gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-03529 · 2026-08-24 · Unknown

Demetrius Jerome Moore, Lacole Regina Moore v. Experian Information Solutions Inc. et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Dana M. Sabraw (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:21Z · confidence high

The court granted the pro se plaintiffs' motions to proceed in forma pauperis and screened their Fair Credit Reporting Act complaint. It dismissed with leave to amend claims regarding the Virginia Credit Union, Henrico Federal Credit Union, and Commonwealth of Virginia accounts for failure to state a claim, while allowing claims regarding the First Premier tradeline and a notice violation to proceed.

What the court decidedThe model
Grant Plaintiffs' Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
“Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ IFP Motions.”
agree with court
The plaintiffs submitted affidavits showing income of $783/month and $0/month, assets of $150, and expenses of $1,445/month. This record clearly demonstrates an inability to pay the $405 filing fee while maintaining necessities of life, satisfying the standard set forth in Escobedo v. Applebees.
Dismiss § 1681e(b) and § 1681i(a) claims related to Virginia Credit Union tradeline
“Plaintiffs therefore fail to plausibly allege these claims and they are dismissed.”
agree with court
The complaint failed to identify the specific inaccurate information reported. Under Shaw v. Experian, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting to state a claim. Conclusory allegations of inaccuracy without factual support are insufficient under Iqbal/Twombly.
Dismiss § 1681e(b) and § 1681i(a) claims related to Henrico Federal Credit Union tradeline
“Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.”
agree with court
The plaintiff failed to identify what the derogatory remarks were or what the accurate status should have been. Additionally, the allegation that Equifax deleted the tradeline is not a violation of § 1681e(b) because deletion is a statutory requirement under § 1681i(a)(5)(A) when an item is found inaccurate or unverifiable.
Dismiss § 1681e(b) and § 1681i(a) claims related to Commonwealth of Virginia account
“As it is unclear what Plaintiff is alleging, this claim is dismissed.”
agree with court
The complaint contained contradictory or unclear allegations regarding whether the account was past due or paid timely. A court cannot supply essential elements of a claim that are absent or unclear in a pro se complaint. Boquist v. Courtney supports this dismissal.
Allow § 1681e(b) and § 1681i(a) claims related to First Premier tradeline to proceed
“Accordingly, these claims are sufficiently plead “to warrant ordering [Defendants] to file an answer.””
agree with court
Plaintiff Lacole alleged that the account was reported as past due but provided documentation that it was never late. This constitutes a plausible allegation of inaccurate reporting, satisfying the prima facie requirement for FCRA claims.
Allow § 1681i notice claim against Experian and Trans Union to proceed
“the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly stated a violation of § 1681i sufficient to warrant a response.”
agree with court
Plaintiff alleged that he did not authorize electronic communication and that the defendants provided results only via an online portal. This plausibly alleges a violation of § 1681i(a)(6)(A), which requires notice by mail unless the consumer authorizes other means.
Grant leave to amend dismissed claims
“Here, it is not absolutely clear that the dismissed claims could not be cured by amendment.”
