Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 GUILLERMO MANUEL GONZALEZ- Case No.: 3:26-cv-04045-RBM-BJW RUIZ, 10 ORDER GRANTING PETITION Petitioner, 11 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 12 [Doc. 1] WARDEN/ FACILITY 13 ADMINISTRATOR, Otay Mesa 14 Detention Center, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Pending before the Court is pro se Petitioner Guillermo Manuel Gonzalez-Ruiz’s 18 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 (Doc. 1) and Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”). 20 (Doc. 2). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED and the TRO Motion 21 is DENIED AS MOOT. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States without 24 inspection on or around January 15, 2024. (Doc. 1 at 2.) “After his entry and processing 25 by immigration authorities, Petitioner was permitted to live in the community while 26 pursuing his immigration proceedings.” (Id. at 3.) “Petitioner was served with a Notice to 27 Appear dated March 22, 2024, charging him as removable under INA§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) 28 and INA§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i).” (Id.) 1 After his release, “Petitioner obtained lawful employment authorization,” “worked 2 consistently in construction,” “remained engaged in his immigration proceedings, paid the 3 required annual fee associated with his asylum application,” and “developed strong 4 community ties.” (Id. at 4.) Petitioner has no criminal record and his asylum application 5 remains pending. (Id. at 5.) 6 On or around July 4, 2026, immigration officers arrested Petitioner while he was 7 attending an immigration appointment in Miami, Florida. (Id. at 2, 5.) “Petitioner was not 8 provided advance notice that his liberty would be revoked, was not given an opportunity 9 to present evidence regarding his compliance, and was not provided a hearing before a 10 neutral decisionmaker to determine whether detention had become necessary.” (Id. at 5.) 11 Petitioner was transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Center where he remains detained. (Id.) 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 14 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 15 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 16 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 17 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 18 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 19 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 20 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 21 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Petitioner claims his immigration detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due 24 Process Clause and lacks a valid statutory basis. (Doc. 1 at 8–12.) Respondents assert that 25 “Petitioner was previously released from immigration custody on conditional parole issued 26 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)[,]” but nonetheless maintain their position that “Petitioner is 27 subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” (Doc. 5 at 2.) Respondents 28 “acknowledge[ ] that this Court’s prior decisions will control the result here if the Court 1 adheres to its prior decisions, as the facts are not materially distinguishable for purposes of 2 the Court’s decision, and on that basis . . . does not oppose the [P]etition and defers to the 3 Court on the appropriate relief.” (Id. at 2–3.) 4 This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners 5 who were previously released from detention on conditional parole and re-detained several 6 years later. In Faizyan v. Casey, the Court held such petitioners are “subject to the 7 discretionary detention procedures under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and [their] detention without a 8 bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause.” Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 9 WL 3208844, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); see Penagos-Alvarez v. LaRose, Case No.: 10 3:26-cv-00865-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 539340 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2026). Applying the due 11 process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court also found that 12 Respondents’ summary revocation of the petitioner’s “conditional parole without an 13 opportunity to be heard deprived [him] of his due process rights.” Faizyan, 2025 WL 14 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); see C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25- CV- 15 01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding a due process 16 violation where the petitioner was initially released on his own recognizance); Leiva Flores 17 v. Albarran, Case No. 25- cv-09302-AMO, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 18 2025) (finding the same and requiring a hearing before detention). 19 Like in Faizyan, Petitioner was previously released from custody on conditional 20 parole under § 1226(a). (See Doc. 4 at 1.) “As ICE was not authorized to release 21 [Petitioner] if [he] was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court must infer 22 from [his] release that ICE determined [he] was neither.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 23 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). 24 Before he was re-detained in July 2026, Petitioner lived in the United States for over 25 two years, integrated himself into his community, was able to apply for asylum relief, has 26 no criminal history, “complied with his immigration obligations, maintained a fixed 27 residence, obtained lawful employment authorization, worked steadily, paid the annual fee 28 associated with his asylum application, and voluntarily appeared for his scheduled 1 ||immigration appointment[s].”” (Doc. | at 2.) Petitioner also claims, and Respondents do 2 ||not dispute, that he “was not provided advance notice that his liberty would be revoked, 3 || was not given an opportunity to present evidence regarding his compliance, and was not 4 || provided a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether detention had 5 || become necessary.” (/d. at 5.) 6 The Court therefore adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here. For those 7 ||same reasons, the Court finds that: (1) Petitioner is subject to § 1226’s discretionary 8 || detention procedures; and (2) ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s release on conditional parole 9 || without a pre-deprivation hearing violated his due process rights and rendered his detention 10 |}unlawful. See Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. The TRO 13 || Motion (Doc. 2) is therefore DENIED AS MOOT. Accordingly: 14 1. The Government is ORDERED to immediately release the noncitizen from 15 custody, subject to the conditions of his preexisting conditional parole. 16 2. The Court ORDERS that, prior to any re-detention, the noncitizen SHALL 17 receive notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before an 18 immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to determine whether detention 19 is warranted. 20 3. The noncitizen bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the 21 evidence, that he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. See Rodriguez 22 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||DATE: August 12, 2026 6 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28