Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. CA1/2

Opinion

Filed 8/26/26 Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

KATHERINE ROSENBERG-WOHL, Plaintiff and Appellant, A173866 v. STATE FARM FIRE AND (San Francisco City & County CASUALTY COMPANY, Super. Ct. No. CGC-20-587264) Defendant and Respondent.

In late 2018 or early 2019, plaintiff and appellant Katherine Rosenberg-Wohl learned that the pitch of the staircase at her home had changed and needed to be replaced. She had the work done, and in April 2019, notified State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) with which she had a homeowners policy. And in August 2019, she submitted a claim to State Farm, which shortly thereafter denied it. In October 2020, plaintiff filed two lawsuits against State Farm in San Francisco County, one asserting claims for breach of the policy and bad faith, the other—this case—asserting claims for declaratory relief and violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). State Farm removed the policy case to federal court, where the district court dismissed it on the basis it was barred by the one-year suit limitation provision in the policy. Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but ultimately abandoned the appeal. That case is over.

1 This case remained in superior court and, following trips to this court and the California Supreme Court, ultimately resulted in a third amended complaint alleging one cause of action—the UCL claim. State Farm demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the basis that plaintiff lacked standing. Plaintiff appeals, providing us a record that does not comply with the Rules of Court, and with a brief raising three short arguments—and that likewise violates the Rules and settled principles of appellate review. We affirm. PROLOGUE This appeal reaches us after a tortuous eight-year journey through all levels of the California court system, once again in the Court of Appeal, this time following a judgment entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend. And with this appeal, plaintiff, represented by her husband who has represented her throughout, has provided an appellate record that is woefully inadequate, and in violation of the applicable Rules of Court. Specifically: The record on appeal consists of a clerk’s transcript that, not including the register of actions and the clerk’s estimate of the cost of the appeal record, lists a total of five items, the first in chronological order being a June 4, 2025, order denying a motion for new trial, an order entered months after the April 4, 2025, judgment appealed from here.1 1 The five items are: (1) Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Order Sustaining Defendant’s Demurrer or in the Alternative, For a New Trial, “06/04/2025”; (2) Defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company’s “Notice of Entry of Order Denying” that motion, “06/13/2025”;

2 California Rules of Court, rule 8.122, entitled, “Clerk’s transcript,” provides what must be in it: “(b) Contents of transcript “(1) The transcript must contain: “(A) The notice of appeal; “(B) Any judgment appealed from and any notice of its entry; “(C) Any order appealed from and any notice of its entry; “(D) Any notice of intention to move for a new trial or motion to vacate the judgment, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for reconsideration of an appealed order, and any order on such motion and any notice of its entry; “(E) Any notices or stipulations to prepare clerk’s or reporter’s transcripts or to proceed by agreed or settled statement; and “(F) The register of actions, if any. “(2) Each document listed in (1)(A), (B), (C), and (D) must show the date necessary to determine the timeliness of the appeal under rule 8.104 or 8.108.” As is apparent from a comparison of the rule to plaintiff’s clerk’s transcript, with the exception of one item (the notice of appeal), the required documents are missing from the transcript.

(3) “Notice of Appeal,” “07/01/2025”; (4) Clerk’s Notice; and (5) Appellant’s Notice Designating Record on Appeal.

