Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 13 14 CRISTINA LANCRANJAN, Case No. 26-cv-02817-BAS-VET 15 Plaintiff, ORDER: 16 v. (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRO BONO 17 PETER SAATJIAN et al., COUNSEL (ECF No. 7);

18 Defendants. (2) GRANTING IN PART AND 19 DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 20 ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF 21 PROCESS (ECF No. 21);

22 (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 23 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 24 SUPPLEMENT (ECF No. 22);

25 (4) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 26 SERVE EXHIBITS THROUGH 27 ELECTRONIC STORAGE MEDIA (ECF No. 6); AND 28 1 (5) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION REQUESTING 2 JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 3 ATTEMPTED SERVICE WAIVERS UNDER RULE 4(D) 4 (ECF No. 28) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Cristina Lancranjan’s: (1) motion for pro bono 13 counsel (ECF No. 7), (2) motion for alternative service of process (ECF No. 21), (3) motion 14 for leave to serve exhibits through electronic storage media (ECF No. 6), (4) motion to 15 supplement (ECF No. 22), and (5) motion requesting judicial notice of attempted service 16 waivers under Rule 4(d) (ECF No. 28). 17 For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for pro bono counsel. 18 (ECF No. 7.) However, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s 19 motions for alternative service of process (ECF Nos. 21, 22); and GRANTS Plaintiff’s 20 other service-related motions. (ECF Nos. 6, 28.) 21 I. MOTION FOR PRO BONO COUNSEL (ECF No. 7) 22 Unlike criminal defendants, indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to 23 counsel unless their physical liberty is at stake. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 24 18, 25 (1981). Even assuming Plaintiff is an indigent civil litigant, Plaintiff has not alleged 25 any exceptional circumstances warranting appointment of pro bono counsel—especially 26 given the early stage of proceedings. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 27 1991) (two factors determine whether exceptional circumstances exist: (1) the likelihood 28 1 of success on the merits of the case, and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his 2 claims pro se in light of the complexity of legal issues involved). 3 Therefore, though Plaintiff contends that the current case involves complex claims, 4 the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of pro bono counsel at this time. 5 (ECF No. 7.) 6 II. MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS AND TO 7 SUPPLEMENT (ECF Nos. 21, 22) 8 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), plaintiffs may serve an individual 9 located within the United States by using any method allowed by the law of the state in 10 which the district court is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). California—the state in which 11 the Court sits—allows for five basic methods of service: (1) personal delivery to the party; 12 (2) delivery to someone else at the party’s usual residence or place of business; (3) service 13 by mail with acknowledgment of receipt; (4) service on persons outside the state by 14 certified or registered mail with a return receipt requested; and (5) service by publication. 15 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 415.10–50. Alternatively, California Code of Civil Procedure 16 Section 413.30 permits the court to “direct that the summons be served in a manner which 17 is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served and that such proof 18 of service be made as prescribed by the court.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 413.30. 19 Prior to seeking alternative service of process under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 413.30, 20 Plaintiff must first demonstrate that she exercised “reasonable diligence” in attempting to 21 serve Defendants through other means of service specified in the California Code of Civil 22 Procedure, including “personal delivery . . . to the person to be served” (Cal. Civ. Proc. 23 Code § 415.10(a)). California state courts have held that “two or three attempts at personal 24 service at a proper place should fully satisfy the requirement of reasonable diligence and 25 allow substituted service to be made.” Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Grp., Inc., 6 Cal. App. 4th 26 1387, 1392 (1992). 27 Here, Plaintiff claims her process server attempted to personally serve Defendants 28 David Schulman, Peter Saatjian, and PS Law, SPC at their places of residence and 1 business—and attempted to serve each Defendant multiple times. (See ECF Nos. 21-1 ¶ 2 4, 22 ¶ 4 (attempted to serve Defendant David Schulman at workplace three times); ECF 3 Nos. 21-1 ¶ 4, 22 ¶ 3 (attempted to serve Defendant Peter Saatjian at residence at least five 4 times); ECF No. 22 at 12 (attempted to serve Defendant PS Law, SPC via serving employee 5 Defendant Peter Saatjian at place of business at least twice).) Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff 6 has exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to serve the aforementioned Defendants. 7 Plaintiff seeks the Court’s approval for the following methods of service: (1) 8 certified mail; (2) electronic mail; (3) delivery to professional office suites; and (4) delivery 9 to residential addresses of record. (ECF Nos. 21 at 2, 21-1 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff supplements her 10 request through a Declaration filed at ECF No. 22. 11 As a threshold matter, certified mail, delivery to professional addresses, and delivery 12 to residential addresses are permissible methods of service under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 13 415.20–30. See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Ham, 216 Cal. App. 4th 330, 14 337 (2013) (“Neither service by mail nor substituted service requires the plaintiff to obtain 15 permission of the court before using the alternative to personal service.”). Thus, the Court 16 GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to serve Defendants through certified mail, delivery to 17 professional addresses, and delivery to residential addresses. (ECF Nos. 21, 22) 18 However, to electronically serve Defendants David Schulman, Peter Saatjian, and 19 PS Law, SPC, Plaintiff must propose specific email addresses to serve each Defendant and 20 describe how Plaintiff has ascertained that those email addresses are still active. See 21 Creative Intellects v. Haygood, No. 2:21-cv-02670-RGK-AFM, 2021 WL 3568237, at *3 22 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2021) (finding email service reasonably calculated where the plaintiff 23 did not receive any bounce-back email and where the defendant admitted to receiving the 24 email over a phone call with the plaintiff’s counsel under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 413.30); 25 see also LawRank LLC v. LawRankSEO.com, No. 21-CV-04515-HSG, 2021 WL 4461592, 26 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (denying service by email under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 27 § 413.30 where the plaintiff did not receive any response, including a bounce-back email). 28 1 Since Plaintiff has not done so, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to electronically 2 serve Defendants. (ECF Nos. 21, 22.) 3 III. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE EXHIBITS THROUGH ELECTRONIC 4 STORAGE MEDIA (USB) (ECF No. 6) 5 Plaintiff seeks to serve exhibits accompanying a paper copy of the complaint through 6 USB drives. (ECF No. 6.) Since the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s motion for alternative 7 service of process (ECF Nos. 21, 22) and Plaintiff’s request does not meaningfully change 8 the methods of service now approved by the Court (certified mail, delivery to professional 9 addresses, and delivery to residential addresses), the Court also GRANTS Plaintiff’s 10 motion for leave to serve exhibits through USB. (ECF No. 6.) 11 IV. MOTION REQUESTING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ATTEMPTED SERVICE 12 WAIVERS UNDER RULE 4(D) (ECF No. 28) 13 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows the Court to take judicial notice of facts that 14 can be “accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 15 be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). The Court may take judicial notice of documents 16 that are matters of public record. See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 17 (9th Cir. 1986) (When determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a district 18 court may take “judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings.”). 19 Courts within this Circuit have taken judicial notice of declarations of service 20 attempts when those attempts have been previously filed on a public docket. See Smadja 21 v. PetSmart, Inc., No. CV 17-654 DMG (PLAx), 2017 WL 1483322, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 22 Apr. 21, 2017). This Court agrees, and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice 23 (ECF No. 28)—since Plaintiff has previously filed her process server’s attempts on the 24 public docket in this action. 25 V. CONCLUSION 26 For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for pro bono counsel. 27 (ECF No. 7.) However, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s 28 1 ||motions for alternative service of process (ECF Nos. 21, 22); and GRANTS □□□□□□□□□□□ 2 || other service-related motions. (ECF Nos. 6, 28.) 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ~ 5 ||DATED: August 14, 2026 (yatta Baphar □□ 6 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _f£.