Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VINCENT RODRIGUEZ AND Case No.: 25-cv-1445-GPC-AHG CHRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, 12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ Plaintiffs, 13 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF v. JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 14 FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL FCA US LLC; FUTURE CHRYSLER 15 PROCEDURE 68(a) DODGE JEEP RAM OF CONCORD;

16 and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, [Dkt. No. 31.] 17 Defendants. 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiffs Vincent Rodriguez and Christina Rodriguez’s 20 (“Plaintiffs”) Notice of Acceptance of Defendant’s Rule 68 Offer of Judgment and Request 21 for Entry of Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 68. (Dkt. No. 22 31.) Defendants FCA US LLC (“FCA”) and Future Automotive Concord, Inc. d/b/a Future 23 Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram of Concord (“Defendants”) filed objections to Plaintiffs’ request 24 for entry of judgment and proposed judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 32, 33.) The Court set a hearing 25 date and directed Plaintiffs to file a reply by August 7, 2026 but no reply was filed. (Dkt. 26 No. 34.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Request for Entry 27 of Judgment pursuant to Rule 68. 28 / / / 1 Background 2 Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Superior Court of California, County of San 3 Diego against Defendants asserting federal and state law claims arising from alleged 4 defects in the 2022 Jeep Gladiator they purchased. (Dkt. No. 1, Not. Removal ¶¶ 1-2, 14.) 5 Defendants removed the action to this Court on June 5, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1.) 6 On August 19, 2025, Defendant FCA served Plaintiffs with an Offer of Judgment 7 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. (Dkt. No. 31-1, Chae Decl. ¶ 3; id., Ex. 8 A.) However, ten days later, on August 29, 2025, a representative of defense counsel’s 9 firm sent an email purporting to withdraw the August 19, 2025 Rule 68 Offer. (Dkt. No. 10 31-1, Chae Decl. ¶ 5 & n.1; id., Ex. C.) On September 2, 2025, within Rule 68’s fourteen- 11 day acceptance period, Plaintiffs served a written acceptance of the August 19, 2025 offer. 12 (Dkt. No. 31-1, Chae Decl. ¶ 4; id., Exs. A-B.) Defense counsel responded that the offer 13 had been withdrawn and that Plaintiffs’ acceptance was ineffective. (Dkt. No. 31-1, Chae 14 Decl. ¶ 5; id., Ex. D.) 15 After the purported acceptance, the parties continued to litigate the action. On 16 September 15, 2025, the parties participated in an Early Neutral Evaluation (“ENE”) before 17 Magistrate Judge Allison H. Goddard. (Dkt. No. 11.) After the ENE conference, a minute 18 order was filed stating that the “case did not settle” and the court set a Case Management 19 Conference. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.) The parties subsequently filed a Joint Discovery Plan, 20 appeared at the Case Management Conference, and proceeded under a Scheduling Order. 21 (Dkt. Nos. 13-15.) In March and June 2026, the parties filed two joint motions seeking to 22 modify the Scheduling Order. (Dkt. Nos. 18, 27.) The Magistrate Judge granted in part 23 and denied in part the first motion, and denied the second motion. (Dkt. Nos. 19, 28.) On 24 July 2, 2026, Defendants filed a motion to amend the scheduling order which is currently 25 pending. (Dkt. No. 29.) On June 23, 2026, Defendants also filed a motion for judgment 26 on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 25.) 27 Then on July 9, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Notice of Acceptance of Defendant 28 FCA’s Rule 68 Offer of Judgment and Request for Entry of Judgment. (Dkt. No. 31, 1 Notice.) Defendants filed Objections to Plaintiffs’ Notice and proposed judgment. (Dkt. 2 Nos. 32, 33.) Defendants contend that the parties’ continued litigation demonstrates that 3 no settlement existed and that Plaintiffs are judicially and equitably estopped from seeking 4 entry of judgment. (Dkt. No. 32 at 4-7. 1) Plaintiffs did not reply to address Defendants’ 5 arguments. 6 Legal Standard 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 establishes a procedure by which “a party 8 defending against a claim” may “serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on 9 specified terms, with the costs then accrued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a). If the offer is accepted 10 within fourteen days, either party may file “the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof 11 of service,” and “[t]he clerk must then enter judgment.