3 In addition to the clerk’s transcript, plaintiff has accompanied her opening brief with a motion to augment—a motion we granted—to add two items: her “Third Amended Complaint” and the trial court’s order. That is it, plaintiff’s entire record on appeal. Missing from the record is State Farm’s demurrer; plaintiff’s opposition; State Farm’s reply (if any); plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, or in the alternative, for new trial; and the appealed-from judgment. Plaintiff’s briefing is no better. Plaintiff has provided an opening brief whose substance is all of 11 pages, fewer than six of which are argument, with a table of contents that reads in its entirety as follows: “TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. .............................................................................4 “STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY ...............................................................5 “STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........................................................................5 “STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................6 “ARGUMENT ……………………….....………………………………………8 “I. A UCL CLAIM NEED NOT BE PREDICATED UPON A CONTRACT CLAIM. …….....…………………….......…………………8 “II. PAYING FOR A POLICY CONFERS SUFFICIENT STANDING TO CHALLENGE IT AS UNFAIR UNDER THE UCL. …………………............…………………………………….10 “III. THE TRIAL COURT CONFLATED THE CONTRACT CLAIM WITH THE UCL CLAIM. .………….....……………………12 “CONCLUSION …..…………………….............……………………...………….. 15 “CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ….........…..…………………...…………..16 “PROOF OF SERVICE ……………..…….........……………………...………….17” Plaintiff’s brief says nothing about the demurrer and little about her argument(s) in opposition. Indeed, plaintiff’s brief does not even set forth the 4 law that applies here, well-settled UCL law.2 This, too, is a violation of a Rule of Court: rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) that provides an appellant’s opening brief shall “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts . . . .” The leading California appellate practice guide instructs about this: “Before addressing the legal issues, your brief should accurately and fairly state the critical facts (including the evidence), free of bias; and likewise as to the applicable law. [Citations.] [¶] Misstatements, misrepresentations and/or material omissions of the relevant facts or law can instantly ‘undo’ an otherwise effective brief, waiving issues and arguments; it will certainly cast doubt on your credibility, may draw sanctions [citation], and may well cause you to lose the case.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 9:27 (Eisenberg), italics omitted.) Such summary is missing here. Where, as here, “the appellant fails to provide an adequate record of the challenged proceedings, we must presume that the appealed judgment or order is correct, and on that basis, affirm.” (Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 635, 644.) As our Supreme Court has explained: “It is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure 2 While plaintiff’s brief makes relatively few references to what occurred below, several of those references ignore rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), which requires that any reference to a matter in the record, whether factual or procedural, be supported by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears. (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970; Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745.) Plaintiff’s brief is also missing the standard of review, which some courts have held is “a concession of a lack of merit.” (See Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.)

5 that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] . . . ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609, fn. omitted.) We nonetheless review what record we have and the prior appeals,3 and to the best of our ability set forth what occurred here and address plaintiff’s appeal—and conclude it has no merit. BACKGROUND The General Setting The saga began in late 2018 or early 2019, when plaintiff noticed that an elderly visitor had twice stumbled and fell when descending the exterior 3 Despite the inadequacies of the record, we are assisted in our recitation of the background by a prior opinion of this court and an opinion of our Supreme Court, respectively Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 436 (Rosenberg-Wohl I) and Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 520 (Rosenberg-Wohl II).