agree with court
Under Akhtar v. Mesa, a pro se complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured. The court correctly applied this standard.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the § 1915(e)(2) screening standard, which is identical to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. It properly cites Shaw v. Experian for the requirement of a prima facie showing of inaccuracy in FCRA cases. The court correctly distinguishes between conclusory allegations and plausible factual allegations, dismissing claims where the specific inaccuracy was not identified and allowing claims where the inaccuracy was plausibly alleged. The grant of leave to amend is consistent with Akhtar v. Mesa. The reasoning is sound and supported by the cited authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 Case No.: 25-cv-03529-DMS-SBC 9 DEMETRIUS JEROME MOORE, LACOLE REGINA MOORE, 10 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ Plaintiffs, MOTIONS TO PROCEED 11 v. IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 12 SCREENING COMPLAINT EXPERIAN INFORMATION 13 SOLUTIONS INC. et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 On December 11, 2025, Plaintiffs Demetrius Jerome Moore and Lacole Regina 18 Moore, proceeding pro se, filed this action against Defendants Experian Information 19 Solutions Inc. (“Experian”), Trans Union L.L.C. (“Trans Union”), and Equifax Information 20 Services L.L.C. (“Equifax”). (Compl., ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fair 21 Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). (Id. ¶ 16); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x. Plaintiffs have 22 each filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motions”). (ECF Nos. 6, 11). 23 For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ IFP Motions and sua sponte 24 dismisses the Complaint in part. 25 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 26 Parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay a filing fee 27 28 1 of $405. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)–(b). However, a court may authorize a party to proceed in 2 forma pauperis (“IFP”) without the prepayment of fees if the party submits an affidavit 3 demonstrating their inability to pay. § 1915(a)(1); see CivLR 3.2(a) (listing specific 4 requirements for the affidavit). Although a party need not be “absolutely destitute” to 5 proceed IFP, they must “allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty” 6 such that they could not “pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 7 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). 8 Plaintiffs’ IFP Motions each contain an Application to Proceed in District Court 9 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Form AO 240). (ECF No. 6 at 4–5; ECF No. 11). 10 Plaintiff Demetrius reports that his only income over the past twelve months was $783 11 monthly from Social Security disability benefits. (ECF No. 6 at 4). Plaintiff Lacole reports 12 that she is not employed and has not received any income in the past twelve months. (ECF 13 No. 11 at 1). Plaintiffs state that they have $150 in a checking or savings account and no 14 other assets. (ECF No. 6 at 5; ECF No. 11 at 2). Plaintiffs itemize monthly expenses 15 totaling $1,445 for rent, electricity, and gas. (ECF No. 6 at 5; ECF No. 11 at 2). On this 16 record, each Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that they cannot “pay the court costs 17 and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Accordingly, the 18 Court grants Plaintiffs’ IFP Motions. 19 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING 20 A. Background 21 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, three nationwide consumer reporting agencies, 22 have “continuously inaccurately reported” their accounts as “current, undisputed, 23 derogatory, and past due.” (Compl. ¶¶ 1–3). On June 25, September 27, October 2, and 24 December 2, 2024, Plaintiff Demetrius disputed a tradeline reported by Virginia Credit 25 26 1 The $405 fee consists of a $350 filing fee mandated by § 1914(a) and a $55 administrative fee prescribed 27 by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to § 1914(b). See Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). However, the filing fee for an 28 1 Union with all three Defendants and a Commonwealth of Virginia account with Equifax. 2 (Id. ¶¶ 18–19, 32, 46, 54). Plaintiff Demetrius alleges that the latter account “was first 3 reported derogatory in 1996 and Plaintiff had continuously made payments to said account 4 from April 2020 until present.” (Id. ¶ 55). On the same four dates in 2024, Plaintiff Lacole 5 disputed a tradeline reported by Virginia Credit Union and a tradeline reported by First 6 Premier with all three Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 66, 72, 75, 81, 84). As to the First Premier 7 tradeline, Plaintiff Lacole alleges that she provided Defendants with “documentation and 8 confirmation from the data furnisher that said account was never late.” (Id. ¶ 67). Plaintiffs 9 allege that Defendants “refused and failed to reinvestigate” each of these disputes within 10 thirty days, unlawfully determining them to be frivolous. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 33, 47, 58, 64, 68, 73, 11 77, 82, 86). 