Marriage of Perez CA3

Opinion

Filed 8/26/26 Marriage of Perez CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

In re the Marriage of CARLOS ERNESTO and C104512 JESSICA REBECA PEREZ. (Super. Ct. No. 20FL04398) CARLOS ERNESTO PEREZ, Appellant, v.

JESSICA REBECA PEREZ,

Respondent.

At a mandatory settlement conference, husband Carlos Ernesto Perez and wife Jessica Rebeca Perez agreed to set aside a default judgment of dissolution entered more than a year earlier. Several days later, husband filed a motion requesting the family court vacate the order because the court lacked authority to set aside the default judgment and because he was coerced into the agreement. Finding that husband failed to meet his burden of proving coercion, the court denied the motion. On appeal, husband, who appears in propria persona and on the judgment roll, challenges the family court’s authority to set aside the default judgment. He also contends the court violated his right to due process by allowing wife’s counsel, who was appointed to represent her in a contempt proceeding, to also appear at the hearing on his motion to vacate the order.

1 Finally, he raises two claims of error stemming from a subsequent hearing from which he did not file a notice of appeal. We affirm. BACKGROUND On December 5, 2023, following a hearing at which the wife did not appear, the family court granted husband’s request for a default judgment of dissolution. The court awarded joint legal and physical custody of the couple’s minor children and provided a visitation schedule for husband. The “[p]roperty [was] characterized and divided as set forth in [husband’s] property declarations.” The court also terminated jurisdiction to award spousal support and directed husband to submit a proposed judgment conforming to the order. The court entered a formal order on December 15, 2023. A year later, on December 31, 2024, the family court held two separate hearings on husband’s motions to enforce aspects of the default judgment. The first hearing addressed husband’s request for an order to enforce the judgment “apportioning community property assets and debts.” In that motion, husband also requested a psychological evaluation of the children along with genetic testing. The court’s findings and order from this first hearing stated that wife received notice of the hearing but did not appear. The court affirmed the parentage of the children based on the birth certificates and husband’s petition for dissolution. The court also set a trial date of March 14, 2025, for the husband’s request to enforce the judgment apportioning community property assets and debts, with a mandatory settlement conference scheduled for March 5, 2025. The court scheduled a separate hearing on husband’s request for a psychological evaluation of the minors. At the second hearing to address husband’s motion for contempt, held in the afternoon on the same day, the family court determined that “[wife] ha[d] not received notice of these proceedings, which is necessary to satisfy due process.” The court continued the matter and ordered husband to “personally serve” wife with the documents.

