Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 Case No.: 26-cv-00521-DMS-BJW 9 JOSEPH ALEXANDER, 10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 11 v. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SCREENING DAWN HILL-KEARSE et al., 12 COMPLAINT 13 Defendants. 14 15 16 17 On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff Joseph Alexander, proceeding pro se, filed this action 18 against Defendants Dawn Hill-Kearse and Sergio Jimenez. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Plaintiff 19 concurrently filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”), which is 20 currently pending before the Court. (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2). For the following reasons, 21 the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Motion and sua sponte dismisses the Complaint with leave 22 to amend. 23 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 24 Parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay a filing fee 25 26 27 28 1 of $405. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)–(b). However, a court may authorize a party to proceed in 2 forma pauperis (“IFP”) without the prepayment of fees if the party submits an affidavit 3 demonstrating their inability to pay. § 1915(a)(1); see CivLR 3.2(a) (listing specific 4 requirements for the affidavit). Although a party need not be “absolutely destitute” to 5 proceed IFP, they must “allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty” 6 such that they could not “pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 7 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). 8 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion consists of an Application to Proceed in District Court 9 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Form AO 240). (IFP Mot. 1). Plaintiff reports that his 10 only source of income within the past twelve months was from employment where he 11 earned $1,000 per month. (Id.). Plaintiff states that he has $55 in a checking or savings 12 account, but does not have any other assets. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff reports monthly expenses 13 totaling $1,000. (Id.). The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he 14 cannot “pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 15 1234. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Motion. 16 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING 17 A. Background 18 On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed this action. Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of one 19 allegation that “Defendants conspired together and intentionally delayed the calendar of 20 motions, in violation of due process.” (Compl. 1). Plaintiff states the “basis for this court’s 21 jurisdiction is federal law” and “demands compensation of $500,000.” (Id.). The 22 Complaint does not contain any other factual allegations. 23 24 25 26 1 The $405 fee consists of a $350 filing fee mandated by § 1914(a) and a $55 administrative fee prescribed 27 by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to § 1914(b). See Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). However, the filing fee for an 28 1 B. Legal Standard 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen an IFP complaint and dismiss 3 the case if, at any time, it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 4 a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 5 is immune from such relief. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 6 curiam) (confirming § 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to non-prisoners as well). A complaint “is 7 frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” and malicious where “it 8 was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 9 325 (1989); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). 10 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 11 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil 12 Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 13 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 14 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 15 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 16 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept 17 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 18 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 19 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 20 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 21 Finally, dismissal is warranted when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief against an immune 22 defendant, as long as the court “has sufficient information to make a determination on 23 immunity.” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016). 24 C. Discussion 25 The Court now examines the Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or 26 malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief 27 against a defendant with immunity from such relief. 28 1 Although pro se filings should be liberally construed, the Complaint fails to state a 2 claim upon which relief may be granted because it does not contain any factual allegations 3 || supporting the cause of action. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document 4 ||filed pro se is to be liberally construed ... .” (citation modified)). Furthermore, the 5 ||Complaint violates Rule 8 because it does not contain “a short and plain statement of the 6 || claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Deuschel v. Cal. 7 || Health & Hum. Servs. Agency, No. 24-3129, 2025 WL 1625535, at *1 (9th Cir. June 9, 8 ||2025) (finding a complaint may be properly dismissed under § 1915(e)(2) for failing to 9 ||comply with Rule 8). As such, the Complaint does not “give the defendant fair notice of 10 || what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Pickern v. Pier I Imports 11 ||} (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). Accordingly, □□□□□□□□□□ □ 12 claim is dismissed. 13 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 14 A court “should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is 15 || absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 16 || Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). Here, it is not 17 ||absolutely clear that the identified deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. 18 || Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's JFP Motion and sua 20 || sponte DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to amend. Within twenty-one (21) days of 21 date of this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: August 17, 2026 2» J ] \ 24 Yn - 25 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw %6 United States District Judge 27 28