12 In or around January 2025, Henrico Federal Credit Union allegedly contacted 13 Defendants to notify them that Plaintiff Demetrius’ “account’s derogatory remarks were 14 erroneous and the credit reporting should be updated to reflect as such.” (Id. ¶¶ 23, 36, 15 50). On February 11 and April 4, 2025, Plaintiff Demetrius allegedly submitted disputes 16 with Defendants, providing them with the “documentation and correspondence from 17 Henrico Federal Credit Union.” (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24, 35, 37, 49). However, Plaintiff Demetrius 18 alleges that Defendants again failed to reinvestigate and deemed the disputes frivolous. 19 (Id. ¶¶ 24, 37, 51). Plaintiff Demetrius alleges that on or around April 1, 2025, Equifax 20 “maliciously and intentionally deleted and removed said trade-lines from his credit file” 21 and that “[t]hese loans were procured solely for the purposes of improving Plaintiff’s Fair 22 Issac [sic] Corporation Score and his credit worthiness.” (Id. ¶ 52). Plaintiff Demetrius 23 further alleges that Experian and Trans Union provided the results of the reinvestigation 24 through an online portal which “blocked and restricted” his access, despite the fact that he 25 had submitted his disputes through the mail and had not authorized another means of 26 communication. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 41). Plaintiff Demetrius alleges that subsequent attempts to 27 contact Experian and Trans Union by mail and phone were unsuccessful. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 42). 28 1 Finally, Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants’ reporting, they were unable to 2 secure a car loan, student loan, and mortgage. (Id. ¶ 89). 3 On December 11, 2025, Plaintiffs filed this action with a Motion to Proceed IFP 4 signed by Plaintiff Lacole. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). On February 24, 2026, the Court denied the 5 motion because multiple plaintiffs may only proceed IFP if they each demonstrate an 6 inability to pay the filing fee. (ECF No. 3 at 2). On April 1, 2026, the Court dismissed the 7 case for failure to either pay the filing fee or file an IFP motion on behalf of each Plaintiff 8 by the deadline set out in the previous order, and the case was subsequently closed. (ECF 9 Nos. 4, 5). On April 6, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their IFP Motions, explaining that they had 10 not received the Court’s February 24, 2026 order due to a mailing issue. (ECF Nos. 6, 11; 11 see ECF Nos. 7–10, 13–14 (returning mail as undeliverable)). On May 4, 2026, the Court 12 reopened the case and took the IFP Motions and Complaint under submission. (ECF No. 13 12). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated § 1681e(b) by failing 14 to implement or follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of 15 the information they publish and § 1681i(a)(1) by failing to implement or follow reasonable 16 procedures designed to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether disputed 17 information is inaccurate. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 25, 34, 38, 48, 53, 59, 65, 69, 74, 78, 83, 87, 90, 18 93). Plaintiff Demetrius additionally alleges that Experian and Trans Union violated § 19 1681i(a)(6) by failing to mail him the results of his reinvestigations. (Id. ¶¶ 26–29, 40– 20 43). Plaintiffs seek actual, compensatory, special, and punitive damages under §§ 1681n 21 and 1681o, as well as fees and costs. (Id. ¶¶ 91, 94, 96).2 22 23 24 25 26 2 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ violations of §§ 1681i(a) and 1681i(a)(1) have “resulted in the negligent and intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress.” (Id. ¶¶ 92, 95). The Court construes these 27 allegations as part of the FCRA claims, but to the extent Plaintiffs intend to allege state-law causes of action, they must make that intention clear in any amended complaint. (See id. ¶ 7 (invoking jurisdiction 28 1 B. Legal Standard 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen an IFP complaint and dismiss 3 the case if, at any time, it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 4 a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 5 is immune from such relief. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 6 curiam) (confirming § 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to non-prisoners as well). A complaint “is 7 frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” and malicious where “it 8 was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 9 325 (1989); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). 10 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 11 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil 12 Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 13 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 14 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 15 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 16 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept 17 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 18 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 19 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 20 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 21 Finally, dismissal is warranted when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief against an immune 22 defendant, as long as the court “has sufficient information to make a determination on 23 immunity.” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016). 