gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-02610 · 2026-08-14 · Unknown

Jerome L. Grimes v. J M Towing, Inc.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
William Q. Hayes (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:22Z · confidence high

The court considered a pro se prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and his complaint against a towing company. The court denied the motion as barred by the three-strikes rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and dismissed the action without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
“For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's IFP Motion (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”
agree with court
The court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars prisoners with three or more prior dismissals for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim from proceeding IFP unless they are in imminent danger of serious physical injury. The court relied on judicial notice of its own records and a prior order in a related case (Grimes v. Arguetta) which established that the plaintiff had 'far more than three' such dismissals. The court also correctly found that the complaint, alleging 2025 torts, did not meet the 'imminent danger' exception as defined by Ninth Circuit precedent (Andrews v. Cervantes).
Dismissal of Civil Action Without Prejudice
“The Court DISMISSES THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE based on Plaintiffs failure to pay the full $405 statutory and administrative filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)”
agree with court
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), a civil action must be dismissed if the filing fee is not paid and the party is not granted IFP status. Since the IFP motion was properly denied under § 1915(g), the dismissal for failure to pay the fee is the correct procedural consequence. Dismissing without prejudice is standard in this context to allow the plaintiff to refile if they can pay the fee or if the bar is lifted.
Certification of Frivolous Appeal
“CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and “not taken in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3)”
agree with court
The court is authorized to certify an appeal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) if it is not taken in good faith. Given the clear application of the three-strikes bar and the lack of imminent danger allegations, an appeal challenging the denial of IFP status would likely lack merit, making the certification appropriate.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable statute (§ 1915(g)), applies the correct standard for what constitutes a 'strike' (citing El-Shaddai and O’Neal), properly uses judicial notice of prior court records to establish the three-strikes bar (citing Wilson and Andrews v. King), and correctly applies the 'imminent danger' exception (citing Andrews v. Cervantes). The dismissal for failure to pay fees is a direct consequence of the IFP denial. The certification of a frivolous appeal is also appropriate given the clear statutory bar.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 13 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 14 15 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No.: 26-cv-02610-WQH-MMP 16 ORDER: Plaintiff, 17 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO 18 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS 19 BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) J M TOWING, INC., (ECF No. 2); AND 20 21 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 22 Defendant. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 23 REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 24 HAYES, Judge: 25 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and currently 26 incarcerated at the Larry D. Smith Correctional Facility in Riverside County, has filed a 27 Complaint against Defendant J M Towing, Inc. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a Motion 28 to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”). (ECF No. 2.) 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Typically, parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay 3 filing fees wof $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). “An action may proceed despite failure to 4 pay the filing fees only if the party is granted IFP status.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 5 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Moore v. 6 Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). To further “the 7 congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court,” prisoners 8 cannot proceed IFP once they “have, while incarcerated, on 3 or more prior occasions had 9 claims dismissed due to their frivolity, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim.” Tierney 10 v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311–12 (9th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up); see also 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil 12 action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, 13 while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the 14 United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 15 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent 16 danger of serious physical injury.”). 17 When courts review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as one of these three 18 strikes, “the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial” because “the 19 central question is whether the dismissal rang the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 20 bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 21 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Prior cases are considered strikes, then, “even if 22 the district court styles such dismissal as denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 23 action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 27 Dec. 1, 2023). The $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed without prepayment. Id. 28 1 (9th Cir. 2008). Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 2 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP for having three strikes, but “in 3 some instances, the district court docket records may be sufficient to show that a prior 4 dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a 5 strike.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 While incarcerated, Plaintiff has had numerous prior civil actions dismissed on the 8 grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief 9 may be granted. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding 10 that “a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as the records 11 of [different courts] in other cases”). Indeed, a recent order in another matter found that 12 “Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, while incarcerated, has had far more than three prior civil 13 actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a 14 claim upon which relief may be granted.” Grimes v. Arguetta, No. 25-cv-1979-BAS-MSB, 15 2025 WL 2495242, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025). That order took judicial notice that 16 Plaintiff has filed “over 600 civil actions in multiple federal district courts across the 17 country dating back to 1986[;]” identified at least five specific strikes entered in the Eastern 18 District of California, Middle District of Florida, and District of Maryland; and noted prior 19 § 1915(g) bars in this Court, the Northern District of California, Western District of 20 Louisiana, Eastern District of Kentucky, Middle and Northern Districts of Florida, and the 21 District of Maryland dating as far back as 2007. Id. at *2–3; see also Grimes v. Armada 22 Transp., Inc., No. 26-cv-3241-AJB-SBC, 2026 WL 1591095, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 23 2026). 24 Nor can Plaintiff meet the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception 25 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Imminent danger requires an allegation that a harm is “ready 26 to take place” or “hanging threateningly over one’s head.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 27 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). It “cannot be triggered solely by complaints of 28 past injury or generalized fears of possible future harm.” Hernandez v. Williams, No. 1 21-cv-347-MMA-KSC, 2021 WL 1317376, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021) (cleaned up). 2 || Plaintiff claims Defendant J M Towing, Inc., a towing/impound yard operator, committed 3 || various torts against him in 2025. (See Doc. No. 1 at 2—7.) Plaintiff does not attempt to 4 ||allege he is in any imminent danger. Therefore, nothing in his complaint satisfies the 5 imminent danger exception. 6 il. CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's IFP Motion (ECF 8 ||No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court DISMISSES THIS ACTION 9 || WITHOUT PREJUDICE based on Plaintiffs failure to pay the full $405 statutory and 10 ||administrative filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal 11 || from this Order would be frivolous and “not taken in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 12 1915(a)(3); and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the case. 13 14 || Dated: August 14, 2026 Nitta Z. Ma 15 Hon, William Q. Hayes 16 United States District Court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 ee