Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IRA A. STRINGER, Jr., Case No.: 24-cv-1234-JO-BJW 12 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 13 v. RE MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 14 RAUL MORALES, Acting Warden, et al., CORPUS 15 Respondent. 16 [ECF No. 31] 17 18 Before the Court is Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas 19 Corpus. ECF No. 31. After Respondent filed the Motion, Petitioner filed a First Amended 20 Petition and an opposition to the Motion. ECF Nos. 32-33. The Court submits this Report 21 and Recommendation to United States District Judge Jinsook Ohta pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 22 § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.1.e. Having reviewed the parties’ filings, the Court 23 RECOMMENDS that the District Court: (1) DENY AS MOOT Respondent’s Motion to 24 dismiss to the extent it challenges Ground One of the superseded Original Petition; (2) 25 GRANT the Motion IN PART as to claims seeking relief solely from Petitioner’s reversed 26 convictions under California Penal Code section 209, subdivision (a); and (3) 27 OTHERWISE DENY the Motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 28 // 1 I. PRIOR STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS 2 A San Diego County Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner Ira Alexander Stringer 3 (“Petitioner” or “Stringer”) of two counts of aggravated kidnapping to commit extortion or 4 exact money or property from another person (Cal. Penal Code § 209, subd. (a); counts 1 5 and 2); three counts of aggravated kidnapping to facilitate carjacking (§ 209.5; counts 5, 6, 6 and 15); two counts of simple kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); counts 9 and 10); two counts 7 of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 11 and 12); one count of child 8 endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 13); two counts of felony possession of a firearm 9 (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 14 and 19); and one count of robbery (§ 211; count 18). The 10 trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of life without the possibility of parole, 11 plus 87 years to life. People v. Stringer, 41 Cal. App. 5th 974, 979–80 (2019). 12 Petitioner appealed and challenged the extortion instruction, the sufficiency of the 13 evidence, the effectiveness of trial counsel, and the denial of his request for self- 14 representation. Id. at 979–80. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 15 Division One, reversed Counts 1 and 2 because the trial court’s definition of “extortion” 16 constituted prejudicial instructional error. Id. at 992–93. The Court of Appeal also reversed 17 Counts 9 and 10—Petitioner’s simple-kidnapping convictions—because they were lesser 18 included offenses of the kidnapping-to-facilitate-carjacking convictions. Id. at 993. The 19 Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in all other respects, vacated the sentence, and 20 remanded the matter for the People to elect whether to retry Counts 1 and 2 or, if the People 21 declined retrial, for resentencing. Id. Petitioner’s petition for review was denied by the 22 California Supreme Court in 2020. ECF No. 31 at 2. 23 On remand, the People elected not to retry Petitioner on Counts 1 and 2. People v. 24 Stringer, No. D079595, 2023 WL 3087498, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023). The trial 25 court denied Petitioner’s Motion to Strike his prior two strike convictions pursuant to 26 People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996), and resentenced Petitioner on 27 October 8, 2021, to an aggregate term of 75 years to life plus 42 years. Id.; ECF No. 31 at 28 3. Petitioner appealed, challenging the denial of his motion and identifying clerical errors 1 in the abstract of judgment. Stringer, 2023 WL 3087498, at *1. The Court of Appeal 2 affirmed the judgment and directed the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to 3 conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence. Id. 4 In June 2024, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in San Diego County Superior 5 Court, Case No. HC26955. Petitioner identifies the claims raised as ineffective assistance 6 of trial and appellate counsel, judicial misconduct, and failure to give clarifying jury 7 instructions concerning section 209, subdivision (a). The Superior Court denied the petition 8 on August 22, 2024. ECF No. 32 at 3. 9 II. FEDERAL PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 10 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas 11 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Original Petition”) on July 15, 2024. ECF No. 1. 12 The Original Petition asserted three grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleged 13 that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by erroneous jury 14 instructions concerning extortion and alleged disparities in the treatment of witnesses. Id. 15 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserted ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, alleging that 16 trial counsel failed to adequately clarify the extortion instruction and use Petitioner’s notes 17 to impeach witness credibility, and that appellate counsel failed to raise those matters on 18 appeal. Id. