Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IN RE: ASHKAN MIRFAKHR RAJAEE Case No.: 26-cv-3162-RSH-GC and NASSIM RAJAEE, Bankruptcy No.: 24-00617-CL7 12 Debtors. 13 NASSIM RAJAEE, ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 14 Appellant, AND GRANTING TRUSTEE’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 15 v. AGAINST APPELLANT’S 16 FORMER ATTORNEY CHRISTOPHER R. BARCLAY, Chapter 7 17 Trustee, [ECF Nos. 4, 5] 18 Appellee. 19 20 Pending before the Court are motions filed by appellee Christopher R. Barclay, the 21 Chapter 7 Trustee, to dismiss the appeal and for sanctions. ECF Nos. 4, 5. Those motions 22 have been fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10. As set forth below, the Court grants both 23 motions. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 A. The Instant Appeal 26 On May 21, 2026, appellant Nassim Rajaee, through her attorney Daryoush 27 Shahrouzi, filed this bankruptcy appeal. ECF No. 1. She appeals from an April 22, 2026 28 1 Court”) denying a motion by her co-debtor spouse Ashkan Rajaee seeking reconsideration 2 of a February 24, 2026 order authorizing the Trustee to abandon property of the bankruptcy 3 estate to Nassim Rajaee and Ashkan Rajaee. Id. The underlying case is In re Ashkan Rajaee 4 & Nassim Rajaee, No. 3:24-bk-00617-CL7 (S.D. Cal. Bankr.) (the “Bankruptcy Case”); 5 see also Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. Nos. 922 (Apr. 22, 2026 Order on Debtor Ashkan Rajaee’s 6 Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Trustee’s Notice of Proposed Abandonment of 7 Property); 838 (Feb. 24, 2026 Order on Trustee’s Notice of Proposed Abandonment of 8 Property) (the “Abandonment Order”). 9 It is undisputed that in the Bankruptcy Case, Appellant did not oppose the proposed 10 abandonment of property prior to entry of the Abandonment Order, and did not seek 11 reconsideration of the Abandonment Order. Nonetheless, she has appealed the denial of 12 her husband’s request for reconsideration. On the same day she filed this appeal, her co- 13 debtor spouse appealed the same order. His appeal is pending as a separate appellate 14 proceeding in Case No. 26-cv-3165. 15 On June 26, 2026, Christopher R. Barclay, the Chapter 7 Trustee, filed motions to 16 dismiss the appeal and for sanctions. ECF Nos. 4, 5. 17 On August 18, 2026, this Court granted the application of Attorney Shahrouzi to be 18 relieved as Appellant’s counsel, based on Appellant’s failure to communicate with him. 19 ECF No. 13. Appellant is, at this time, unrepresented for purposes of this appeal. 20 B. Other Appeals Filed from the Bankruptcy Case 21 This is one of over twenty bankruptcy appeals that Mr. or Ms. Rajaee have taken 22 from the same Bankruptcy Case, including: 23 (1) No. 25-cv-667-RSH-KSC (notice of appeal filed on Mar. 20, 2025; affirmed 24 on Oct. 31, 2025) 25 (2) No. 25-cv-777-BJC-JLB (notice of appeal filed on Mar. 28, 2025; appeal 26 withdrawn on Apr. 16, 2025) 27 (3) No. 25-cv-778-BEN-DEB (notice of appeal filed on Mar. 28, 2025; appeal 28 withdrawn on Apr. 4, 2025) 1 (4) No. 25-cv-2850-RSH-JLB (notice of appeal filed on Sept. 24, 2025; affirmed 2 on Apr. 23, 2026) 3 (5) No. 25-cv-3480-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed on Oct. 30, 2025; dismissed 4 on May 21, 2026) 5 (6) No. 25-cv-3260-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed on Nov. 13, 2025; dismissed 6 on Apr. 23, 2026) 7 (7) No. 25-cv-3506-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed Nov. 21, 2025; dismissed on 8 Apr. 23, 2026) 9 (8) No. 25-cv-3530-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed Nov. 26, 2025; dismissed on 10 Apr. 23, 2026) 11 (9) No. 26-cv-76-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed Dec. 23, 2025; dismissed on 12 Apr. 23, 2026) 13 (10) No. 26-cv-937-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed Feb. 3, 2026; affirmed on July 14 17, 2026) 15 (11) No. 26-cv-2968-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed Apr. 13, 2026; dismissed on 16 August 20, 2026) 17 (12) No. 26-cv-2969-RSH-JLB (notice of appeal filed Apr. 13, 2026; dismissed on 18 August 20, 2026) 19 (13) No. 26-cv-3058-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed May 6, 2026; pending) 20 (14) No. 26-cv-3060-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed May 6, 2026; pending) 21 (15) No. 26-cv-3061-RSH-BJW (notice of appeal filed on May 6, 2026; pending) 22 (16) No. 26-cv-3065-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed May 6, 2026; pending) 23 (17) No. 26-cv-3162-RSH-AHG (notice of appeal filed May 6, 2026; pending) 24 (18) No. 26-cv-3165-RSH-AHG (notice of appeal filed May 6, 2026; pending) 25 (19) No. 26-cv-3166-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed May 6, 2026; pending) 26 (20) No. 26-cv-3170-RSH-DDL (notice of appeal filed May 6, 2026; pending) 27 (21) No. 26-cv-3809-RSH-GC (notice of appeal filed May 13, 2026; dismissed on 28 August 18, 2026) 1 To date, none of these appeals has been successful. 