gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-00603 · 2026-08-26 · Unknown

Maeve Camplisson; David Sanchez; and S.D., a minor, by and through their legal guardian Elvis Diciero, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Adidas America, Inc., an Oregon corporation

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Gonzalo P. Curiel (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:20Z · confidence high

The court considered Defendant Adidas America, Inc.'s motion to stay proceedings pending a decision in a related California state court case, Variety Media, LLC v. Superior Court. The court granted the motion, imposing a six-month stay or until the state appellate court publishes its opinion, whichever is earlier.

What the court decidedThe model
Defendant's motion to stay proceedings is granted for six months or until the state appellate court publishes its opinion in Variety Media, whichever is earlier.
“Weighing the above factors, Defendant’s motion to stay is GRANTED for six months or until the state appellate court publishes its opinion in Variety Media, whichever is earlier.”
agree with court
The court applied the standard Landis factors for a stay. It found that while an indefinite stay would cause harm, a short, defined stay (six months) balances the interests. It determined that the pending state court decision is likely to resolve central legal issues regarding the interpretation of California Invasion of Privacy Act § 638.51, which would promote the orderly course of justice and avoid fruitless litigation efforts. The court appropriately limited the stay to mitigate the prejudice of delay.
The parties' joint motion to adjourn the hearing on the motion to stay is denied as moot.
“The Court also DENIES the parties’ joint motion to adjourn hearing on Defendant’s motion to stay, ECF No. 64, as moot.”
agree with court
Since the court decided the motion to stay on the papers and vacated the hearing, the motion to adjourn the hearing became moot. This is a standard procedural consequence.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the relevant legal standard for a stay and applies the factors to the specific facts. It acknowledges the tension between the indefinite nature of the pending state appeal (which favors denial) and the likelihood that the state court decision will resolve central legal issues (which favors grant). The court resolves this tension by imposing a time-limited stay, which is a reasonable exercise of discretion supported by the cited authorities. The reasoning is complete and addresses the parties' arguments.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAEVE CAMPLISSON; DAVID Case No.: 25-CV-00603-GPC-GC SANCHEZ; and S.D., a minor, by and 12 through their legal guardian ELVIS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 DICIERO, individually and on behalf MOTION TO STAY of all others similarly situated, 14 [ECF No. 55, 64] Plaintiffs, 15 16 v. 17 ADIDAS AMERICA, INC., an Oregon 18 corporation, 19 Defendant. 20 21 Before the Court is Defendant Adidas America, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) motion to 22 stay the proceedings. ECF No. 55. The motion to stay has been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 23 58, 61. The Court VACATES the hearing set on August 28, 2026. Based on the reasoning 24 below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to stay. The Court also DENIES the 25 parties’ joint motion to adjourn hearing on Defendant’s motion to stay, ECF No. 64, as 26 moot. 27 1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Defendant owns and uses its website www.adidas.com/us, allowing consumers to 3 buy and access information about the brand’s products. ECF No. 3 (“Compl.”) ¶ 21. As 4 part of its website, Defendant has installed tracking pixels TikTok Pixel and Microsoft 5 Bing (together, “Trackers”). Compl. ¶ 3. Tracking pixels are “small, almost-invisible 6 image[s]…embedded in a website or an email to track a user’s activities.” Id. ¶ 23. When 7 a user visits a website, the website’s code installs the tracker into the user’s browser and 8 can, at that point, track user interactions “on its platform in order to place targeted 9 advertisements.” Id. ¶¶ 26-27. The tracked data can include “the user’s operating system, 10 the type of website or email used, the time when the website was accessed, the user’s IP 11 address, and whether there are cookies that previously have been set by the server hosting 12 the pixel image.” Id. ¶ 23. 13 Each of the Trackers have different tracking capabilities. The TikTok Pixel 14 “enables website owners to track users’ interactions with the website” and “collects and 15 reports supplementary metadata, including timestamp (when an action took place), IP 16 address (which can be used to determine the geographic location of the user), unique 17 identifiers (which are assigned to a user’s device or browser session that distinguish one 18 user from another), device details (make, model, operating system), and browser 19 information.” Id. ¶ 30. It also uses “fingerprinting”—a process that collects information 20 about the website user and matches it to information within the existing TikTok database 21 across other websites with the pixel installed. Id. ¶ 31. This process associates 22 information gathered from the pixel with personally identifying information, allowing 23 one to track specific device activity. Id. TikTok Pixel also utilizes “AutoAdvanced 24 Matching,” which allows personal information (e.g., name, date of birth, address) to be 25 sent to TikTok and identify a targeted individual with certainty. Id. ¶ 34. This information 26 is used for analytics and advertising purposes for the website owner, but TikTok can also 27 1 share the data with third parties. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Plaintiffs allege concerns that this private 2 data could also be shared with China to surveil the user, given previous concerns from 3 Congress, independent tech watchdogs, and human rights groups. Id. ¶¶ 38-42. 4 In comparison, the Microsoft Bat Bing Tracker similarly places a cookie on the 5 user’s browser to collect information, which is tracked by both the website owner and 6 Microsoft. Id. ¶ 43. This information includes a unique Microsoft ID, which “track users’ 7 activity across the internet.” Id. ¶ 44. 8 Defendant does not actively notify users of the Trackers on its website. However, 9 the website has a link to its Terms and Conditions as well as its Privacy Policy. The 10 Terms and Conditions outlines that third-party trackers, such as cookies, are used for 11 targeted advertising. Mot. at 11. It also “explicitly directs consumers on how to opt out of 12 the collection of their data.” Id. The Privacy Policy “describe[s] that cookies and other 13 tracking technologies are implemented on the browser in order to collect and store data, 14 including the ability to recognize the users’ devices to deliver relevant advertisements.” 15 Compl. ¶ 50. 16 Access to the Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy is located in a hyperlink at 17 the “very bottom” or footer of the website in “small font.” Id. ¶ 51. The Defendant 18 maintains this location pursuant to the California Online Privacy Protection Act 19 (“CalOPPA”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22575 et seq. Mot. at 12. 20 Plaintiffs, like other members of the defined Class, visited the adidas website and 21 did not “consent to having their personally identifiable and addressing information 22 collected, stored, or disseminated.” Id. ¶ 54. Thus, Plaintiffs maintain that their “injuries 23 occurred at the moment their information was improperly acquired by” Defendant. Id. ¶ 24 56. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 On March 14, 2025, Plaintiffs Maeve Complisson, David Sanchez, and S.D., a 3 minor, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a class action complaint against Defendant for 4 allegedly violating the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) when Defendant 5 installed and used tracking pixels on Plaintiffs’ and the Class’ browsers, which collected 6 their private information without their consent. ECF No. 1. On June 26, 2026, Defendant 7 moved to stay the proceedings in light of a pending decision in Variety Media, LLC v. 8 Super. Ct. of the State of Cal., No. B350578 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2025). ECF No. 55 9 (“Mot.”). On July 25, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. ECF No. 58 (“Opp.). 10 On August 7, 2026, Defendant filed a reply. ECF No. 61 (“Rep.”). 11 LEGAL STANDARD 12 “The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its 13 power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 14 (1997) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). “A stay is not a matter of 15 right[.]” Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926). Rather, it is “an 16 exercise of judicial discretion,” and “[t]he propriety of its issue is dependent upon the 17 circumstances of the particular case.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) 18 (quoting Virginia R. Co., 272 U.S. at 672). The party requesting a stay bears the burden 19 of demonstrating that a stay is appropriate. Id. at 434; DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc. v. Apple, 20 Inc., No. 14-cv-05330-HSG, 2015 WL 1967878, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2015). 21 In determining whether to grant a motion to stay, “the competing interests which 22 will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be weighed.” Lockyer v. 23 Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). These interests include: (1) “the 24 possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay,” (2) “the hardship or 25 inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward,” and (3) “the orderly 26 course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, 27 1 and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” Id. While these three 2 considerations are important, ultimately, the court can consider “the totality of the 3 circumstances governs.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Daniel A. Rosen, Inc., No. 2:21- 4 CV-07492-VAP-JDEX, 2023 WL 11876966, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2023). 5 DISCUSSION 6 Defendant argues the stay should be granted because Variety Media, LLC v. Super 7 Ct. of the State of Cal., No. B350578 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21 2025) is poised to answer 8 whether “commonplace internet technologies,” such as website cookies, applies under the 9 § 638.51 of CIPA—a relevant legal issue in this instant case. Mot. at 7. 1 Defendant 10 maintains that all three factors considered for a stay weigh in its favor. Id. at 10. Plaintiffs 11 contest, arguing that none of the three factors favor a stay. Opp. at 1-2. 12 I. Possible Damage Resulting from Granting Stay 13 The first Landis factor considers “the possible damage which may result from 14 granting the stay.” CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268. Courts consider whether granting a stay will 15 “cause undue prejudice” and consider factors such as “the stage in the litigation, whether 16 discovery is or will be complete, and whether the matter has been marked for trial.” 17 ASCII Corp. v. STD Ent. USA, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1378, 1380 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 18 This putative class action case is at an early stage, a scheduling order regulating 19 discovery was issued on June 4, 2026, and no depositions have reportedly occurred. ECF 20 No. 54. The current deadline for filing a class certification motion is November 6, 2026, 21 and a trial date has not been scheduled. Id. Defendant asserts that there is no risk of 22 deterioration of evidence because the case is not document-sensitive and Defendant is 23 preserving relevant information pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e). Mot. 24 25 26 1 Throughout the order, the pagination for docketed documents is derived from the numbering generated by the ECF system. 