Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 Case No.: 25-cv-01665-DMS-MSB 9 JACOB MATTHEW, 10 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S 11 v. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT CHRISTOPHER PALOMARES et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 15 16 17 On December 18, 2025, Plaintiff Jacob Matthew, proceeding pro se, filed a Second 18 Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants Officer Christopher Palomares, Officer 19 Tim Dinger, Sheriff’s Deputy John Cashman, and Automotive Specialists. (Second Am. 20 Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 17). Plaintiff brings constitutional and “equitable” claims 21 arising from a June 20, 2025 traffic stop on the San Pasqual Reservation and the subsequent 22 impoundment of the vehicle he was driving. (Id. at 1, 7). As Plaintiff is proceeding in 23 forma pauperis (“IFP”), the Court is required to screen the SAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(2). (See ECF No. 8). For the following reasons, the Court sua sponte dismisses 25 causes of action one, three, four, five, and six, and directs the U.S. Marshal to effectuate 26 service of the SAC for the remaining claim. 27 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff alleges that on June 20, 2025, he was driving a black 2014 Lincoln MKS 3 with expired Texas license plates near the Valley View Casino on the San Pasqual 4 Reservation in California. (SAC ¶¶ 9, 11).1 At approximately 8:45 AM, tribal police 5 officers allegedly ran Plaintiff’s plates and pulled him over. (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff alleges 6 that Defendant Officers Palomares and Dinger detained him for lack of registration and 7 driving without a valid driver’s license in violation of the California Vehicle Code. (Id. 8 ¶ 11). Plaintiff alleges that when he informed the Officers he was “traveling privately,” 9 they “retaliated by shouting ‘sovereign citizen’ accusations and accusing Plaintiff of 10 ‘playing games.’” (Id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff alleges that at some point Defendant Deputy 11 Cashman from the San Diego County Sheriff’s Office arrived on the scene but failed to 12 intervene in the situation. (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff alleges that Officers Palomares and Dinger 13 handcuffed him, placed him against a police cruiser in the hot sun for approximately forty 14 minutes, patted him down, and seized his wallet and other private property. (Id. ¶ 15). 15 Plaintiff further alleges that the Officers interrogated him without Miranda warnings, 16 “coercing answers about past arrests, tattoos, military service, residency, and activities.” 17 (Id. ¶ 16). The Officers allegedly searched the vehicle without consent, “exposing a patent 18 application for a dual therapy for alcoholism and liver disease (valued at $1.35 billion in 19 projected first-year sales . . .), scattering papers, and requiring 20 minutes to reorganize.” 20 (Id. ¶ 18). Officer Palomares allegedly issued Plaintiff a Notice to Appear in San Pasqual 21 Tribal Court for violations of tribal code section 3.07(D)(7)(e) requiring a driver’s license 22 and registration. (Id. ¶ 20). Officer Palomares then allegedly called “Hector,” an agent of 23 Defendant Automotive Specialists to tow the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22). Plaintiff was released 24 and later texted Hector, who confirmed that the vehicle could not be retrieved without tribal 25 police release, state obligations, and fees. (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges that at an August 14, 26 27 1 Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle is “titled via a trust transfer grant deed to the Jacob Matthew: Jensen 28 1 2025 hearing in tribal court, the prosecution stated that the vehicle was impounded pursuant 2 to California Vehicle Code section 22651 because its registration had been expired for 3 more than six months. (Id. ¶ 26). 4 On July 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action with a Motion to Proceed IFP, Motion for 5 a Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Motion for an In- 6 Chambers Conference, and Motion to Seal Case. (ECF Nos. 1–3, 5–7). The Court 7 subsequently granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed the 8 Complaint, denying the requests for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, 9 and to seal the case. (ECF No. 8). The Court reasoned that Plaintiff had failed to allege 10 that Defendants were acting under color of state law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but 11 gave Plaintiff leave to amend. (Id. at 4). On July 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended 12 Complaint (“FAC”) with a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Motion to Clarify 13 Equitable Status, and a Motion to File Documents Under Seal. (ECF Nos. 9–12). On 14 August 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Supplemental 15 Pleading. (ECF No. 14). On December 1, 2025, the Court found the FAC sufficient to 16 survive screening, denied the preliminary injunction request, declined to “clarify equitable 17 status,” denied the request to file under seal, and gave Plaintiff twenty-one days to file an 18 amended complaint with the proposed additions. (ECF No. 16). On December 18, 2025, 19 Plaintiff filed the SAC alleging six causes of action: (1) a First Amendment retaliation 20 claim brought under § 1983 against Officer Palomares, Officer Dinger, and Deputy 21 Cashman; (2) a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim brought under 22 § 1983 against all Defendants; (3) a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 23 brought under § 1983 against Officer Palomares, Officer Dinger, and Deputy Cashman; (4) 24 an “Equitable Wrongful Deprivation of Unalienable Right to Liberty” claim against Officer 25 Palomares and Officer Dinger; (5) an “Equitable Wrongful Deprivation of Unalienable 26 Right to Property 4th Amendment” claim against Officer Palomares, Officer Dinger, and 27 Automotive Specialists; and (6) an “Equitable Wrongful Deprivation of Privacy 9th 28 Amendment” claim against Officer Palomares and Officer Dinger. (SAC ¶¶ 27–38). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen an IFP complaint and dismiss 3 the case if, at any time, it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 4 a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 5 is immune from such relief. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 6 curiam) (confirming § 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to non-prisoners as well). A complaint “is 7 frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” and malicious where “it 8 was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 9 325 (1989); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). 10 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 11 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil 12 Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 13 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 14 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 15 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 16 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept 17 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 18 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 19 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 20 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 21 Finally, dismissal is warranted when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief against an immune 22 defendant, as long as the court “has sufficient information to make a determination on 23 immunity.” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016). 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 The Court’s December 1, 2025 Order found that Plaintiff had cured the state-actor 26 deficiency previously identified by the Court. (See ECF Nos. 8, 16). However, as the SAC 27 supersedes previous complaints and § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to dismiss complaints any 28 time they are found to be deficient, the Court now subjects the SAC to a full § 1915 1 screening. See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). 2 Accordingly, the Court will examine each cause of action to determine whether it is 3 frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks 4 monetary relief against a defendant with immunity from such relief.2 5 A. Section 1983 Claims 6 Plaintiff’s first three causes of action are brought under § 1983. (SAC ¶¶ 27–32). 7 “Section 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of rights under the Constitution and laws 8 of the United States when the deprivation takes place under color of any statute, ordinance, 9 regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.” Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. 10 Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified); (see ECF Nos. 11 8, 16). As discussed in the Court’s previous order, “actions taken under color of tribal law 12 are beyond the reach of § 1983.” R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 13 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983); (see ECF No. 8 at 4). As such, the Officers may “be held liable 14 under § 1983 only if they were acting under color of state, not tribal, law.” Pistor v. Garcia, 15 791 F.3d 1104, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the Officers 16 were acting under the color of state law by pointing to a cross-deputization agreement 17 between San Diego County and the San Pasqual Band, the Officers’ enforcement of state 18 law, and an impoundment justified by the California Vehicle Code. (SAC ¶¶ 11, 26); cf. 19 Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 895–97 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that tribal officers were 20 acting under the color of state law when they pulled over a non-member driving on a public 21 highway and gave him a state-law citation). Deputy Cashman, a San Diego County 22 Sheriff’s Deputy, is properly identified as a state actor. (SAC ¶ 11). Finally, Automotive 23 Specialists may be considered a state actor only if it “acted in concert in effecting a 24 particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444–45 (9th 25 26 27 2 Plaintiff sues Officer Palomares, Officer Dinger, and Deputy Cashman in their individual capacities. (SAC 1). The Court does not presently have sufficient information to evaluate Defendants’ immunity 28 1 Cir. 2002) (citation modified) (“The Supreme Court has articulated four tests for 2 determining whether a private individual’s actions amount to state action: (1) the public 3 function test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the 4 governmental nexus test. Only the joint action test is relevant here.” (citation omitted)). 