6 staircase of plaintiff’s home and, upon investigating, learned that the pitch of the staircase had changed and the staircase needed to be replaced. Plaintiff had the work done, and in April 2019, notified State Farm of the situation. And some four months later, on August 9, plaintiff submitted a claim to State Farm for the construction expenses and anticipated additional expenses. By letter of August 26, State Farm denied the claim. Some further communications with plaintiff’s husband ensued, to no avail, ultimately leading to plaintiff’s husband filing two lawsuits. Plaintiff Files Two Lawsuits In October 2020, plaintiff filed two lawsuits in San Francisco Superior Court: (1) Action No. 587262 and (2) Action No. 587264, the latter being this action. Action No. 587262 alleged two claims, for breach of the policy and violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. State Farm removed the case to federal court, and brought a motion to dismiss based on the one- year suit limitation provision in the State Farm policy. The Supreme Court would come to describe what then occurred: “Agreeing with State Farm that plaintiff’s lawsuit was barred under the limitations period found in her insurance policy because she did not file suit within one year of her loss, the federal district court granted the insurer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint [citations]. Plaintiff eventually abandoned her appeal in that matter.” (Rosenberg-Wohl II, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 524–525, fn. omitted.) Action No. 587264 remained in San Francisco County. The complaint initially alleged causes of action for declaratory relief and violation of the unfair competition law (UCL). The action was designated as a “class action,” filed by plaintiff “on behalf of herself and those similarly situated.” A few 7 months after the original complaint, apparently before State Farm filed a responsive pleading, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, titled as one “stating claim for unfair competition, and need for public injunctive relief.” State Farm filed a demurrer to the amended complaint on two bases: (1) there was another action pending, and (2) the complaint failed to state a claim under the UCL because the action was “time-barred” and State Farm “has not acted unfairly.” State Farm also filed a motion to strike. In April 2021, the trial court filed its order on the demurrer and motion, holding that the one-year limitation provision applied to plaintiff’s claim, and sustaining the demurrer with leave to amend to add additional facts supporting waiver. The court also ruled that the issue of whether State Farm acted unfairly (that is, whether the replacement staircase is or is not covered under the policy) could not be decided on demurrer, and granted the motion to strike with leave to amend. In May, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (SAC), adding a claim for false advertising. In June, State Farm filed a demurrer and a motion to strike the SAC. The demurrer argued that both causes of action failed to state a claim, the first, for false advertising, because “Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred under her insurance policy and Plaintiff fails to satisfy the reasonable consumer standard required to assert claims regarding State Farm’s alleged representations”; and the second, for violation of the UCL, because “Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred under her insurance policy.” For reasons best known to itself and its then counsel, State Farm did not demur to the UCL claim on the basis that plaintiff lacked standing to sue. (See County of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1009 [general demurrer lies for lack of standing].)

