adoptable and ordered adoption as the permanent plan. II. FACTS RELATED TO ICWA At the outset of the child welfare proceedings, Mother and maternal aunt reported having Cherokee ancestry. Mother told the intake social worker the child’s great-great-grandmother was Cherokee but did not have enough Cherokee ancestry to receive “benefits.” The maternal aunt told the intake social worker she “was about 4 [percent] Native American” and knew the great-great grandmother was Cherokee. Maternal grandmother reported she “had a percentage of Native American heritage with Cherokee but was not aff[iliated] with a tribe.” The child also reported having Indian ancestry. Mother also indicated on an ICWA-020 form possible Cherokee ancestry. At the detention hearing in April 2024, the juvenile court deferred 3 making an ICWA finding and ordered the Agency to continue its ICWA inquiry. Over the next several months, the assigned social worker contacted the child, Mother, maternal grandmother, a maternal aunt, and the child’s alleged father (Father) to inquire further about the child’s possible Indian ancestry. Maternal grandmother again claimed Cherokee ancestry. Maternal grandmother reported she was not enrolled in a tribe and the Cherokee ancestry came from the late maternal great-grandfather’s side of the family. Maternal grandmother provided the maternal great-grandfather’s full name and place of death. According to maternal grandmother, the maternal great-grandfather was not enrolled in a tribe. Maternal grandmother reported maternal aunt was not enrolled in a tribe. Maternal grandmother also claimed the maternal great-great- grandmother, who was deceased, had Cherokee ancestry but had not been enrolled in a tribe. Maternal grandmother did not know the maternal great- great-grandmother’s full name, date and place of birth, or date and place of death. Maternal grandmother said she would search for more information and notify the social worker of any. Maternal grandmother lived with maternal aunt and provided the social worker her date and place of birth. The maternal grandmother later provided the social worker with the maternal great-grandfather’s date and place of birth and date of death, and the maternal great-great-grandmother’s full name, place of birth, date and place of death, and possible maiden names. Maternal grandmother did not know the maternal great-great-grandmother’s date of birth. Maternal grandmother also claimed that the maternal great-grandmother, who was deceased, had Indian ancestry but did not know the tribe. Maternal grandmother provided the social worker with the maternal great- 4 grandmother’s full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, and date and place of death. Maternal grandmother did not have any additional information about Indian ancestry and did not identify any other relatives who might know of such. Father reported no known Indian ancestry. Based on the information provided by maternal grandmother and maternal aunt, the Agency concluded there was reason to believe the child might be an Indian child and further inquiry would be conducted. In April 2024, the assigned social worker reviewed the BIA’s list of designated tribal agents from the Federal Register and identified three potentially relevant tribes: (1) Cherokee Nation, (2) Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and (3) United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma. In May 2024, the social worker sent ICWA inquiries both by e- mail and certified mail to the agents of those three tribes and to the BIA’s Pacific Regional Office director. Each ICWA inquiry included “information on the family’s Native American ancestry and a family tree.” Within a day, the Agency received a response from the Cherokee Nation, which reported the child was not eligible for enrollment in the tribe. About a month later, the Agency also received a response from the Eastern Band of Cherokee, which reported the child was not eligible for enrollment in the tribe, and in mid-June, the Agency received a response from the United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, which likewise reported the child was not eligible for enrollment in the tribe. From July 2024 through July 2025, the social worker periodically contacted Mother, maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and the child, to ask again whether any had any new information pertaining to the family’s Indian ancestry. None of them had additional information to report. The 5 social worker tried to contact Father for the same purpose but as of August 11, 2025, had not received a response from him. The Agency’s interim review report dated August 11, 2025 (the August 11, 2025 report) included a 14-page report on the Agency’s ICWA inquiry. Mother stipulated to the admission of the August 11, 2025 report at the ICWA review hearing of that date and did not object to any of its contents. At the hearing on August 11, 2025, the juvenile court reviewed the August 11, 2025 report and took judicial notice of the court file. The court found the ICWA inquiry conducted by the Agency was “proper, adequate, and duly diligent” and that “there is no reason to know the child is an Indian Child.” The court found ICWA did not apply but the Agency had an affirmative and continuing duty of inquiry. DISCUSSION I. OVERVIEW OF ICWA INQUIRY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW “ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes. . . .” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1129.) The juvenile court and the county welfare department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child” who is the subject of a child welfare petition “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) ICWA and related California law impose on the juvenile court and a county welfare agency a duty to inquire, a duty of further inquiry, and a duty to provide ICWA notice. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131–1133.)
