Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BIN IBRAHIM, Case No.: 26cv3847-LL-DDL 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 14 TODD BLANCHE, et al., 15 Respondents. [ECF No. 1] 16 17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Bin Ibrahim’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 19 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Respondent filed a Return in opposition to 20 the Petition [ECF No. 5], and Petitioner filed a Traverse [ECF No. 6]. For the reasons set 21 forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner Bin Ibrahim is a native and citizen of Ghana who was a “victim of brutal 24 homophobic vigilante violence in Ghana.” Pet. ¶ 15. Petitioner entered the United States 25 in May 2023 seeking asylum. ECF No. 1-3 at 3. In August 2023, Petitioner applied for 26 asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations 27 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Pet. ¶ 17. According to Respondents, Petitioner was 28 apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol agents on January 2, 2026 after entering the United 1 States from Canada. ECF No. 5 at 2. On January 24, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to 2 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody at Otay Mesa Detention Center 3 (“OMDC”). Pet. ¶ 18; ECF No. 5 at 2. 4 On March 18, 2026, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied all claims for relief and 5 ordered Petitioner removed to Uganda. ECF No. 5 at 2. Petitioner timely appealed his order 6 of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Pet. ¶ 23. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 9 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 10 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 11 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 12 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 13 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 14 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 15 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 16 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 17 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 18 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 19 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 A. Jurisdiction 22 Respondent states that as a threshold matter, Petitioner’s claims are jurisdictionally 23 barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). ECF No. 5 at 4–5. Section 1252(g) states that “[e]xcept 24 as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or 25 nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, . . 26 . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien 27 arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, 28 1 adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1252(g). 3 The Court finds § 1252(g) does not bar its jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. The 4 Supreme Court has explained that § 1252(g) does not bar jurisdiction for the “universe of 5 deportation claims” but instead “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney 6 General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or 7 execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 8 482 (1999); see also Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, 2025 WL 2461663, at *2 9 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that we should read § 1252(g) 10 narrowly.”). The Supreme Court later reiterated this narrow application of § 1252(g): 11 “We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to 12 ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language 13 to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 14 281, 294 (2018) (citation omitted). Petitioner is not challenging the commencement of 15 removal proceedings but is instead claiming a lack of legal authority to detain him for a 16 prolonged time without a bond hearing during proceedings. See Ibarra-Perez, 2025 WL 17 2461663, at *2 (noting that a claim based on a lack of legal authority to execute a removal 18 order due to a violation of a court order, the Constitution, INA, or international law, does 19 not challenge the decision or action to execute a removal order). Therefore, 20 § 1252(g) does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction in this matter. 21 B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 22 Petitioner contends that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates the 23 Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pet. ¶¶ 29–46. Respondents disagree that his 24 detention is unconstitutionally prolonged and argue that there is no due process violation 25 because Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1), which mandates detention through 26 the conclusion of the removal process, and that is all the process he will receive. ECF No. 27 5 at 5–10. 28 1 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be 2 “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. 3 “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in 4 deportation proceedings.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 5 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). “At the same time, however, this Court has recognized 6 detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the 7 deportation process.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has questioned the constitutionality of certain 8 immigration detention statutes, including § 1225(b): 9 We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that 10 those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against 11 the government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our 12 American government. “[L]iberty is the norm, and detention 13 prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 14 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). Civil detention violates due process outside 15 of “certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 16 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation 17 omitted). 