8 When the demurrer came on for hearing, plaintiff abandoned her claim for false advertising, leaving the single cause of action under the UCL. And on July 29, the trial court entered its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, holding as follows: “Plaintiff here does not seek to recover policy benefits. But the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s claims are nonetheless ‘on the policy’ because they are ‘grounded upon [State Farm’s] failure to pay policy benefits.’ Plaintiff’s initial claim on the policy, State Farm’s denial, and Plaintiff’s subsequent claim for relief are all inextricably intertwined. . . . Though Plaintiff seeks equitable relief in the form of an injunction . . . , as opposed to damages (i.e., policy benefits), the essence of the relief sought relates to the denial of her claim.” Judgment was entered for State Farm, from which plaintiff appealed. In a 2–1 opinion we affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that the one- year suit limitation provision applied. Our fundamental holding was that the four-year limitations period in the UCL did not control a suit based on acts that occurred during the claim handling process, which required proof of lost policy benefits to establish UCL standing, and the gravamen of which arose out of the contractual relationship. (Rosenberg-Wohl I, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.) Plaintiff sought review, which the Supreme Court granted, with this straightforward statement of the issue on review: “When a plaintiff files an action against the plaintiff’s insurer for injunctive relief under the Unfair Competition Law, which limitations period applies, the one-year limitations period authorized by Insurance Code section 2071 or the four-year statute of limitations in Business and Professions Code section 17208?” In July 2024, the Supreme Court filed its opinion reversing our decision, holding that the one-year limitations period in plaintiff’s policy did 9 not apply to her cause of action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as the lawsuit was not a “ ‘suit or action on [the] policy for the recovery of any claim.’ ” (Ins. Code, § 2071.) Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “Plaintiff is not attempting to directly or indirectly recover damages associated with the denial of her insurance claim. Instead, plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief regarding State Farm’s claims-handling practices generally and a forward-looking injunction under the UCL. In pursuing such relief, plaintiff brings an essentially ‘preventive’ [citation] action to which neither the standard policy’s language, nor the policy reasons underlying the Legislature’s authorization of a one-year limitations period for filing certain kinds of claims-related lawsuits, applies.” (Rosenberg-Wohl II, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 523.) Following remand, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (TAC), apparently stipulated to by State Farm. The TAC is 16 pages long, with 56 paragraphs, the first paragraphs of which allege plaintiff’s relationship with State Farm (TAC ¶ 5, 8, 10); her “late 2018 or early 2019” observations of her neighbor’s falls (¶ 10); her learning the staircase had to be replaced (¶ 11); her having the work done (¶¶ 11, 12); her notifying State Farm in April 2019, (¶ 11, 12); and her submitting a claim in August (¶ 12). The TAC goes on to allege that State Farm “summarily denied” the claim, the next two paragraphs alleging that “State Farm did not explain its analysis or justify its conclusion in a way that Plaintiff could evaluate State Farm’s coverage decision,” and that “State Farm had no basis for its decision” (¶¶ 15, 16, 17). Then, against the background of earlier allegations that State Farm has an “obligation to be reasonable and to act in good faith when” adjudicating submitted claims, which, in particular “requires not just that State Farm has reasonably investigated the claim but also that if State Farm 10 is going to deny the claim, that State Farm has explained why in a way that allows its consumers to evaluate whether and how to submit additional or different information to advance their case. But State Farm doesn’t do this” (¶ 9), the TAC alleges this: “On information and belief, State Farm has a practice of summarily denying and regularly summarily denies property insurance claims unless State Farm believes the particular claim fails into a category of likely coverage.” (Id. ¶ 19.) “On information and belief, State Farm has a practice of obfuscating and regularly fails to make clear precisely what the basis is for its denials.” (Id. ¶ 21.) The TAC goes on for some 15 paragraphs with allegations of communications between State Farm’s representative and plaintiff’s husband (¶¶ 25-39). The TAC then states, in capitalized boldface, that “THIS IS NOT A LAWSUIT FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; RATHER IT IS A CHALLENGE TO HOW STATE FARM DOES BUSINESS,” and then alleges as follows: “Under this lawsuit, Plaintiff does not seek to recover damages for money owed to her under her policy contract. The goal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit is to seek a determination that the way that State Farm does business violates the law and that State Farm should be prevented from continuing to do so. Someone needs to hold State Farm to the standard its customers (and the law of this State) demand. Plaintiff has standing to bring this claim for declaratory and injunctive relief because she continues to have her homeowners policy (and expects to have it into the foreseeable future) and that allows her to try to hold State Farm to task in how it manages of its property insurance policies . . .” (Id. ¶ 40).

11 The TAC then goes on to allege the substance of its UCL claim, which includes the following: “44. Under California law, State Farm is to give at least as much consideration to the interests of its insured as it gives to its own interests when adjudicating a claim. “45. However, as is evident from the allegations above, State Farm does not accept this legal obligation. Without a court order declaring State Farm to be in violation of this standard and a court order specifically requiring State Farm to comply with this standard, State Farm will continue to violate its legal obligations to its insureds. “46. Drafting such an order can straightforward [sic]. Simply one example would be: ‘State Farm is ordered, when adjudicating any property insurance claim presented to it, to give at least as much consideration to the interests of its insured as to its own interests.’ Undoubtedly following discovery more specific orders could be proffered to the court for consideration. . . .” As noted, State Farm filed a demurrer to the TAC. As also noted, the demurrer is not in the record, but according to the trial court’s order the demurrer asserted three grounds: (1) plaintiff lacks standing under the UCL; (2) the court should invoke the doctrine of equitable abstention to refrain from proceeding; and (3) absence of an actual controversy. Plaintiff filed opposition that, as also noted, is not in the record. So, except for whatever we can glean from the trial court’s order, we have no understanding of what argument(s) plaintiff made in opposition to the demurrer. The motion came on for hearing on March 28, before a most experienced law and motion judge, the Honorable Ethan Schulman.

