People v. Prince CA2/7

Opinion

Filed 8/27/26 P. v. Prince CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B348039

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PA009207) v.

THOMAS RAVON PRINCE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed. William Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephen D. Svetich, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________ INTRODUCTION Thomas Ravon Prince was convicted of first degree murder with findings that the murder was committed in the commission of a robbery and that Prince personally used a firearm during both offences. The trial court sentenced Prince to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Prince was 21 years old at the time of the offenses. He appeals from a postjudgment order denying his motion for a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook).1 The superior court determined Prince was ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.2 Prince contends section 3051 violates his federal and state constitutional rights to equal protection because young adult offenders serving LWOP sentences for crimes they committed when they were 18 to 25 years old are ineligible for youth offender parole hearings, but young adult offenders serving non- LWOP sentences and juvenile offenders who committed crimes before the age of 18 serving LWOP sentences are eligible. Prince 1 In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 283 to 284, the California Supreme Court held a juvenile offender (i.e., under the age of 18) who is eligible for a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051 is entitled to a hearing to develop and preserve evidence of his or her youth-related characteristics and the circumstances at the time of the offense. In Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at page 451, the California Supreme Court further held that “an offender entitled to a hearing under sections 3051 and 4801 may seek the remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though the offender’s sentence is otherwise final.” 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 also argues his sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the California Constitution. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

In 1992, Prince was charged by information with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed during the commission of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Prince was also charged with second degree robbery. (§ 211). The information alleged Prince used a firearm in the commission of both offenses.4 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The parties agree Prince was 21 at the time of the offenses. At trial, the People introduced evidence Prince and another man, Ricky Simuel, robbed a jewelry store and fatally shot the owner, Norm Schumow. Arriving in a stolen white Oldsmobile Cutlass sedan, Prince and his accomplice entered a jewelry store. Prince held a gun; the other man held a sledgehammer. The store manager, Donald Everette, moved to sound the store alarm, but Prince told him to stop and ordered everyone in the store to get on the ground. Simuel smashed the jewelry case open with the sledgehammer. As Schumow moved to the front of the store, Prince told Schumow, “I’m not kidding. Get down on the ground,” and gunshots rang out. Schumow died of gunshot wounds.

3 We summarize the factual background from our previous opinion affirming Prince’s convictions on direct appeal. (People v. Prince (June 17, 1994, B075641) [nonpub. opn.].) 4 Prince was also charged with attempted murder, but this count was dismissed before conclusion of the trial.

3 Another bystander to the robbery, Mollie Kallick, was shot in the ribs and survived. Approximately $6,000 of jewelry was taken. Law enforcement found the white Oldsmobile Cutlass sedan abandoned near the scene, and it contained a sledgehammer and other tools used in the robbery, but not the gun. Several months later, a detective interviewed Prince, who stated he did not know Simuel and that he entered the jewelry store to buy a wedding ring. Viewing stills from surveillance footage in the jewelry store, Prince ultimately admitted, “He [Schumow] rushed me. The gun went off. He grabbed me. He ran up on me.” Prince also stated he threw the gun away. In 1993, the jury returned a guilty verdict on first degree murder and second degree robbery, finding the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The jury also found true that Prince personally used a firearm in the commission of both offenses. As relevant here, the trial court sentenced Prince to LWOP. This court affirmed but ordered certain sentence modifications.5 In 2021, Prince petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The superior court denied the petition, ruling that Prince failed to make a prima facie showing he was eligible for relief because he was the “actual killer.” This court affirmed. (People v. Prince (Dec. 7, 2023, B319849) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2025, Prince filed a motion requesting a Franklin/Cook hearing to preserve youth-related mitigating evidence for a 5 Specifically, Prince’s sentence was modified by staying the sentence imposed on the robbery count and reducing the amount payable to the restitution fund.

4 future youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. The trial court denied Prince’s motion because his sentence of life without the possibility of parole made him ineligible for relief. Prince timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 3051 Does Not Violate the Constitutional Right to Equal Protection Section 3051 “offers opportunities for early release to certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838 (Hardin).) “Under the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration. [Citation.] But not all [young adult] offenders are eligible for parole hearings. The statute excludes, among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18.” (Id. at pp. 838-839; see § 3051, subd. (h); see also People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 116; People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 484 (Briscoe).) Defendants who were 18 to 25 years old at the time of their offenses but who are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 due to their sentences are not entitled to a Franklin hearing. (See People v. Mason (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 411, 415.) Prince argues section 3501, subdivision (h), violates the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions because it treats young adult offenders serving LWOP sentences differently than other young adult offenders sentenced to non- 5 LWOP terms, and differently than juveniles sentenced to LWOP. “We review these claims de novo” (People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 345 (Morales)), and we apply a deferential rational basis standard of review to a defendant’s equal protection challenge to the youth offender parole statute. (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) In Hardin, the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that “section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole is constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard, either on its face or as applied” to defendants “who are serving life without parole sentences for special circumstance murder.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) Prince acknowledges Hardin forecloses his equal protection argument as between young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP and young adult offenders who committed murder and received non-LWOP sentences. But he argues Hardin did not directly consider whether there is a rational basis to distinguish between young adult and juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. Prince is correct that Hardin did not consider this equal protection challenge. But Hardin observed that this court had held it was unnecessary to address this argument because “the Legislature acted reasonably in distinguishing between offenses committed before and after the age of 18 because the Eighth Amendment (and the law more generally) makes the same distinction.” (Hardin, at p. 846.) In all events, Prince fails to show the Legislature acted irrationally by granting youth offender parole hearings to juvenile offenders with a sentence of life without the possibility of parole while denying such hearings to young adult offenders with the same sentence. As People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 6 193, 204 explained when rejecting a similar equal protection challenge to section 3051, “The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age.” (Sands, at p. 204.) Sands reasoned that “the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences [imposed on juveniles] but go no further.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463-464 [rejecting equal protection challenge to § 3051 based on the different treatment of juvenile and young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP because “the United States and California Supreme Courts have found the line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational one”]; Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347 [“for purposes of LWOP offenders, the line drawn at 18 is a rational one”]; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 (Acosta) [“[T]here is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile LWOP offenders and young adult LWOP offenders: their age.”].)

