Stephen Dragasits v. Correctional Officer Archuleta, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se plaintiff's motion seeking review of documents regarding a prior appeal, entry of partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), and severance of claims. The court denied all three requests but sua sponte extended the deadline for the plaintiff to file a third amended complaint.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to review documents (characterized as a repackaged motion for reconsideration) denied“As Dragasits’s motion to review documents is in fact a repackaged motion for reconsideration, it is again denied.” | agree with court The court correctly identifies that the plaintiff's request is functionally a motion for reconsideration, which was previously denied on the merits. The court notes that even if the procedural defect (untimeliness) were forgiven, the substantive grounds for reconsideration (intervening change in law or clear error) were already rejected. Therefore, denying the motion again is consistent with the prior ruling and the record. |
Motion for entry of partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) denied“The Court declines the invitation to enter partial final judgment.” | agree with court The court applied the correct standard from Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and cited *Noel v. Hall* for the factors to consider (interrelationship of claims, prejudice, delay). The court found that the plaintiff failed to address these factors and that the record did not support piecemeal appeals. This is a proper exercise of discretion. |
Motion to separate (sever) 8th Amendment claims from 14th Amendment claims denied“This motion, too, is denied.” | agree with court The court noted that the cases were consolidated at the plaintiff's own request due to interrelatedness. The plaintiff provided no authority for severing claims solely because some were dismissed. Given the prior consolidation order and lack of justification for severance, the denial is appropriate. |
Sua sponte extension of deadline to file third amended complaint“the Court sua sponte extends that amendment deadline to August 31, 2026.” | agree with court The court exercised its inherent authority to manage the docket and extend deadlines, particularly considering the plaintiff's pro se status. This is a procedural order within the court's discretion. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly characterizes the plaintiff's first request as a motion for reconsideration and denies it based on prior merits. It correctly applies the Rule 54(b) standard and cites the appropriate Ninth Circuit authority (*Noel v. Hall*). It properly denies severance based on the lack of authority and prior consolidation. The sua sponte extension is a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion for a pro se litigant.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Stephen DRAGASITS, Case No.: 24-cv-1257-AGS-SBC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION 5 v. (ECF 47) AND SUA SPONTE EXTENDING AMENDMENT 6 Correctional Officer ARCHULETA, et al., DEADLINE 7 Defendants. 8 9 In his most recent motion, unrepresented plaintiff Stephen Dragasits seeks three 10 forms of relief, which are addressed in turn below. 11 First, he “[a]sks the district court to review the submitted documents [that] show [he] 12 was timely in seeking an appeal.” (ECF 47, at 2.) This Court previously denied Dragasits’s 13 motion to reconsider due to, among other things, its untimeliness. Dragasits now explains 14 that his reconsideration motion was untimely because he did not know “the option for 15 reconsideration was still on the table with the district court” at the time he appealed. (Id. 16 at 3.) Given this context, he hopes that proof of his timely appeal will convince this Court 17 to overlook his tardiness and reach the merits of his reconsideration motion. Yet, even if 18 Dragasits’s late filing were forgiven, this Court already rejected that motion on its merits 19 as well. (See ECF 41, at 2 (“In any event, the Court has read through the cases cited by 20 plaintiff, and none suggest that there has been an ‘intervening change in controlling law’ 21 or that the court ‘committed clear error.’”).) As Dragasits’s motion to review documents is 22 in fact a repackaged motion for reconsideration, it is again denied. 23 Second, Dragasits “prays that the Court will grant the motion to use Federal R[ule 24 of Civil Procedure] 54(b)” to enter a partial final judgment on already dismissed claims. 25 (ECF 47, at 3.) The Court may “direct the entry of a final judgment” after dismissing less 26 than all the claims in a suit only “if the court expressly determines that there is no just 27 reason to delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). To grant that relief, the Court must consider “such 28 1 || factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases 2 || which should be reviewed only as single units” as well as “equitable factors such as 3 || prejudice and delay.” Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2009). Dragasits does not 4 address any of these factors, though, and the Court’s own review of the record does not 5 ||suggest that this case should proceed by piecemeal appeals. The Court declines the 6 || invitation to enter partial final judgment. 7 Finally, plaintiff requests “separation of the 8th Amendment violation from the 8 || plaintiff's attempt to hold stated defendants for violations of the 14th Amendment ‘Due 9 ||Process.’” (ECF 47, at 3.) Previously, at Dragasits’s own request, his cases were 10 || consolidated because of the interrelatedness of the claims. (See ECF 9; ECF 10.) The only 11 ||reason Dragasits offers for separating these claims—which were, again, joined at his 12 || urging—is that some have now been dismissed. Yet he provides no authority for severing 13 ||claims merely due to an intervening (partial) dismissal. (See generally ECF 47.) This 14 || motion, too, is denied. 15 In sum, all the requests in Dragasits’s latest motion are DENIED. Nonetheless, this 16 |! Court will offer him some unrequested relief. In its last order, the Court set a deadline of 17 July 31, 2026, for Dragasits to file his “third amended complaint updating only” the name 18 |! of one of the Doe defendants. (See ECF 41, at 1.) That date has passed without a third 19 |! amended complaint. Considering Dragasits’s unrepresented status, the Court sua sponte 20 | extends that amendment deadline to August 31, 2026. 21 |!Dated: August 12, 2026 22 23 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 2 a oe