People v. Santana CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/25/26 P. v. Santana CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085381

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FVI21001665)

v.

ARMANDO JOSEPH SANTANA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Michael A. Knish, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions. Ronda G. Norris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Armando Joseph Santana of first degree murder of Daniel Castillo (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd.(a)) and found true three firearm enhancement allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) [10 years for personal use of a firearm], (c) [20 years for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm], and (d) [25 years to life for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm, causing death].) The court sentenced Santana to 25 years to life for the first degree murder conviction plus 20 years for the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c). The court struck the enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and imposed but stayed the enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b). On appeal, Santana contends his first degree murder conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. He further contends that the trial court erred by imposing the 10-year term for the gun enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects a total additional term of 30 years for the gun enhancements instead of 20 years. We reject the first contention. However, the People concede and we agree the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement. On remand, we direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect an enhancement of 20 years under section 12022.53, subdivision (c), and a stayed term under section 12022.53, subdivision (b). Otherwise, we affirm the judgment.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Santana, Castillo, and N.W. were good friends who used drugs together. In late May 2021, Santana began to suspect Castillo was having an affair with Santana’s girlfriend, A.R., and he believed Castillo had impregnated her. Santana sent A.R. multiple messages accusing A.R. of cheating on him. He made threats to A.R., stating, “I should blast [you all],” “as for [Castillo] it’s to[o] late for him its [sic] just a matter of time,” and “go text that faggot tell him ill [sic] kill him tomorrow after he gets outta [sic] work.” Santana also sent messages to N.W., accusing Castillo of the affair. And he threatened Castillo, telling him he would “kill him” if he found out Castillo lied when he denied the affair. Castillo told his own girlfriend, S.H., and N.W. that Santana’s actions made him afraid for his safety. On June 4, 2021, while Santana, Castillo, and N.W. used drugs together, Santana showed them a nine-millimeter handgun. That same day at a social gathering, S.H., overheard Santana say “he was going to commit some felony type shit and disappear for awhile.” Two days later, Santana and Castillo exchanged a series of messages showing they planned to meet and smoke narcotics. Santana also said his bong was broken and he wanted Castillo’s. According to the messages, Castillo picked up Santana around noon. Sometime a little after noon, Castillo’s next-door neighbor heard two loud bangs that were 11 or 12 seconds apart. The neighbor stepped outside her unit and saw a male walking from Castillo’s apartment. She saw him walk down the street and open another neighbor’s trash can.

3 Early the next morning, police found Castillo in his apartment, seated on his couch with two gunshot wounds to the cheek and neck. The fired cartridge casings found at the scene, one close to Castillo and the other about 10 feet away, were from a nine-millimeter gun. The trajectory of the bullet wounds indicated that, at the time of the shooting, Castillo was sitting and the shooter was standing. Santana’s fingerprint was lifted from a Gatorade bottle in Castillo’s apartment. Multiple neighborhood surveillance videos showed a man walking from Castillo’s apartment, then running up the road, and placing what was later discovered to be Santana’s broken bong in a trash can. Surveillance also showed a white car with a black hood speeding away, which matched the description of the car Santana shared with A.R. DISCUSSION I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim Santana contends insufficient evidence supports his conviction of first degree murder because the killing was the result of provocation, not premeditation and deliberation. He asserts that his “belief that [A.R.] and Castillo were having an affair and that she may have been pregnant with Castillo’s baby, is evidence of subjective provocation that precluded [him] from deliberating or premeditating before shooting [the victim].” He acknowledges that he “agonized over [this] belief” for “several weeks” and this “emotional roller coaster” supports that he acted “rashly,” necessitating that his conviction be reduced to second degree murder. We disagree and conclude there was ample substantial evidence to support the conviction. A. Standard of Review “ ‘To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, 4 credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 118.) We “ ‘ “presume[] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88 (Morales).) “ ‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.” (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210.) This standard applies “in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to establish premeditation and deliberation as elements of first degree murder.” (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 368 (Silva).)

5 B. Legal Principles “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Murder that is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” is first degree murder. (§ 189, subd. (a).) “ ‘[P]remeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand,’ and ‘deliberate’ means ‘formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” ’ ” (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 88.) “Evidence concerning motive, planning, and the manner of killing are pertinent to the determination of premeditation and deliberation, but these factors are not exclusive nor are they invariably determinative.” (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 368.) “ ‘Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree murder.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942.) “To reduce a murder to second degree murder, premeditation and deliberation may be negated by heat of passion arising from provocation. [Citation.] If the provocation . . . precludes the defendant from subjectively deliberating or premeditating, the crime is second degree murder.” (People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332; see People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [“a subjective test applies to provocation as a basis to reduce malice murder from the first to the second degree: it inquires whether the defendant in fact committed the act because he was provoked”].)