18 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original). 19 The Court agrees with those courts that have found a noncitizen detained under 20 § 1225(b) for a prolonged period without an individualized bond hearing may assert a 21 constitutional right to due process. See Sadeqi v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2587-RSH-BJW, 22 2025 WL 3154520, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (“This Court agrees with the majority 23 position that a petitioner detained under Section 1225(b)(1) may assert a due process 24 challenge to prolonged mandatory detention without a bond hearing.”); Maksin v. Warden, 25 Golden State Annex, No. 1:25-CV-00955-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2879328, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 26 Oct. 9, 2025) (“Several courts including the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit, as well as 27 numerous district courts, have found that unreasonably long detention periods may violate 28 the due process clause.” (collecting cases)); Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State Annex 1 Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-00098-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2 July 25, 2025) (“[E]ssentially all district courts that have considered the issue agree that 3 prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, 4 ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” (quoting Martinez v. Clark, 5 No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report 6 and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-01669-RAJ, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. 7 Nov. 13, 2019))); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he 8 Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding that an unreasonably 9 prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing 10 violates due process.”); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1116–17 (W.D. Wash. 11 2019). 12 Respondents rely on two cases to support their argument that § 1225(b)(1) and its 13 provision for mandatory detention provides all the process that Petitioner is due. See ECF 14 No. 5 at 7–8 (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), and 15 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)). However, the Court is 16 not persuaded. 17 In Thuraissigiam, the habeas petitioner argued that the Illegal Immigration Reform 18 and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 violated “his right to due process by precluding 19 judicial review of his allegedly flawed credible-fear proceeding.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 20 at 138. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner, as an applicant for admission, was 21 provided “the right to a determination whether he had a significant possibility of 22 establishing eligibility for asylum” pursuant to § 1225(b), and that he had “only those rights 23 regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Id. at 140 (internal quotation 24 marks and brackets omitted) (quoting §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (v)). The Court finds 25 Thuraissigiam addressed a noncitizen’s right to challenge admission, not detention. See, 26 e.g., Sadeqi, 2025 WL 3154520, at *2 (“This Court likewise agrees with those district 27 courts that interpret Thuraissigiam as circumscribing an arriving alien’s due process rights 28 to admission, rather than limiting that person’s ability to challenge detention.”); Aviles- 1 Mena v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06783-RFL, 2025 WL 2578215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2 2025) (finding Thuraissigiam inapplicable to cases challenging detention). 3 The Court also finds Mezei distinguishable. Mezei involved a noncitizen who had 4 been “permanently excluded from the United States on security grounds but stranded in his 5 temporary haven on Ellis Island because other countries [would] not take him back.” Mezei, 6 345 U.S. at 207. The Supreme Court recognized Mezei’s exclusion for security reasons as 7 different from noncitizens who may be released from detention on bond. Id. at 216 (“An 8 exclusion proceeding grounded on danger to the national security, however, presents 9 different considerations; neither the rationale nor the statutory authority for such release 10 exists.”). The facts are significantly different because Petitioner has not been excluded as 11 a security risk and does not have a final order of removal. See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 12 322 F.3d 386, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Mezei Court explicitly grounded its decision 13 in the special circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attorney 14 General that Mezei presented a threat to national security.”); Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 15 772 (finding Mezei inapposite to issue of whether prolonged detention without a bond 16 hearing violates due process). 17 Petitioner contends that the six-factor balancing test articulated in Banda v. 18 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2019) demonstrates that his detention 19 violates his due process rights. Pet. ¶¶ 29–46. Respondents argue that applying those 20 factors shows that Petitioner’s detention is not unconstitutional. ECF No. 5 at 9–10. 21 In Banda, the court considered the following factors to determine whether prolonged 22 mandatory detention under § 1225(b) in a particular case violates the Due Process Clause: 23 “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the 24 conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) 25 delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that 26 the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 27 1118 (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D. Minn. 2019)). 