gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-04416 · 2026-08-12 · Unknown

Jaime Santis Santis v. Christopher Larose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.

Proceeding
original
Outcome
other — ¶¶ 28–30.) 1 On or about May 26, 2026, Petitioner w
Area
civil
Panel
Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:21Z · confidence high

The court considered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawfulness of the petitioner's immigration detention. The court stayed the case to allow the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies at a scheduled bond hearing and ordered the parties to file a joint status report.

What the court decidedThe model
Stay of the case
“the Court STAYS this case.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the prudential exhaustion requirement, noting that the bond hearing is imminent and provides a viable avenue for relief, rendering the habeas petition premature. The decision to stay rather than dismiss is consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent when exhaustion is possible.
Requirement for Joint Status Report
“the Parties shall file a Joint Status Report on or before August 17, 2026.”
agree with court
This is a standard procedural mechanism to monitor the progress of the administrative exhaustion process and determine if the case becomes moot.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standard for habeas corpus and the prudential exhaustion requirement. It distinguishes prior district court precedent (Garcia-Gonzalez) based on the new Ninth Circuit authority (Rodriguez Vazquez) and the fact that a bond hearing is actually scheduled, making the remedy available and not futile. The decision to stay the case is a proper exercise of discretion under Leonardo v. Crawford.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JAIME SANTIS SANTIS, Case No.: 3:26-cv-04416-RBM-MSB 11 Petitioner, ORDER STAYING CASE AND 12 v. REQUIRING STATUS REPORT 13 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden, Otay [Doc. 1] Mesa Detention Center, et al., 14 Respondents. 15 16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner Jaime Santis Santis’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ 18 of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the lawfulness of 19 his immigration detention. (Doc. 1.) Because Petitioner’s bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1226(a) is scheduled for August 13, 2026, and because Petitioner should first exhaust 21 that remedy, the Court STAYS this case. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in or 24 about 2005. (Id. ¶ 26.) Petitioner has resided here continuously since then and has an 25 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal pending before United States 26 Citizenship and Immigration Services. (Id. ¶ 27.) In connection with that Application, the 27 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) granted Petitioner employment authorization 28 valid through July 23, 2030. (Id. ¶¶ 28–30.) 1 On or about May 26, 2026, Petitioner was stopped during a routine traffic stop in 2 Florida. (Id. ¶ 31.) During that stop, state law enforcement contacted immigration 3 authorities, who subsequently arrested Petitioner and took him into immigration custody. 4 (Id.) Petitioner was then transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Center, where he remains 5 today. (Id. ¶ 32.) “DHS has requested a bond hearing for Petitioner which is scheduled 6 for August 13, 2026.” (Doc. 4 at 2.) 7 On August 3, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court set a briefing 8 schedule that same day. (Doc. 2.) Respondents filed their Response to Petition on August 9 10, 2026. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed his Traverse on August 11, 2026. (Doc. 5.) 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 12 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 13 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 14 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 15 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 16 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 17 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 18 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 19 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 22 Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 53–64.) Respondents argue that: 23 (1) because DHS has requested a bond hearing, Petitioner “is lawfully detained under 8 24 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is receiving the relief to which he is entitled;” (2) the Petition is moot; 25 and (3) Petitioner should first be required to exhaust available remedies. (Doc. 4 at 2–3.) 26 The Parties agree that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a). See Rodriguez Vazquez 27 v. Bostock, — F. 4th —, 2026 WL 2196424, at *3 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026) (concluding that 28 noncitizens “present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United 1 States are subject to the detention regime of § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A)”). The Parties 2 disagree as to whether § 1226(a), and Respondents’ non-compliance with its procedures 3 when they initially detained Petitioner, compels immediate release. (See Doc. 4 at 2–3; 4 Doc. 5 at 3–6, 10–13.) 5 Petitioner correctly notes that this Court has previously concluded that “immediate 6 release, rather than a bond hearing, is the appropriate remedy” when a petitioner is detained 7 without a pre-deprivation hearing. (Doc. 5 at 11 (citing Garcia-Gonzalez v. LaRose, No. 8 3:26-cv-04248-RBM-DDL, ECF No. 6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2026)).) The petition in Garcia- 9 Gonzalez, though, was filed before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodrigez Vasquez, and 10 the respondents there failed to contest the petitioner’s assertion that a bond hearing would 11 be futile. Here, Respondents represent that they have scheduled a bond hearing for 12 Petitioner for August 13, 2026. (Doc. 4 at 2.) The immigration judge at that bond hearing, 13 no longer bound by Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), will order 14 Petitioner released if Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that he is 15 not a flight risk or danger to the community. Rodriguez Vasquez, 2026 WL 2196424, at 16 *5 (citing Rodriguez-Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022)); see also Pena 17 v. Casey, Case No. 26-cv-04382-BAS-AHG, 2026 WL 2281003, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18 7, 2026) (“Given her long history in the United States and lack of a criminal record, this 19 Court finds it likely that an Immigration Judge will find she has so demonstrated, but that 20 is a determination delegated to the Immigration Court.”). 21 Therefore, a bond hearing is no longer futile such that the Court would find it 22 appropriate or necessary to waive the prudential exhaustion requirement. See Castro- 23 Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring, “as a prudential matter, that 24 habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking 25 relief under § 2241”), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez, 548 26 U.S. 30 (2006). Given the potential for Petitioner to obtain relief at the bond hearing, the 27 fact that the bond hearing is only two days away, and the Ninth Circuit’s instruction that 28 district courts “should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings 1 || until the petitioner has exhausted remedies,” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 2 Cir. 2011), the Court finds it appropriate to STAY this case. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the case is STAYED. Additionally, the Parties shall file 5 ||a Joint Status Report on or before August 17, 2026. The Joint Status Report shall include: 6 ||(1) whether and when Petitioner received a bond hearing; (2) the outcome of that hearing; 7 || and (3) the Parties’ position as to whether the habeas petition is now moot. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 DATE: August 12, 2026 Bipetiiters 1 ON. RUTH BERMGDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28