5 “A plaintiff may demonstrate joint action by proving the existence of a conspiracy or by 6 showing that the private party was a willful participant in joint action with the State or its 7 agents.” Id. at 445. To be liable as a co-conspirator, the private party must share the 8 common objective of violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. Here, Plaintiff does 9 not plausibly allege that Automotive Specialists shared in the common goal of violating 10 Plaintiff’s rights. However, the allegation that the Officers called a towing operator they 11 worked with frequently is sufficient to demonstrate joint action for purposes of this 12 screening. (SAC ¶ 22); see, e.g., Stypmann v. City of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1341– 13 42 (9th Cir. 1977) (“A police officer makes the initial determination that a car will be towed 14 and summons the towing company. The towing company tows the vehicle only at the 15 direction of the officer. . . . The towing company detains the vehicle and asserts the lien for 16 towing and storage charges pursuant to a statutory scheme designed solely to accomplish 17 the state’s purpose of enforcing its traffic laws. Thus, the private towing company is a 18 willful participant in a joint activity with the State or its agents.” (citation modified)). For 19 those reasons, each of the Defendants meets the threshold requirement of being a state actor 20 under § 1983. 21 1. First Amendment Claim 22 Plaintiff’s first claim, brought under § 1983, alleges that Officer Palomares, Officer 23 Dinger, and Deputy Cashman violated his “First Amendment right to free expression by 24 retaliating against his assertion of equitable status and private capacity.” (SAC ¶ 28). “To 25 bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must allege that (1) [they] engaged 26 in constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a person of 27 ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) the protected 28 activity was a substantial motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.” Ariz. Students’ 1 Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation modified); see 2 Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398–99 (2019) (finding there must be but-for cause 3 between the defendant’s retaliatory animus and the plaintiff’s subsequent injury). Here, 4 Plaintiff alleges that the Officers and Deputy responded to the statement he was “traveling 5 privately” with “accusations and sarcastic dismissal.” (SAC ¶¶ 14, 28). However, these 6 allegations do not rise to the level of chilling a person of ordinary firmness. See, e.g., 7 Giddens v. City of Suisun, No. 2:14-cv-00943 TLN AC (PS), 2018 WL 705535, at *10 8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2018) (finding that insults are not enough to silence a person of ordinary 9 firmness). Furthermore, to the extent the retaliatory act is the stop or citation, Plaintiff 10 himself admits he was driving with expired registration and without a driver’s license. (Id. 11 ¶¶ 11, 17). Thus, there is no but-for connection between the alleged “retaliatory animus” 12 and Plaintiff’s subsequent injury. Nieves, 587 U.S. at 398–99. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 13 First Amendment claim is not plausibly alleged and fails to state a claim upon which relief 14 may be granted. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 15 2. Fourth Amendment Claim 16 Plaintiff’s second claim, brought under § 1983, alleges that Defendants violated his 17 Fourth Amendment rights “by detaining him for 40 minutes, searching his [vehicle], and 18 seizing it without probable cause, running his Texas plates while stopped in traffic.” (SAC 19 ¶ 30). Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Cashman failed to intervene and that Automotive 20 Specialists conspired with the Officers to effect the seizure. (Id.). However, Plaintiff does 21 not plausibly allege that the initial stop was unlawful because running a license plate is not 22 a Fourth Amendment search and information that the vehicle’s registration had lapsed 23 supplied reasonable suspicion for a stop. United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 24 1153 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We hold that a license plate check does not constitute a Fourth 25 Amendment search.”); Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) 26 (“Because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants, even if only for a brief 27 period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, an 28 official must have individualized reasonable suspicion . . . .” (citation modified)). 1 Even where an initial stop is lawful, the “traffic stop can become unlawful if it is 2 prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket 3 for the violation” unless there is reasonable suspicion of an independent offense that 4 justifies extending the stop. United States v. Steinman, 159 F.4th 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2025) 5 (citation modified). Furthermore, “handcuffing substantially aggravates the intrusiveness 6 of an otherwise routine investigatory detention and is not part of a typical Terry stop.” 7 Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation modified). Here, 8 Plaintiff alleges that the Officers, without cause, handcuffed him, placed him against a 9 police cruiser in the sun for forty minutes, patted him down, seized his wallet, and 10 interrogated him. (SAC ¶¶ 15–16). Plaintiff further alleges that the Officers searched the 11 vehicle without his consent. (Id. ¶ 18). Taking these allegations as true, Plaintiff’s SAC 12 is sufficiently plead “to warrant ordering [Defendants] to file an answer.” Wilhelm v. 13 Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that this 14 search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged 15 a failure to intervene claim against Deputy Cashman. “Police officers have a duty to 16 intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other 17 citizen.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation modified). 