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has 12 recognized that a Rule 68 offer “is more consequential than a run-of-the-mill settlement 13 offer.” Kubiak v. Cnty. of Ravalli, 32 F.4th 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2022). Indeed, a Rule 68 14 offer, “once made, is non-negotiable; it is either accepted, in which case it is automatically 15 entered by the clerk of court, or rejected.” Id. at 1188 (quoting Nusom v. Comh Woodburn, 16 Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997)). In other words, the Rules prescribe that once an 17 offer is made, it “must remain open for fourteen days” and “[n]o other outcome (such as 18 negotiation or revocation) is contemplated.” Id.; see also LaPierre v. City of Lawrence, 19 819 F.3d 558, 562 n. 5 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting “the established rule that Rule 68 offers of 20 judgment, once made, are irrevocable for 14 days”) (citing Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality 21 of Carolina, 799 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Rule 68 guarantees the offeree fourteen days 22 to contemplate the offer, as though the offeree had paid for a fourteen-day option”)); 23 Sanchez v. Prudential Pizza, Inc., 709 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 68 offers may 24 not be revoked during the 14-day period established by the Rule”); Richardson v. Nat'l R. 25 26 27 28 1 R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“a Rule 68 offer is simply not 2 revocable during the [14-day] period.”) 3 Discussion 4 Plaintiffs request entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 based on their acceptance 5 of Defendant FCA’s Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. (Dkt. No. 31 at 2-5.) Defendants do not 6 dispute Plaintiffs’ timely acceptance of the Rule 68 Offer of Judgment and that Defendants’ 7 purported withdrawal was ineffective. Rather, they oppose Plaintiffs’ request on two 8 grounds. First, Defendants essentially argue that Plaintiffs waived their right to enforce 9 the Rule 68 agreement by continuing to engage in litigation conduct and include the 10 Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the case had not settled after the ENE conference. (Dkt. 11 No. 32 at 2-3.) Second, Defendants contend that judicial and equitable estoppel apply and 12 bar Plaintiffs from seeking to enforce the Rule 68 settlement. (Id. at 5-7.) 13 A. Plaintiffs Waived Their Right to Enforce the Accepted Rule 68 Offer 14 Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs’ timely accepted the Rule 68 Offer, Plaintiffs’ 15 conduct during the approximately ten months following their acceptance demonstrates that 16 they relinquished any right to enforce the agreement. (Dkt. No. 32 at 2-3.) Defendants 17 emphasize that after accepting the Rule 68 Offer on September 2, 2025, Plaintiffs continued 18 litigating the action, including by participating in the Early Neutral Evaluation Conference 19 and Case Management Conference, filing a Joint Discovery Plan, engaging in discovery, 20 and twice stipulating to modify deadlines under the Scheduling Order. (Id.) Plaintiffs did 21 not file the Offer and Notice of Acceptance with the Court until approximately ten months 22 later, on July 9, 2026. 23 Once accepted, a Rule 68 offer of judgment “becomes a settlement agreement.” 24 Miller v. City of Portland, 868 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Guerrero v. 25 Cummings, 70 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, Rule 68 offers are “analyzed in the 26 same manner as any contract.” Id. at 851 (quoting Erdman v. Cochise Cnty., 926 F.2d 877, 27 880 (9th Cir. 1991)). Federal courts look to applicable state law in interpreting a contract. 28 See Revitch v. DirectTV, LLC, 977 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2020). 1 A contractual right may be lost by waiver when the party “seeking to enforce a 2 known contractual right has intentionally relinquished or abandoned that right.” Quach v. 3 Cal. Commerce Club, Inc., 16 Cal. 5th 562, 569 (2024) (citation omitted); Morgan v. 4 Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 417 (2022) (“Waiver, we have said, ‘is the intentional 5 relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”). To constitute a waiver, “there must 6 be an existing right, knowledge of the right, and an actual intention to relinquish the right.” 7 Bickel v. City of Piedmont, 16 Cal. 4th 1040, 1053, (1997) superseded by statute on another 8 ground as noted in Riverwatch v. Cnty. of San Diego, 76 Cal. App. 4th 1428, 1439 (1999)). 