In re Neena A. CA2/7

Opinion

Filed 8/26/26 In re Neena A. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re NEENA A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ________________________________ B348078 (Los Angeles County LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 19CCJP01014-C) AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MILDRED N., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lucia J. Murillo, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Kineta Flowers and Mary Manuel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________

INTRODUCTION

Mildred N. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1),1 and disposition orders declaring her daughter, Neena A., a dependent child of the court, removing Neena from Mildred, and requiring monitored visitation. Mildred argues substantial evidence did not support the court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. We affirm the jurisdiction findings and dismiss Mildred’s appeal from the disposition orders as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2025 the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services received a report that Mildred and 14-year-old Neena got in a fight, that Mildred slapped Neena five times and punched her chest 16 times, and that Neena refused to return home. Neena had slight redness below her collar bone, but no marks or bruises. Neena told the social worker that she arrived home late after school because she was looking for her backpack, but that 1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 her mother did not believe her. Neena said that Mildred yelled at her and slapped her in the face and that Neena hit her mother back. When Neena told Mildred she was going to leave, Mildred blocked the door. Eventually Neena left, went to a friend’s house, and stayed overnight at her boyfriend’s house. Neena said that this was the first time she and Mildred hit each other, but that Mildred previously hit her with a belt and threatened to hit her with a hanger. Mildred said she knew Neena lied about looking for her backpack because she told the same story twice before. Mildred said that Neena “got in her face” and that Mildred “pushed her in her chest and made her sit back down on the couch.” Neena said “she did not want to be in the home and she was going to leave” and started hitting Mildred. Mildred “pushed Neena in her chest to get her out of her face.” When Neena tried to leave, Mildred blocked the door, and they “started tussling.” A cousin arrived and called the police. Mildred said that Neena had been “ditching school and going to her boyfriend’s house,” that Neena was “disrespectful at home,” and that she “throws a fit when she does not get what she wants.” Mildred said that she had “done safety plans in the past but they did not work” and that Neena’s behavior was “getting worse.” She said that Neena had “threatened her and told her that she is going to have her put in jail” and that Mildred would let Neena go into foster care because she did not want to risk losing her two younger children, who were four and 10 years old. The Department filed a petition on behalf of the three children under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).2 The 2 The juvenile court later dismissed allegations relating to the two younger siblings.

3 Department alleged in counts a-1 and b-1 Mildred “physically abused” Neena, “struck [Neena’s] face with [her] hand,” “forcefully pushed [Neena] back down onto a couch,” and “threw items around the home.” The Department also alleged that on prior occasions Mildred hit Neena with belts and threatened to hit her with a hanger. The Department alleged Mildred’s physical abuse endangered Neena’s physical health and safety, created a detrimental home environment, and placed Neena and her siblings at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger, and physical abuse. The Department alleged in count b-2 that Mildred was “unwilling and unable to continue providing . . . Neena with appropriate care and supervision, due to [Neena’s] behavior, including runaway behavior,” and that Mildred refused to implement a safety plan and asked the Department to detain Neena. At the detention hearing the juvenile court detained Neena and ordered monitored visitation for Mildred. At the jurisdiction hearing the juvenile court sustained counts a-1, b-1, and b-2 and dismissed two counts under section 300, subdivision (j). At disposition the court removed Neena from Mildred, ordered Mildred to participate in individual counseling and conjoint counseling when recommended by Neena’s therapist, and ordered monitored visitation. Mildred timely appealed from the court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. While this appeal was pending, at the six-month review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (e), in July 2026 the juvenile court returned Neena to Mildred.3 3 We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s July 22, 2026 order. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) Under the Supreme Court’s decision in In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042

4 DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s Findings Under Section 300, Subdivisions (a) and (b)

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Under section 300, subdivision (a), the juvenile court may assert jurisdiction if “the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” “‘Nonaccidental’ generally means a parent or guardian ‘acted intentionally or willfully.’” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction where a “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.” Under this provision the child protective agency must prove “‘(1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.’” (In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712; see In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.) We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; In re Mildred’s challenge to the jurisdiction findings based on physical abuse is not moot because sustained allegations of physical child abuse are reportable for inclusion in California’s Child Abuse Central Index.

