Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 WILBEL FRANCSHESCO CAMACHO- Case No.: 26-CV-3885-JAO (SBC) DIAZ, 11 ORDER GRANTING PETITION Petitioner, 12 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 13 (ECF No. 1) MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of 14 the Department of Homeland Security, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Wilbel Francshesco Camacho-Diaz’s 18 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF No. 1. Also before the Court are Respondents 19 Markwayne Mullin’s (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)), 20 Todd Blanche’s (Acting Attorney General), Todd M. Lyon’s (Acting Director, 21 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)), Jesus Rocha (Acting Field Office 22 Director, San Diego Field Office), and Christopher LaRose’s (Warden at Otay Mesa 23 Detention Center) Response to Petitioner’s Habeas Petition. ECF No. 4. For the reasons 24 set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 25 BACKGROUND 26 Petitioner, born in Venezuela, entered the United States around September 2023, 27 upon which he was initially detained and then released into the country. See ECF No. 1 28 1 at 2–3. Once released, Petitioner received a work permit and worked as a waiter at a 2 restaurant. See id. at 3. 3 On January 12, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner to be removed. See 4 id. Petitioner had 30 days to appeal, which he did not do, so his order of removal became 5 final on February 11, 2026. See ECF No. 4-4 at 2; ECF No. 5 at 2 (citing 8 CFR § 6 1241.1(c)). Petitioner was arrested by ICE at his workplace on April 4, 2026, during 7 which he was told that he was to be removed to Ecuador. See ECF No. 1 at 3. 8 Petitioner’s removal order states he is to be removed to Uganda or, in the alternative, 9 Ecuador. See ECF No. 4-4 at 2. Petitioner is currently detained at the Otay Mesa 10 Detention Facility in San Diego, California. See ECF No. 1-3 at 3. 11 Petitioner claims that his continued detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 12 U.S. 678 (2001) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). See ECF No. 1 at 4. Respondents opposed the 13 petition because Petitioner has been detained for only about three months and his 14 arguments do not rebut the presumptively reasonable detainment period. See ECF No. 4 15 at 2–3. On August 12, 2026, the Court found that because Petitioner’s removal order 16 became final on February 11, 2026, his detention was no longer presumptively 17 reasonable. See ECF No. 6. The Court then ordered the Respondents to submit 18 supplemental briefing by August 14, 2026, which they did. See id.; ECF No. 7. In 19 Respondents’ supplemental briefing, they state there is no additional information to 20 provide the Court. See ECF No. 7 at 1. 21 LEGAL STANDARD 22 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 23 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district 24 of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole 25 judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or 26 removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas 27 v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 28 13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral 1 issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of 2 indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 3 Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 4 grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. 5 Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 6 DISCUSSION 7 When an alien is denied asylum, granted withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 8 1231(b)(3), and ordered removed, they must be detained for ninety days (90) pending the 9 government’s efforts to secure their removal to a third country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). 10 This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the 11 removal period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period 12 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” and “does 13 not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). A six- 14 month period of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of 15 detention.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to 16 “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 17 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If petitioner satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts 18 to the Government to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the 19 period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably 20 foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer 21 reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. 22 In that case, the petitioner’s release may be conditioned on any of the various forms of 23 conditioned release. Id. at 700. 24 “[T]he removal period begins when an alien is ‘ordered removed,’ and the 25 removal order becomes ‘administratively final.’” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 26 523, 534 (2021). 27 Section 1231(a)(1)(B) states that:

28 The removal period begins on the latest of the following: 1 (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final. 2 (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court 3 orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order. 4 (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an 5 immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. 6 7 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). 8 The Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied his initial burden. Petitioner argues that 9 no sufficient facts exist to establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 10 foreseeable future. See ECF No. 1 at 2. Petitioner provides statistics to establish that he is 11 unlikely to be removed to Ecuador or Uganda within a reasonable period of time. See id. 12 at 5; ECF No. 5 at 2. Respondents did not present their own evidence to contradict 13 Petitioner’s facts, nor did they provide any evidence that Petitioner is likely to be removed 14 any time soon. See ECF No. 4 at 2. Instead, Respondents argued that Petitioner has only 15 been detained for three months and so his detention is presumptively reasonable. See id. 16 at 1–2. The Court determined the presumptively reasonable calculation begins once the 17 order of removal becomes final. See ECF No. 6 (citing Baythavong v. Noem, 26-cv-1138- 18 DMS-MSB, at *23 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2026)). 19 Respondents do not point to any evidence that they have taken any action to 20 effectuate removal of Petitioner. See Grishchenko v. Noem, 2025 WL 3675070, at *2 21 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2025) (“Respondents do not identify any potential countries which 22 might accept Petitioner’s third country removal, or any factors related to Petitioner or 23 people like him which might make a future removal attempt successful when others have 24 failed.”). As Petitioner contends, since “the government does not even attempt to provide 25 any evidence of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, it has failed to rebut Mr. 26 Camacho-Diaz’s argument.” ECF No. 5 at 4. The Court concludes that Respondents 27 have failed to rebut Petitioner’s showing that there is no significant likelihood of 28 removal. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition. 1 CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 3 ||Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from 4 ||custody, subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, 5 || including the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). The Parties are ORDERED to file a 6 || Joint Status Report by August 21, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released.'! As 7 || this concludes the litigation in this case, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: August 14, 2026 10 1] Sy, :

13 dot Jill A. Otake 14 a ait $ United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26) ' Petitioner requested attorney’s fees, related expenses, and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice 27 |! act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See ECF No. | at 17. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate 3g ||EAJA fee application within 30 days of the issuance of this Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).