2 Numerous appellate filings by Mr. and Ms. Rajaee refer to an earlier dispute that Mr. 3 Rajaee had with Tyler Davis, a former business partner at TopDevz, LLC (“TopDevz”), 4 over ownership of TopDevz. See generally Rajaee v. Davis, Case No. 24-cv-1 (S.D. Cal.), 5 Dkt. No. 138 (background discussion in Apr. 11, 2024 order dismissing case) at 1-6. In 6 2021, Mr. Rajaee initiated an arbitration proceeding against Davis, which resulted in an 7 arbitration award against Mr. Rajaee. On August 15, 2023, the San Diego Superior Court 8 entered judgment confirming the award. Mr. Rajaee appealed to the California Court of 9 Appeal. Additionally, on January 2, 2024, he brought a civil lawsuit in this Court seeking 10 to undo the arbitration award. See Rajaee v. Davis, Case No. 24-cv-1 (S.D. Cal.), Dkt. No. 11 1. On April 11, 2024, this Court dismissed that lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction under the 12 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which applies to bar “cases brought by state-court losers 13 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 14 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 15 judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 16 On February 26, 2024, Mr. and Ms. Rajaee filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. See 17 Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 1. On May 9, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order 18 converting the case to Chapter 7 and appointing Christopher R. Barclay as Trustee. See 19 Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 37. Neither debtor timely appealed the conversion order, but 20 Mr. Rajaee ultimately filed an untimely motion to reconsider the conversion order, and 21 then appealed to this Court the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of that motion to reconsider. See 22 Bankruptcy Court, Dkt. Nos. 176, 236. On October 31, 2025, this Court affirmed. See Case 23 No. 25-cv-667, Dkt. No. 23. Mr. Rajaee has further appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals 24 for the Ninth Circuit, and that appeal remains pending. 25 The Rajaees’ bankruptcy appeals frequently refer to and/or seek to invalidate the 26 arbitration award and San Diego Superior Court judgment that were entered against Mr. 27 Rajaee, as well as the Bankruptcy Court’s conversion order. 28 // 1 C. Attorney Shahrouzi’s Role in the Bankruptcy Proceedings 2 Attorney Shahrouzi has participated in the bankruptcy proceedings since the 3 beginning of 2026. On January 6, 2026, he filed an adversary proceeding, No. 26-90003- 4 CL, on behalf of Mr. Ashkan Rajaee seeking damages against the Chapter 7 Trustee and 5 the Trustee’s lawyers. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 736.1 Although represented by 6 Attorney Shahrouzi in this adversary matter, Mr. Rajaee is otherwise proceeding pro se in 7 the Bankruptcy Case. 8 On February 12, 2026, Attorney Shahrouzi appeared for Ms. Nassim Rajaee in the 9 Bankruptcy Case. Dkt. No. 809. The same day, the Trustee filed a motion to declare Mr. 10 Rajaee a vexatious litigant. Dkt. No. 812. The motion was set for a hearing before the 11 Bankruptcy Court on March 23, 2026. Dkt. No. 813. 12 While the Trustee’s vexatious litigant motion was pending, on March 13, 2026, Mr. 13 Rajaee filed four additional motions, variously seeking (1) reconsideration of an order 14 approving abandonment of property, (2) reconsideration for the second time of an order 15 denying a motion to disqualify opposing counsel, (3) an evidentiary hearing, and (4) 16 sanctions against the Trustee and the Trustee’s attorneys. See Dkt. Nos. 858, 861, 864, 866. 17 The Bankruptcy Court ultimately denied each of these motions on April 22, 2026. See Dkt. 18 Nos. 921, 922, 924, 925. 