27 1 at 12. Accordingly, Defendant argues that this factor favors a stay because Plaintiffs 2 would suffer no damage beyond mere delay, as the Variety Media appeal should have a 3 ruling within six to eight months. Mot. at 10-11; Rep. at 8. 4 In turn, Plaintiffs contend that they would suffer substantial prejudice and harm 5 because the proposed stay is indefinite, given it is subject to appeal to the California 6 Supreme Court. Opp. at 5-6. They also maintain that the case has progressed beyond the 7 initial stages of litigation. Id. at 6-7. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant ignores 8 the dissipation of key witnesses and testimonial evidence. Id. 9 “If a stay is especially long or its term is indefinite . . . a greater showing [is 10 required] to justify it.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000); see Edwards 11 v. Oportun, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“the Court concludes that 12 there is a ‘fair possibility of harm’ to Plaintiff because the length of the stay is an 13 indefinite one.”); Lathrop v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14-CV-05678-JST, 2016 WL 97511, 14 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2016) (ruling a fair possibility of harm existed because the 15 proposed stay’s indefinite length would increase difficulty of reaching class members, 16 risk evidence dissipating, and the pending case would unlikely be the final stage of 17 litigation). 18 While the case has not yet engaged in significant discovery, see Target 19 Therapeutics, Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., No. C-94-20775 RPA (EAI), 1995 WL 20 20470, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 1995) (granting a stay where parties have not engaged in 21 significant discovery and no trial date has been set), and Defendant is preserving 22 information in accordance with its obligations, the proposed stay is indefinite in nature 23 and raises the prospect of the dissipation of key witnesses and testimonial evidence. The 24 Court finds that an indefinite stay would create a fair probability of harm. 25 The cases that Defendant cites against these points are distinguishable and 26 unavailing. First, Defendant cites cases which involved cases before the California 27 1 Supreme Court that were not subject to further appeal. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Sonesta 2 Int’l Hotels Corp., 648 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (pending decision from 3 California Supreme Court); Skulevold v. SD&A Techs., 2020 WL 7711834 at *4 (C.D. 4 Cal Nov. 18, 2020) (noting that resolution of Supreme Court decision would be final and 5 no longer “be subject to appeal”); Erceg v. Lending Club Corp., 475 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 6 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (pending decision from California Supreme Court decision); 7 Nguyen v. Marketsource, Inc., 2018 WL 2182633, at *6 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) 8 (pending Supreme Court decision); In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions, 2011 WL 9 3846727, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2011) (pending decisions from California Supreme 10 Court); Burnell v. Swift Transportation Co., 2011 WL 13352810, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11 20, 2011) (same). Next, the cases Defendant references in support of intermediate 12 appellate decisions concern those of the Ninth Circuit, which would be binding on this 13 Court. See, e.g., Gustavson v. Mars, Inc., No. 13-CV-04537-LHK, 2014 WL 6986421, at 14 *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014) (granting stay where “the Ninth Circuit’s decision is likely 15 to provide substantial guidance, if not new law, that will materially impact the Court’s 16 decisions in the instant case”); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella 17 Valley Water Dist., No. 13-CV-883 JGB (SPx), 2015 WL 13764632, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 18 Sept. 8, 2015) (granting stay where “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the interlocutory 19 appeal could clarify the issues in this case, in effect saving time and resources”); In re 20 Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, Tel. Consumer Prot. Act Litig., No. 11-MD-02295 21 JAH-BGS, 2022 WL 3153574, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2022) (granting stay pending 22 Ninth Circuit decision). 23 Accordingly, the Court finds this factor leans in favor of denying an open-ended 24 stay. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 1 II. Hardship and Inequity if Stay is Denied 2 When there is “even a fair possibility” of harm to the opposing party, the moving 3 party “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to move 4 forward.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). 5 Defendant first argues it would be severely prejudiced if the stay were to be denied 6 because it will have to expend a substantial amount of resources and time in discovery, in 7 opposing class certification and on summary judgment motions. Mot. at 2-13. However, 8 being required to defend a suit, which includes the costs of litigation and further 9 discovery, does not sufficiently establish a clear case of hardship or inequity. See Lockyer 10 v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2005); Millennium Lab'ys, Inc. v. Ameritox, 11 LTD., No. 12-CV-01063-MMA-JMA, 2016 WL 11783308, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 12 2016); Edwards v. Oportun, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2016); cf., 13 Finder v. Leprino Foods Co., No. 1-13-CV-02059-AWI-BAM, 2017 WL 1355104, at *4 14 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2017) (“[F]orcing a party to conduct ‘substantial, unrecoverable, and 15 wasteful’ discovery and pretrial motions practice on matters that could be mooted by a 16 pending appeal may amount to hardship or inequity sufficient to justify a stay.”). 