9 “The intention may be express, based on the waiving party’s words, or implied, based on 10 conduct that is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable 11 belief that such right has been relinquished.” Lynch v. Cal. Coastal Com., 3 Cal. 5th 470, 12 475 (2017) (quotations marks omitted); Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 13 F.2d 1390, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1991) (a party asserting waiver must establish either that the 14 party possessing the right, “with full knowledge of the facts and an intent to waive the right, 15 made a clear expression of its intent,” or that the party’s conduct “warrants the inference 16 that it has relinquished that right.”). 17 District courts, in other districts, addressing settlement agreements have similarly 18 recognized that a party’s decision to continue litigating rather than seek enforcement may 19 support a finding of waiver. See Langreich v. Gruenbaum, 775 F. Supp. 2d 630, 638-39 20 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (the defendants waived any claim for enforcement as they were “free . . . 21 to seek to enforce” the earlier settlement but “chose not to do so, and opted instead to 22 litigate the case.”); Ballard ex rel. Ballard v. Phila. Sch. Dist., No. 05-772, 2013 WL 23 12435699, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff, “waived any 24 recourse she may have had to enforcement of the Settlement Agreement” based on her 25 subsequent conduct and “untimeliness in bringing this enforcement action”). 26 Rule 68’s post-acceptance procedure further informs the analysis. Following 27 acceptance, “either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of 28 service,” after which “[t]he clerk must then enter judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a). 1 Although Rule 68 does not specify a deadline for filing, its prescribed procedure 2 contemplates filing the offer and notice of acceptance to obtain entry of judgment. 3 Here, Plaintiffs’ conduct, considered as a whole, warrants the inference that they 4 relinquished their right to enforce the accepted Rule 68 Offer. Plaintiffs had knowledge of 5 the right at issue, as demonstrated by their execution and service of the written acceptance 6 on September 2, 2025. (Dkt. No. 31-1, Chae Decl. ¶ 4; id., Exs. A-B.) Plaintiffs’ 7 subsequent conduct, however, was inconsistent with preservation of that right. Less than 8 two weeks later, Plaintiffs appeared at the September 15, 2025 Early Neutral Evaluation 9 and thereafter continued litigating the action as an unresolved controversy. (Dkt. No. 11.) 10 Plaintiffs then filed a Joint Discovery Plan and appeared at the Case Management 11 Conference. (Dkt. Nos. 13-14.) They thereafter joined Defendants in seeking 12 modifications of the Scheduling Order deadlines on two separate occasions. (Dkt. Nos. 18, 13 27.) Throughout this period, Plaintiffs did not file the accepted Rule 68 Offer or seek entry 14 of judgment; the Notice of Acceptance and Request for Entry of Judgment was not filed 15 until ten months later on July 9, 2026. (Dkt. No. 31.) Thus, for approximately ten months 16 after serving their acceptance, Plaintiffs continued litigating the case including attending 17 conferences with the Magistrate Judge before filing their Rule 68 Offer and Notice of 18 Acceptance. That sustained course of conduct, taken together, is inconsistent with 19 preservation of the right Plaintiffs now seek to enforce. 20 As in Langreich, Plaintiffs had the ability to stand on the agreement but instead 21 proceeded with the litigation. See Langreich, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 638-39. Considering the 22 totality of Plaintiffs’ actions, including their approximately ten-month failure to seek entry 23 of judgment and their affirmative and repeated participation in the continued litigation of 24 the action, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs relinquished their known right to enforce the 25 September 2, 2025 acceptance. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have waived 26 their right to seek to enforce the Rule 69 Offer of Judgment, the Court need not address 27 whether judicial and equitable estoppel also bars Plaintiffs request. As such, the Court 28 DENIES Plaintiffs’ Request for Entry of Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. I Conclusion 2 Based on the reasoning above, the Court therefore DENIES Plaintiffs’ Request For 3 || Rule 68 Offer of Judgment and VACATES the hearing set for August 28, 2026. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: August 25, 2026 72 6 Hon. athe Cae 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28