Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 FREDY LOPEZ-CHIJAL, Case No. 26-cv-04655-BAS-VET 14 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 15 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) 16 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al., 17 Respondents. 18 19 20 21 Petitioner Fredy Lopez-Chijal filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 22 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming he was improperly detained after he was released by the Office 23 of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) and allowed to live in the United States. (ECF No. 1.) 24 The Government filed a Return, which—instead of addressing the issues raised in the 25 Petition—stated it had no opposition to a bond hearing based on Rodriguez Vazquez v. 26 Bostock, No. 25-6842, __F.4th __ (9th Cir. July 30, 2026). (ECF No. 5.) However, as 27 Petitioner points out in the Traverse, the Petition does not raise issues addressed in 28 Rodriguez Vazquez, and Petitioner is requesting immediate release, not a bond hearing. 1 (ECF No. 6.) For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Petition and orders that 2 Petitioner be released on the same terms and conditions as he was previously released. 3 I. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 5 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the writ 6 is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 7 A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or she is in 8 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It applies 9 to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 10 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody and since he is seeking release from custody, he has 11 standing to pursue this Petition. 12 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 13 Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, was arrested at the border in 2019 as a 14-year- 14 old unaccompanied minor. (Pet. ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 1.) ORR released Petitioner and allowed 15 him to live with his uncle in the United States. (Id.) On August 5, 2026, Immigration and 16 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) re-detained Petitioner without notice, explanation, or any 17 changed circumstances that would justify revocation of the previous conditions of his 18 release. (Id. ¶ 7.) Petitioner, thus, requests release on the same conditions. 19 III. ANALYSIS 20 Petitioner’s re-detention without notice or an opportunity to be heard violates 21 Petitioner’s due process rights. Individuals released from custody, even where such release 22 is conditional, have a liberty interest in continued liberty. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 23 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parolees); Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 150 (1997) (pre- 24 parolees); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probationers). Thus, this Court 25 agrees with those courts that have held: 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 [O]nce a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, 2 the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed 3 circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk, or is now subject to a final order of removal. And if 4 the noncitizen disputes the notion that changed circumstances justify his 5 rearrest, he is entitled to a prompt hearing before an Immigration Judge. 6 Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176–77 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Kamalpreet 7 v. Singh, No. 26-cv-1211-LL-JLB, 2026 WL 622687, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) 8 (“Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 9 government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 10 creates an implicit promise, upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty will be 11 revoked only if they fail to live up to the conditions of release.” (citation modified) (quoting 12 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025))). 13 The Government argues that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under Rodriguez 14 Vazquez, and the Court should address this statutory issue before addressing the 15 constitutional claim. (ECF No. 5.) However, Rodriguez Vazquez is inapplicable to an 16 individual in Petitioner’s circumstances. Rodriguez Vazquez dealt with individuals arrested 17 in the interior of the United States after entering the United States illegally. Petitioner was 18 arrested at the border and, as such, was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 19 § 1225(b)(2). Although subject to mandatory detention, Petitioner was paroled into the 20 United States under § 1182(d)(5)(A). “Such parole, however, ‘shall not be regarded as 21 admission of the alien.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1182(d)(5)(A)). Thus, the Government’s reliance on Rodriguez Vazquez is misplaced. 23 Because ORR released Petitioner in 2019, he is entitled to remain released on the 24 same conditions as he was released at that time. If ICE believes circumstances have 25 changed, it must provide notice of these changed circumstances to Petitioner and provide 26 Petitioner an opportunity to be heard promptly before an Immigration Judge. Hence, the 27 Court GRANTS the Petition. 28 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, the Court issues the following writ: 3 The Court ORDERS that Fredy Lopez-Chijal (A# 201-924-402) be released 4 on the same terms and conditions on which he was previously released by ORR in 2019. 5 6 The Clerk of Court shall close the case. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 ~ 9 || DATED: August 24, 2026 (pallu Bahar □□ 10 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A.