17 The Court finds that Defendant has not made a sufficient showing of hardship or 18 inequity as to current discovery requests but acknowledges potential hardship as to 19 further substantive motions. 20 III. Orderly Course of Justice 21 The third Landis factor considers the “orderly course of justice measured in terms 22 of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be 23 expected to result from a stay.” CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268. Determining whether to grant a 24 stay of litigation pending a related proceeding “does not require that the issues in such 25 proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” Leyva v. Certified 26 Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979); Canady v. Bridgecrest 27 1 Acceptance Corp., No. CV-19-04738-PHX-DWl, 2020 WL 5249263, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2 Sept. 3, 2020) (finding that although a pending decision may not settle every question of 3 fact and law in a suit, but is likely to settle and simplify them, weighs in favor of granting 4 a stay). Instead, where state proceedings will “simplify many of the issues before the 5 Court due to the overlapping nature of the claims,” this factor weighs in favor of a stay. 6 Sanchez v. Green Messengers, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2023). 7 Conversely, a stay is inappropriate where the other proceeding is “unlikely to decide, or 8 to contribute to the decision of, the factual and legal issues before the district court.” 9 Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 10 Here, Variety Media involves issues that overlap with the present case. Both 11 require determining the meaning of § 638.51 and its application to commonplace internet 12 technologies such as cookies. Though not binding, a published intermediate state court 13 decision on state law would be helpful and instructive. Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 14 738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013). Given the split among federal district court decisions 15 on this issue, it would stand as an important opinion from a California state court on 16 California law.2 Variety Media will likely provide this Court with substantial guidance 17 that will materially impact the Court's decisions in this matter. Waiting for a decision to 18 issue will “avoid exhausting judicial resources to decide …plaintiff's pending motion for 19 20 2 Two state superior courts have entered a stay in two cases to obtain clarity on the 21 application of § 638.51. See Casillas v. Anytime Fitness Franchisor LLC, 2026 WL 22 1365282, at *3 (Cal. Super. May 12, 2026); Rodriguez v. Dish Network L.L.C., 2026 WL 1468210, at *4 (Cal. Super. Apr. 28, 2026). Additionally, several federal cases have 23 entered into stipulated stays pending a decision on Variety Media, indicating that parties 24 have acknowledged the decision’s relevance to the § 638.51 question. See In re USA Today Co., Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., No. 3:24-CV-05150-MMC, ECF No. 79 (N.D. 25 Cal. Apr. 27, 2026); Maketa v. Valnet, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-05517-RS, ECF No. 51 (N.D. 26 Cal. Mar. 4, 2026); Fregosa v. Mashable, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-01094-CRB, ECF No. 82 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2026). 27 1 certification, and any possible discovery-related matters or summary judgment 2 motions to follow which may prove fruitless.” Seefeldt v. Ent. Consulting Int'l, LLC., 441 3 || F. Supp. 3d 775, 779 (E.D. Mo. 2020). 4 At the same time, the Court acknowledges that the supplemental briefing request 5 || may affect the applicability of the ruling. As argued by Plaintiffs, § 638.51 might not be 6 || decided in this appeal. Opp at 9. Specifically, the Court of Appeal requested 7 ||supplemental briefing for whether Variety improperly raised certain arguments in its 8 demurrer or writ petition and whether online trackers must collect “destination 9 || identifying metadata” to classify as a pen register under § 638.51. /d.; see Variety Media, 10 || LLC v. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty., No. B350578 Ltr. to Counsel regarding Supplemental 11 || Briefing (Cal. Ct. App. May 11, 2026). As to the meaning of the request, it is impossible 12 tell whether Plaintiff's interpretation is more than speculation. At the same time, the 13 || pending decision seems likely to settle central legal issues that are the subject of this 14 || litigation, which would serve the orderly course of justice. Balancing the above 15 || considerations, this factor favors a short stay. Accordingly, the Court will impose a close- 16 || ended stay of six months to await a decision or indications that the appellate court is 17 unlikely to address the salient questions before the Court. 18 CONCLUSION 19 Weighing the above factors, Defendant’s motion to stay is GRANTED for six 20 months or until the state appellate court publishes its opinion in Variety Media, 21 || whichever is earlier. The parties should file a supplemental briefing at the end of the stay, 22 ||informing the court on the status of Variety Media. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||Dated: August 26, 2026 72 st 25 Hon. athe Cee 26 United States District Judge 27 28 25-CV-00603-GPC-GC