People v. Randall CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D086203 · 2026-08-26 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD103478
Trial judge: David J. Danielsen
Outcome: modified —  Affirmed as modified.
Area: criminal
Panel: O'Rourke (author), Judith D. McConnell, Julia C. Kelety

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:15Z · confidence high

The trial court resentenced the defendant under Penal Code section 1172.75, vacating a $5,000 restitution fine and imposing a new $300 fine nunc pro tunc to the original sentencing date. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified, vacating the $300 fine because the 10-year statute of limitations under section 1465.9(d) had expired since the original 1996 imposition.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Imposition of a $300 restitution fine nunc pro tunc during resentencing under section 1172.75 “We agree with the parties that the restitution fine must be vacated because more than 10 years have elapsed since the original imposition of the fine, and reimposition of the fine in a different amount at a section 1172.75 resentencing does not restart section 1465.9(d)’s 10-year clock.”	de novo	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court agree with court

Authorities

relied: People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596 — Resentencing does not restart the 10-year clock for restitution fines under section 1465.9, subdivision (d).
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Matters may be resolved by memorandum opinion.
relied: Salmon Protection & Watershed Network v. County of Marin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 195 — Judicial notice may be denied if materials are unnecessary to the resolution of the appeal.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the plain language of section 1465.9(d) and relies on the specific authority of People v. Salstrom to support the conclusion that the 10-year period is not reset by resentencing. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the sole issue raised by the parties' concession.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

On a Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing, the trial court reduced Randall's 1995 sentence from 85 years to life to 25 years to life, vacated the original $5,000 restitution fine, and imposed a $300 restitution fine nunc pro tunc to the original sentencing date. The Court of Appeal, accepting the Attorney General's concession, held that section 1465.9, subdivision (d) barred reimposition of any restitution fine more than 10 years after the original 1996 imposition, vacated the $300 fine, and otherwise affirmed the judgment as modified.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Imposition at the section 1172.75 resentencing of a $300 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), nunc pro tunc to the original 1996 sentencing date, in place of the vacated $5,000 fine “We agree with the parties that the restitution fine must be vacated because more than 10 years have elapsed since the original imposition of the fine, and reimposition of the fine in a different amount at a section 1172.75 resentencing does not restart section 1465.9(d)’s 10-year clock.”	unclear	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court The court did not articulate a standard of review, but the issue is one of statutory interpretation of newly added section 1465.9, subdivision (d), which by its terms makes the balance of a section 1202.4 restitution fine unenforceable and requires vacatur of the portion of the judgment imposing it once 10 years have passed from the date of imposition. The original fine was imposed in 1996, the trial court itself made the new fine nunc pro tunc to that date, the People conceded, and the court cited People v. Salstrom for the proposition that a resentencing does not restart the 10-year clock. The result follows from the statutory text and the only cited appellate authority; the opinion's reasoning is brief and leans on the concession, but nothing in it is legally wrong.

Authorities

relied: People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596 — Under the language of section 1465.9, subdivision (d), a resentencing does not restart the 10-year period after which a section 1202.4 restitution fine becomes unenforceable and must be vacated (review granted on a different issue).
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — An appeal presenting no substantial question may appropriately be resolved by memorandum opinion.
relied: Salmon Protection & Watershed Network v. County of Marin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 195 — A reviewing court may deny a request for judicial notice of materials unnecessary to resolution of the appeal.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion applies the plain text of section 1465.9, subdivision (d) and the only published appellate decision construing it, Salstrom, to a conceded error, and the vacatur of the fine follows directly from the statute's command that any portion of a judgment imposing a fine older than 10 years shall be vacated. The analysis is thin because it rests largely on the People's concession, but no argument was left unanswered and no authority was misapplied.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 8/26/26 P. v. Randall CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086203

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD103478)

VIRGIL RANDALL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 Retired Judge of the San Diego Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. MEMORANDUM OPINION In 1995, a jury found Virgil Randall guilty of three counts of robbery (Pen. Code1, § 211) and found true the allegation he committed the crimes while armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1). The trial court found true additional allegations that Randall had two prior strike convictions (§ 667, subd. (b)), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Randall to a total term of 85 years to life and imposed a $5,000 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b). In August 2023, the trial court received Randall’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.75, appointed him counsel, and requested briefing. On May 16, 2025, the court resentenced Randall to a total term of 25 years to life. The court also vacated the $5,000 restitution fine, but imposed a restitution fine of $300, nunc pro tunc to the date of the original sentencing. Randall appeals from the judgment entered after his resentencing under section 1172.75. He contends the trial court erred by imposing a $300 restitution fine in place of the vacated $5,000 restitution fine. According to Randall, section 1465.9, subdivision (d) (section 1465.9(d)), which renders unenforceable and uncollectible restitution fines under section 1202.4 that are older than 10 years, applies to prevent a court from reimposing any portion of a restitution fine that was originally imposed more than 10 years prior. The People concede error. We accept the concession and vacate the balance of the reimposed fine. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We find this matter appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.) Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” Randall asserts the $300 restitution fine the court imposed at his resentencing must be vacated pursuant to section 1465.9(d), because more than 10 years have elapsed since the trial court imposed the original fine in 1996. The People agree with Randall that the 10-year period specified in section 1465.9(d) started with the original imposition of the fine in 1996, particularly since the court reimposed the fine nunc pro tunc. The People thus concede the fine should be vacated. We agree with the parties that the restitution fine must be vacated because more than 10 years have elapsed since the original imposition of the fine, and reimposition of the fine in a different amount at a section 1172.75 resentencing does not restart section 1465.9(d)’s 10-year clock. (See People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600–601 [under language of § 1465.9, subd. (d), resentencing does not restart the 10-year clock], review granted on different issue on Mar. 11, 2026, S295038.) DISPOSITION The $300 restitution fine is vacated. The judgment is modified to reflect this vacatur and is otherwise affirmed.2 The trial court is directed to 2 Randall filed an unopposed request for judicial notice of two 3 modify the abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion and to forward the modified abstract to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

declarations, one from trial defense counsel and another from appellate defense counsel, as well as a copy of “[t]he list generated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (‘CDCR’) dated June 16, 2022, listing those incarcerated people housed in state prison and sentenced by the San Diego Superior Court, who were identified by the CDCR as eligible for Senate Bill (‘SB’) 483 relief.” We deny the request for judicial notice as these materials are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. (See Salmon Protection & Watershed Network v. County of Marin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 195, 209, fn. 13.) 4

Cites, in this corpus

Salmon Protection & Watershed Network v. County of Marin No. A133109 · 2012-04-20
People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17