18 Officers may be held liable “only if they had an opportunity to intercede.” Id. Here, 19 Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Deputy Cashman was present throughout the incident 20 but failed to prevent the unconstitutional conduct. (SAC ¶ 19). Unlike situations that occur 21 within a matter of seconds, Plaintiff describes a prolonged encounter involving 22 handcuffing, searching, and questioning. (Id.). Thus, Deputy Cashman would have had 23 an opportunity to intercede and this derivative claim likewise survives screening. 24 Finally, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the impoundment of the vehicle was 25 unlawful. Under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment, officers 26 may impound a vehicle “if the driver’s violation of a vehicle regulation prevents the driver 27 from lawfully operating the vehicle, [or] if it is necessary to remove the vehicle from an 28 exposed or public location.” Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 1 2005). Here, Plaintiff admits that he was driving with expired registration and did not have 2 a driver’s license, a circumstance under which California law expressly authorizes removal. 3 (SAC ¶¶ 11, 17, 26); Cal. Veh. Code § 22651 (West 2026). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not 4 plausibly alleged that the impoundment of the vehicle was unlawful. As this is the only 5 theory of liability against Automotive Specialists, claim two is entirely dismissed as to this 6 Defendant. Plaintiff’s second cause of action survives only as to the unreasonable search 7 and seizure claim after the traffic stop had commenced. 8 3. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims 9 Plaintiff’s third claim, brought under § 1983, alleges that Officer Palomares, Officer 10 Dinger, and Deputy Cashman violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process 11 rights by “interrogating and coercing answers without Miranda warnings.” (SAC ¶ 32); 12 see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, “a violation of Miranda does not 13 necessarily constitute a violation of the Constitution” and thus does not “confer a right to 14 sue under § 1983.” Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 150, 152 (2022). Instead, Miranda’s 15 purpose is to determine whether statements should be suppressed at a criminal trial. Id. at 16 151. As there is no relevant criminal proceeding here, Miranda serves no purpose. 17 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a due process violation. As this claim 18 fails, so does the related failure-to-intervene claim against Deputy Cashman. 19 B. Equitable Claims 20 Plaintiff’s last three causes of action assert “equitable” claims for the deprivation of 21 his right to liberty, property, and privacy. (SAC ¶¶ 33–38). However, these are not 22 recognized causes of action. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 23 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A] litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 24 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Even liberally construed as claims under § 1983, causes of action 25 four and five are duplicative of causes of action one and two. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 26 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed . . . .” (citation 27 modified)). Furthermore, although the sixth cause of action invokes the Ninth Amendment, 28 it “has never been recognized as independently securing any constitutional right, for 1 purposes of pursuing a civil rights claim.” Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 2 748 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, claims four through six are dismissed for failure to state a 3 claim upon which relief may be granted. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 4 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 5 For the foregoing reasons, causes of action one, three, four, five, and six are 6 dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff has twice amended his complaint and it is clear 7 that the identified deficiencies are legal in nature and cannot be cured by further 8 amendment. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th 9 Cir. 2011) (explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment 10 would be futile). Plaintiff’s second cause of action survives on the unlawful search and 11 seizure theory against Officer Palomares, Officer Dinger, and Deputy Cashman. 12 The Court ORDERS: 13 1. The Clerk of Court shall issue a summons and forward it to Plaintiff with a 14 blank U.S. Marshal Form 285, a certified copy of the operative complaint, and 15 a certified copy of this Order. Plaintiff must fill out U.S. Marshal Form 285 16 as completely and accurately as possible with the addresses where Defendants 17 may be found or subject to service. See CivLR 4.1c. Plaintiff must then return 18 the form to the U.S. Marshal pursuant to the Clerk’s instructions. 19 2. The U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the operative complaint, summons, 20 and this Order upon Defendants, as directed by Plaintiff on U.S. Marshal Form 21 285. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States. 22 3. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by 23 counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other 24 document submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include 25 with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate 26 stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of any document was 27 served on the Defendants or counsel for Defendants and the date of service. 28 Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been l filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service will be 2 disregarded. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: August 12, 2026 J \ 5 rn Yn « 6 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28