19 On May 6, 2026, Mr. Rajaee (pro se) and Ms. Rajaee (represented by Attorney 20 Shahrouzi) each filed a notice of appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings on each of 21 22 23 24 1 On July 28, 2026, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the adversary case on the 25 Defendants’ motion. See Case No. 26-90003, Dkt. No. 43. On August 11, 2026, Mr. Rajaee appealed that dismissal. Dkt. No. 47. The same date, the Bankruptcy Court granted a 26 motion for sanctions brought by the Trustee’s lawyers, against both Mr. Rajaee and 27 Attorney Shahrouzi. Dkt. No. 49 at 7. In reciting this procedural history or other rulings from the Bankruptcy Court adverse to the debtors, the Court expresses no view on the 28 1 Mr. Rajaee’s four motions mentioned above, for a total of eight appeals, each of which is 2 pending in this Court: 3 • In Case Nos. 26-cv-3061 (Ashkan Rajaee) and -3060 (Nassim Rajaee, 4 represented by Attorney Shahrouzi), each debtor appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s April 22, 5 2026 order denying Ashkan Rajaee’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. See Bankruptcy 6 Case, Dkt. No. 921 (order); Dkt. No. 955 (Ashkan Rajaee notice of appeal); Dkt. No. 941 7 (Nassim Rajaee notice of appeal). 8 • In Case Nos. 26-cv-3165 (Ashkan Rajaee) and -3162 (Nassim Rajaee, 9 represented by Attorney Shahrouzi), each debtor appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s April 22, 10 2026 order denying Ashkan Rajaee’s motion for reconsideration of an order approving the 11 Trustee’s abandonment of estate property to the debtors. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 12 922 (order); Dkt. No. 958 (Ashkan Rajaee notice of appeal); Dkt. No. 940 (Nassim Rajaee 13 notice of appeal). 14 • In Case Nos. 26-cv-3170 (Ashkan Rajaee) and -3166 (Nassim Rajaee, 15 represented by Attorney Shahrouzi), each debtor appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s April 22, 16 2026 order denying Ashkan Rajaee’s motion for sanctions against the Trustee and the 17 Trustee’s attorneys. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 925 (order); Dkt. No. 964 (Ashkan 18 Rajaee notice of appeal); Dkt. No. 943 (Nassim Rajaee notice of appeal). 19 • In Case Nos. 26-cv-3065 (Ashkan Rajaee) and -3058 (Nassim Rajaee, 20 represented by Attorney Shahrouzi), each debtor appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s April 22, 21 2026 order denying Ashkan Rajaee’s second motion to reconsider an order denying Ashkan 22 Rajaee’s motion to disqualify counsel. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 924 (order); Dkt. 23 No. 961 (Ashkan Rajaee notice of appeal); Dkt. No. 993 (Nassim Rajaee notice of appeal).2 24 25 26 2 The simultaneous appeals of Mr. and Ms. Rajaee are to all appearances, including 27 based on the similarity of the documents filed, closely coordinated. Indeed, in e-filing a notice of appeal in connection with the last appeal discussed above—ultimately docketed 28 1 On May 20, 2026, Attorney Shahrouzi filed in the Bankruptcy Court, pursuant to 2 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(1), a statement of issues for each of Ms. Rajaee’s appeals. 3 Although the four orders being appealed cover a range of different topics, Attorney 4 Shahrouzi’s statement of issues for each of the four appeals is identical: 5 1. Judicial Estoppel – putative Chapter 7 trustee Christopher Barclay – Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by failing to apply judicial 6 estoppel to the Chapter 7 arguments? 7 2. Fraud in the Procurement of the San Diego Judgment — Conversion 8 Order – Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by failing to 9 adjudicate the merits of the fraud on the court in the procurement of the San Diego judgment being enforced in bankruptcy proceedings as a 10 proof of claim? 11 3. Fraud on the Court — Conversion Order – Did the bankruptcy court 12 abuse its discretion by failing to determine on the merits whether the 13 Conversion Order was procured through fraud on the court, where officers of the court allegedly omitted material jurisdictional, service, 14 standing, and authority facts necessary to give operative effect to the 15 San Diego confirmation judgment?

16 4. Fraud on the Court — Chapter 7 Order on Appeal – Did the 17 bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by entering the Chapter 7 Order on appeal without determining the fraud-on-the-court challenges that 18 officers of the court procured the order through materially misleading 19 20 21 at Case No. 26-cv-3058—it appears that Attorney Shahrouzi initially e-filed a notice of appeal that was signed by Ashkan Rajaee proceeding pro se. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. 22 No. 942. One week later, Attorney Shahrouzi e-filed a notice of appeal from the same order 23 that was instead signed by his client Nassim Rajaee. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 993. Although Attorney Shahrouzi added the docket label of “amended notice of appeal” in e- 24 filing the document, nothing in the notice itself indicated that it purported to be an amended 25 notice. Thus, his amended notice was treated by the Clerk’s Office as a new appeal, and was placed on this Court’s docket as Case No. 26-cv-3809—a ninth appeal arising from 26 the same set of four Bankruptcy Court orders. Months later, in moving to withdraw from 27 Case No. 26-cv-3809, Attorney Shahrouzi called this duplication to the Court’s attention, and the Court dismissed the appeal. See Case No. 26-cv-3809, Dkt. Nos. 5 (application to 28 1 half-truths and omissions concerning jurisdiction, standing, service, Tyler Davis's authority, TopDevz, LLC's representation, and the 2 putative Chapter 7 trustee Christopher Barclay’s authority? 3 See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. Nos. 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004. In each of the four cases, 4 Attorney Shahrouzi’s statement of issues fails to mention the order that is actually being 5 appealed. Instead, all four stated issues appear to challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s May 9, 6 2024 conversion order, which neither party timely appealed. Two of the four stated issues 7 directly refer to the “San Diego judgment” or the “San Diego confirmation judgment” at 8 the heart of Mr. Rajaee’s pre-petition business dispute with Davis and TopDevz. 9 On May 7, 2026, the Bankruptcy Court declared Ashkan Rajaee to be a vexatious 10 litigant and ordered that Mr. Rajaee obtain leave of the Bankruptcy Court before additional 11 filings in that Court, other than notices of appeal. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 967. 12 On August 13, 2026, Attorney Shahrouzi filed a motion to withdraw from 13 representation of Mr. Rajaee in the Bankruptcy Case. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 1069. 14 That motion remains pending. 15 I. MOTION TO DISMISS 16 A. Legal Standard 17 “Under th[e] prudential standing doctrine, only a ‘person aggrieved,’ that is, 18 someone who is ‘directly and adversely affected pecuniarily’ by a bankruptcy court’s order, 19 has standing to appeal that order.” In re Point Ctr. Fin., Inc., 890 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 20 2018) (quoting Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). 21 “An order that diminishes one’s property, increases one’s burdens, or detrimentally affects 22 one’s rights has a direct and adverse pecuniary effect for bankruptcy standing purposes.” 23 Id. The party invoking appellate jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating prudential 24 standing. In re Benham, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2016); accord In re Hope 25 7 Monroe St. Ltd. P’ship, 743 F.3d 867, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“As in other jurisdictional 26 contexts, the party invoking appellate jurisdiction to review a bankruptcy court order has 27 28 1 the burden of demonstrating prudential standing.”) (citing Spenlinhauer v. O’Donnell, 261 2 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2001)). 3 B. Analysis 4 The Trustee argues that Appellant lacks prudential standing because she was not 5 “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily” by the order she appeals: She never opposed 6 or objected to the Trustee’s notice of intent to abandon; she never sought reconsideration 7 of the Bankruptcy Court’s abandonment order, or joined her co-debtor’s motion; and, 8 fundamentally, the Abandonment Order approved the return of asserts to her and to her 9 spouse. ECF No. 4-1 at 9-11. Appellant responds that she is indeed a “person aggrieved” 10 by the Abandonment Order, but she does not explain how. See ECF No. 9 at 12-14. She 11 asserts that “[r]eturning property to a debtor is not invariably a net benefit,” id. at 13, and 12 notes that the Abandonment Order “did not allocate ownership between the joint Debtors, 13 determine accompanying liabilities, or decide who would bear litigation, tax, defense, and 14 preservation burdens,” id. at 14. But even so, she has failed to articulate how the 15 Abandonment Order directly worked to her pecuniary disadvantage, let alone to establish 16 such an adverse pecuniary effect. The lack of an adverse pecuniary effect on Appellant 17 from the Abandonment Order is consistent with the fact that she never opposed, objected 18 to, or sought reconsideration of that order in the Bankruptcy Case. 19 As articulated in Appellant’s statement of issues on appeal, and as reflected in her 20 brief opposing dismissal, her “grievance” has nothing whatsoever to do with the property 21 that the bankruptcy estate returned to her and her husband. Her “statement of issues,” as 22 filed in the Bankruptcy Case, instead relates to alleged errors in (1) the Bankruptcy Court’s 23 conversion of the case to Chapter 7; and (2) the San Diego Superior Court judgment entered 24 prior to their bankruptcy filing. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 1001 at 10 (statement of 25 issues in connection with BAP No. 26-1101); ECF No. 1-2 (notice of transfer of BAP No. 26 26-1101 to this Court). Appellant’s brief opposing the motion to dismiss repeatedly returns 27 to those same issues. See, e.g., ECF No. 9 at 5, 6, 9, 10, 13–15, 17–19 (alleging errors or 28 1 invalidity in connection with San Diego Superior Court judgment).3 Her separately filed 2 motion arguing that the Trustee lacks the ability to elect district court review, which this 3 Court has already denied as meritless, repeats the same themes. See ECF No. 2 (motion to 4 determine invalidity of Trustee’s statement of election) at 7–8, 10–13, 15; ECF No. 13 5 (order denying motion). The Court has no trouble concluding that this appeal is unrelated 6 to any injury arising from the transfer of estate property to her and her husband, and instead 7 reflects the debtors’ coordinated, repetitive efforts to force the re-litigation of the state- 8 court dispute involving Appellant’s husband and his business partner. 9 Appellant has failed to establish prudential standing to challenge the Abandonment 10 Order or the denial of her husband’s motion to reconsider that order. This appeal is 11 therefore subject to dismissal. 12 II. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 13 A. Legal Standard 14 Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020, “[i]f the district court . . . determines that an appeal 15 is frivolous . . . it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.” 16 Sanctions are awardable under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020, and these costs may include 17 attorneys’ fees. See In re Benham, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 1043. 18 “An appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious or if the claims of error are wholly 19 without merit.” Erde v. Bodnar (In re Westwood Plaza North), 889 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 20 2018) (citation omitted). Courts consider several factors when determining if an appeal is 21 frivolous, including whether the appellant’s argument “addresses the issues on appeal 22 23 24 3 The first sentence of Appellant’s opposition brief states: “The Motion to Dismiss 25 assumes the antecedent issue this appeal preserves: whether the Bankruptcy Court ever acquired personal jurisdiction over TopDevz, LLC (‘TopDevz’) as a joint movant and 26 received a valid TopDevz request from a ‘party in interest’ under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).” 27 ECF No. 9 at 5. This statement, in addition to being incoherent, reflects the total lack of connection between the Abandonment Order that Appellant has appealed and the questions 28 1 properly; fails to support the issues on appeal; fails to cite any authority; cites inapplicable 2 authority; makes unsubstantiated factual assertions; makes bare legal conclusions; or, 3 misrepresents the record.” Aldana v. Stadtmueller (In re De Jesus Gomez), 592 B.R. 698, 4 709 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Maloni v. Fairway Wholesale Corp. (In re Maloni), 5 282 B.R. 727, 734 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002)). A court may award sanctions for a frivolous 6 appeal over whose merits the court lacks appellate jurisdiction. In re Westwood Plaza 7 North, 889 F.3d at 977 (ordering sanctions where “[t]he appeal of the district court’s orders 8 was wholly without merit, and sought review of multiple district court orders over which 9 this court lacked jurisdiction”). 10 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 is modeled after Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. 