12 According to the register of actions, the hearing was not reported. Following that hearing, Judge Schulman issued a 10-page order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The order was comprehensive indeed, Judge Schulman discussing for several pages UCL law and its requirement for standing, detailingly applying that law to plaintiff’s TAC, all leading to his conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing for want of any economic injury. Judge Schulman went on, “even if [plaintiff] had properly pled an economic injury, Plaintiff did not plead any casual connection between State Farm’s alleged conduct and her theory . . . .” And, he finally added, plaintiff suffered no “injury in fact.” Judgment was apparently entered on April 7. That same day, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which, like so much else, is not in the record. What is in the record is the June 4 order denying the motion. And on July 1, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, checking the box to indicate that the appeal was from a “[j]udgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, and [o]ther.” DISCUSSION The Standard of Review In Amiodarone Cases (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1100–1101, we confirmed the well-settled law as to our standard of review: “We accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the operative complaint. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] We likewise accept facts that are reasonably implied or may be inferred from the complaint’s express 13 allegations. [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘ “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint . . . .” [Citations.] On appeal from a dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, we review the order de novo, exercising our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citations.]’ ” ’ (Ibid.) “Although our review is de novo, it is plaintiffs’ burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the demurrer was erroneously sustained as a matter of law, which means that plaintiffs must show that they pleaded facts sufficient to establish each element of each cause of action. [Citation.]” As will be shown below, plaintiff has failed to make that required demonstration, and her appeal necessarily fails on that basis. It also fails for a procedural reason. The Appeal Has No Merit: Judge Schulman Was Right We begin with the observation that the record plaintiff has provided includes almost nothing that allows us to conduct any meaningful review under the governing principles, itself enough to reject her appeal on procedural grounds. The law is that a party appealing an adverse judgment has the burden of providing an adequate record in order to show error and prejudice. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186–187; Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502 [record is inadequate for review where the appellant has not included moving papers, opposition, or court’s order]; see Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 478 [“Plaintiffs seek reversal of the trial court’s November 15, 2004, order sustaining Noell’s and Moores’s demurrers to plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. However, plaintiffs have failed to include in the record either the operative complaint or the demurrers . . . . On that basis alone, we must reject plaintiffs’ claim.”].)

