In re D.S. CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/26/26 In re D.S. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re D.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH & D087680 HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521436C) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.S. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniela A. Reali, Judge. Affirmed. Tracy M. DeSoto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, R.S. Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, A.R. Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

R.S., father of D.S. (Father R.S.), and A.R., father of L.R. (Father A.R.), appeal from the juvenile court’s February 6, 2026 orders following a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Their sole contention is that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the children’s potential Native American ancestry as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.

§ 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code1 § 224 et seq.), by not inquiring of certain extended relatives. They request conditional reversal and remand for compliance with ICWA. We find no error and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND K.S. (Mother) had a prior dependency case in 2024 involving her three children, D.S., L.R., and Z.K.,2 due to domestic violence between Mother and her husband, Father R.S. In 2025, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, placed the children in Mother’s care, and entered exit orders addressing visitation and legal custody with the respective fathers. Less than one month after the juvenile court terminated dependency proceedings, the children again came to the Agency’s attention due to 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Mother, Z.K., and Father of Z.K., are not parties to this appeal. Father R.S. and Father A.R. do not challenge the court’s jurisdiction and disposition findings. Because the only issues on appeal relate to ICWA compliance, we limit the facts to issues relevant on appeal.

2 domestic violence between Mother and Father R.S. On September 22, 2025, the Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b), and obtained a protective custody warrant for the children. The Agency inquired of several relatives regarding Native American ancestry. The form ICWA-010(A) for L.R. reflects the Agency inquired of Mother, Father A.R., maternal aunt M.J., maternal uncle I.M., and L.R.’s paternal grandmother M.F. Those relatives gave no reason to believe L.R. was an Indian child. The form ICWA-010(A) for D.S. reflects the Agency inquired of Mother, Father R.S., maternal aunt M.J., and maternal uncle I.M. Likewise, those individuals gave no reason to believe D.S. was an Indian child. During the investigation and detention phase of proceedings, the Agency documented additional inquiries with Mother, maternal aunt M.J., maternal uncle I.M., Father R.S., Father A.R., and L.R.’s paternal grandmother M.F. These individuals denied having knowledge of any family members who ever lived on a reservation, received tribal assistance, spoke a Native American language, or were active in or a member of a tribe or tribal activities. At the detention hearing, Father A.R. and Father R.S. filed forms ICWA-020 claiming no Indian status. Counsel for Mother informed the juvenile court—the same judge from prior proceedings—that ICWA does not apply and there was “no new ICWA information” since the previously filed form ICWA-020. Counsel for Father R.S. stated the ICWA inquiry was “consistent with what had been submitted in the past.” Counsel for Father A.R. also informed the court the information on the form ICWA-020 “continues to indicate there is no Native American history.” The court 3 ordered the parents to provide any new or different information regarding ICWA to the Agency. A relative search identified maternal stepgrandfather R.M., with whom the Agency had contact and had briefly placed D.S. Mother denied having a relationship with maternal grandparents. As to D.S., the Agency sent relative notification letters to various paternal relatives but received no responses from those individuals. Father R.S. disclosed that paternal grandfather was deceased. D.S.’s paternal half siblings K.S. and P.S. emailed the Agency inquiring about her well-being, but the record does not reflect the Agency followed up with them about ICWA. As to L.R., Father A.R. disclosed names of paternal grandparents and paternal uncle T.J, who was in prison, and paternal aunt Kaila, who resided with paternal grandmother M.F. At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court inquired of several of L.R.’s relatives who were present including paternal grandfather B.R., paternal grandmother M.F., paternal stepgrandmother A.R., and paternal stepmother B.R. All of these individuals denied having a reason to believe that they or the children had any affiliation with a federally recognized tribe. At the January 2026 contested adjudication and disposition hearing, the juvenile court took judicial notice of the previously sustained petition and minute orders from the prior dependency case. At the February 2026 contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found, without prejudice, ICWA did not apply. Prior to entering its ruling, the court referenced the prior dependency case and the “exit orders drafted by this court.” The court found the allegations in the petition true, removed D.S. from both parents, and ordered reunification 4 services. It also removed L.R. from Mother, found it was detrimental for L.R. to be placed with Father A.R., and ordered reunification services. DISCUSSION Father R.S. challenges the sufficiency of the Agency’s initial inquiry because it did not question three individuals about possible Native American ancestry, specifically, D.S.’s maternal stepgrandfather with whom the Agency had contact, and D.S.’s two paternal half siblings who emailed the Agency asking about D.S.’s well-being. In addition to those individuals, Father A.R. contends the Agency should have inquired of L.R.’s paternal grandfather, paternal aunt, and paternal uncle, all of whom were identified during the investigation. Both fathers join each other’s respective arguments. California’s statutory scheme contains “three distinct duties regarding ICWA in dependency proceedings.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052 (D.S.).) First, the juvenile court and the Agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This duty of inquiry requires asking parents, legal guardians, extended family members and others who have an interest in the child whether they have Native American ancestry. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) ICWA defines “ ‘extended family member’ ” by “the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe” or, absent such law or custom, as “a person who has reached 18 years of age and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).) Second, if the initial inquiry creates a “reason to believe” the child has Native American ancestry, the Agency is required to “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child . . . as soon as practicable” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)) to “determine whether there is reason to know a child is 5 an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)). “Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.) Generally, we review ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) When the facts are undisputed, we independently determine ICWA compliance. (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the Agency complied with its initial duty of inquiry and that ICWA was inapplicable. All three parents denied Indian ancestry and represented to the court that circumstances had not changed since they filed their previous forms ICWA-010, in which they also denied Indian ancestry. As to D.S., the Agency inquired of Mother, Father R.S., maternal aunt, and maternal uncle, each of whom denied Native American ancestry. In addition, the Agency attempted to contact D.S.’s paternal relatives by mailing notification and information forms to them. Although the record does not contain responses from these relatives, the court could reasonably find that the Agency, by mailing the forms, made “a meaningful effort to locate and interview” D.S.’s paternal relatives. (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709.) The duty of initial inquiry ‘ “does not require the agency to “find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to make reasonable inquiries.” ’ (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1140 (Dezi C.).) Because the additional paternal relatives did not respond to Agency, the court could conclude that these paternal relatives were not “reasonably available” to help the Agency investigate whether D.S. was possibly a Native American child. (Ibid.)