B. Briscoe is Distinguishable Prince next argues this case is like Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th 479. Briscoe held that section 3051 violated the equal protection clause in “the narrow factual context” of young adult offenders “sentenced for special circumstance murder during a robbery or burglary under section 190.2, subdivision (d),” which applies to nonkiller participants in specified felony offenses during which a murder occurred. (Briscoe, at pp. 485, 490.) The defendant in Briscoe was convicted of first degree murder as a nonkiller participant in the underlying felonies of robbery and burglary, for which he was sentenced to LWOP. (Id. at p. 485.) The defendant was 21 years 7 old at the time of the offenses, and the trial court determined he was ineligible for a section 3051 youth offender parole hearing. (Id. at p. 486.) The defendant successfully argued on appeal that section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance felony murder as nonkillers under section 190.2, subdivision (d), while including those convicted of nonspecial circumstance first degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. (See Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 489-490 & fn. 5; see also id. at p. 487 [noting that although “Hardin forecloses Briscoe’s challenge to section 3051’s exclusion of youth special circumstance murderers generally, . . . his narrower challenge based on section 190.2, subdivision (d) survives”].) Briscoe observed that the Legislature amended section 189 by “directly incorporating the section 190.2, subdivision (d) standard into the definition of first degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3).” (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 491.) Thus, “[s]ection 190.2, subdivision (d) describes the exact same circumstances and conduct that are now necessary to support a conviction for first degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3).” (Id. at p. 492; see id. at p. 489 [“The two provisions employ the same standard of liability, ‘as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.’ ”].) Yet, although both statutes involved the same underlying conduct, a young adult offender convicted under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), would be entitled to a Franklin hearing, while a young adult offender convicted under section 190.2, subdivision (d), would not. Briscoe reasoned that because “[t]he disparate treatment of offenders who committed murder per these identical 8 provisions during the same underlying felonies cannot reflect any difference in culpability” (Briscoe, at p. 492), it followed that “[t]he result is an irrational distinction between equally culpable youth offenders seeking parole that the Legislature did not contemplate” (id. at p. 490). Accordingly, it held that offering parole opportunities to young adult offenders convicted of section 189, subdivision (e)(3), but not section 190.2, subdivision (d), lacks a rational basis, and “[a]s applied to youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or burglary, the statute violates equal protection.” (Briscoe, at p. 495.) Briscoe reversed the order denying the defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing. The People argue Briscoe is distinguishable because the special circumstance finding in Briscoe was made under section 190.2, subdivision (d), whereas in Prince’s case the finding was made under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). According to the People: “Briscoe is distinguishable from the instant case. Briscoe concerned a special circumstance allegation under section 190.2, subdivision (d), which is applicable to major participants in a non-homicide felony who acted with reckless indifference to life but are not actual killers and did not have intent to kill. In contrast, the evidence presented at trial established that [Prince] was the murderer, not merely an accomplice.” In other words, under section 190.2, subdivision (d), a person could be convicted of special circumstance murder without being the actual killer or having intent to kill, but a conviction under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), requires a finding that the murder was committed as either the actual perpetrator or accomplice. We agree with the People.

9 As stated, Briscoe involved a special circumstance finding under section 190.2, subdivision (d). Briscoe did not address the situation where, as here, a special circumstance finding was made under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). As relevant here, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), provides for a penalty of death or life without parole if the murder “was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit” certain specified felonies, including robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). Thus, while section 190.2, subdivision (d) (at issue in Briscoe), expressly applies only to nonkillers, that is not necessarily the case with section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) (under which Prince was convicted). That is because section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) applies to actual killers and nonkillers who commit murder while intending to commit a felony such as robbery. (See § 190.2(a)(17); see also CALCRIM No. 730.)

C. Section 3051 Does Not Violate the State Constitutional Prohibition Against Cruel or Unusual Punishment Prince further argues the exclusion in section 3051 of young adult offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole who were 18 years old or older constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. Prince did not raise this argument in the superior court and it is forfeited. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 991 [“ ‘[a] party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct’ ”].) Even if Prince had not forfeited the argument, the argument lacks merit. (See People v. Baker (2018)

10 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733 [“[t]here is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches” to the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, and “ ‘[a]lthough articulated slightly differently, both standards prohibit punishment that is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime or the individual culpability of the defendant’ ”]; see also Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 [sentence of LWOP “does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26”]; Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781 [Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, which held the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile to a mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole, “applies to juvenile offenders sentenced to mandatory LWOP terms, not 21 year olds”]; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439 [Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing a sentence of LWOP on a 21-year-old defendant]; People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1020, 1030-1032 [Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing a sentence of LWOP on an 18-year-old defendant]; cf. People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429 [Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing a sentence of death on a 21-year-old defendant].)

11 DISPOSITION

The order denying Prince’s request for a Franklin/Cook hearing is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.