14 In any event, plaintiff’s appeal fails on the merits, as her allegations do not meet the requirements of the UCL. UCL Law California’s Unfair Competition Law is found in Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., section 17204 of which provides that for an individual to pursue a UCL claim, he or she must prove they “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” This requirement is intended to preserve standing for those who had “business dealings with a defendant and had lost money or property as a result of the defendant’s unfair business practices” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 321 (Kwikset)); and to have standing, plaintiff must establish that she has personally “lost money or property,” that she has some form of economic injury—that she has “personally suffered . . . harm.” (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 323.) Such injury is “ ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, [citations]; and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 322.) The injury must “ ‘affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way’ ” (id. at p. 323), and it must be economic. (Ibid.) In California Medical Assn. v. Aetna Health of California, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1075, 1086 (California Medical), our Supreme Court explained the development of the law of standing this way: “In the past, ‘any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public’ could bring a UCL action—even if that person had not been injured by the business act or practice at issue. (Former [Bus. & Prof. Code,] § 17204; [citation].) Some in the legal and business communities were concerned that this broad authority to sue allowed attorneys ‘to file frivolous lawsuits against small businesses even though they ha[d] no client or 15 evidence that anyone was damaged or misled.’ [Citations.] In response, the electorate approved Proposition 64, a 2004 initiative measure. [Citations.] “Proposition 64 limited the set of eligible private UCL plaintiffs to those persons who have ‘suffered injury in fact’ and ‘lost money or property as a result of’ the business act or practice at issue. [Citation.] . . . ([Bus. & Prof. Code,] § 17204; see Kwikset[, supra,] 51 Cal.4th [at pp.] 322–323 & fn. 5.) The core inquiry is whether the plaintiff has suffered ‘economic injury . . . caused by . . . the unfair . . . practice . . . that is the gravamen of the claim.’ (Id. at p. 322.)” (California Medical, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1086, italics omitted.) As quoted above, plaintiff’s brief has three short arguments, totaling fewer than six pages, the first and third of which, labeled I and III, appear related: “I. A UCL Claim Need Not Be Predicated Upon a Contract Claim” and III. Judge Schulman “Conflated The Contract Claim With The UCL Claim.” Addressing these arguments, we begin by noting that the first is unremarkable—and irrelevant—as no one is asserting the contrary. And as to the third, nothing in Judge Schulman’s order indicates, let alone holds, that he “conflate[d]” the UCL claim with some contract claim. To the contrary, the focus of Judge Schulman’s ruling was on the post–Proposition 64 requirement that a plaintiff show economic loss, a subject he addressed for several pages, following which he discussed the requirement of causation, and finally the requirement of injury in fact. We see nothing conflating about any of that. Plaintiff’s second argument, though asserting that “Paying For A Policy Confers Sufficient Standing . . . Under The UCL,” also devotes much of its two and a half pages discussing a contract claim. More importantly, it does 16 nothing, and cites nothing, to support the claim in the argument that “paying” is enough. It is, in two words, nothing more than an ipse dixit. As quoted above, plaintiff expressly alleged that she “has standing to bring this claim for declaratory and injunctive relief because she continues to have her homeowners policy (and expects to have it into the foreseeable future) and that allows her to try to hold State Farm to task in how it manages [] its property insurance policies . . . .” As Judge Schulman tersely put it, “Plaintiff alleges she purchased a homeowner’s insurance policy, State Farm has an obligation to reasonably investigate claims in good faith and to provide sufficient reasoning for denying coverage, and that State Farm’s failure to comply with those obligations constituted an unfair business practice under the UCL. In short, as Defendant observed, Plaintiff’s theory of standing is limited to her status as a State Farm policyholder, without any allegation of economic loss.” California Medical collects the case-law references as to what a plaintiff must allege for standing: “ ‘suffered injury in fact’ ”; “ ‘lost money or property’ ”; some form of “economic injur[y]”—“ ‘a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount’ ”; “economic injury . . . caused by . . . the unfair . . . practice.” (California Medical, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1082, 1086, 1088.) Those are the words and phrases necessary to state a UCL claim. Those words and phrases are nowhere to be found in plaintiff’s second argument—or, for that matter, in the other two. Were all that not enough, plaintiff’s appeal fails for the additional reason that she nowhere addresses Judge Schulman’s holding that she did not suffer “injury in fact.” (See Hall v. Time, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 854–855.) A recent decision by our colleagues in Division Three, Suchard v. Sonoma Academy (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1089, is illustrative. The case was 17 a UCL claim brought as a class action by parents and students who alleged the school engaged in unfair business practices by not disclosing past abuse and misconduct directed at other students. (Id. at p. 1092.) The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the named plaintiffs lacked standing because the risk of injury they alleged was not concrete and particularized as to themselves. (Id. at pp. 1094–1095.) The complaint did not allege the school had inflicted any economic injury on the named plaintiffs because there was no allegation that the school had given them anything but the education for which they had bargained. (Id. at pp. 1098–1099.) Because there were no pleaded facts showing that the value of the education for which they paid tuition had been reduced or altered in any way by the alleged improper conduct toward other students, their allegations of having been deceived into overpaying were insufficient. (Id. at p. 1099.) Likewise here. The only facts alleged by plaintiff in the TAC is that she holds a State Farm homeowners’ policy and has paid policy premiums and intends to do so in the future. But those policy premiums were paid before the staircase failed, was repaired, and before the tardy claim was submitted by her husband. They are not economic loss caused by State Farm. They are not injury in fact. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. State Farm shall recover its costs on appeal.

18 RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P. J.

MILLER, J.

(A173866N)