2 Following the December 31, 2024 hearings, wife filed a motion to set aside the default and the default judgment on grounds that she was not properly served with the summons and that she did not receive actual or constructive notice of the proceedings. At the mandatory settlement conference on March 5, 2025, husband and wife agreed to “set aside” the default judgment of dissolution. The minute order stated the parties entered the agreement “freely, voluntarily, and with knowledge and understanding of the [meaning] of their agreement.” “Both parties swore to not have been coerced into signing the agreement.” The stipulation was signed “via zoom,” and the order setting aside the judgment would be “effective immediately” under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Five days later, on March 10, 2025, husband filed a motion to vacate the agreement between the parties to set aside the default judgment on three grounds: (1) the purpose of the mandatory settlement conference was arbitrarily changed; (2) the agreement improperly set aside a judgment that was entered more than four years earlier in violation of statutory deadlines; and (3) husband “did not voluntarily and freely agree to the terms” and was coerced into the “agreement under duress and intimidation.” Following a hearing on July 22, 2025, at which both parties appeared, the family court denied husband’s motion, stating that “as the moving party, [husband] failed to meet his burden of proof establishing that he was coerced into entering the stipulation or that other circumstances exist that would justify setting aside the agreement that set aside the default.” At the same hearing, the court denied without prejudice wife’s motion to dismiss husband’s contempt action. Husband timely appealed the July 22, 2025, order. DISCUSSION On appeal, husband contends the March 5, 2025, order should be vacated because (1) the family court “lacked authority to disturb” the default judgment; and (2) the order went beyond the scope of the mandatory settlement conference that was “scheduled 3 solely to address property issues.” Husband also raises several other claims of error, including that the family court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction to address spousal support given that the default judgment terminated the court’s jurisdiction over spousal support and that his rights to due process were violated when wife’s counsel, who was appointed to represent her at a different proceeding represented her at the July 22, 2025 hearing, and when the family court ordered his microphone muted during the October 8, 2025 spousal support hearing. We conclude husband’s contentions are without merit. Applicable Standards of Review We review a family court’s ruling on a motion seeking relief from a family law judgment for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Diamond (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 550, 566.) In doing so, we presume the trial court’s judgment is correct and adopt all intendments and inferences to affirm the judgment or order unless the record expressly contradicts them. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham).) The party challenging a judgment on appeal bears the burden of providing an adequate record to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) Here, husband proceeded only with a clerk’s transcript. Without a record of the oral proceedings, we treat this as an appeal “on the judgment roll.” (Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082.) Accordingly, we “ ‘must conclusively presume that the evidence is ample to sustain the [family court’s] findings.’ ” (Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154.) Our review is therefore limited to determining whether error appears on the face of the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.830(b); National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521.) Analysis 1. Agreement to Set Aside Default Judgment At the mandatory settlement conference, the family court stated it was satisfied that the parties entered the agreement to set aside the judgment “freely, voluntarily and 4 with knowledge and understanding of the [meaning] of their agreement. And that both parties swore to not have been coerced into signing the agreement.” In reviewing husband’s motion to vacate the order setting aside the judgment, the family court found that husband failed to “meet his burden of proof establishing that he was coerced into entering the stipulation or that other circumstances exist that would justify setting aside the agreement that set aside the default.” The record does not contradict the family court’s finding. (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) Therefore, we uphold it. Husband’s contentions that we should reverse because the family court lacked “statutory … authority” to disturb the default judgment, and that its order based on their stipulation went beyond the scope of the mandatory settlement conference, which was “solely to address property issues,” are not well taken. Family Code sections 2122 and 3691 and Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) contain time limits for bringing a request to set aside a default judgment. Those time limits are inapplicable here because the court did not set aside the default judgment under any of those provisions. It did so based on the parties’ agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).) Our state has a strong “public policy of promoting settlement of family law litigation, while reducing its costs through mutual cooperation of clients and their counsel.” (Featherstone v. Martinez (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 775, 783 (Featherstone); see Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1359 [“the strong public policy of this state [is] to encourage the voluntary settlement of litigation”].) The only limitation is that parties may not enter agreements that contravene public policy. (Civ. Code, § 3513; see also Civ. Code, § 1668.) The parties’ voluntary agreement to set aside the default judgment does not contravene public policy. It aligns with the policy of promoting settlements in family law matters. (Featherstone, at p. 783.) That the parties attested to the stipulation “via zoom” and did not physically sign the stipulation does not make the agreement any less valid. “A stipulated settlement presented orally by the party litigants or their counsel to a judge, in the course of a settlement conference supervised 5 by that judge, satisfies … section 664.6.” (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 906.) We also reject husband’s contention that the parties’ agreement should be vacated because the agreement went beyond the property issues that were the subject of the mandatory settlement conference as scheduled by the court. The court’s order setting the mandatory settlement conference did not preclude the parties from discussing or reaching agreement on other matters in the litigation, including the default judgment. More importantly, the parties voluntarily agreed to set aside the entire default judgment not just the part limited to property issues. Our public policy encourages such agreements. (Featherstone, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 783.) In sum, the family court had authority to set aside the default judgment based on the parties’ agreement. And the record does not contradict the family court’s finding that husband failed to “meet his burden of proof establishing that he was coerced into entering the stipulation or that other circumstances exist that would justify setting aside the agreement that set aside the default.” (See Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) Therefore, the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the agreement. (In re Marriage of Diamond, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p 566.) 2. Due Process Claim We also reject husband’s contention the family court violated his right to due process by allowing wife’s appointed counsel to appear at the July 22, 2025, hearing for two reasons. One, husband has not identified the interest he claims was infringed because wife’s appointed counsel appeared at the hearing. Two, his objection to appointed counsel’s appearance is not well taken given that wife’s request to dismiss the contempt proceeding was also heard at the July 22, 2025, hearing. Because counsel was appointed to represent her on that precise issue, his appearance was not improper. The cases husband cites are not helpful. Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 sets forth the due process requirements for depriving a party of a property interest. (Id. at 6 p. 333.) But husband has identified no property interest that was infringed because wife’s counsel appeared at the hearing. The other case husband cites, In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, is distinguishable. In that case, the family court displayed “ill-disguised impatience with [the party] and his counsel[,] ... repeatedly threaten[ed] a mistrial if the proceedings were not concluded quickly enough, [and] abruptly ended the trial before [the party] had finished his presentation.” (Id. at p. 291.) Our court was clear that the family court’s “method of conducting a trial cannot be condoned in a California courtroom.” (Ibid.) Allowing appointed counsel to address the contempt issue for which counsel was appointed, albeit at a different hearing, and which resulted in no finding or order adverse to husband on that issue, is not comparable to the structural unfairness we found unacceptable in In re Marriage of Carlsson. 3. Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction We lack jurisdiction to address husband’s two remaining claims — that the family court lacked jurisdiction to award spousal support and that the court violated his right to due process by ordering his microphone muted at the October 8, 2025, spousal support hearing — because he did not appeal the order from that hearing. Courts liberally construe notices of appeal “to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.” (Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 776, 783; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) “But there are limits to our ability to liberally construe a notice of appeal.” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 76.) “The policy of liberally construing a notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency [citation] does not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment or order not mentioned at all. [Citations.] [I]t is well ‘beyond liberal construction’ to view an appeal from one order as an appeal from a ‘further and different order.’ ” (Ibid.) “[W]hen a notice of appeal manifests a ‘ “clear 7 and unmistakable” ’ intent to appeal only from one order, we cannot liberally construe the notice to apply to a different, omitted order.” (Ibid.) Husband appealed from the July 22, 2025, order, not the October 8, 2025, order. “We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” (In re J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 75.) Therefore, we do not address these remaining claims. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. No costs are awarded to respondent because she has not filed a brief in this appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

/s/ MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/ EARL, P. J.

/s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.