24 C. Discussion 25 The Court now examines the Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or 26 malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief 27 against a defendant with immunity from such relief. As Plaintiffs proceed pro se, the Court 28 1 construes the filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A 2 document filed pro se is to be liberally construed . . . .” (citation modified)). 3 1. Section 1681e(b) 4 Under § 1681e(b), a consumer reporting agency preparing a consumer report must 5 “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information 6 concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” Liability is ultimately 7 “predicated on the reasonableness of the credit reporting agency’s procedures.” Shaw v. 8 Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 891 F.3d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Guimond v. Trans 9 Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995)) (noting that the reasonableness 10 of the procedures is normally a question for trial). However, to state a claim, a plaintiff 11 “must first make a prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting” by the consumer reporting 12 agency. Id. at 756 (citation modified) (quoting Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 13 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010)); see Gross v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246, 1251 (9th 14 Cir. 2022) (“This order of proof makes sense: if there is no inaccuracy, then the 15 reasonableness of the investigation is not in play.”).3 Reporting is inaccurate “where it 16 either is patently incorrect or is misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can 17 be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Shaw, 891 F.3d at 756 (citation 18 modified). Although Plaintiffs state that Defendants’ reporting was inaccurate, the Court 19 must examine the factual basis for each alleged inaccuracy. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting 20 that conclusory statements and recitals of the elements of a cause of action are insufficient). 21 a. Virginia Credit Union 22 Plaintiffs allege that they each disputed a tradeline reported by Virginia Credit Union 23 and provided information to support their disputes. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 32, 46, 63, 72, 81). 24 However, the Complaint does not describe the account, what information was reported 25 26 3 Although the dissemination of inaccurate reporting is not an element of a § 1681e(b) claim, it does bear 27 on whether the plaintiff has Article III standing. Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 n.3; TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 434 (2021) (“The mere presence of an inaccuracy in an internal credit file, if it is 28 1 about it, or what the inaccurate information allegedly was. See, e.g., Walters v. Transunion, 2 No. CV-26-03233-PHX-DWL, 2026 WL 2119331, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2026). 3 Plaintiffs therefore fail to plausibly allege these claims and they are dismissed. 4 b. Henrico Federal Credit Union 5 Plaintiff Demetrius alleges that Henrico Federal Credit Union notified Defendants 6 that his “account’s derogatory remarks were erroneous” and that he provided Defendants 7 with “documentation and correspondence” affirming this. (Compl. ¶¶ 23, 24, 36, 37, 50). 8 However, as previously discussed, conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim 9 upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff Demetrius does not identify what the 10 derogatory remarks were and what the accurate status should have been. Without that 11 information, the Court cannot assess whether the reporting was patently incorrect or 12 sufficiently misleading. See Shaw, 891 F.3d at 756. Plaintiff Demetrius further alleges 13 that Equifax “maliciously and intentionally deleted and removed” the Henrico Federal 14 Credit Union tradelines from his reporting. (Id. ¶ 52). However, removal of a disputed 15 item is explicitly contemplated by the statute, and Plaintiff does not explain how this made 16 the reporting inaccurate under § 1681e(b). See § 1681i(a)(5)(A) (“If, after any 17 reinvestigation . . . an item of the information is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or 18 cannot be verified, the consumer reporting agency shall . . . promptly delete that item of 19 information from the file of the consumer, or modify that item of information, as 20 appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation . . . .”). Accordingly, this claim is 21 dismissed. 22 c. Commonwealth of Virginia 23 Plaintiff Demetrius alleges that Equifax “continuously reported [his Commonwealth 24 of Virginia] account as past due” despite it first being reported derogatory in 1996 and 25 Plaintiff making payments to the account from April 2020 until present. (Compl. ¶¶ 55– 26 57). It is unclear whether Plaintiff is alleging that the account was not past due. (See id. ¶ 27 57 (“Defendant knew that this account had been paid timely . . . .”)). If the account was 28 indeed current, then reporting otherwise is patently incorrect. Cf. Gross, 33 F.4th at 1252 1 (finding that where a balance was not owed, it was patently incorrect to report an account 2 as past due). As it is unclear what Plaintiff is alleging, this claim is dismissed. See Boquist 3 v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2022) (“A liberal construction of a pro se 4 complaint, however, does not mean that the court will supply essential elements of a claim 5 that are absent from the complaint.”). 