5 Miguel J. (Aug. 3, 2026, B339932) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___ [2026 WL 2225188, p. 6].) We “draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if there is other evidence to the contrary.” (In re A.L. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 628, 645; see Miguel, at p. 6.) “‘We do not consider the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.’” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411-412; see In re S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction Findings Based on Mildred’s Physical Abuse of Neena Mildred argues substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s findings. Substantial evidence, however, supported the findings for counts a-1 and b-1 based on Mildred’s physical abuse of Neena. During the physical altercation with Neena, Mildred slapped Neena in the face, hit her in the chest, pushed her onto the couch, and held her down. When Neena tried to leave, Mildred blocked the door and fought (“tussled”) with Neena. Mildred denied hitting Neena, but admitted that she pushed Neena in the chest and that she might have scratched her. Though Neena did not suffer serious physical harm during this altercation, the court could reasonably find that, based on the continuing conflict between Mildred and Neena, there was a substantial risk Mildred would inflict serious physical harm in the future. (See § 300, subd. (a) [“a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted”]; In re Marquis H. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 726 [“the court is vested with broad 6 discretion in determining whether ‘there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer . . . serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally’”]; see also In re O.M. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 489, 507 [“When evaluating the potential of future risk, the juvenile court may consider a parent’s insight (or lack thereof) into the problems that led to the child welfare agency’s intervention.”].) Mildred had struggled to manage Neena’s behavior since Neena began dating her boyfriend eight months earlier. Mildred stated: “‘It’s been a major change with Neena, she’s a liar and acting as if she is gangsta to fit in with her boyfriend.’” The record does not support Mildred’s contention the altercation was “a single, isolated altercation that both parties acknowledged had never occurred before and had not recurred.”4 Though it may have been the first time Mildred and Neena came to blows, even by Mildred’s account their previous arguments had come close. Mildred said the incident was not the first time Neena had yelled at Mildred and got “in [her] face as if she want[ed] to hit” Mildred, but “it was the first time she had the ‘balls’ to actually do something” to Mildred. Because Neena’s relationship with her boyfriend was a continuing source of conflict between Neena and Mildred, and there was no evidence Neena’s relationship with the boyfriend had ended, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude physical altercations were likely to recur, creating a substantial risk Mildred would inflict serious physical harm on Neena in the future. (See In re L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 410 [“‘The 4 Because Neena left home immediately after the altercation and the Department placed her in a foster home, that the altercation did not recur is not probative of the risk Neena would suffer physical harm had she continued to live with Mildred.

