Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 Case No.: 26-cv-04006-DMS-GC 9 RONALD SATISH EMRIT, 10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 11 v. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND WALTER GOGGINS et al., 12 SCREENING COMPLAINT 13 Defendants. 14 15 16 17 On July 13, 2026, Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit, proceeding pro se, filed this action 18 against Defendants Walter Goggins and Walmart Advertising. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1).1 19 Plaintiff seeks $500 billion in damages for defamation, public nuisance, industrial 20 espionage, and tortious interference with business relations arising from Defendant 21 Goggins’ appearances in television advertising. (Id. at 1, 13–15). Plaintiff concurrently 22 filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”), which is currently pending 23 before the Court. (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2). For the following reasons, the Court grants 24 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion and sua sponte dismisses the Complaint without leave to amend. 25 26 27 1 Although Plaintiff refers to Defendant as Walter Goggins, it is the Court’s understanding that he refers 28 1 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 2 Parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay a filing fee 3 of $405. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)–(b).2 However, a court may authorize a party to proceed in 4 forma pauperis (“IFP”) without the prepayment of fees if the party submits an affidavit 5 demonstrating their inability to pay. § 1915(a)(1); see CivLR 3.2(a) (listing specific 6 requirements for the affidavit). Although a party need not be “absolutely destitute” to 7 proceed IFP, they must “allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty” 8 such that they could not “pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 9 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). 10 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion consists of an Application to Proceed in District Court 11 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Form AO 239). (IFP Mot. 1). Plaintiff reports that he 12 is disabled and unemployed, with his sole income being $1,036 per month in disability 13 payments. (Id. at 1–2). Plaintiff states that he has $357.30 in a checking account and no 14 other assets. (Id. at 2–3). Plaintiff itemizes monthly expenses totaling $790. (Id. at 4–5). 15 The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he cannot “pay the court 16 costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Accordingly, 17 the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Motion. 18 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING 19 A. Background 20 On July 13, 2026, Plaintiff, a recording artist living in Bowie, Maryland, brought 21 this action alleging that Defendant Goggins is a “creepy and weird actor” whose 22 appearances in Walmart and GoDaddy commercials “can be intimidating for African- 23 Americans” because of his role in the film Django Unchained. (Compl. 1–2, 4). On this 24 basis, Plaintiff asserts claims for defamation, public nuisance, industrial espionage, and 25 26 2 The $405 fee consists of a $350 filing fee mandated by § 1914(a) and a $55 administrative fee prescribed 27 by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to § 1914(b). See Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). However, the filing fee for an 28 1 tortious interference with business relations. (Id. at 13–14). The remainder of the 2 Complaint appears to be unrelated to the Defendants. Plaintiff recounts suspected identity- 3 theft reported by Progressive Insurance, payments through Zelle, previous lawsuits against 4 public figures, and many other topics. (See, e.g., id. at 2–4). Although only Defendants 5 Goggins and Walmart Advertising are listed in the case caption, the “Parties to This 6 Litigation” section identifies different defendants including Sabrina Carpenter, The 7 Grammys, Justice Ketanji Brown-Jackson, Lady Gaga, Vivendi Universal, Universal 8 Music Group, Universal, General Electric, RCA, Comcast, the Recording Industry 9 Association of America, and Cary Sherman. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that the Court has 10 jurisdiction because under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, “the U.S. District Court for the District of 11 New Jersey (as an Article III court) has jurisdiction over this matter because there is 12 complete diversity of jurisdiction between the Plaintiff and the four defendants given that 13 the plaintiff lives in Sarasota, Florida and no longer in Fort Worth, Texas.” (Id.). Plaintiff 14 additionally alleges that “the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut also has 15 subject matter jurisdiction over the present case at bar because this proceeding involves a 16 discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act of 17 1990, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, Fourth Amendment, and Privileges 18 and Immunities Clause.” (Id. at 6). Although Plaintiff seeks $500 billion, he 19 simultaneously alleges that “[b]ecause the amount in controversy does not exceeds [sic] 20 $75,000 (i.e. $0 is less than $75,000), this court does not have jurisdiction based on the 21 amount in controversy.” (Id. at 1, 6). 22 B. Legal Standard 23 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen an IFP complaint and dismiss 24 the case if, at any time, it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 25 a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 26 is immune from such relief. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 27 curiam) (confirming § 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to non-prisoners as well). A complaint “is 28 frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” and malicious where “it 1 was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 2 325 (1989); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). 3 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 4 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil 5 Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 6 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 7 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 8 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 9 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept 10 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 11 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 12 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 13 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 14 Finally, dismissal is warranted when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief against an immune 15 defendant, as long as the court “has sufficient information to make a determination on 16 immunity.” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016). 17 C. Discussion 18 The Court now examines the Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or 19 malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief 20 against a defendant with immunity from such relief. In doing so, the Court is mindful of 21 its obligation to ensure it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Arbaugh v. Y&H 22 Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (finding that courts “have an independent obligation to 23 determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge 24 from any party”). 25 Plaintiff has been described as a “serial pro se filer of frivolous lawsuits in federal 26 courts” who has “filed over 500 lawsuits throughout the country.” Satish Dat Beast v. 27 Carpenter, No. CV 26-96-M-KLD, 2026 WL 2434678, at *2 (D. Mont. July 6, 2026); 28 Emrit v. Barkley, No. 23-1275, 2023 WL 3300970, at *1 (3d Cir. May 8, 2023). Many 1 district courts have dismissed materially similar complaints as frivolous at screening and 2 multiple districts have imposed pre-filing restrictions on him. See Emrit v. Obama, No. 3 1:26-CV-393 (BKS/PJE), 2026 WL 2210045, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026). Section 4 1915 “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably 5 meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s 6 factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly 7 baseless,” including those “that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Neitzke v. Williams, 8 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327–28 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) 9 (citation modified). Here, the Court finds that the Complaint falls into this category 10 because it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. 11 Additionally, Plaintiff has not established subject-matter jurisdiction because no federal 12 question appears on the face of the Complaint and Plaintiff’s conflicting statements on the 13 identities of the defendants and the amount in controversy do not establish diversity 14 jurisdiction. (Compl. 1, 5–6, 13–14). Finally, the Court finds that the Complaint does not 15 comport with Rule 8 where it does not “tie factual averments against specific parties to 16 individual causes of action.” Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1290 (9th Cir. 17 2026). 18 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion and sua 20 sponte DISMISSES the Complaint. A court “should not dismiss a pro se complaint 21 without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 22 could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) 23 (citation modified). However, dismissal without leave to amend is proper “when 24 amendment would be clearly frivolous, unduly prejudicial, cause undue delay or a finding 25 of bad faith is made.” United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, & Allied Trades No. 40 v. 26 Ins. Corp. of Am., 919 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, it is absolutely clear that any 27 amendment cannot cure the identified deficiencies and would be frivolous. Accordingly, 28 the Complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is instructed to 1 close this case. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 || Dated: August 24, 2026 4 2 ine Yn: L4\ 5 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28