28 1 First, the length of detention, which is the most important factor, weighs in 2 Petitioner’s favor as Petitioner has been detained for approximately seven months without 3 a bond hearing. This length is commensurate with what federal district courts in California 4 have found warrants a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Marco 5 Antonio B.R. v. Warden of Golden State Annex Detention Facility, No. 1:26-cv-0810-TLN- 6 CSK, 2026 WL 1091489 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2026) (holding petitioner detained for five 7 months without a bond hearing was likely to succeed on claim that continued prolonged 8 detention is unconstitutional); Yagoub v. LaRose, No. 3:26-cv-00914 JLS-JLB, 2026 WL 9 673799, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026) (finding detention of “nearly eight months” 10 without a bond hearing weighed in petitioner’s favor); Amado v. United States Dep’t of 11 Just., No. 3:25-cv-02687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) 12 (explaining that “[c]ourts have found detention over seven months without a bond hearing 13 weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable” and collecting cases). 14 Next, the Court finds that the likely duration of future detention also weighs in favor 15 of Petitioner. Here, Petitioner’s immigration case is currently on appeal with the BIA. Pet. 16 ¶ 23. If the BIA affirms, petitioner will have the opportunity seek review in the Ninth 17 Circuit. These appeals can take a long time. See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (finding 18 appeal of removal order with the BIA and review in the Ninth Circuit “may take up to two 19 years or longer”). Petitioner’s position is just as likely to lead to further prolonged detention 20 as the petitioner in Banda, where there was a final removal order from an IJ and he had just 21 filed an appeal to the BIA. See id. The Banda court concluded that this factor favored the 22 petitioner under those circumstances, and the Court finds the same here. 23 Third, courts consider the conditions of detention. “The more that the conditions 24 under which the [noncitizen] is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger his 25 argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (second 26 alteration in original) (citation omitted). Petitioner is detained at OMDC, and courts have 27 found confinement at OMDC is “indistinguishable from penal confinement.” Kydyrali, 499 28 F. Supp. 3d at 773; Gao v. LaRose, 805 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2025) 1 (“[C]onditions of confinement at Otay Mesa Detention Center are not dissimilar to criminal 2 confinement”). The Court finds this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 3 The fourth and fifth factors concern delays in the removal proceedings caused by 4 Petitioner or the Respondents. Petitioner does not state any delays caused by the 5 government. But see Roka v. Noem, No. 3:26-CV-00788-JES-MMP, 2026 WL 926915, at 6 *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2026) (finding that IJ reassignments that drove the recent delay of the 7 petitioner’s merits hearing weighed against the government). The Court finds no showing 8 that either side has caused undue delays, so these factors are neutral. 9 Lastly, when considering the “likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in 10 a final order of removal,” the Court considers “whether the noncitizen has asserted any 11 defenses to removal.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. at 1120 (citations omitted). Here, an IJ has 12 already ordered Petitioner removed to Uganda. ECF No. 5 at 2. In response, Petitioner filed 13 a BIA appeal challenging the IJ’s denial of his claims for relief. Pet. ¶ 23. Determining the 14 outcome of Petitioner’s immigration proceedings will require an individualized, fact- 15 intensive analysis. The Court is, however, in no position to assess the merits of his claim 16 for relief, at this stage or on this record. Thus, the Court finds this factor is neutral. 17 Considering all the factors, the Court finds Petitioner’s mandatory detention under 18 § 1225(b) has become unreasonable and that due process requires that he be provided with 19 a bond hearing. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e 20 note that the discretionary parole system available to § 1225(b) detainees is not sufficient 21 to overcome the constitutional concerns raised by prolonged mandatory detention.”). 22 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 23 IV. CONCLUSION 24 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 25 Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and ORDERS as follows: 26 1. Respondents SHALL provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before 27 a neutral immigration judge within seven (7) days of this Order, unless Petitioner 28 requests a continuance. 1 a. At the hearing, the government SHALL BEAR the burden of establishing by 2 clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen is a danger to the 3 community or a flight risk if released (See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 4 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)); 5 b. The IJ SHALL consider alternative conditions of release and the noncitizen’s 6 ability to pay bond if he or she determines bond 1s appropriate; and 7 c. The government SHALL make a complete record of the bond hearing 8 available to the noncitizen and his counsel. 9 2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgement in Petitioner’s favor and close this case. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 ||Dated: August 25, 2026 NO 12 QF | 13 Honorable Linda Lopez 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28