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleged that: (1) the California Court of Appeal’s 19 use of the Jackson v. Virginia “beyond a reasonable doubt” sufficiency-of-the-evidence 20 standard was objectively unreasonable; (2) the appellate court contradicted its asserted de 21 novo review; (3) affirmance of the evidence’s sufficiency violated the Fourteenth 22 Amendment; and (4) the trial judge failed to restrain prosecutorial “vitriol” and, along with 23 the prosecutor, knowingly relied on allegedly misleading or incomplete witness testimony 24 to support the California Penal Code section 209 charges. Id. 25 Concurrently with the Original Petition, Petitioner moved for a stay and abeyance 26 under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), to exhaust in state court claims concerning 27 the extortion instruction. ECF No. 4. The Court granted Petitioner leave to proceed in forma 28 pauperis. ECF No. 7. On February 10, 2025, U.S. District Judge Jinsook Ohta denied the 1 stay request. ECF No. 18. The Court concluded that the identified unexhausted claims arose 2 from alleged instructional error related to Petitioner’s extortion convictions, which the 3 California Court of Appeal had already reversed in full, and that the claims were therefore 4 moot and not potentially meritorious under Rhines. Id. 5 On September 24, 2025, the Court ordered Respondent to file either an answer or a 6 motion to dismiss the Original Petition. ECF No. 20. Following extensions of time, 7 Respondent filed the pending Motion to Dismiss on January 16, 2026. ECF No. 31. 8 Respondent argues that portions of Ground One of the Original Petition are illegible and 9 that Grounds Two and Three are moot to the extent they seek relief from the extortion- 10 related convictions reversed on direct appeal. Id. 11 On February 17, 2026, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition (“FAP”), which was 12 entered on February 23, 2026. ECF No. 32. The FAP supersedes the Original Petition and 13 is therefore the operative pleading. Although Respondent’s Motion addresses only the 14 Original Petition, and although certain portions of the FAP are difficult to decipher, the 15 Court liberally construes the FAP and summarizes the claims it reasonably presents as 16 follows. The FAP does not assert Ground Two as an independent ground for relief; instead, 17 Petitioner states that the allegations underlying that claim are incorporated into Ground 18 One. Id. Liberally construed, Ground One alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective 19 assistance by failing to investigate and present assertedly favorable evidence and witnesses, 20 adequately understand and litigate the elements of extortion, request clarifying jury 21 instructions, and impeach alleged inconsistencies between the victims’ grand-jury and trial 22 testimony. Id. Ground One further alleges that the prosecution misstated the law and 23 evidence concerning extortion, relied on allegedly false or inconsistent testimony, and 24 secured an improper extortion instruction, while the trial court failed to correct those 25 asserted errors. Id. Ground Three challenges the state appellate court’s affirmance of the 26 sufficiency of the evidence as an unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia and the 27 Due Process Clause, principally on Petitioner’s theory that the evidence did not establish 28 the “coerced consent” and property-demand components he contends were required to 1 support the kidnapping-for-extortion charges under California Penal Code section 209(a). 2 Id. Petitioner further asserts that the appellate court’s review improperly relied on 3 assumptions rather than the trial record, conflicted with its stated de novo review, and failed 4 to account for the allegedly erroneous extortion instruction, asserted prosecutorial 5 misconduct, and alleged discrepancies in the victims’ testimony. Id. On February 23, 2026, 6 Petitioner filed an opposition to the Motion, which was entered on March 2, 2026. ECF 7 No. 33. Petitioner also moved for leave to file excess pages, which the Court found as moot 8 in a separate order. ECF Nos. 34, 35. 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal courts may adjudicate only live cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, 11 § 2. “Mootness is jurisdictional.” Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) 12 (citing Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000)). 13 Accordingly, throughout the litigation, a habeas petitioner must suffer, “or be threatened 14 with, an actual injury that traceable to the [respondent] and likely to be redressed by a 15 favorable judicial decision.” Id. (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). 16 The redressability inquiry in a habeas action is informed by the nature of habeas 17 relief. “[T]he traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody,” 18 although federal courts retain flexibility to fashion habeas relief as law and justice require. 19 Burnett, 432 F.3d at 999 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973), and 20 Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994)). A case is moot only where no 21 effective relief for the alleged violation can be granted. Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. 22 Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, a habeas claim is moot 23 where the Court could not grant effective habeas relief even if the petitioner established 24 the asserted constitutional violation. See Burnett, 432 F.3d at 999–1001. 25 An amended pleading generally supersedes the original pleading. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 26 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, after a petitioner files an amended petition, the 27 amended petition ordinarily becomes the operative pleading, and a motion directed solely 28 to allegations in a superseded petition may be denied as moot. See id. But amendment does 1 not necessarily moot a pending motion to dismiss. A court may consider the motion to the 2 extent the amended pleading retains the claims, theories, or alleged deficiencies challenged 3 in the original pleading and the amendment does not materially alter the issues presented. 4 See KST Data, Inc. v. DXC Tech. Co., 980 F.3d 709, 715–16 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that 5 an amended complaint did not require a new answer where the amendment did not alter 6 the defendant’s previous admissions or denials); Meister v. Fling Enter. Prevost LLC, No. 7 CV-24-02943-PHX-JJT, 2025 WL 896465, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2025) (declining to 8 deny a pending motion to dismiss as moot where the amended complaint remained 9 substantially identical to the original complaint and suffered from the same asserted 10 deficiencies). 