7 court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’”]; In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 [same]; see also In re Miguel J., supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2026 WL 2225188, p. 5] [a “‘“parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue’”’”].) Mildred’s reliance on In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128 is misplaced. In Isabella F. the “mother became physical” with her nine-year-old daughter after the daughter “resisted getting ready for school,” inflicting scratches on the daughter’s face and a gouge mark on her earlobe. (Id. at pp. 131-132.) The daughter said the mother hit her in the face, grabbed her neck, and locked her in the bathroom. (Id. at p. 131.) The mother said that the daughter “was having a ‘really bad tantrum’” and that she tried to pull her into the bathroom to calm down. (Id. at p. 132.) The child protective agency filed a petition, but the next day recommended returning the daughter to the mother. (Id. at p. 133.) Two weeks later, the daughter told the social worker that the incident “was the first time anything like that had happened,” that she was not afraid of her mother, and that she did not want to be removed from her mother’s care. (Id. at pp. 133-134.) At the jurisdiction hearing the mother, who was attending anger management classes and participating in therapy, “acknowledged that she did not handle the incident with her daughter in the best way possible and that she could use support dealing with anger management,” “took responsibility for the incident,” and “testified that the services she had received so far had helped . . . .” (Id. at pp. 134-135.) The court in Isabella F. held substantial evidence did not support the finding that the 8 child suffered serious physical harm or that she faced a substantial risk of serious physical harm. (Id. at pp. 138-139.) The court stated the “primary motivating factor in declaring jurisdiction appear[ed] to have been to offer [the] mother services.” (Id. at p. 139.) Unlike the mother in Isabella F., Mildred did not take responsibility for the incident or admit she needed help managing her anger. Unlike the daughter in Isabella F., Neena did not want to return home. Nor did the juvenile court in this case sustain allegations against Mildred simply to offer her services. In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, which Mildred cites, is also distinguishable. In J.N. the intoxicated parents got into a car accident, injuring their young children. (Id. 1014.) The court in J.N. reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings, stating: “Despite the profound seriousness of the parents’ endangering conduct on the one occasion in this case, there was no evidence from which to infer there is a substantial risk such behavior will recur.” (Id. at p. 1026.) The court stated that the juvenile court in that case did not find the parents were substance abusers, that the evidence did not establish the parents consumed alcohol on a regular basis, and that “both parents were remorseful, loving, and indicated that they were willing to learn from their mistakes.” (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, as discussed substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding there was a substantial risk Mildred’s behavior would recur. Mildred also argues she acted in self-defense. She contends that Neena “struck first” and that she had to “defend herself from her daughter’s physical aggression.” But Neena stated Mildred hit her first, and the juvenile court found Neena’s statements 9 were credible. (See In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 67 [“we defer to the juvenile court’s credibility findings”].) Moreover, even if Neena hit first, Mildred admitted she pushed Neena onto the couch and blocked the door when she tried to leave. Mildred provides no authority for her assertion her “physical response in the context of mutual combat” was “categorically different from the nonaccidental infliction of harm.” Even if Mildred hit or pushed Neena in response to Neena’s physical aggression, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude Mildred’s conduct was physical abuse, not reasonable self-defense. Mutual combat is not a defense to child abuse. Finally, Mildred argues the juvenile court “failed to apply the reasonable parent discipline doctrine.” She contends a “parent has the right to reasonably discipline a child and to administer reasonable punishment without being liable for abuse.” Mildred forfeited the argument by not raising it in the juvenile court. (See In re P.L. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 406, 409 [a “‘reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court’”].) Even if not forfeited, the argument is meritless because there was no evidence the altercation had anything to do with discipline. Mildred relies on In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, where the court stated “‘“a parent has a right to reasonably discipline his or her child and may administer reasonable punishment . . . .”’” (Id. at pp. 640-641.) The court in D.M. articulated three factors for deciding whether a parent’s use of discipline on a particular occasion is reasonable: “(1) whether the parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the punishment is ‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was 10 ‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of punishment was reasonable or excessive.’” (Id. at p. 641.) Mildred argues that D.M. is “directly on point” and that the juvenile court should have applied those three factors. Even assuming that D.M. was correctly decided and that the court’s three-part test is the appropriate standard, the case does not support Mildred. In D.M. the mother told the social worker she disciplined her young children by spanking them “on the buttocks with her bare hand or with a sandal.” (In re D.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 637.) The court held the juvenile court erred in sustaining allegations under section 300, subdivision (a), based on a “categorical view that ‘hitting children with shoes’ is ‘physical abuse’ and ‘not a proper form of discipline.’” (D.M., at p. 637.) Unlike the mother in D.M., Mildred never claimed she was disciplining or punishing Neena; she denied hitting Neena, claimed Neena hit her, and explained her actions by saying “she was defending herself and she was not going to allow her daughter to be in her face and hitting her.”5 5 Because we affirm the jurisdiction findings on counts a-1 and b-1 based on physical abuse, we do not consider whether substantial evidence also supported the jurisdiction findings on count b-2 based on Mildred’s inability or unwillingness to continue to care for Neena. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283 [“‘“[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate”’”]; In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [same]; In re Landon M. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [same].)

11 B. Mildred’s Appeal from the Order Removing Neena and Requiring Monitored Visitation Is Moot “‘A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’” [Citation.] A case becomes moot when events “‘render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.’” [Citation.] For relief to be “effective,” two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.’” (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1051; see In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277; In re Jayden A. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1334, 1343.) “A reviewing court must “‘decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”’” (In re S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1051; see In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) “‘[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case is not moot, and merits review is required. When a parent has not made such a showing, the case is moot, but the court has discretion to decide the merits nevertheless.’” (S.R., at p. 1052; see D.P., at p. 283.) Because the juvenile court returned Neena to Mildred at the six-month review hearing, Mildred’s appeal from the court’s order removing Neena and requiring monitored visitation is 12 moot. We cannot grant Mildred any effective relief because she has already obtained the relief she seeks in her appeal from the disposition orders. (See In re Jayden A., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1347 [“The court’s orders returning [the child] to [the father’s] custody and terminating jurisdiction rendered [the] appeal moot.”].) In a supplemental brief Mildred argues we should exercise our discretion to review the juvenile court’s disposition orders “because they were derived from the juvenile court’s erroneous jurisdictional findings.” Because substantial evidence supported the jurisdiction findings, we decline to exercise our discretion to review the merits of Mildred’s moot appeal from the juvenile court’s removal and visitation orders.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings are affirmed. Mildred’s appeal from the orders removing Neena and requiring monitored visitation is dismissed as moot.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.