6 As to D.S.’s paternal half siblings, the Agency did not have a duty to contact and inquire of them because they had not reached 18 years of age and therefore were not “extended family members.” ( § 224.1, subd. (c).) Given their status as minors, the juvenile court could reasonably have found that they were unlikely to possess greater knowledge of Native American ancestry than their father, who unequivocally denied such ancestry. Based on D.S.’s parents’ and extended relatives’ repeated denials of Native American ancestry, coupled with the lack of responses from several identified paternal relatives, the juvenile court had no “reason to believe” that D.S. was an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) We are unpersuaded by Father R.S.’s argument that the Agency should have inquired of maternal stepgrandfather R.M. with whom it was in contact. The parties do not dispute that R.M. was asked about, and denied, possible Native American ancestry in the prior dependency case that concluded shortly before these proceedings. In assessing the adequacy of the Agency’s ICWA inquiry, it would make little sense to disregard its prior inquiry of R.M., particularly where the juvenile court—who presided over both proceedings—took judicial notice of the prior petition and minute orders. (See In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 801 (C.R.) [considering maternal grandmother’s prior denial of Indian ancestry in a related case].) On our own motion, therefore, we take judicial notice of the Agency’s prior interview with R.M., which reflects that R.M. denied any reason to believe that Mother had Native American ancestry. (Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 235–236, fns. 2 & 3 [appellate court on its own motion may take judicial notice of records of other cases].) Given that the same judge presided over both proceedings, and the prior proceedings were recent, the court could reasonably have considered R.M.’s prior denial of Indian 7 ancestry. (See C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 801.) The Agency’s failure to reinquire with R.M. “does not render the [Agency’s] otherwise diligent and well-documented efforts unreliable.” (In re Bella L. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1284, 1290.) As to L.R., substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that the Agency fulfilled its duty of inquiry. Both parents and several additional extended relatives and other interested individuals, as described in section 224.2, subdivision (b), denied Indian ancestry, including maternal aunt and uncle, paternal stepmother, paternal grandparents, and paternal stepgrandmother. In light of these unambiguous denials, the court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Agency fulfilled its duty of initial inquiry and to find that ICWA did not apply. We disagree with Father A.R.’s contention that the Agency’s inquiry was deficient because it did not contact L.R.’s paternal aunt and uncle. Because L.R.’s uncle was incarcerated and uninvolved with the case, he was not “reasonably available” for questioning. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140 [“The operative concept is those people who are reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.”].) Although the Agency did not contact L.R.’s paternal aunt, the Agency twice inquired of L.R.’s paternal grandmother (the paternal aunt’s mother), with whom the paternal aunt lived. Thus, questioning the paternal aunt would have been duplicative and, therefore, unnecessary. (See C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 802.) The Agency is not required to “pursue unproductive investigative leads.” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053.) Finally, Father A.R.’s claim that the Agency and the juvenile court did not, but should have, questioned L.R.’s paternal grandfather B.R.

8 mischaracterizes the record. While the record does not show that the Agency contacted B.R., the juvenile court inquired of him and several other paternal extended relatives of L.R. at the February 6, 2026 contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing. There, B.R. denied having a reason to believe that he or L.R. had any affiliation with a federally recognized tribe or that L.R. was an Indian child. The Agency was not obligated to pursue other extended relatives on a fact-finding mission, because no one even suggested that L.R. or D.S. might be Indian children. (See In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413 [“the obligation is only one of inquiry and not an absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native American ancestry”].) Accordingly, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support a finding by the juvenile court that the Agency made a meaningful effort to locate and interview those individuals who were reasonably available to help it investigate whether D.S. or L.R. had any possible Indian ancestry. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1141.) We thus conclude the court did not err by finding ICWA did not apply.

9 DISPOSITION The orders are affirmed.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.