Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIA1 ALICIA FLORES HERCULES, Case No.: 26-CV-4551 JAO (DEB)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS 14 GREGORY J. ARCHAMBEAULT, et al., (ECF No. 1) 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Maria Alicia Flores Hercules’ Petition for Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is 20 Respondents’ Response to the Petition (ECF No. 4) and Petitioner’s Reply (ECF No. 5). 21 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition on due process 22 grounds. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a Honduran citizen who entered the United States as a 17-year-old in 25 or about 2022. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–2. She was apprehended at that time but released 26 into the country to pursue her asylum and withholding of removal claims. See id. ¶ 4. 27 28 1 The Petition and Reply refer to Petitioner as both Maria and Marta. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 1–2. 1 Upon release, she was granted work authorization, see id., lived peacefully in her 2 community, maintained steady employment, and complied with her obligations of 3 release, see ECF No. 5 at 6. However, on June 6, 2026, Petitioner was driving to work 4 when three trucks blocked her car and took Petitioner into custody, where she has 5 remained since. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6–8. 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 8 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district 9 of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole 10 judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or 11 removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas 12 v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 13 13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral 14 issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of 15 indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 16 Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 17 grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. 18 Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 19 DISCUSSION 20 Petitioner argues that she is currently being detained without cause and in violation 21 of her right to due process. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11–14. Although Respondents 22 acknowledge that in light of Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842, --- F.4th ---, 23 2026 WL 2196424 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026), Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 24 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than mandatory detention under § 1225(a), they argue that the 25 Court should order a bond hearing without reaching Petitioner’s due process argument. 26 See ECF No. 4 at 2 n.1. The Court, however, concludes that Petitioner’s re-detention 27 without notice violates due process and that only immediate release affords relief because 28 Petitioner is entitled to process before the revocation of her prior release. 1 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 2 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 3 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 4 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 5 533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment 6 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 7 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a 8 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 9 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their 10 liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a 11 protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 12 Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an 13 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to 14 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that 15 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the 16 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 17 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 18 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a 19 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 20 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 21 Petitioner has been out of custody since 2022, when the government implicitly 22 determined she was not a danger to the community or a flight risk and released her from 23 detention. There is no suggestion that Petitioner violated the terms of her release in the 24 years she has been out of detention. See generally ECF No. 4. Petitioner thus has a 25 protected liberty interest continuing to remain out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. 26 Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after [her] initial apprehension 27 reflected a determination by the government that [she] was neither a flight risk nor a 28 danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty 1 unless [she] no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 2 1164 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our 3 country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth 4 Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 5 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding the petitioner had a protected 6 liberty interest in his release). 7 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 8 procedural protections before she can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. 9 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 10 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Mathews factors. 11 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: 12 (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 13 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 14 additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the 15 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 16 procedural requirement would entail.” 17 Id. 18 The Court finds that all three factors support a determination that the 19 Government’s re-detention of Petitioner without notification, reasoning, or an 20 opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. First, as discussed 21 above, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to 22 her release in 2022. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 23 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due 24 Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 25 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free 26 to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal 27 life.”). 28 1 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as 2 Respondents revoked Petitioner’s release from custody without providing Petitioner with 3 notification, reasoning, or a hearing. Since the government’s initial determination in 4 2022 that Petitioner should be released because she posed no danger to the community 5 and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have changed. See 6 Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a 7 determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or 8 a flight risk.”). Indeed, after her release from custody, Petitioner has apparently complied 9 with all conditions of release. See ECF No. 5 at 6. “Once a noncitizen has been released, 10 the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to 11 removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of 12 materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact 13 dangerous or has become a flight risk[.]” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Where as 14 here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an 15 erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] 16 has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [her] detention.” 17 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 18 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up). 19 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 20 and a hearing is “low.” See Alvarenga Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Pinchi, 792 F. 21 Supp. 3d at 1036; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the 22 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 23 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). 24 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her release in 25 violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Monroy 26 Martinez v. Lyons, 2026 WL 1047937, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) (granting a writ of 27 habeas corpus on due process grounds where the petitioner’s release on bond was 28 revoked); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the 2 || conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). 3 CONCLUSION 4 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas 5 || Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from 6 || custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting release. The Court ORDERS, prior 7 ||to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for 8 revocation of her release and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine 9 || whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the burden of establishing, by 10 and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk 11 flight. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038. The Parties are ORDERED to file a 12 || Joint Status Report by September 4, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: August 24, 2026 15 16 hf on 18 Jill A. Otake 19 ta aie : '$ United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28