Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARYAN AHMED MOHOMED, Case No.: 26-CV-3426 JLS (GC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND (2) GRANTING 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, et al., MOTION TO SEAL 15 Respondents. (ECF Nos. 1, 10) 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Maryan Ahmed Mohomed’s Petition for Writ 19 of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court 20 are Respondents’ Response to Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 9) and Petitioner’s Traverse 21 (“Traverse,” ECF No. 12). Also before the Court is Respondents’ Motion to File 22 Documents Under Seal (“Mot.,” ECF No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the Court 23 GRANTS IN PART the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and GRANTS the Motion to 24 Seal. 25 MOTION TO SEAL 26 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 27 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 28 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 1 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 2 Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz v. 3 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The presumption 4 of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, 5 particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the 6 public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler 7 Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 8 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 9 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 10 presumption of access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. The showing required to meet this burden 11 depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more than 12 tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. When 13 the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the “compelling 14 reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the underlying motion does not surpass 15 the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. 16 Under the compelling reasons standard, “the party seeking protection bears the 17 burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no [protection] is granted.” 18 Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). “In general, 19 ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify 20 sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper 21 purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, 22 circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 23 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, “[t]he mere fact that the production of records 24 may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will 25 not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). 26 The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court” 27 upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Nixon, 28 435 U.S. at 599. 1 Respondents seek to seal Exhibits 6, 7, and 8 to their Return under seal. See Mot. at 2 1. These Exhibits include information containing Petitioner’s “personal identifying 3 information, personal identifying information of third parties, law enforcement sensitive 4 information, and information concerning Petitioner’s applications for relief from removal.” 5 Id. These Exhibits are “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case,” therefore, 6 the compelling reasons standard applies. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. The Court 7 finds that these requests are narrowly tailored and sufficiently meet the compelling reasons 8 standard. See, e.g., Ndandu v. Noem, et al., No. 25-cv-2939 RBM (MSB), ECF No. 2 at 3, 9 6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (granting motion to seal concerning documents related to 10 asylum and CAT protection because they had the potential to identify him and subject him 11 to physical harm if made public); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1095–96 (E.D. 12 Cal. 2025) (granting motion to seal any information related to petitioner’s asylum 13 application due to the sensitive nature of the allegations). Therefore, Respondent’s Motion 14 to Seal (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file under 15 seal the lodged unredacted document submitted by Respondents: Exhibit 6, Transcript of 16 Oral Decision Rendered by Immigration Judge; Exhibit 7, digital audio recording of Oral 17 Decision Rendered by Immigration Judge; and Exhibit 8, Federal Bureau of Investigation 18 Letter Head Memorandum (ECF No. 11). 19 HABEAS PETITION 20 Petitioner, a citizen of Somalia, entered the United States in 2022, was briefly 21 detained, and released on parole. Ret. at 2. On October 17, 2022, a Form I-200 Warrant 22 was issued, and Petitioner was taken into custody and ultimately released on her own 23 recognizance under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. On January 17, 2025, a Form I-200 Warrant 24 was again issued for Petitioner, and she was arrested. Id. Petitioner applied for relief from 25 removal include asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Id. at 3. Petitioner 26 was denied relief by an IJ on April 30, 2026, finding her uncredible due to FBI interviews 27 and investigations concerning her brother’s involvement with Al Shabab and her sister’s 28 criminal history. Id. Petitioner was ordered removed to Somalia, in the first instance, and 1 ||to Kenya, in the second instance, but was granted withholding of removal as to Somalia. 2 ||/d. Petitioner now challenges the January 2025 revocation of her parole under the Due 3 || Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pet. at 16-18. 4 Respondents state that Petitioner 1s subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 5 |}and “do not oppose an order from this Court directing a bond hearing.” Ret. at □□ The 6 ||Court finds that a post-deprivation bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides 7 || Petitioner with sufficient process. See Diego Anibal Aliaga Pena v. Sixto Marrero, et al. 8 || No. 26-CV-3279 JLS (MSB), 2026 WL 2126861 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2026) (finding a post- 9 || deprivation bond hearing sufficient considering changed circumstances). Accordingly, the 10 Court DENIES the Petition to the extent it seeks release and GRANTS the Petition to the 11 ||} extent it seeks a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 12 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ 13 || of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and ORDERS the Government to provide Petitioner with 14 || an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within fourteen (14) days, unless 15 || Petitioner, the non-citizen, requests a continuance. Bond SHALL NOT be denied on the 16 basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) requires mandatory detention. The non-citizen bears the 17 || burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they are not a danger to 18 community or a flight risk. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.A4th 1189, 1197 (9th 19 2022). The Court DENIES the Petition to the extent that Petitioner requests to be 20 ||released from custody. The Parties SHALL FILE a status report informing the Court of 21 outcome of the hearing by September 9, 2026. As this concludes the litigation in this 22 ||matter, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 || Dated: August 13, 2026 2 (een 26 United States District Judge 27 28