Immigrant Rights Defense Council v. Afridi CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 8/26/26 Immigrant Rights Defense Council v. Afridi CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC, G065519 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022- v. 01248387)

SHAFI AFRIDI, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed. Shafi Afridi, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Medvei Law Group and Sebastian M. Medvei for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Shafi Afridi appeals from a postjudgment order compelling him to serve responses to judgment debtor discovery and imposing sanctions. Defendant contends this order amounts to improper “double sanctions” and plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC does not have standing because it is a shell entity used to “perpetrate fraud and abuse of process.” We conclude the order is a separate sanctions award for separate acts of discovery abuse. And defendant has not shown any fraud, which in any event would not nullify plaintiff’s standing. We therefore affirm. FACTS Plaintiff brought a civil suit alleging defendant violated the Immigration Consultants Act (ICA). (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22440 et seq.) In the course of litigation, the trial court ordered defendant to pay $2,680 in discovery sanctions to plaintiff. Plaintiff never received payment. At trial, the court found for plaintiff and enjoined defendant from violating the ICA. The court later awarded costs and attorney fees to plaintiff, and an amended judgment was entered. That judgment is not challenged here, nor is the award of attorney fees. While the parties were litigating postjudgment motions, plaintiff served judgment debtor interrogatories and requests for production. Defendant did not serve responses, and plaintiff filed motions to compel. In his initial opposition to the motion to compel interrogatory responses, defendant asserted judgment debtor discovery was improper because no judgment had been entered ordering him to pay the pretrial sanctions and because he had already paid the funds to his former attorney. After his opposition was filed, defendant took over his own representation, 2 and the hearing for these two discovery motions was continued twice so defendant could provide supplemental briefing. In his supplemental opposition, defendant asked the court to enforce the sanctions payment against his former attorney instead. In support, defendant provided an invoice from his prior counsel showing $3,250 owed for sanctions, as well as a line item from his bank statement showing payment of the full invoice. Defendant also asserted plaintiff does not have standing because its counsel has actively concealed material financial information and misrepresented the true nature of its legal dealings. Defendant pointed to comments made by plaintiff’s counsel in a TV interview, a confidential settlement agreement in another case directing payment of settlement funds to plaintiff’s counsel rather than plaintiff, and documents from the California and Delaware Secretary of State for the plaintiff and related entities. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion regarding the interrogatories, denied the motion regarding the requests for production because defendant served late responses, and awarded $2,120 in sanctions.1 DISCUSSION The trial court may impose monetary sanctions against anyone engaging in a “misuse of the discovery process” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a)2), which includes failing to timely respond (§ 2023.010, subd. (d)).

1 At oral argument, defendant presented paper copies of the California bar profiles of plaintiff’s counsel. He also mentioned the trial court denied both his motion to compel a “person most qualified” deposition and his request to present standing and alter ego evidence at trial. None of these items are included in the record and therefore cannot be considered here. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1249.)

2 All statutory references are to this code.

3 When a party “unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories,” the court must impose monetary sanctions unless it finds the sanctioned party “acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (§ 2030.290, subd. (c).) The same is true for motions to compel responses to requests for production. (§ 2031.300, subd. (c).) We review discovery orders for abuse of discretion. (Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 881.) “Under this standard, a trial court’s ruling ‘will be sustained on review unless it falls outside the bounds of reason.’” (Ibid.) “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to impose sanctions and in setting the amount of monetary sanctions.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 789.) Defendant does not dispute he failed to respond to the interrogatories and that his responses to the requests for production were served after the motion was filed. “Untimely compliance is not compliance.” (Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 808, 831.) The trial court acted well within its discretion by imposing monetary sanctions. While defendant does not dig deep into the Civil Discovery Act (§ 2016.010 et seq.) or related case law, we understand him to assert he acted with substantial justification (or that imposing sanctions is unjust) for two basic reasons. First, defendant contends this order asks him to pay twice for the same offense, amounting to improper “double sanctions,” because he already 4 gave money to his former attorney to pay the pretrial sanctions.3 Defendant agrees plaintiff never received those funds but—more fundamentally—this order does not direct defendant to pay the prior sanctions. There is no double sanctions issue. Defendant’s previous nonpayment is relevant only to explain why plaintiff served judgment debtor discovery. In his reply brief, defendant makes a different “double sanctions” argument: the current sanctions award is punishment for his failure to pay the previous sanctions. It is not. The current sanctions are for a separate act of discovery abuse—his failure to timely respond to postjudgment discovery. Next, defendant contends plaintiff lacks standing because it is not an independent public interest entity but is instead controlled by plaintiff’s counsel, Sebastian Medvei, for his own personal financial benefit. Even if defendant’s submitted documents were admissible,4 they do not show improper conduct by plaintiff. The Secretary of State documents merely establish plaintiff’s counsel has interest in multiple entities. The settlement agreement does not show impropriety on its face. Though a link was provided for the NBC News interview in defendant’s briefing, the video was unavailable for viewing. However, the statement attributed to Medvei— “IRDC LLC does not make money; I make money”—is not itself unethical.5 3 Defendant asserts he paid the funds to his prior counsel who should have paid plaintiff and he should not be forced to pay again.

4 Plaintiff objected to the admissibility of all defendant’s documents. The trial court noted the lack of a defendant declaration but did not rule them inadmissible.

5 Defendant criticizes the trial court for failing to consider these documents and its standing arguments, but the order notes the court previously rejected these same arguments in connection with plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and declined to reconsider its findings.

5 Even if these documents showed any fraud, it is unclear how that would affect plaintiff’s standing. To the extent defendant asserts plaintiff lacks standing to bring the lawsuit at all, his challenge fails. Plaintiff’s standing is statutory. (§ 367 [standing may be provided by statute]; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22446.5, subd. (b) [anyone may bring a civil action for ICA violations on behalf of the general public].) To the extent defendant challenges plaintiff’s standing to enforce the pretrial sanctions order, that order was “immediately enforceable” “through the execution of judgment laws.” (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.) Plaintiff has the statutory right while enforcing that order to propound judgment debtor discovery. (§ 708.020.) Defendant’s reliance on Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214 is misplaced. That case allows a plaintiff to hold a corporation liable for the debt of a corporate insider. (Id. at p. 221.) It does not strip a party of standing to bring a lawsuit, enforce an order for monetary sanctions, or obtain additional monetary sanctions for postjudgment discovery abuse.6 6 While we deny plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, we agree our review is hindered by missing documents. (See Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412 [“To the extent the court relied on documents not before us, our review is hampered. We cannot presume error from an incomplete record”].)

6 DISPOSITION The postjudgment order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, P. J.

DELANEY, J.