6 d. First Premier 7 Plaintiff Lacole alleges that she disputed a First Premier tradeline four times in 2024 8 and provided Defendants with “documentation and confirmation from the data furnisher 9 that said account was never late.” (Compl. ¶¶ 66–67, 75–76, 84–85). Read with the 10 allegation that Defendants reported Plaintiffs’ accounts as past due, Plaintiff Lacole has 11 plausibly alleged inaccurate reporting. Accordingly, these claims are sufficiently plead “to 12 warrant ordering [Defendants] to file an answer.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 13 (9th Cir. 2012); (Compl. ¶ 3). 14 2. Section 1681i 15 Section 1681i(a) provides that “if the completeness or accuracy of any item of 16 information contained in a consumer’s file . . . is disputed by the consumer . . . , the agency 17 shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation” and update or delete the 18 information “before the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the agency 19 receives the notice of the dispute.” § 1681i(a)(1)(A). The agency must also notify any 20 person who provided any of the information in dispute. Id. at (a)(2)(A). If the agency 21 determines the dispute to be frivolous or irrelevant or concludes the reinvestigation, it must 22 notify the consumer within five business days by mail or if authorized by the consumer, by 23 other means. § 1681i(a)(3)(B), (a)(6)(A). As with § 1681e(b), a claim under § 1681i 24 requires that Plaintiff make a prima facie showing of an inaccuracy. Shaw, 891 F.3d at 756 25 (“Although § 1681i does not on its face require that an actual inaccuracy exist, we . . . have 26 imposed such a requirement. Requiring an inaccuracy . . . is consistent with the FCRA’s 27 purpose to protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate information about them.” 28 (citation modified)). As discussed above, only Plaintiff Lacole’s claims related to the First 1 Premier tradeline meet this requirement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Virginia Credit Union, 2 Henrico Federal Credit Union, and Commonwealth of Virginia § 1681i(a) claims are 3 dismissed. 4 Finally, Plaintiff Demetrius alleges that Experian and Trans Union violated § 1681i 5 by failing to mail him the results of the reinvestigations. (Compl. ¶¶ 26–29, 40–43). 6 Taking as true that Experian and Trans Union provided the results only through an online 7 portal that Plaintiff had not authorized, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly stated a 8 violation of § 1681i sufficient to warrant a response. 9 A court “should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is 10 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 11 Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation modified); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 15(a) (courts should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires”). Here, it is 13 not absolutely clear that the dismissed claims could not be cured by amendment. 14 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ IFP Motions and sua 16 sponte DISMISSES with leave to amend Plaintiffs’ §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i(a) claims 17 related to the Virginia Credit Union tradeline, Henrico Federal Credit Union tradeline, and 18 Commonwealth of Virginia account. Plaintiff Lacole’s §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i(a) claims 19 related to the First Premier tradeline survive screening, as does Plaintiff Demetrius’ § 1681i 20 notice claim against Experian and Trans Union. Within twenty-one (21) days of the date 21 of this Order, Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint. 22 The Court ORDERS: 23 1. The Clerk of Court shall issue a summons and forward it to Plaintiffs with a 24 blank U.S. Marshal Form 285, a certified copy of the operative complaint, and 25 a certified copy of this Order. Plaintiffs must fill out U.S. Marshal Form 285 26 as completely and accurately as possible with the addresses where Defendants 27 may be found or subject to service. See CivLR 4.1c. Plaintiffs must then 28 return the form to the U.S. Marshal pursuant to the Clerk’s instructions. l 2. The U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the operative complaint, summons, 2 and this Order upon Defendants, as directed by Plaintiffs on U.S. Marshal 3 Form 285. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States. 4 3. Plaintiffs shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by 5 counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other 6 document submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiffs shall include 7 with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate 8 stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of any document was 9 served on the Defendants or counsel for Defendants and the date of service. 10 Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been 11 filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service will be 12 disregarded. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: August 24, 2026 2» 15 jn Yn. 16 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 7 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Cites, in this corpus