11 First Fed. Bank v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 227 B.R. 284, 297 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 12 Courts may look to cases applying Fed. R. App. P. 38 when determining whether an appeal 13 is frivolous and an award of costs is appropriate. Id.; In re Ashai, 211 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 14 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (collecting cases). A finding of bad faith is not necessary to impose 15 sanctions under that rule. See In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1989). Fed. R. App. 16 P. 38 not only permits sanctions against the appellant directly, but also “permit[s] the 17 imposition of personal sanctions against counsel.” In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027, 1065 (9th 18 Cir. 2010). Under Fed. R. App. P. 38, the award of attorneys’ fees and costs “must be 19 limited to appellees’ direct fees and costs for defending against the frivolous appeal, and 20 may not include the fees and costs incurred regarding the imposition of sanctions.” Blixseth 21 v. Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC, 854 F.3d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 As a separate source of sanctions authority, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that “[a]ny 23 attorney ... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously 24 may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ 25 fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” Id. Proof of bad faith is not required; 26 instead, “[r]ecklessness suffices for § 1927 sanctions ….” Lahiri v. Universal Music & 27 Video Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010). 28 // 1 B. Analysis 2 For the reasons set forth above, Appellant lacks prudential standing because she was 3 not “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily” by the Abandonment Order, or by the 4 order denying her husband’s motion to reconsider the Abandonment Order. Appellant’s 5 position—that she is aggrieved by an order that transferred property to her and her husband, 6 that she never opposed or challenged in the Bankruptcy Case—is, in light of her inability 7 to identify any direct and adverse pecuniary effect, wholly without merit. 8 The frivolous nature of this appeal is also apparent through her statement of issues, 9 her meritless motion to invalidate the Trustee’s election, and her opposition to the motion 10 to dismiss—all of which raise arguments that have little or nothing to do with the orders 11 she is appealing and instead focus in a duplicative, repetitive manner on her husband’s 12 prior disputes and grievances. 13 Appellant’s brief opposing the Trustee’s motion for sanctions offers more of the 14 same. The brief, signed and filed by counsel, begins in the following incoherent manner: 15 I. PRELIMINARY SANCTIONS NEXUS: FINLAYSON’S KNOWLEDGE DEFEATS FRIVOLOUSNESS AND SCIENTER 16 17 The motion seeks punishment for preserving four unresolved TopDevz predicates: (1) the governance act removing Ashkan Rajaee (“Ashkan”) 18 and appointing Tyler Davis (“Davis”); (2) TopDevz, LLC’s 19 (“TopDevz”) authorization of counsel; (3) service on TopDevz; and (4) whether an unauthorized appearance conferred personal jurisdiction. 20 Jesse S. Finlayson (“Finlayson”) signed the motion and declared 21 personal knowledge. (Doc. 5-2 ¶¶ 2-3.) His knowledge bears directly on Rule 8020 frivolousness, § 1927 scienter, and whether prior orders 22 can be invoked as neutral proof of adjudication. Because the asserted 23 chapter 7 authority derives from the disputed conversion order, this opposition refers to Christopher R. Barclay as the putative Trustee. 24 25 ECF No. 7 at 6. Appellant’s brief continues for over twenty pages in a similar vein. The 26 other argument headings are: “No Vote or Appointment Made Davis TopDevz’s Manager,” 27 “California Internal-Affairs Law Governs the Predicate Questions,” “The Federal 28 Conversion Order Depends on the Disputed TopDevz Predicates,” “The San Diego 1 Judgment Depends on the Same Authority, Service, and Evidence Defects,” “Void or 2 Jurisdictionally Defective Orders Cannot Prove Their Own Predicates,” “Appellant May 3 Raise the Defect When the Orders Are Invoked Here,” “‘Rejected’ Is Not an Adjudication 4 of the Missing Predicates,” “Downstream Orders Did Not Cure the Original Due-Process 5 Failure,” “This Court’s Jurisdictional and Inherent Powers Cannot Be Sold,” and “The 6 Filing Volume Reflects Repeated Nonadjudication, Not Abuse.” These arguments, made 7 by a member of the bar of this Court, are largely unmoored from any pertinent issue on 8 appeal. 9 When it comes to the actual order that is being appealed, Appellant says very little. 10 She asserts that the appealed order is “part of the disputed authority chain, and preservation 11 is required,” because: 12 The Abandonment Reconsideration Order arose within a chapter 7 administration created by conversion. The conversion order considered 13 and granted the collective Davis/TopDevz motion based on the 14 arbitration ruling’s supposed removal of Ashkan. (Rajaee Decl. Vol. 1, Ex. 9, pp. 2-5; Vol. 2, Ex. 44, pp. 1-3.) Whether TopDevz was 15 authorized and subject to personal jurisdiction therefore bears on the 16 authority under which the putative Trustee sought and defended the appealed order. 