11 IV. DISCUSSION 12 A. The Motion Is Moot as to Ground One of the Original Petition 13 Respondent argues that Ground One of the Original Petition should be dismissed 14 because portions of that filing are illegible or difficult to read. ECF No. 31 at 5–6. After 15 Respondent filed the Motion, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition (“FAP”). ECF No. 16 32. The FAP replaces the Original Petition and is now the operative petition. See Ferdik, 17 963 F.2d at 1262. Liberally construed, the FAP’s Ground One presents allegations 18 concerning ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the extortion instruction, alleged 19 prosecutorial misconduct, and the trial court’s handling of those matters. ECF No. 32. 20 Because Respondent’s legibility argument concerns Ground One as pleaded in the 21 Original Petition, which has been replaced by the FAP, the Court RECOMMENDS that 22 the District Court DENY AS MOOT that portion of the Motion. This recommendation 23 does not decide whether Petitioner is entitled to relief on Ground One as pleaded in the 24 FAP, or whether that claim is timely, exhausted, or otherwise properly before the Court. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 1 B. Claims Seeking Relief Solely From Petitioner’s Reversed Section 209(a) Convictions Are Moot 2 3 Respondent argues that Grounds Two and Three are moot because they concern 4 Petitioner’s extortion-related convictions, which the California Court of Appeal reversed 5 on direct appeal. ECF No. 31 at 4-5. Petitioner agrees that Grounds Two and Three “may 6 be moot,” but argues that the facts in those grounds are relevant to Ground One. ECF No. 7 33 at 9-10. 8 The California Court of Appeal reversed Counts 1 and 2, Petitioner’s convictions for 9 aggravated kidnapping to commit extortion or exact money or property from another 10 person under California Penal Code section 209, subdivision (a). The Court of Appeal 11 concluded that the jury received an erroneous instruction defining extortion. Stringer, 41 12 Cal. App. 5th at 992–93. On remand, the People elected not to retry Petitioner on Counts 13 1 and 2. Stringer, 2023 WL 3087498, at *1. Petitioner is therefore not in custody on Counts 14 1 and 2. 15 To the extent Grounds Two and Three seek habeas relief solely from Counts 1 and 16 2, those claims are moot. Petitioner has already obtained reversal of those convictions, and 17 the People elected not to retry him on those counts. Thus, even if Petitioner proved the 18 constitutional violations he alleges, this Court could not give him further habeas relief on 19 Counts 1 and 2. See Burnett, 432 F.3d at 999–1001; Neighbors, 303 F.3d at 1065–66. 20 This conclusion is consistent with the Court’s prior order denying Petitioner’s 21 request for a stay and abeyance. Judge Ohta concluded that the claims Petitioner identified 22 as unexhausted concerned instructional error related to the extortion convictions. Because 23 the Court of Appeal had already reversed those convictions, the Court concluded that no 24 effective relief remained available and denied the stay request. ECF No. 18; see also Kirvin 25 v. California, No. 16-cv-3387AG (SS), 2017 WL 11829698, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 26 2017). 27 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the 28 Motion IN PART as to claims in Grounds Two and Three seeking habeas relief solely 1 from Counts 1 and 2. This recommendation does not determine whether factual allegations 2 included in those grounds may be relevant to Ground One of the FAP, Petitioner’s 3 remaining convictions, or his current sentence. 4 C. The Remaining Aspects of the Motion Should Be Denied Without Prejudice 5 The FAP is the operative petition. ECF No. 32. Respondent filed the Motion before 6 Petitioner filed the FAP, and the Motion addresses the Original Petition. ECF No. 31. 7 Except for Respondent’s challenge to Ground One as pleaded in the superseded Original 8 Petition and claims seeking relief solely from Petitioner’s reversed convictions under 9 California Penal Code section 209, subdivision (a), the Motion does not substantively 10 address the operative FAP. 11 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY the Motion 12 WITHOUT PREJUDICE in all other respects. 13 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 14 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the District Judge issue 15 an Order: 16 1. DENYING AS MOOT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for 17 Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 31, to the extent it challenges Ground One of the 18 superseded Original Petition; 19 2. GRANTING the Motion IN PART as to claims seeking relief solely 20 from Petitioner’s reversed convictions under California Penal Code section 209, 21 subdivision (a); and 22 3. OTHERWISE DENYING the Motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 23 The Court further RECOMMENDS that Respondent be ordered to file an answer 24 to the First Amended Petition within 60 days after entry of an order adopting this Report 25 and Recommendation. The answer must address the allegations of the First Amended 26 Petition and include the materials required by Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 27 Cases. Petitioner may file a reply within 30 days after service of Respondent’s answer. 28 1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party may file and serve specific written 2 objections to this Report and Recommendation no later than August 28, 2026. The 3 ||document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party may, but is not required to, file and 5 || serve a response to another party’s objections no later than September 11, 2026. The parties 6 || are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right 7 || to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 8 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 ||Dated: August 14, 2026 11 12 13 Je J. White 14 United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _9-