S.K. v. Papazyan CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 8/27/26 S.K. v. Papazyan CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

S.K., B343046 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 24STRO07084)

LILIT PAPAZYAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard Bloom, Judge. Affirmed.

Zarmi Law and David Zarmi for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Office of Noelle M. Halaby, Noelle M. Halaby and Maria D. Houser for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________ Lilit Papazyan (Papazyan) appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against her protecting S.K,1 pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.).2 Papazyan contends the trial court erred in excluding a Ring doorbell camera video (Ring video) because she failed to provide a transcript, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 2.1040.3 We affirm.

BACKGROUND Papazyan is married to S.K.’s son. On September 26, 2024, S.K. sought and obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Papazyan. The trial court set a hearing on the DVRO for October 21, 2024. At Papazyan’s request, the court continued the hearing to November 15, 2024. At the hearing, S.K. testified that she went to her son’s house to see her grandchildren on September 21, 2024. S.K. testified that Papazyan invited her inside the house to have a conversation. S.K. further testified that she and Papazyan had a disagreement, and Papazyan punched her head, pulled her hair, spit on her face, and kicked her hip. S.K. was taken to the emergency room. At the hearing, S.K. introduced photographs of her injuries. S.K. testified that she did not inflict any of the 1 In accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1), we refer to the person protected in this domestic violence prevention proceeding by her initials. 2 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

2 injuries upon herself. During cross-examination, Papazyan’s counsel confirmed that she “didn’t self-inflict any of these injuries, right?” At that point, Papazyan sought to introduce the entire Ring video, which was one minute and 23 seconds, as impeachment evidence, claiming that it showed S.K. inflicting the injuries upon herself. S.K.’s counsel objected primarily because Papazyan’s counsel did not prepare a transcript of the audio recording, as required by rule 2.1040. The trial court excluded the Ring video on this basis. Papazyan’s counsel requested a recess so he could prepare a transcript. The court denied the request because “[w]e’re in the hearing.” The trial court subsequently allowed Papazyan’s counsel to play a four-second portion of the Ring video to provide context for a photograph introduced by S.K.’s counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued a one-year domestic violence restraining order against Papazyan. The restraining order expired on November 15, 2025.4 This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION I. Relevant Law and Standards of Review “Under the DVPA, a court may issue a restraining order to prevent domestic violence or abuse if the party seeking the order 4 We exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this arguably moot appeal because “[a]pplying a strict standard of mootness . . . would effectively deprive persons affected by injunctions of limited duration from obtaining any judicial review.” (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 728; see also In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute”].)

3 ‘shows, to the satisfaction the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’ ” (Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360, 367.) In general, we defer to the trial court and review an order granting or denying a DVRO for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) We review de novo the court’s interpretations of applicable statutes and the California Rules of Court. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800.) We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (Jane IL Doe v. Brightstar Residential Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 171, 176.) Even if the court erred, we reverse only when there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the error. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 118.) II. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted Rule 2.1040 Rule 2.1040 provides that “before a party may present or offer into evidence any electronic sound or sound-and-video recording” that is not a deposition or prior testimony, “the party must provide to the court and to opposing parties a transcript of the electronic recording . . . .” (Rule 2.1040(b)(1).) There is no dispute that the Ring video had both video and audio. Papazyan contends that the trial court erred in excluding the full Ring video because rule 2.1040 does not apply to “a recording offered solely for video.” Papazyan is incorrect. The rule applies to any “sound-and-video recording” that is “offer[ed] into evidence.” (Ibid.) It matters not whether the proponent intends to rely only on the video portion. Papazyan attempts to describe the exhibit as “a visual-only video,” but that is incorrect. The Ring video had sound. On appeal, Papazyan argues that “the most obvious 4 solution was simply to admit the video without the audio.” However, Papazyan’s counsel never clearly asked to admit the Ring video without the audio. Rather, he sought to introduce the entire video into evidence, arguing that only the video was relevant and “[y]ou can barely hear the audio.” Therefore, Papazyan has forfeited any argument that the trial court should have admitted the Ring video without the audio. (See Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226 [arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal].) It is not the court’s responsibility to propose solutions to counsel’s evidentiary problems. (Truslow v. Woodruff (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 158, 165 [“A court cannot be expected to perform the duties of an advocate”].) More important, though, Papazyan’s proposal would have unfairly prejudiced S.K. The audio was part of the exhibit. The audio may have had some benefit to S.K.’s case. S.K. could have excused the transcript requirement by “stipulat[ing] . . . the sound portion of a sound-and-video recording does not contain any words that are relevant to the issues in the case.” (Rule 2.1040(b)(3).) She elected not to do so. Therefore, S.K. was entitled to a transcript even though Papazyan only sought to rely on the video portion of the exhibit. On reply, Papazyan argues that rule 2.1040 is ambiguous because it applies to “electronic sound” and “sound-and-video” recordings, but not a “video played without sound.” Based upon this purported ambiguity, Papazyan relies on the intent behind the rule, which is to ensure an adequate record in the event of an appeal. (Rule 2.1040, Advisory Comm. Comment.) We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024)

5 16 Cal.5th 478, 500.) However, rule 2.1040 is clear on its face. The rule applies to “any electronic sound or sound-and-video recording” that is “offer[ed] into evidence.” (Rule 2.1040(b)(1).) We ascribe “ ‘usual and ordinary meaning’ ” to these terms. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572.) If the plain language is unambiguous, we do not look beyond its dictates. (Ibid.) As discussed, Papazyan sought to introduce a sound-and- video recording. It matters not that she only intended to play the video in open court. The entire video, including the sound, would have been admitted into evidence, thereby implicating rule 2.1040. In sum, we find that the trial court correctly interpreted rule 2.1040 to apply to a sound-and-video recording offered into evidence, even if the proponent only intended to play the video portion in open court. III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Rule 2.1040 allows a trial court to excuse the transcript requirement based upon a finding of good cause. (Rule 2.1040(b)(3)(C).) We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to do so here. A transcript was necessary so both the court and defense counsel could understand the nature of the evidence. As the court noted, S.K.’s attorney should not have to take Papazyan’s counsel’s word for what the Ring video says. Papazyan’s counsel articulates no reason he could not have prepared a transcript in advance of the hearing. Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to take a break so Papazyan’s counsel could prepare a transcript. “[A] court has both the inherent authority and responsibility to efficiently administer all of the judicial proceedings that are pending before it . . . .” (People v. Engram 6 (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1146.) The trial court was under no obligation to delay court proceedings to afford Papazyan’s counsel an opportunity to prepare a transcript that should have been prepared before the hearing. Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Ring video for non- compliance with rule 2.1040. We need not address Papazyan’s remaining argument that the trial court erred in excluding the Ring video under Evidence Code section 352. IV. There Was No Prejudice Even if the trial court erred, we find no prejudice. Papazyan sought to introduce the Ring video to demonstrate that S.K. was lying when she testified that her injuries were not self- inflicted. S.K. has not provided a copy of the Ring video, so we cannot determine whether it impeaches her testimony. (See 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 434, fn. 9 [the burden is on the appellant “to provide an adequate record on appeal to allow the reviewing court to assess the purported error”].) The record, however, contains photographs of S.K.’s injuries. S.K. suffered contusions on her left hip, left elbow and arm, and left axilla. In addition, a crown was dislodged from S.K.’s mouth. Given the implausibility that these severe injuries were self-inflicted, there is no reasonable probability that Papazyan would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the Ring video been admitted. Therefore, we find no prejudice in the trial court’s decision to exclude the Ring video. (See In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 118.)

7 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Respondent S.K. is entitled to her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

GOORVITCH, J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.