17 18 ECF No. 7 at 9. Appellant’s view appears to be that any order issued by the Bankruptcy 19 Court after its conversion of the bankruptcy to Chapter 7 is “part of the disputed authority 20 chain” leading back to an allegedly erroneous arbitration ruling that preceded the debtors’ 21 bankruptcy filing. In Appellant’s view, she and her husband may file—and are “required” 22 to file as a matter of “preservation”—an appeal from each and every Bankruptcy Court 23 order for reasons having nothing to do with the orders themselves, but rather because the 24 orders are all tainted by alleged errors in the past arbitration. Appellant makes no effort to 25 hide the repetitive nature of these appeals; as she argues, “repetition matters only if the 26 repeated issue was decided,” ECF No. 7 at 18, and she has not been satisfied with the results 27 of the debtors’ appeals to date. The number of appeals that Appellant and her spouse have 28 filed from the Bankruptcy Case bear out her commitment to repetitive filings; many of 1 these appeals themselves contain subsidiary motions or filings seeking to nullify the 2 arbitration ruling, the San Diego Superior Court judgment, or the Bankruptcy Court’s 3 conversion order referenced in Appellant’s filings in this case.4 4 This appeal was filed as part of a coordinated blitz of eight notices of appeal filed 5 on May 6, 2026 from four orders that the Bankruptcy Court issued on April 22, 2026. The 6 blitz was imperfectly executed, with Attorney Shahrouzi inadvertently e-filing a notice of 7 appeal in the name of Ashkan Rajaee, and then a week later e-filing a fifth notice of appeal 8 in his client’s name without bothering to clarify the duplication until he sought to withdraw 9 as counsel months later. See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. Nos. 942, 993. The fact that all four of 10 Attorney Shahrouzi’s appeals have “statements of issues” that are identical to each other— 11 and do not even mention the orders he actually purports to appeal—clearly establishes, in 12 the context of the litigation here, not only frivolousness but also bad faith, an improper 13 motive of harassment, and the vexatious multiplication of proceedings. 14 The Court finds this appeal to be frivolous, and determines that sanctions against 15 Attorney Shahrouzi pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 are warranted in the amount of 16 Appellee’s direct fees and costs for defending against the appeal, which may not include 17 the fees and costs incurred regarding the imposition of sanctions. Blixseth, 854 F.3d at 631. 18 Sanctions against Attorney Shahrouzi are likewise warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as to 19 the fees and costs incurred in this case, which result from Attorney Shahrouzi’s vexatious 20 and unreasonable conduct. 21 It is not clear to the Court to what extent, if any, Nassim Rajaee has personally 22 participated in this appeal that has been pursued by Attorney Shahrouzi in her name and in 23 concert with separate proceedings initiated by Ashkan Rajaee. Although Nassim Rajaee is 24 responsible for the claims made by her attorney on behalf, the Court declines to order her 25 26 27 4 Several of the appeals filed by Appellant and her co-debtor spouse remain pending. The Court expresses no view on the merits of such appeals, but notes their multiplicity 28 1 ||joint and several liability as to the sanctions imposed against Attorney Shahrouzi. This 2 ||exercise of discretion in the context of this case is without prejudice to any request for 3 || sanctions that may be made in her other appeals brought by Attorney Shahrouzi. 4 ||. CONCLUSION 5 The Trustee’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 4] is GRANTED, and the appeal is 6 || DISMISSED. 7 The Trustee’s motion for sanctions [ECF No. 5] is GRANTED. No later than 8 || fourteen (14) days from the date of this order, the Trustee shall file a claim for its 9 ||recoverable costs and fees supported by adequate evidence. No later than fourteen (14) 10 || days after such filing, Attorney Shahrouzi may file appropriate objections to such evidence 11 to the Trustee’s fee calculation. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: August 26, 2026 ¢ [owe 15 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 te