6 The duty to inquire “begins with the initial contact” and includes “asking a party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) “Section 224.2, subdivision (b) specifies that once a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department, the duty to inquire ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) The duty of further inquiry arises if the court or social worker “has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This duty of further inquiry includes (1) interviewing parents and extended family members to gather certain information, (2) “[c]ontacting the [BIA] and the State Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the . . . tribes in which the child may be a member . . . or eligible for membership,” and (3) “[c]ontacting the tribe or tribes and any other person [who] may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.” (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) [same requirements].) Contact with a tribe includes “sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as well as information on the current status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(c).) The duty to provide ICWA notice is triggered if, after the duty of inquiry and of further inquiry are satisfied, the court or the county welfare agency “knows or has reason to know . . . that an Indian child is involved” in the child welfare proceedings. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) Notice pursuant to ICWA 7 must be given to the tribes identified through inquiry to enable them “‘to determine whether the child involved in a dependency proceeding is an Indian child and, if so, whether to intervene in, or exercise jurisdiction over, the matter.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1133.) We review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence standard. (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) Under that standard, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s ICWA findings and draw all reasonable inferences in their support. (In re J.N., at p. 774.) We review for abuse of discretion the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency’s ICWA inquiry was adequate, proper, and duly diligent. (In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 66; see Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141 [“the juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’”].) II. THE AGENCY PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE IT SATISFIED ITS ICWA DUTY OF FURTHER INQUIRY Mother acknowledges the Agency satisfied its obligations under the duty of inquiry, and the Agency acknowledges it had a duty of further inquiry. Mother argues the Agency did not produce sufficient evidence to prove it satisfied its obligations imposed by the duty of further inquiry because the Agency did not submit or include in its reports actual copies of the e-mail and letter inquiries sent to the BIA and the three Cherokee tribes, the certified mail receipts, and the BIA’s and the tribes’ responses to those inquiries. In finding ICWA did not apply, the juvenile court reviewed and relied upon the August 11, 2025 report, which included a detailed 14-page 8 section on the Agency’s efforts to satisfy its ICWA inquiry duties. A social worker’s reports generally are admissible and competent proof, even if they contain hearsay.4 (See In re M.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1069–1071; In re Jonique W. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 685, 698 [“[g]enerally speaking,” a social worker’s report containing hearsay “is competent and admissible proof” in a child welfare proceeding]; see also § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)(C) [at permanency hearing “the court shall review and consider the social worker’s report and recommendations”].) Mother stipulated to the admission of the August 11, 2025 report without objection to any of its contents and did not ask for the report’s preparer to be made available for cross-examination at the ICWA review hearing. The August 11, 2025 report constitutes substantial evidence supporting the juvenile’s court’s ICWA findings. That report identified each person interviewed by the Agency (including Mother, Father, maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and the child), documented each of the numerous instances in which the Agency interviewed them, provided detailed information about each person interviewed,5 and for each person interviewed 4 At the jurisdiction hearing, a social worker’s report is competent and admissible evidence if the report’s preparer is made available for cross- examination upon a party’s timely request. (§ 355, subd. (b).) Here, the juvenile court did not make its ICWA finding at the jurisdiction hearing; nonetheless, Mother did not request the preparer of the August 11, 2025 report be made available for the ICWA review hearing.
