People v. Woolen CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/25/26 P. v. Woolen CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B348855

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA070163) v.

MICHAEL SHABOYA WOOLEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed. Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. ____________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION1 I In 2004, a jury convicted defendant Michael Shaboya Woolen of one count of willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code,2 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and found that he personally used a firearm in the offense causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 35 years to life in prison, consisting of life with the possibility of parole after seven years for attempted murder (see §§ 664, (a)(1), 3046, subd. (a)(1)), plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, plus three years for enhancements under section 667.5, former subdivision (b) for prior prison sentences Woolen had served. In 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019- 2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1), which eliminated the one-year enhancement for prior prison terms under section 667.5, subdivision (b) except in the case of defendants whose prior prison term was imposed for a sexually violent offense. Two years later, the Legislature enacted section 1172.75, which declared all existing enhancements imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b) invalid except when the enhancement was imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense, and created a mechanism for eliminating the invalid enhancements 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it “is determined by a controlling decision which does not require a reexamination of its principles or rules.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1(2).) 2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 from sentences of defendants in custody. (Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) In 2022, the superior court resentenced Woolen pursuant to section 1172.75, striking the three section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements but leaving the rest of the sentence intact. This resulted in a new aggregate sentence of 32 years to life. In July 2025, Woolen filed a motion in the superior court for a new resentencing hearing on the ground that the court at the previous hearing did not consider all subsequent changes in the law when deciding on the new sentence. The court held a new hearing in August 2025, at which it found that the court in 2022 had failed to conduct a full resentencing. The court therefore recalled Woolen’s sentence and once again resentenced him. After considering the relevant factors, the court imposed the same sentence of 32 years to life. The court recognized that Woolen had obtained an associate’s degree while in prison and that he suffered from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Nevertheless, the court found that a reduced sentence was not warranted because of the circumstances of the original offense, and because Woolen had committed significant rules violations in prison and had not participated in enough rehabilitative programming. We appointed counsel to represent Woolen on appeal. Woolen’s attorney filed a brief raising no issues and requesting that we exercise our discretion to independently review the record for error pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. In Delgadillo, the Supreme Court established procedures for cases in which counsel determines that an appeal from an order denying postconviction relief lacks merit. In such cases, “(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that 3 determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If the defendant does not file a supplemental brief, we “may dismiss the appeal as abandoned.” (Id. at p. 232.) In that instance, we do “not need to write an opinion but should notify the defendant when [we] dismiss[] the matter.” (Ibid.) Because a defendant who has been denied postconviction relief has no constitutional right to an appeal, we are not required to conduct an independent review of the record before dismissing the appeal, but we may conduct such a review at our discretion. (Id. at pp. 227-228, 232.) If the defendant does file a supplemental brief or letter, we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We followed the procedure outlined above and, on June 12, 2026, Woolen submitted a supplemental brief. Recognizing our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record, we decline to do so here. II Woolen raises several arguments in his supplemental brief. We reject all of these arguments as we explain below. First, Woolen argues the superior court erred by refusing to consider alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (Brady) and Napue v. Illinois 4 (1959) 360 U.S. 264 [79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217] that occurred at his trial. He argues that the court in People v. Nuno (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1030 held that documents related to these issues are relevant in resentencing proceedings. But Nuno involved resentencing under section 1172.6, where the “evidentiary hearing resembles a criminal trial” because “the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt petitioner’s guilt” under current law. (Nuno, supra, at p. 1059.) In that context, the court held that “principles of fundamental fairness require disclosure of material exculpatory evidence” pursuant to Brady. (Nuno, supra, at p. 1061.) Proceedings under section 1172.75 do not work the same way. The court must conduct “a full resentencing” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402), but the statute does not require the prosecution to prove the defendant remains guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the court’s reasoning in Nuno does not apply. Instead, the ordinary rule prevails: a defendant may not use an appeal of a postjudgment order to contest “matters that could have been reviewed on timely appeal from the judgment.” (People v. Howerton (1953) 40 Cal.2d 217, 220; accord, People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 883.) Next, Woolen contends the trial court erred by failing to rule on his “[m]otion to [c]onsolidate [s]entences pursuant to . . . [section] 669.” Section 669 gives superior courts discretion to direct different components of a sentence to be served either concurrently or consecutively. “We assume the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law” (People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724), and that its decision to reimpose consecutive sentences for the attempted murder conviction and the firearm enhancement was the result of an exercise of the 5 court’s informed discretion. In his motion to consolidate sentences, Woolen refers to a 2014 conviction for possession of a weapon in violation of section 4502, subdivision (a)(1), and argues that the determinate sentence in that case must be served before the indeterminate life sentence in this case, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him for any other offense. The record does not document the 2014 conviction, and we do not see what it has to do with the resentencing on Woolen’s attempted murder conviction. Woolen also complains that the abstract of judgment does not reflect his credits for time served. At the resentencing hearing, the parties agreed that Woolen had served 271 days prior to his sentencing and 7,849 days from that date until the resentencing, not including conduct credits. The court ordered the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to calculate the balance. Woolen has provided no information to show those numbers were incorrect, or that the CDCR miscalculated Woolen’s conduct credits. Next, Woolen argues his attorney rendered ineffective assistance at the resentencing hearing by preventing him from being present and speaking during the resentencing hearing, and by failing to ensure the superior court received copies of documents he submitted. These documents include a motion to augment the record with information related to Woolen’s background and performance in prison, another motion to augment the record with an excerpt from a hearing during Woolen’s trial at which the court discussed the issue of motive with both attorneys in the case, and the aforementioned motion to consolidate sentences.

6 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must show [both] that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]), and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” (id. at p. 687). Woolen’s claims fail one or both of these tests. First, the record shows Woolen was electronically present for the hearing, and he has not shown there was any additional relevant information he could have provided that his attorney prevented him from sharing. Instead, his attorney submitted documents to the superior court at Woolen’s request for resentencing. The court stated during the resentencing hearing that it “received the supplemental briefings” that Woolen’s attorney had received from Woolen, and that it “had time to review” them. Thus, there is no reason to think his attorney failed to present the court with the relevant documents. In addition, Woolen has not shown how the parties’ discussion of motive during the original trial was relevant to his resentencing hearing.

7 DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying Woolen’s petition for resentencing is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.