Natalie Rajic v. Vlad Kroutik, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Natalie Rajic filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and other motions in a civil case that was referred to a bankruptcy judge. The District Court denied the IFP motion because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate poverty and the case was not yet properly before the District Court, and denied the other motions as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF 4) is DENIED.“The IFP motion is thus DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the two-prong test for IFP status in the Ninth Circuit: (1) the plaintiff must demonstrate poverty with particularity, and (2) the complaint must be screened for frivolousness or failure to state a claim. The plaintiff's reported monthly net income of $6,690 (approx. $80,000 annually) objectively fails the poverty prong. Additionally, the court correctly noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and Local Bankruptcy Rules, the case was referred to a bankruptcy judge, and the motion to withdraw reference was not yet ripe for district court review because the bankruptcy court's briefing period had not expired. Therefore, the district court lacked the proper procedural posture to grant the motion at that time. |
Motions for withdrawal of reference, temporary restraining order, and recusal (ECF 2, ECF 3, ECF 14) are DENIED as moot.“In light of this ruling, the pending motions for withdrawal of reference, a temporary restraining order, and recusal of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel that was assigned to Rajic’s (premature) appeal are DENIED as moot.” | agree with court Because the IFP motion was denied, the plaintiff is required to pay the filing fees to proceed. The other motions were likely dependent on the case proceeding in the district court or on the IFP status. Denying them as moot is a standard procedural consequence when the underlying basis for the motions (the IFP status or the district court's jurisdiction over the specific pending motions) is removed or the case remains in the bankruptcy court. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the legal standards for IFP status in the Ninth Circuit and applies the plaintiff's own financial disclosures to deny the motion. It also correctly applies the local rules regarding the referral of bankruptcy cases to determine that the motion was not yet properly before the district court. The denial of the other motions as moot is a logical consequence of the IFP denial and the case remaining in the bankruptcy court.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Natalie RAJIC, Case No.: 26-cv-4101-AGS-SBC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 5 v. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP (ECF 4) AND PLAINTIFF’S OTHER 6 Vlad KROUTIK, et al., MOTIONS (ECF 2, ECF 3, ECF 14) 7 Defendants.
9 Plaintiff Natalie Rajic moves to proceed without paying the usual $405 in 10 court-filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, S.D. Cal. 11 (effective Dec. 1, 2023). If granted the right to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), a 12 plaintiff can proceed without paying those fees. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 13 (9th Cir. 1999). To qualify for that status, plaintiff must “state the facts as to [her] poverty 14 with some particularity.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960). 15 Rajic has not met this standard. Despite her representation that she has experienced 16 “211 days of forced homelessness,” she also represents that she’s been staying in “hotel 17 lodging” and lists “$6,690.00” as her “current monthly net income.” (ECF 4, at 2.) 18 Unfortunate as her circumstances may be, they do not render her current salary—which 19 extrapolates to an annual income in excess of $80,000—a poverty wage. (See id.) 20 Even if it did, her IFP request would still fail. When someone financially qualifies 21 for IFP status, the Court must then screen the complaint and dismiss it if it is “frivolous” 22 or “fails to state a claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In this district, “proceedings arising 23 under title 11,” like this one, “shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.” 24 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a); S.D. Cal. LBR 1001-1 & 5011. And “motions to withdraw 25 reference of a case” that was “referred to the [Bankruptcy] Court” are only “forwarded to 26 the District Court” once the briefing period set by the Bankruptcy Court “expires.” 27 S.D. Cal. LBR 5011-1(a) & (c). In accordance with these rules, Rajic’s case was referred 28 to a bankruptcy judge who set a briefing period that won’t expire until later this month on 1 }}“August 28, 2026.” See In re Rajic, Case No. 26-90099-JBM, ECF No. 9, at 4 (S.D. Cal. 2 || July 29, 2026). So, her motion is not yet properly before this Court. 3 To the extent Rajic claims that her circumstances require a more expedited review, 4 || this Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that Rajic’s motion “does not present 5 emergency circumstances.” See id. at 2. After all, Rajic’s complaint seems to raise “similar 6 || issues to those that the Court has previously decided and revisited once already.” See id. In 7 || addition, it’s hard to “reconcile [her] high income with claims of true homelessness over 8 last seven months.” See id. 9 The IFP motion is thus DENIED. In light of this ruling, the pending motions for 10 || withdrawal of reference, a temporary restraining order, and recusal of the Ninth Circuit 11 ||}Court of Appeals panel that was assigned to Rajic’s (premature) appeal are DENIED as 12 || moot. 13 Dated: August 11, 2026 l/ — 14 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Cites, in this corpus
- Leroy Jefferson v. United States of America, Undocketed 723 · 1960-04-25