5 The report documents Mother’s full name, date and place of birth, address, phone number, and possible Cherokee affiliation; Father’s full name, date of birth, address; maternal grandmother’s full name, date and place of birth, address, phone number, and noted possible Cherokee ancestry; the maternal great-grandmother’s full name, former name, date and place of birth, and date and place of death; the maternal great-grandfather’s full name, date and place of birth, date and place of death, and noted possible 9 provided a summary of information received about potential Indian ancestry. The report gave detailed information on the Agency’s review of the BIA’s resources, the names of the three Cherokee tribes and their agents obtained from that review, and the contact information for each agent. The report established that in May and June 2024, the social worker sent ICWA inquiries both by e-mail and certified mail to the three Cherokee tribes and the BIA Pacific Regional Office. As to each of the three tribes, the report noted the Agency has received a response “indicating that the child was not eligible for enrollment with the tribe.” The Agency was not required to submit actual copies of the Agency’s e-mail inquiries, inquiry letters, certified mail receipts, and responses from the tribes. Section 224.2, which governs the duties of initial inquiry and further inquiry, has no requirement of producing or filing inquiry letters, return receipts, or responses with the court. “[S]ection 224.2, subdivision (e) does not require that the [Agency] report its [ICWA] inquiry efforts to the juvenile court in the form of a declaration or in any particular form at all.” (In re M.W. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1046.) In contrast, when ICWA notice is given pursuant to section 224.3, section 224.3, subdivision (c) expressly requires that “[p]roof of the notice, including copies of the notices sent and all return receipts and responses received, shall be filed with the court in advance of the hearing . . .” (§ 224.3, subd. (c); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.482(b) [“Proof of notice . . . must be filed with the court in advance of the hearing . . . and must include . . . return receipts, and any Cherokee ancestry; the maternal aunt’s full name, date and place of birth, address, phone number, and noted possible Cherokee ancestry; and the maternal great-great-grandmother’s full name, former name, place of birth, approximate date and place of death, and noted possible Cherokee ancestry.
10 responses received from the [BIA] and tribes”].) Mother does not contend there was “reason to know” the child was an Indian child that would have triggered the duty to provide ICWA notice under section 224.3. Mother argues that without the documentation she claims the Agency should have provided, the juvenile court could not have determined whether the ICWA inquiries were sent to the BIA and the correct tribes and contained sufficient and accurate information. The August 11, 2025 report reflects that the Agency reviewed the BIA list of designated tribal agents and, from that list, identified Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and United Keetoowah Band in Oklahoma as potentially relevant. Mother does not identify any other tribe that the Agency should have contacted. The child’s relatives identified only Cherokee as the source of possible Indian ancestry. The August 11, 2025 report provided that for each tribe, the Agency sent ICWA inquiries which included “information on the family’s Native American ancestry and a family tree.” It is reasonable to infer the information provided to the tribes was the information obtained from the child’s family members, which was described in the August 11, 2025 report and prior Agency reports. (In re J.N., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 774 [all reasonable inferences are drawn in support of ICWA findings].) The August 11, 2025 report indicates a response had been received from each tribe and the BIA. A reasonable inference from the Agency’s receipt of those responses is the ICWA inquiries had been sent to the correct addresses and/or e-mail addresses for the correct tribes and the BIA. None of the tribes identified any additional information that would have been necessary for the tribe “to make a membership or eligibility determination.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(c).) The August 11, 2025 report thus provided sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s ICWA findings, 11 and the juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding the Agency’s ICWA inquiry “proper, adequate, and duly diligent.” Our conclusion is supported by other decisions addressing the nature and sufficiency of the documentation necessary to prove compliance with ICWA inquiry requirements. (See, e.g., In re M.W., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1045–1046 [rejecting father’s challenge to the county welfare department’s documentation of further inquiry efforts and finding “section 224.2, subdivision (e) does not require that the [county welfare] department report its inquiry efforts to the juvenile court in the form of a declaration or in any particular form at all”]; In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1054 [the Agency’s addendum report contained sufficient information to support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply]; In re H.M. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1184 [rejecting the mother’s claim the documentation in the Agency addendum reports of further inquiry was inadequate].) Mother cites In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123 and describes it as similar to the present case. In E.C., the mother reported Apache ancestry and testified the maternal great-grandmother and two maternal great-uncles were enrolled members of the Apache tribe. (Id at p. 147.) Although this information triggered the duty of further inquiry, the record contained no documentation as to whom the Agency may have directed ICWA inquiries and what responses, if any were received. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded that because the Agency failed to conduct a further inquiry and document the results, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 147–148.) Here, in sharp contrast, the Agency provided a detailed, 14-page report documenting its further inquiry under ICWA.
12 DISPOSITION The postjudgment order terminating parental rights and placing the child for adoption is affirmed.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, J.
SCOTT, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. S.O. No. E053095 · 2011-12-12
- Contra Costa County Social Service Department v. Sandra W. A062034 · 1994-07-01