In re Jorge G. CA2/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from orders
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Los Angeles County · No. 25CCJP02078
- Trial judge
- D. Brett Bianco
- Outcome
- dismissed — Dismissed.
- Area
- dependency
- Panel
- Frances Rothschild (author), Gregory J. Weingart
Analysis
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Opinion
Filed 8/25/26 In re Jorge G. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re JORGE G. et al., Persons B350353 Coming Under Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP02078)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JORGE G., SR., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Dismissed. Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. __________________________________ In the proceedings below, the juvenile court sustained a petition brought by respondent Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on behalf of minors Jorge G. (born December 2010) and Angelique G. (born March 2012) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1 Appellant father Jorge G., Sr., appeals from the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders, contending they are unsupported by substantial evidence. During the pendency of this appeal, however, the court sustained subsequent petitions filed by DCFS under sections 342 and 387. DCFS contends these events render Father’s current appeal moot, and Father has failed to respond to DCFS’s argument. We agree with DCFS and dismiss this appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. DCFS Files a Petition In May 2025, DCFS received a referral that Angelique was sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend, Alejandro. Angelique and two of Mother’s nieces reported to police that Alejandro had sexually abused all three. The police also spoke with Daphne 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 (Jorge and Angelique’s adult half sibling), who stated Alejandro had been “sexually inappropriate to her since the age of 15.” Father told a children’s social worker (CSW) that Anglique had disclosed to him, “approximately 1-2 months ago,” that Alejandro was sexually abusing her, but asked him not to say anything until she graduated from elementary school. Father acquiesced but had Angelique stay with him for the next two weeks. Father also learned Alejandro had sexually abused Daphne as well as two of Mother’s nieces. After staying with Father for two weeks, Angelique returned to Mother’s home to retrieve her cell phone “for evidence.”2 Father instructed her to call him “if Alejandro did anything to her or she felt uncomfortable,” and he would pick her up. A day before Mother and Angelique went to the police, Father received a text message from Daphne to pick Angelique up immediately. After he did, Angelique disclosed Alejandro had abused her again. The next day, Father informed Mother about the abuse. In 2009, Father “registered as a control[led] substance offender.” The paternal grandmother reported Father drank alcohol but had “no recent observations of him consuming alcohol or being intoxicated.” The paternal grandfather confirmed that “in the past, the father also consumed alcohol but not recently.” The CSW subsequently asked Father to test for drugs and alcohol. Father agreed but never tested. In July 2025, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of Jorge and Angelique under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d), and (j).
2 Angelique told Father Alejandro had sent her “inappropriate text messages.”
3 Counts b-1, d-1, and j-1 alleged Mother’s companion Alejandro sexually abused Angelique multiple times, and Father failed to protect Angelique because he knew or should have known of the abuse, but nevertheless let her live with Mother and Alejandro.3 At the detention hearing, the court found DCFS had made a prima facie case, detained the children from Mother, and released them to Father, on the condition that he reside with the paternal grandparents (or at another DCFS-approved location) and underwent weekly drug testing.
B. The Court Sustains the Petition In the subsequent investigation, a dependency investigator (DI) spoke with Father. As the DI was reading the allegations to Father, he asked her to stop because “he did not want the details of the abuse.” He explained he initially agreed to Angelique’s request not to disclose the abuse because there were two more weeks before school ended. When the DI asked why he waited a month to report the abuse, however, Father responded: “Because she asked me to wait. She didn’t want to feel awkward and get bullied. I told mom, I told her, they were going to stay here with me for 2 weeks. Then mother came to pick her up. I didn’t want to, I asked Angie to tell mom. She said don’t worry[,] I’m going to be fine. Don’t tell mom. Angelique put me in a situation, and I want my daughter to trust me. I know her very good. Her mother broke her trust so I didn’t want to break her trust.” Father claimed he was scared Mother would “prevent the case to 3 Counts b-2, d-2, and j-2 alleged Mother knew Alejandro sexually abused Daphne but still permitted Alejandro access to Jorge and Angelique.
4 move forward [sic]” and did not want Angelique “to retract her story.” Despite the court’s order, Father did not drug test. In August 2025, the court sustained the petition as pleaded, removed the children from Mother, and placed them with Father, again on the condition that he reside with the paternal grandparents (or at another DCFS-approved location) and underwent weekly drug testing. The court stated Father could stop testing after four “clean consecutive tests.” The court also ordered Father to participate in conjoint counseling with the children, sex abuse awareness counseling, and family preservation services. Father timely appealed.
C. The Court Sustains Additional Petitions In June 2026, DCFS asked us to judicially notice: (1) a section 342 petition DCFS filed in February 2026; (2) a section 387 petition DCFS filed in February 2026; (3) an amended section 342 petition DCFS filed in April 2026; (4) April 2026 minute orders regarding the adjudication and disposition of the amended section 342 petition; and (5) April 2026 minute orders regarding the adjudication and disposition of the section 387 petition. Father did not oppose this request, and we grant it. The judicially noticed petitions and orders inform us that: In February 2025, DCFS filed a supplemental petition under section 387 alleging Father failed “to participate in sexual abuse awareness counseling and conjoint counseling with the children in violation of the Juvenile Court orders dated 08/27/25,” “to regularly participate in Family Preservation services in violation of the Juvenile Court orders, resulting in Family Preservation services being terminated,” and to reside in the paternal grandparents’ home, moving out in December 2025, without providing DCFS with a current address.
5 In April 2025, DCFS filed an amended subsequent petition under section 342 alleging Father frequently left the children with the paternal grandparents for “days at a time” without making a plan for their care, and that he appeared under the influence in front of the children on one occasion in December 2025 and refused to drug test that day. In April 2026, the court sustained both the section 387 and amended section 342 petitions as to Father. DCFS asserts Father did not appeal these orders, and Father does not claim otherwise.
DISCUSSION DCFS contends Father’s appeal is moot because “the juvenile court made subsequent jurisdictional findings against him, which were unchallenged and are now final.” Father does not contend otherwise, and we agree. “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A reviewing court must ‘ “decide on a case-by- case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In a dependency case, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ ” (Id. at p. 277.)
6 “In dependency proceedings, the basic pleading device to assert a child falls within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is a petition.” (In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364.) “ ‘It may be an original petition (§ 332), a subsequent petition for children who are already dependents when there are “new facts or circumstances” that bring them within a category of section 300 “other than those under which the original petition was sustained” (§ 342), or a supplemental petition when there are facts which indicate that a previous disposition is not appropriate. (§ 387.)’ ” (Ibid.) In A.B., the mother asked us to “reverse the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under the original petition.” (In re A.B., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363.) “DCFS concede[d] the jurisdictional finding under the original petition was error but argues it was rendered moot by the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under the subsequent petition.” (Id. at p. 1364.) We agreed, concluding “no effective relief would be provided to mother by reversing jurisdiction under the original petition because jurisdiction was established independently under the subsequent petition on entirely new and independent facts.” (Ibid.) Here, Father challenges only the orders made on the original petition. The juvenile court sustained subsequent petitions independently establishing jurisdiction on entirely new and independent facts, and Father failed to appeal those findings, rendering them final. Father’s current appeal is therefore moot. While we have discretion to consider moot appeals (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282), Father offers no reason for us to do so here, and we decline to do so.
7 DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. D.B. B249402 · 2014-04-30