6 C. Analysis Here, Santana’s statement to Castillo and the messages he sent to A.R. and N.W. indicate Santana had a motive to kill Castillo: Santana believed Castillo was having an affair with Santana’s girlfriend and that Castillo had impregnated her. Santana threatened Castillo’s life and indicated more than once that he was going to act on these threats. In messages to A.R., he said he would “kill” Castillo if he had slept with A.R. and “it’s to[o] late for [Castillo] its [sic] just a matter of time.” Santana also told Castillo he would kill him if he found out Castillo lied about the affair. Santana announced several days before the killing that he was “going to commit some felony type shit and disappear for awhile.” On the basis of Santana’s statements alone, a rational jury could infer that Santana reflected on the situation, formed an intent to kill Castillo, and made plans to carry out the murder to exact revenge for the affair. His statements provided overwhelming evidence of both motive and planning activity. And, given that Santana was aware of the adulterous allegations for several weeks and did not act immediately as one who acts impulsively would, a rational trier of fact could reject as implausible Santana’s claim that he acted on provocation. Santana’s acts on the day of the murder—he made plans to meet with Castillo and brought his nine-millimeter gun—also indicate reflection and weighing of considerations, not impulsiveness. A rationale jury could infer from this evidence that Santana plotted a violent altercation because he arranged to meet Castillo alone and brought a deadly weapon. (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471 [when a defendant arms him or herself with a weapon prior to an encounter it can be inferred that the defendant “planned a violent encounter”].)

7 It is also reasonable to infer from the nature of Castillo’s injuries that Santana’s actions were designed to kill. Santana shot a vital part of Castillo’s body—his face and neck—at close range. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1082 [“firing a shot at a vital area of the body at close range” is a “ manner of killing indicative of a deliberate intent to kill”].) The fact he waited 11 to 12 seconds between the first and second shot, strongly suggests Santana had a moment to reflect and purposively acted to ensure Castillo was dead. Likewise, Santana’s calm and focused actions after the killing— walking out of Castillo’s apartment and down the road where he disposed of a bong that would have connected him to the murder—are actions inconsistent with the state of mind of one who has acted in the heat of passion. (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 92 [taking time after a homicide to hide incriminating evidence is inconsistent with impulsive and rash behavior and may contribute to a finding of premeditation and deliberation]; People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1028 [undertaking a mundane task after homicide, like opening a package of cookies, is inconsistent with a conclusion that a defendant had acted under provocation].) That some of the evidence could be construed in support of a finding that Santana rashly killed Castillo in a fit of anger, as Santana argues, is immaterial. If the evidence reasonably justifies the jury’s findings, as it does here, the fact “ ‘that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124.) For the same reason, we are unpersuaded by the two cases Santana cites in support: While both People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, and In re Scott (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 871, recognize that provocation may arise from series of stressful events over a period of time, the facts of those cases 8 involved repeated acts of provocation not present in this matter and the jury, here, reasonably chose not to believe that Santana rashly killed Castillo. Under our highly deferential standard of review, we will not displace the trier of facts’ credibility determinations, reweigh the evidence, or draw inferences contrary to the verdict. Because there was reasonable, solid, and credible evidence from which a rational jury could find Santana acted with premeditation and deliberation, Santana’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. II. Sentencing Error Santana next contends the trial court erred by imposing an “additional 10-year term” for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), given that the court imposed a 20-year term for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c). He asks that the matter be remanded for the trial court to “strike” the punishment and to correct the abstract of judgment. The People agree that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. They contend the trial court properly imposed and stayed the section 12022.53, subdivision (b), firearm enhancement at the sentencing hearing, but improperly included the 10-year term in the written abstract of judgment. We agree the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence is inconsistent with the judgment recorded: it imposed and stayed a 10-year term for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement, but the abstract of judgment imposed the term along with the 20-year term under section 12022.53, subdivision (c). “When an abstract of judgment does not reflect the actual sentence imposed in the trial judge’s verbal pronouncement, [we have] the inherent power to correct such clerical error on appeal[.]” (People v. Jones 9 (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89.) We accordingly order that the abstract of judgment be corrected to conform with the sentence that the trial court actually imposed. Santana’s additional contention that the enhancement, on remand, must be stricken is without merit. (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1129–1130 [after imposing the enhancement with the longest term, any remaining firearm enhancements found true are “imposed and then stayed”].) DISPOSITION We remand with directions for the clerk of the superior court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that the 10-year term for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement is stayed, resulting in a total term of 20 years for the firearm enhancements. The superior court clerk is directed to forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.